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ABSTRACT
PERSON-BASED PROMINENCE IN OJIBWE
SEPTEMBER 2020
CHRISTOPHER MATHIAS HAMMERLY
B.A., B.S., UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, TWIN CITIES
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Brian Dillon
This dissertation develops a formal and psycholinguistic theory of person-based promi-
nence effects, the finding that certain categories of person such as FIRST and SECOND
(the LOCAL persons) are privileged by the grammar. The thesis takes on three questions:
(i) What are the possible categories related to person? (ii) What are the possible promi-
nence relationships between these categories? And (iii) how is prominence information
used to parse and interpret linguistic input in real time?
The empirical through-line is understanding obviation — a “spotlighting” system,
found most prominently in the Algonquian family of languages, that splits the (ani-
mate) third persons into two categories: PROXIMATE, the person who is in the spotlight,
and OBVIATIVE, the persons who are introduced into the discourse, but are not in the
spotlight. I provide a semantics for the feature [proximate], and detail a lattice-based
theory of feature composition to derive the categories related to obviation in Border
Lakes Ojibwe and beyond. This leads to insights about the syntactic and semantic rela-
tionships between person, animacy-based noun classification, number, and obviation.
The novel contribution to the theory of person-based prominence effects is to de-
compose person features into sets of primitives. This proposal allows the stipulated
entailment relationships between categories and features, as encoded in prominence
hierarchies and feature geometries, to be derived from the first principles of set theory.
xii
I further motivate the account by showing that it has increased empirical coverage, and
apply it to capture patterns of agreement and word order in Border Lakes Ojibwe.
Finally, I present a psycholinguistic study on how obviation is used to process filler-
gap dependencies in Border Lakes Ojibwe. I show that obviation, and by extension,
prominence information more generally, is used immediately to predictively encode
movement chains, prior to bottom-up information from voice marking about the argu-
ment structure of the clause. I argue for a modular and syntax-first model of parsing,
revising the Active Filler Strategy to be guided by pressures to minimize syntactic dis-
tance and maximize the expected well-formedness of each link in the chain. These
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1.1 Background: What is person-based prominence?
The focus of this dissertation is on understanding person-based prominence — how it
is encoded in the representation of person categories, how it influences syntactic phe-
nomena such as agreement and word order, and how it affects our ability to process
language in real time. Beginning with the work of Silverstein (1976), person categories
have been organized via Person-Animacy Hierarchies (PAHs) such as
(1) SPEECH-ACT PARTICIPANTS > ANIMATE BEINGS > INANIMATE OBJECTS
where speech-act participants are the author and addressee of an utterance, animate
beings are the (culturally determined) set of living or sentient things, and inanimate
objects are everything else that does not fall into the other two categories.
Person-based prominence is the observation that certain person categories such as
first and second person are often privileged by the grammar. The PAH provides the
means to encode these preferences by stipulating a ranking between different cate-
gories. From this ranking, rules such as show agreement with the highest ranked ar-
gument in the clause can be defined. Such a rule provides a basic description of the
patterns of agreement in a diverse range of languages, including the language at the
1
center of this dissertation, Border Lakes Ojibwe, a Central Algonquian language spoken
along what is now the border of Minnesota and Ontario. Regardless of whether the first
person is the external argument (2a) or the internal argument (2b), the person prefix
(in bold) shows the first person form ni-.







‘I see h/ (PROX)’







‘s/he (PROX) sees me’
The examples above further reveal a second type of prominence-based grammatical
generalization: direct versus inverse alignment effects. These effects are described by
considering how the categories from two scales map to one another. Besides the basic
person categories, the relevant categories to add here are those of the external argument
(EA), the syntactic position of the more agentive argument, which is ranked above the
internal argument (IA), the syntactic position of the patient or theme. As schematized
in (3), the sentence from (2a) shows a DIRECT alignment of the more prominent local
person with the more prominent EA position, while the sentence in (2b) shows an
INVERSE alignment such that the higher ranked person is associated with the lower
ranked IA position.
(3) a. DIRECT (e.g. 1→ 3)
LOCAL > THIRD
EA > IA
b. INVERSE (e.g. 3→ 1)
LOCAL > THIRD
EA > IA
In Border Lakes Ojibwe, direct alignments are associated with what is called the “direct
marking” in what is known as the theme sign morphology; the form -aa in the example
in (2a). In contrast, inverse alignments are associated with “inverse marking” on the
theme sign; a special form -ig as shown in the example in (3b).
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While the examples above are couched within the grammatical patterns easily ob-
served in Ojibwe, prominence effects described by the PAH are widespread both in terms
of construction and language family. The PAH is able to describe the typology of a wide
range of grammatical patterns including split ergative case marking (Silverstein, 1976;
Dixon, 1994), differential object marking (DOM; Bossong, 1991), word order alterna-
tions (Young and Morgan, 1987), the person-case constraint (PCC; Farkas and Kazazis,
1980; Coon and Keine, 2020), direct-inverse marking (Dawe-Sheppard and Hewson,
1990; Macaulay, 2009), and omnivorous agreement (Preminger, 2014), and has been
directly employed in understanding the processing of argument structure (Bornkessel,
2002). In short, the prominence relationships between person-animacy categories de-
scribed by the PAH rankings appears to be deeply engrained in the human language
faculty — it is not quirk of a particular language or construction, and demands a deep
explanation.
While essentially all formulations of the PAH recognize some version of the three
categories encompassing the speech-act participants, animate third persons, and inan-
imate third persons, a complicating factor is that the PAH appears to be articulated to
different degrees of specificity for particular languages or language families. For exam-
ple, the Empathy Hierarchy of DeLancey (1981) and the Animacy Hierarchy of Comrie
(1989) both split the ANIMATE BEINGS category with a ranking of HUMAN > ANIMAL.
Similarly, both rankings of AUTHOR > ADDRESSEE (Zwicky, 1977) and ADDRESSEE >
AUTHOR (Dawe-Sheppard and Hewson, 1990) have been proposed as a further articu-
lation to the SPEECH-ACT PARTICIPANTS.
These refinements can be empirically motivated for two basic reasons. First, they
can be due to the fact that different languages distinguish different sets of categories
related to person. For example, some languages (e.g. Ojibwe) distinguish exclusive
and inclusive persons, while others (e.g. English) conflate these meanings into a single
generic first person. Second, a given agreement slot or paradigm may fail to show
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evidence of a ranking between two categories that can otherwise be observed to be
ranked. For example, in Ojibwe embedded clauses, also known as the conjunct order,
direct marking occurs with both the 1 → 3 and 3 → 1 alignments, as shown in (4).1
This contrasts with the matrix clause or independent order patterns seen in (2), where
the inverse marker appears in the 3→ 1 alignments.









‘if I don’t see h/ (PROX)’









‘if s/he (PROX) doesn’t see me’
The scale implied by the patterns in (4) suggests a collapse in the ranking between the
SPEECH-ACT PARTICIPANTS and the ANIMATE BEINGS. Given that the PAH is intended
to provide a universal description of prominence-based effects, contending with the
splitting and collapse of categories across languages and differences in where inverse
alignments arise — that is, dealing with variation and typology in possible person dis-
tinctions and possible prominence effects — is a central component of any complete
theory. The theory presented over the course of the thesis connects the two puzzles of
deriving possible person categories and possible person-based prominence effects by ty-
ing both to the underlying feature-based representation. The idea is one inherited from
current theories of person representations such as the feature geometry (Harley and
Ritter, 2002; Béjar, 2003). The logic, which should become concrete over the course of
these introductory remarks, is that feature combinations give rise to the range of pos-
sible categories; these feature sets in turn guide interactions with syntactic operations
such as AGREE, giving rise to prominence effects.
Given the above discussion, it is possible to present a somewhat refined formula-
tion of the goals of this dissertation: To derive the possible person categories and the
1It is relevant to note that direct marking does not take a single form, but generally varies as a
function of the person category of the IA. To clarify this in the examples so far, -aa indexes proximate
arguments and -i first person arguments. Inverse, in contrast, has a number of allomorphs but always
appears with the same basic form -ig(oo).
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prominence relationships between them both within and across languages, and then to
understand the consequences of these relationships for grammatical phenomena such
as agreement and word order and the processing of argument structure. To this end,
the particular articulation of the PAH at the center of this dissertation is in (5).
(5) Universal prominence hierarchy for person, obviation, and animacy
{1 > 2 | 2 > 1} (LOCAL) > 3 (PROXIMATE) > 3′ (OBVIATIVE) > 0 (INANIMATE)
There are two basic expansions from the initial hierarchy in (1), which I consider in
turn. The first is that the SPEECH-ACT PARTICIPANTS, which I refer to interchangeably
as the LOCAL persons, can show a ranking of either 1 > 2, 2 > 1, or both. The second
is that the ANIMATE BEINGS category is divided by a ranking of the PROXIMATE third
person above the OBVIATIVE third persons. The discussion here, and in much of the
thesis, largely sets aside the inanimate category for reasons of scope, but it is included
above for explicitness. While further articulations may well be motivated (e.g. a split
between humans and animals, as discussed above, or with honorific categories such
as elder versus non-elder), the hierarchy in (5) is claimed to describe the maximal
universal ranking of the categories related to person, obviation, and animacy-based
noun classification.
The operative word for understanding the universality of the scale is maximal. As
was shown with the contrast between matrix and embedded clauses in Ojibwe, not
all prominence rankings are realized in every context. Setting aside for the moment
the proximate/obviative split and focusing in on the core person distinctions, over the
course of the thesis, I show that the all and only the range of prominence effects sum-
marized in (6) can be observed across languages and constructions.
5
(6) Summary of possible/predicted person-based prominence effects
Ultra Strong (Author): 1 > 2 > 3 Blackfoot, Classical Arabic
Ultra Strong (Addressee): 2 > 1 > 3 Nez Perce
Strong: {1 > 2, 2 > 1} > 3 Slovenian
Weak: 1/2 > 3 Massachusett, Kichean, Italian
Me-First: 1 > 2/3 Romanian
You-First: 2 > 1/3 Cuzco Quechua
No Effect: 1/2/3 Ojibwe, Moro
As indicated, these possibilities are in turn described by all and only the possible rank-
ings and category collapses implied by the scale in (5). Variation in the ranking of the
local persons gives rise to the two types of Ultra Strong effects and the Strong effect.
Collapsing the ranking of first and second gives rise to Weak effects. Collapsing only
the second or first person with the third gives rise to Me-First and You-First effects,
respectively. Finally, a full collapse leads to a lack of prominence-based effects.
All other logically possible rankings given the categories 1, 2, and 3 are so far unat-
tested in human language. These (im)possibilities are summarized in (7).
(7) Summary of impossible person-based prominence effects
*3 > 1 > 2




What all of these impossible and unattested rankings have in common is that the third
person category is ranked above at least one of the local persons. This is critically dis-
tinct from the possible rankings, which allow the ranking between the local and third
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persons to be collapsed, but not reversed. This universal restriction must be captured
in a principled manner by theories of the representation of person. From a descriptive
angle, the proposed scale does the job. The goal of the thesis is for the theory of per-
son features to do this work to create the link between possible person categories and
possible prominence effects.
To review, the second attribute of interest with the proposed scale is the ranking
of the PROXIMATE above the OBVIATIVE. This distinction in the (animate) third per-
sons is known as obviation, and is a feature seen most prominently in the languages of
the Algonquian family, of which Border Lakes Ojibwe is a part. These categories dis-
tinguish the single most prominent third person — the proximate person — from all
other third persons — the obviative persons. The prominence ranking between prox-
imate and obviative can be observed with the examples in (8). As with the 1 ↔ 3
argument alignments seen above, where agreement always occurred with the relatively
more prominent first person argument, in the 3↔ 3′ alignments the preverbal person
marker always indexes the relatively more prominent proximate argument regardless
of whether it is the EA (8a) or IA (8b).









‘S/he (PROX) sees h/ (OBV)’









‘S/he (OBV) sees h/ (PROX)’
Furthermore, the theme sign takes the direct form -aa with a direct alignment (8a) and
the inverse form -igoo (an allomorph of -ig) with the inverse alignment (8b). These
alignments are schematized in (9).
(9) a. DIRECT (e.g. 3→ 3′)
PROX > OBV
EA > IA




One revealing fact about obviation is that every language that distinguishes the cate-
gories of proximate and obviative in turn show evidence of a ranking between the two.
That is, there is no language with an obviative marking system that shows evidence that
the ranking in (10) is collapsed.
(10) Obviation Hierarchy: 3 > 3′
This clearly distinguishes obviation from the core person features, where all possible
collapses of the ranking were observed. Contending with this lack of variation in obvi-
ation sets another goal for our theory of features.
The dissertation is therefore tied together by the more particular through-line of
gaining a deeper understanding of person-based prominence by an examination of how
obviation is encoded within the representation of possible person categories, how it
influences agreement and word order, and how it is used along with direct/inverse
marking to put together the pieces of argument structure in real time processing. This
study of obviation is situated within a broader account of ϕ-features including the core
distinctions of person, which provide the means to distinguish various sets consisting of
the author, addressee, and others, the distinction of animacy-based noun classification,
which separates sets of animate beings from inanimate objects, and a distinction in
number, which in the languages surveyed here distinguishes singletons from groups.
The remainder of the introduction is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 I provide
an overview of the proposed representation of person, obviation, and animacy, which
is centered around the intimately linked questions of how to derive the range of both
prominence effects and possible person distinctions from a single representation. Sec-
tion 1.3 introduces the theory of how this representation is manipulated to give rise to
prominence-based agreement and word order effects. In Section 1.4 I review the evi-
dence for how prominence influences the real-time processing of argument structure,
and summarize the proposed model of filler-gap dependency processing to capture these
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effects. Section 1.5 then turns to the necessary background on Border Lakes Ojibwe.
Section 1.6 concludes with an overview of the thesis.
1.2 Study I: Representing prominence and possible persons
The first question that animates the thesis is: how are prominence relationships encoded
in the linguistic representation? This is taken to amount to the question of how person,
obviation, and animacy are representationally encoded. The PAH provides rankings of
person categories such as “first”, “exclusive”, “inclusive”, “second”, “third”, “proximate”
and “obviative”. These categories can be used to classify a variety of linguistic forms,
including pronouns, agreement, and clitics. However, current theories recognize that
categories are not the end of the representational line, but rather are built through
the combination of atomic units known as features. To make explicit an already implicit
analogy, just as molecules are made from the combination of atoms, categories are made
from the combination of features. The goal is to identify the atomic units of syntax, and
to build a model of how they interact to produce particular collections of categories.
Prominence effects provide a critical insight into this endeavor. Current theories
such as the widely adopted feature geometric approach (Harley and Ritter, 2002; Béjar,
2003) pins the emergence of prominence effects on the relationships between features
rather than the relationships between categories. A geometrically-based representation
that provides the means to distinguish the categories of FIRST, SECOND, PROXIMATE, and
OBVIATIVE is given in (11).
(11) Representation of person/obviation under the feature geometry
a. FIRST: [ π [ prox [ part [ auth ] ] ] ]
b. SECOND: [ π [ prox [ part ] ] ]
c. PROXIMATE: [ π [ prox ] ]
d. OBVIATIVE: [ π ]
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The geometry stipulates that more specific features such as [auth(or)] entail the pres-
ence of all less specific features [part(icipant)], [proxi(imate)], and [π]. The result
is that the following subset-superset relationships can be observed between the four
person categories (cf. Béjar, 2003):
(12) Proper subset/superset relationships between categories
a. FIRST ⊃ SECOND ⊃ PROXIMATE ⊃ OBVIATIVE
b. {π, [prox], [part], [auth]} ⊃ {π, [prox], [part]} ⊃ {π, [prox]} ⊃ {π}
Operations such as AGREE can then be tuned to target a specific feature set. If that more
specific set is not available for one reason or another, then the next most specific set is
targeted.
A major issue that this thesis reckons with is that all current theories rely on the
stipulation of the relationships between categories or features via second-order rep-
resentations such as a hierarchy or geometry. While the geometry is a step forward
in understanding the relationships that hold between features, like the PAH, it relies
on extrinsic requirements to create the relevant entailments between categories. The
novel contribution of this thesis is to provide a feature representation that instead de-
rives prominence relationships from first-order set-based relationships, dispensing with
direct use of hierarchies and geometries. The claim is that features are not in fact the
most atomic representation, but are decomposable into smaller units. The thesis that
I defend, summarized in (13), is that the syntactic representation of features consists
of a set of ontologically-based primitives I , U , O’s, and R’s, where I is ultimately inter-
preted as the author, U as the addressee, the O’s as the animate others, and the R’s as
the inanimate others. To continue the analogy from before, just as atoms are made of
particles, features are made of primitives.
10
(13) Thesis for the decomposition of ϕ-features
ϕ-features consist of sets formed from the ontologically-based primitives I , U ,
O, O′, . . . , On, R, R′, . . . , Rn such that:
The feature [author] is decomposable into the set {I}
The feature [addressee] is decomposable into the set {U}
The feature [participant] is decomposable into the set {I , U}
The feature [proximate] is decomposable into the set {I , U , O}
The feature [animate] is decomposable into the set {I , U , O, O′, . . . , On}
The root Φ is decomposable into the set {I , U , O, O′, . . . , On, R, R′, . . . , Rn}
To expand, the claim is that all humans share a common ontology — this amounts to
saying that there is a set of primitive mental concepts related to person. In particular,
there are primitive concepts for the utterance author, the utterance addressee, animate
persons other than the author and addressee, and inanimate others. The symbols I , U ,
the O’s and the R’s are respectively the syntactic analogues of these primitive concepts.
The proposal of these analogues allows for the maintenance of the assumption of the
modularity of syntactic generation from the interpretation of structures.
Given the proposal in (13), prominence relationships fall out of the subset-superset
relationships between features, rather than categories per se. This is shown in (14).
(14) Proper subset/superset relationships between features
a. [animate] ⊃ [proximate] ⊃ [participant] ⊃ [author], [addressee]
b. {I , U , O, O′, . . . , On} ⊃ {I , U , O} ⊃ {I , U} ⊃ {I}, {U}
The resulting representation is therefore freed of all remaining extrinsic stipulations on
the relationship between features and categories. The features are made up of sets of
primitives, and the relationships between the features follow from foundational rela-
tionships defined within set theory. The workings of how this representation interacts
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with a theory of AGREE to capture prominence effects such as the PCC and direct/inverse
marking is summarized in Section 1.3.1.
What is pertinent for the immediate discussion is that the sets of primitives that
these features are made up of interact to form various person categories, which are
summarized in Table 1.1. The interactions between features are governed by binary
feature values, which can be either positive (+) or negative (−).2
Category Syntactic Set Features
EXCLUSIVE {I} {+anim, +prox, +auth, −part*}
INCLUSIVE {I , U} {+anim, +prox, +auth, +part*}
SECOND {U} {+anim, +prox, −auth, +part*}
PROXIMATE {O} {+anim, +prox, −auth, −part*}
OBVIATIVE {O′} {+anim, −prox}
INANIMATE {R} {−anim}
Table 1.1: Proposed set-based and feature-based representations for (singular) per-
son/obviation/animacy categories. The difference between ±part and ±part* is dis-
cussed further below.
Notice that the feature/value combinations in Table 1.1 are restricted in certain
cases. For example, [−proximate] does not appear in combination with either the au-
thor or participant features, and [−animate] does not appear with proximate, author, or
participant features. Understanding the basis for these restrictions ties into the second
goal of the first portion of the thesis: to provide a representation of person, obviation,
and animacy that generates all and only the possible category distinctions observed in
natural language.
It is well known that languages show different sets of ϕ-based categories. At the
same time, not all logically possible distinctions are attested. The classic example of
a puzzle of this sort was put forward by Zwicky (1977), who showed that languages
with three basic person categories universally treat the meaning associated with the
inclusive person (you + us) as a form of first person rather than second person. What
is surprising about this is that the inclusive includes reference to both the author and
2The unvalued variant is reserved for probes. This proposal is summarized below in Section 1.3.1.
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addressee — as such, there is no a priori reason to assume that the inclusive meaning
should be universally conflated with the first person rather than the second person in
languages that lack a clusivity distinction. Explaining this type of gap falls to the theory
of the representation of person categories.
Recent work by Harbour (2016) has generalized this basic problem as one of gen-
erating partitions of a common space of possible persons, showing that only 5 of the 15
possible patterns are attested. I adopt Harbour’s “partition problem” as a core explanan-
dum, seeking to provide an account of the additional partitions encoded by obviation
and noun classification, which are not covered in Harbour’s original account. Setting
aside animacy and number for the time being and focusing in on obviation and person,
this adds a sixth possible partition to the mix, as summarized in (15).
(15) Possible partitions with the addition of Border Lakes Ojibwe. From left-to-
right: Monopartition, participant bipartition, author bipartition, triparti-































As in (Harbour, 2016), I adopt and defend the thesis that the semantic denotation
of person features are lattices formed from the power sets of ontological primitives, as
summarized in (16). Ultimately, these primitives allow reference to the author (i), the
addressee (u), animate others (o’s) and inanimate others (r ’s). To be clear, the lower
case variants introduced here are the ontological concepts themselves, while the upper
case variants discussed above are the syntactic instantiation, which are not themselves
interpretable. I retain the denotation of the author and participant features proposed
by Harbour. The novel contribution of the work is to provide denotations of both a prox-
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imate and animate feature to capture the additional partitions rendered by obviation
and animacy-based noun classification.
(16) Thesis for the denotation of ϕ-features (extension of Harbour, 2016)
ϕ-features denote lattices formed from the power sets of the ontological prim-
itives i, u, o, o′, o′′, . . . , r, r ′, r ′′, . . . , such that:
The feature [author] denotes the power set of {i}
The feature [participant] denotes the power set of {i, u}
The feature [proximate] denotes the power set of {i, u, o}
The feature [animate] denotes the power set of {i, u, o, o′, o′′, . . . , }
The root ϕ denotes the power set of {i, u, o, o′, o′′, . . . , r, r ′, r ′′, . . . , }
As was seen with the strictly syntactic interaction between features, the features inter-
act based on their values to derive the appropriate lattice for each person categories.
As expected based on an isomorphic mapping from syntax to semantics, the relevant
feature/value combinations are the same as those specified in Table 1.1. The question
is how exactly these features interact to give rise to the appropriate partitions. On this
front, I break from Harbour’s original account, arguing that only the recent contrastive
theory of feature interaction advanced by Cowper and Hall (2019) can generate the
particular person, obviation, and animacy distinctions found in Border Lakes Ojibwe.
I expand on Cowper and Hall’s account by considering how animacy, obviation, and
number fit into the picture.
I argue that the functional sequence for nominal elements includes projections for
animacy (nP), obviation (ProxP), person (πP), and number (#P) in the order specified
in (17). This sequence is critical to determining the order of composition of each type
of feature with the root node ϕ. As each feature is composed, the lattice denoted by
ϕ, which exhausts the possible space of person/animacy-based reference, is further
restricted. These restrictions are defined by first-order predicate logic: positive action
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of a feature F restrictsϕ to those elements that include a member of the lattice denoted
by F, while negative action of F restricts ϕ to those elements that do not contain any
members of the lattice denoted by F. Setting aside number, animacy splits i, u, and the
o’s form the r ’s; obviation further splits i, u, and the single “proximate” o from the other
o′’s; participant splits i and u from o, and author i from u and o.
















Given this five feature system, with each feature taking a binary value, in theory
the system should be capable of giving rise to up to 32 categories (16 if number is ig-
nored). This is far more than is made in Ojibwe and any other known language with
animacy and obviation distinctions. The principled restriction imposed on the composi-
tion of feature/value combinations comes from the notion of contrastiveness — that all
features specified in the representation of a given category must serve to mark a mean-
ingful contrast between categories. Ultimately, the determination of contrastiveness is
grounded in the principles that guide acquisition (Dresher, 2009, 2018). This plays out
in two ways in Border Lakes Ojibwe, which are visualized with the contrastive hierarchy
in (18). Note that unlike a feature geometry, the contrastive hierarchy is not advanced
as a model of the mental representation of language, but is rather a schematization of
the algorithm employed by the learner to determine the specification of features.
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The first way that contrastiveness rears its head is in the restricted feature specifica-
tions that occur in the context of [−animate] and [−proximate], which was previously
pointed out surrounding the discussion of feature specifications in Table 1.1. Given
the requirement that each feature be contrastive (i.e. that non-contrastive features are
never advanced by the learner), following the composition of [−animate], which cre-
ates a lattice consisting of only the inanimate r ’s, none of the other features (excluding
number) could possibly serve to make a further split on this lattice. All other features
make splits based on i, u, and the o’s rather than the inanimate r ’s. An analogous sit-
uation holds with [−proximate], where the only remaining elements of the lattice are
the non-proximate o′’s, which again cannot be further divided by either the participant
or author features.
The second impact of contrastiveness is on the interpretation of [participant], which
has been notated as [participant*] in the hierarchy above. The proposal is that the
participant feature, which normally denotes a lattice consisting of the power set of {i, u},
is instead winnowed to denote the power set of {u}, which I refer to as [participant*].
This occurs because [participant] is “in the scope of” [author] within the contrastive
hierarchy (Cowper and Hall, 2019). Given that [author] divides based on inclusion or
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exclusion of i, [participant] is winnowed so that it divides lattices based on the inclusion
and exclusion of u alone — including i would not provide any contrasts that have not
already been made. Based on the requirement of contrastiveness, the learner is obliged
to restrict the denotation of [participant] to [participant*].3
The system provides an account of the distinctions made by of animacy, obviation,
and person in Border Lakes Ojibwe. The major benefit of the system, and one that
ultimately proves to be a critical departure from the feature geometric approach, is that
there are no extrinsic restrictions on feature combinations. Restrictions fall out of either
the principle of contrastiveness, which is in turn tied to a general learning algorithm
(Dresher, 2009, 2018), or the order of feature composition defined by the functional
sequence, which can be tied to deeper principles of cognition (Wiltschko, 2014).
The final question is thus whether this system, which works for Border Lakes Ojibwe,
is properly tuned to capture the observed range of typological variation by producing
all and only attested partitions. Ultimately, variation can occur on two dimensions:
(i) whether a given feature is present or absent; and (ii) where a given feature falls
within the contrastive hierarchy. Variation on the first point is entirely free: All possible
feature combinations are argued to be attested. For example, a language that lacks the
feature [proximate] will simply conflate the proximate and obviative person categories
into the generic (animate) third person. This describes nearly all languages outside of
the Algonquian family.
3The astute reader will notice that, in the context of the syntactic representation of features, an
independent [addressee] feature was proposed. In contrast, the account in this paragraph proposes that
[participant*], which essentially amounts to an addressee feature, is derived from [participant] under
particular conditions. This represents a real tension between the features available for the creation of
partitions on agreement “goals” and the person features that are available to agreement “probes”, which
I call the Addressee Asymmetry. The long and short of it is the inclusion of an independent [addressee]
feature is required to capture the existence of 2 > 1 > 3 (Ultra Strong Addressee) and 2 > 1/3 (You-First)
prominence effects (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2). The exclusion of [addressee] on goals is needed to
account for Zwicky’s Problem, the observation that the inclusive is conflated with the exclusive rather
than the second person (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1; also, Harbour, 2016, p. 73-74). This tension will
not be fully resolved in this thesis, but the contours of the problem are sharpened. For further discussion,
see Chapter 7, Section 7.2.
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Variation on the second point is corralled by the functional sequence. For example,
animacy-based noun classification is argued to be restricted to association with nP, and
the core person features with πP. As such, the [animate] feature is universally expected
to take scope within the contrastive hierarchy over both [participant] and [author].
However, within the head π, the scope relations between [participant] and [author] can
be reversed from that seen with Border Lakes Ojibwe. As discussed at length by Cowper
and Hall (2019), this derives the difference between languages that distinguish versus
conflate the inclusive and exclusive persons. I show that this alternation captures the
partition exemplified by Ktunaxa, a language isolate of British Columbia that lacks a
clusivity distinction, but makes a distinction in obviation in the third persons.
The new point of variation proposed in the thesis is that ProxP can either appear
between nP and πP, as was argued to be the case in Border Lakes Ojibwe, or high in the
nominal spine above #P, as shown in (19).
















I argue for this alternation in the location of ProxP based on the octopartition of Black-
foot, a Plains Algonquian language that makes an obviation distinction in the local
persons in addition to the third persons. By taking this high position in the spine, prox-
imate is therefore within the scope (in the relevant sense of the contrastive hierarchy)
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of all other features. Given this, the [−proximate] feature is no longer in a position to
make restrictions on the specification of features, resulting in feature combinations that
contrast obviation in the local persons.
The octopartition of Blackfoot is troublesome for current feature geometric accounts,
as the generally adopted feature geometry places the proximate feature between par-
ticipant and π. Given the representational entailment relationships stated by the ge-
ometry, it is not possible to specify the participant and/or author features without also
specifying the proximate feature, predicting that all local persons should necessarily be
proximate (for a similar line of arguments, see Bliss, 2005a). By breaking these rep-
resentational entailments between features, the proposed set-based representation of
features overcomes this issue.
1.3 Study II: Prominence effects in agreement and word order
The second part of the thesis tackles the question of how to model prominence effects
in the grammar. The first objective is to provide a model of AGREE that makes use of the
proposed set-based representation of features, where features are argued to be made
up of sets of sub-atomic primitives based in the ontology of person. I show that with the
set based representation it is possible to capture all and only the attested person-based
prominence effects. The second objective is to give an account of the verbal agreement
system of Ojibwe. I focus on the patterns related to obviation, where I tie together
patterns of word order and agreement.
1.3.1 A set-based model of prominence effects in agreement
The model of agreement proposed in this thesis is descended from the probe-goal AGREE
relation of Chomsky (2000, 2001), and critically developed in Béjar (2003), Béjar and
Rezac (2009), Preminger (2014), Deal (2015), and Coon and Keine (2020). The se-
quence of operations subsumed under AGREE is argued to consist of four steps: (i)
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Search, where all potential goal(s) bearing valued ϕ-features are located by an agree-
ment probe bearing unsatisfied (unvalued) ϕ-features [uF]; (ii) Match, the evaluation
of whether these potential goals can satisfy any [uF] features of the probe; (iii) Copy,
where the ϕ-features of the goal are copied back to the probe; (iv) Satisfaction, where
the relevant [uF] features of the probe are deactivated. I adopt the obligatory operations
model of Preminger (2014), where the sequence of operations defined by AGREE must
be triggered as soon as a [uF] segment enters the derivation, but failing to Match, Copy,
and ultimately Satisfy [uF] features does not lead to an ill-formed representation.
The representational transformation produced by AGREE is highly dependent on the
adopted representation of ϕ-features. For the past two decades, one of the major rea-
sons the feature geometric representation proposed by Harley and Ritter (2002) has
dominated theories of person has been its ability to capture a wide range of promi-
nence effects in agreement (e.g. Béjar, 2003; Béjar and Rezac, 2003, 2009; Preminger,
2014; Coon and Keine, 2020). Given the dependencies between features required by
the geometry, there are five possible π-probes, shown in (20).
(20) Possible π-probes under the feature geometry
a. [ uπ ]
b. [ uπ [ uParticipant ] ]
c. [ uπ [ uParticipant [ uAuthor ] ] ]
d. [ uπ [ uParticipant [ uAddressee ] ] ]
e. [ uπ [ uParticipant [ uAuthor ] [ uAddressee ] ] ]
Each [uF] segment of the probe can be satisfied by finding a goal that has a “valued”
version of the feature. In terms of the adopted AGREE procedure, the probe in (20a)
would be fully satisfied by any animate person. The probe in (20b) by any local per-
son. The probe in (20c) by a first person; the probe in (20d) by a second person;
and the probe in (20e) by a combination of first and second persons. That said, un-
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der the fallible model of AGREE adopted here (following Preminger, 2014; Deal, 2015),
even a probe with very particular satisfaction conditions can settle for being partially
satisfied by a goal that matches a subset of its [uF] features. Furthermore, given the
subset/superset relationships between features repeated in part in (21), a probe with
less specific satisfaction conditions still matches the more specific categories.
(21) Subset/superset relationships between categories (repeated in part)
a. FIRST ⊃ SECOND ⊃ THIRD
b. {π, [part], [auth]} ⊃ {π, [part]} ⊃ {π}
These relations are again a direct result of the stipulated entailment relationships be-
tween features. If the first person category was only specified for the [author] feature
without entailing the less specific features, while this would be enough to distinguish it
from the others as a particular category, it would erroneously predict that first person
should not provide a match for a less specific probe such as those in (20a,b,d).
A final relevant attribute of AGREE is that a probe can end up targeting more than
one goal in the effort to find satisfaction. Following the recent work of Coon and Keine
(2020), I adopt a gluttony approach, where prominence effects are attributed to a probe
entering into agreement relationships with multiple goals. Recall that, given two DPs,
direct alignments are described by the structurally higher DP (e.g. the external argu-
ment) being “higher ranked” on the PAH than the structurally lower DP (e.g. the internal
argument). Inverse alignments reverse this mapping, with the structurally lower DP be-
ing “higher ranked” on the PAH than the structurally higher DP. However, what it means
for a given ϕ-based category to be “higher ranked” on the PAH is a relative notion. In
the current architecture, it can be entirely pinned to the possible structures of the probe.
Let us see how this plays out. The claim is that gluttony arises just in case a probe
agrees with multiple DPs. In turn, a probe agrees with multiple DPs just in case it
c-commands multiple goals and the more distant goal matches more segments of the
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probe than the closer goal. Consider the two configurations in (22), where a probe
specified with features [uF, uG] is c-commanding two ϕ-bearing DPs. In the direct
alignment in (22), the closer DP1 matches and satisfies both segments of the probe —
this fully satisfies the probe. As a result, the structurally further DP2 cannot provide any
additional matches, so its features are not copied back. With the inverse alignments in
(22b), the closer DP1 only provides a partial match for the [uF] segment of the probe.
DP1 satisfies what it can, leading its features to be copied to the probe. The next goal
DP2 provides an additional match of [uG], so the probe copies back its features as well.












































The resulting difference in the representation of the probe following AGREE is sum-
marized in (23) for the direct versus the inverse. In direct alignments, a single set of
features is copied back, while two sets of features are specified in the inverse alignments.
(23) a. Direct: {[F, G]}
b. Inverse: {[F], [F, G]}
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The result is a wide class of possible types of agreement-based prominence effects in-
cluding the PCC, direct-inverse marking, portmanteau agreement, and omnivority. For
example, with the PCC, gluttony leads to ineffability via a paradox between the condi-
tions on cliticization and the binary nature of the operation MERGE (Coon and Keine,
2020). In the analysis of Ojibwe, gluttony results in the insertion of an elsewhere form
(the inverse marker) due to a conflict in the conditioning of spell-out caused by the
presence of multiple feature sets, and a dearth of portmanteau forms in this slot.
Bringing it all together, the possible probes, given the restrictions of the feature
geometry, define which configurations will give rise to gluttony. The correspondences
between the PAH and the possible feature-geometric probes are summarized in (24).
This is a subtle but critical shift from a PAH-centric formulation of prominence effects in
agreement. The categories themselves do not have an inherent prominence, but rather
gain prominence by virtue of how they interact with different possible probes.
(24) Correspondence between possible feature-geometric π-probes and the PAH
a. [ uπ ] Flat: 1/2/3
b. [ uπ [ uPart ] ] Weak: 1/2 > 3
c. [ uπ [ uPart [ uAuth ] ] ] Ultra Strong (Author): 1 > 2 > 3
d. [ uπ [ uPart [ uAdd ] ] ] Ultra Strong (Addressee): 2 > 1 > 3
e. [ uπ [ uPart [ uAuth ] [ uAdd ] ] ] Strong: {1 > 2, 2 > 1} > 3
A wide range of prominence effects is captured by the feature geometric representation.
However, a fatal issue comes into focus: There are two critical impossible π-probes given
the feature geometric representation, which are shown in (25). These probes violate
the principles of the feature geometry by excluding the intermediate [participant] fea-
ture, which is implied by the presence of the more specific [author] and/or [addressee]
features (cf. Coon and Keine, 2020; Yokoyama, 2019). These two probes are necessary
to account for the You-First and Me-First classes of prominence effects.
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(25) Impossible π-probes under the feature geometry
a. *[ uπ [ uAuthor ] ] Me-First: 1 > 2/3
b. *[ uπ [ uAddressee ] ] You-First: 2 > 1/3
The solution that is advanced in this thesis is to take advantage of the set-based
representation of primitives. The core insight of the feature geometry — that person
features stand in entailment relationships — is retained. On the view taken here, the
theory erred when the entailment relationships were stipulated by making the geometry
a part of the syntactic representation. This resulted in a model of π-probes that is simply
too restrictive. Like the entailment relationships between categories described by the
PAH, I consider the entailment relationships between features expressed by geometries
as something to be derived. This is encompassed in the metatheoretical thesis in (26).
(26) Metatheoretical thesis for the PAH and feature geometry
The PAH and the feature geometry are second-order representations that de-
scribe properties of the representation, but are not encoded in the representation
itself.
In particular, the PAH describes the relationships that hold between categories, and the
feature geometry the relationships that hold between features. The properties implied
by both are captured by the proposed representation in conjunction with the founda-
tional relations of intersection and inclusion defined within set theory.
The starting point is to recall the containment relationships that hold between the
proposed sets for each person feature, repeated in part in (27).
(27) Subset/superset relationships between features (repeated in part)
a. π ⊃ [participant] ⊃ [author], [addressee]
b. {I , U , O, O′, . . . , On} ⊃ {I , U} ⊃ {I}, {U}
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Given that there are no representational dependencies specified between features, the
three person features [uParticipant], [uAuthor], and [uAddressee] can freely combine
with the uπ set that is inherent to the π-probe, giving rise to 8 distinct articulations.
These are summarized in (28).
(28) Correspondence between possible set-based π-probes and the PAH
a. {uπ} Flat: 1/2/3
b. {uπ, uParticipant} Weak: 1/2 > 3
c. {uπ, uAuthor} Me-First: 1 > 2/3
d. {uπ, uAddressee} You-First: 2 > 1/3
e. {uπ, uParticipant, uAuthor} Ultra Strong (Author): 1 > 2 > 3
f. {uπ, uParticipant, uAddressee} Ultra Strong (Addressee): 2 > 1 > 3
g. {uπ, uAddressee, uAuthor} Strong: {1 > 2, 2 > 1} > 3
h. {uπ, uParticipant, uAddressee, uAuthor} Strong: {1 > 2, 2 > 1} > 3
As indicated above, the eight probes are claimed to capture the full range of possible
person-based prominence effects. These set-based probes stand in an exactly analo-
gous relationship to the PAH as the probes under the feature geometric account. The
key additions to the set of possible probes are those in (28c) and (28d), which lack the
“intermediate” participant feature but include the more specific author or addressee
features. These are the probes that are impossible given the feature geometric repre-
sentation, and form a key empirical motivation for the adoption of the proposal.4
To capture prominence effects, recall that each possible person category within a
language gives rise to a set of primitives. The relevant categories for now are those
related to the (singular) first, second, and generic third persons, given in (29).
4Note the third probe that arises on this representation — the one that includes both author and
addressee features, but lacks participant. This provides a second pathway to capture Strong effects.
While redundant, it has no effect on the generative capacity of the account. It remains to be seen whether
the two Strong probes make predictions that can be pulled apart empirically.
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(29) Sample of syntactic category-set correspondences
a. FIRST = {I}
b. SECOND = {U}
c. THIRD = {O}
These categories define potential goals to be targeted for agreement. With the repre-
sentations of both probes and goals in hand, the key proposal is to define the AGREE
sequence in terms of the primitives rather than features, as stated in the thesis in (30).
(30) Thesis for the formulation of AGREE
AGREE operates over sets of ontologically-based syntactic primitives.
The most important component of AGREE to define at the level of the primitive sets
rather than features is the condition on Match. In purely feature-based formulations
of AGREE, Match determines whether an unvalued feature [uF] of the probe can be
matched by a “valued” counterpart F of the goal. In the new formulation given in (31),
AGREE is still segment based in that Match is evaluated with respect to each feature of
the probe, but rather than determining Match based on feature identity with the goal,
it is done by comparing each feature of the probe to the set defined by the goal. The
features themselves are not compared. Match holds between a segment of the probe
and the goal just in case the intersection of the two sets is non-empty.
(31) Definition of Match
A probe determines Match with a goal via intersection between the set F of a
feature [uF] of the probe and the set G of the goal. Match holds if F ∩ G 6= ∅.
With this definition in hand, it is possible to replicate the matching relationships be-
tween categories and features that formed the critical foundation for the adoption of
the feature geometry. As shown in (32a), all persons Match [uπ]. With [uPart], shown
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in (32b), first and second Match, but not third. The features [uAuth] and [uAdd] re-
spectively Match only the first or second persons.
(32) Match relations between person categories and person features
a. uπ ∩ THIRD = u{I , U , O, O′, . . . , On} ∩ {O} = {O}
uπ ∩ SECOND = u{I , U , O, O′, . . . , On} ∩ {U} = {U}
uπ ∩ FIRST = u{I , U , O, O′, . . . , On} ∩ {I} = {I}
b. uPart ∩ THIRD = u{I , U} ∩ {O} = ∅
uPart ∩ SECOND = u{I , U} ∩ {U} = {U}
uPart ∩ FIRST = u{I , U} ∩ {I} = {I}
c. uAuth ∩ THIRD = u{I} ∩ {O} = ∅
uAuth ∩ SECOND = u{I} ∩ {U} = ∅
uAuth ∩ FIRST = u{I} ∩ {I} = {I}
d. uAdd ∩ THIRD = u{U} ∩ {O} = ∅
uAdd ∩ SECOND = u{U} ∩ {U} = {U}
uAdd ∩ FIRST = u{U} ∩ {I} = ∅
Essentially all other aspects of AGREE discussed above in the context of the gluttony-
based account of Coon and Keine (2020) are maintained, but couched in terms of sets.
If Match holds between a probe and a goal, then the set of the goal is copied to the probe.
This set is ultimately spelled-out as agreement morphology. When a probe has multiple
[uF] segments, it will continue searching its domain for a matching goal, agreeing with
more than one along the way if that is what it takes to satisfy all of its features.
To take a concrete example, in (33) I show how this derives direct (non-gluttonous)
versus inverse (gluttonous) configurations in 1 + 3 alignments. In the 1 » 3 configura-
tion in (33a), the probe executes the AGREE procedure with the first person argument
first; this argument Matches, and therefore Satisfies, both the uπ and uPart features of
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the probe. This results in only the set of the first person argument to be copied back.
In the 3 » 1 configuration in (33b), the initial AGREE procedure with the third person
only satisfies the uπ feature; this precipitates agreement with the first person to satisfy
uPart. As a result, both the sets of the third and first person arguments are copied back,
resulting in gluttony.
(33) Weak prominence effect: 1/2 > 3
a. [Probe{uπ, uPart} [ . . . FIRST [ . . . THIRD ] ] ]
(i)
(i) uπ ∩ FIRST = u{I , U , O, O′, . . . , On} ∩ {I} = {I} ⇒ uπ Satisfied
uPart ∩ FIRST = u{I , U} ∩ {I} = {I} ⇒ uPart Satisfied
b. [Probe{uπ, uPart} [ . . . THIRD [ . . . FIRST ] ] ]
(i) (ii)
(i) uπ ∩ THIRD = u{I , U , O, O′, . . . , On} ∩ {O} = {O} ⇒ uπ Satisfied
uPart ∩ THIRD = u{I , U} ∩ {O} = ∅⇒ uPart Unsatisfied
(ii) uPart ∩ FIRST = u{I , U} ∩ {I} = {I} ⇒ uPart Satisfied
To reiterate, the differences between the present account and that based in the fea-
ture geometry are twofold. First, the three core person features can freely combine to
form probes on the head π. This is empirically necessary to capture the Me-First and
You-First classes of prominence effects. Second, the entailment relationships between
categories and features is captured by the inherent containment relationships between
sets and features, rather than stipulated via the PAH or the feature geometry. As a result,
prominence effects are derived from first principles.
1.3.2 Word order and agreement in Border Lakes Ojibwe
The second goal of this portion of the thesis is to apply the theory of AGREE and the
representation of features to understand the interaction between agreement and word
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order in Ojibwe. This brings the focus largely back onto obviation. For the slice of the
agreement paradigms accounted for here, just three features are necessary: [Φ], [ani-
mate], and [proximate]. These three features stand in the subset-superset relationships
summarized in (34).
(34) Subset/superset relationships between features (repeated in part)
a. Φ ⊃ [animate] ⊃ [proximate]
b. {I , U , O, O′, . . . , On, R, R′, . . . , Rn} ⊃ {I , U , O, O′, . . . , On} ⊃ {I , U , O}
All argument combinations will involve the proximate and obviative third persons. To
review, the singular variants of these categories represent the sets in (35).
(35) Set-based representation of (singular) proximate and obviative nouns
a. PROX(IMATE) = {O}
b. OBV(IATIVE) = {O′}
With these features and categories, the following Match relations hold:
(36) Match relations between animacy/obviation categories and features
a. uΦ ∩ PROX = u{I , U , O, O′, . . . , On, R, R′, . . . , Rn} ∩ {O} = {O}
uΦ ∩ OBV = u{I , U , O, O′, . . . , On, R, R′, . . . , Rn} ∩ {O′} = {O′}
b. uAnim ∩ PROX = u{I , U , O, O′, . . . , On} ∩ {O} = {O}
uAnim ∩ OBV = u{I , U , O, O′, . . . , On} ∩ {O′} = {O′}
c. uProx ∩ PROX = u{I , U , O} ∩ {O} = {O}
uProx ∩ OBV = u{I , U , O} ∩ {O′} = ∅
Both uΦ and uAnimate Match with both proximate and obviative categories, while
uProximate matches with only the proximate category.
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Ojibwe (and nearly all other Algonquian languages) distinguish clause-types as a
function of whether the verb is a matrix or embedded clause — these are descriptively
referred to as the independent and conjunct orders, respectively. In the portion of the
agreement system that is the focus of this account, there are two major differences
between the two orders.
To arrive at a description of these differences, consider first the patterns of agree-
ment in matrix clauses for the two 3↔ 3′ alignments, given in (37).


























‘S/he (OBV) sees them (PROX)’ INVERSE: 3′ → 3
Excluding the root, there are five pieces of morphology, which ultimately correspond
to four distinct agreement probes. First, there is the person prefix, realized here as o-
which indexes the person features of proximate argument and is linked to the central
agreement marker -waa, which indexes the number of the proximate argument. Second,
there is the final, realized in both examples as -am, which indexes the animacy of the IA.
In both cases, the IA is animate, so this shows no alternation between the two examples.
Third, there is the theme sign, which as described in Section 1.1 alternates between a
direct form -aa which indexes the proximate EA, and the inverse form -igo, an elsewhere
form. Fourth, there is the peripheral marker -n, which indexes the obviative argument.
As already discussed in Section 1.1 the agreement on the person prefix and central
agreement, as well as the patterns of direct/inverse marking, can be described by a PAH
that ranks proximate over obviative. The prefix and central agreement always index the
higher ranked proximate argument, and the special inverse form appears just in case
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the alignment between the PAH and the hierarchy of argument position is high-to-low
rather than high-to-high. In contrast, the peripheral agreement slot presents an appar-
ent violation of the PAH by always showing agreement with the lower ranked obviative
argument. A first goal of the analysis is to model the hierarchy obeying behavior, but
also illuminate why this apparent violation arises.
The patterns of agreement in embedded clauses are shown in (38).


















‘If s/he (OBV) sees them (PROX)’ INVERSE: 3′ → 3
While much is shared with the independent order, evidence for the two aforementioned
differences emerges. First, there is no person prefix. Instead, the central agreement
marker -waad indexes the person and number of the proximate argument. Second,
there is no peripheral agreement marker. Otherwise, both the final and theme sign
show the same forms and alternations as in the independent order. A second goal of
the analysis is to model these points of variation between matrix and embedded clauses.
The analysis links these patterns of agreement to patterns of word order. Word order
in Border Lakes Ojibwe generally differs as a function of direct and inverse alignment
(Hammerly, 2019b). In the independent order, shown in (39), direct shows an alter-
nation between VOS and VSO orders, with VOS being more common and generally
preferred, while inverse shows VSO only. This reveals a general preference for the less
prominent obviative argument to precede the more prominent proximate argument.
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Intended: ‘The boy (OBV) saw the woman (PROX)’ *VINVOPROXSOBV
The conjunct again differs from the independent in two ways. First, the base order of
embedded clauses is verb-medial rather than verb-initial. Second, the proximate argu-
ment reliably precedes the obviative argument, resulting in SVO in direct alignments
and OVS in the inverse.









‘I heard that the woman (PROX) sang to the child (OBV)’









‘I heard that the child (PROX) was sung to by the woman (OBV)’
d. *ingii-noondam ikwewan gii-nagamotawigod abinoojiinh
With the empirical patterns to be accounted for in hand, the first aspect of the model
to cover is adopting an explicit connection between agreement and movement. In this
model, movement is always preceded by an agreement relation, making movement
parasitic on AGREE (e.g. Chomsky, 2000, 2001; Bošković, 2007). This relationship is
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schematized in (41). The figure purposefully abstracts away from the type of agreement
(ϕ-based or δ-based) and therefore the type of movement chain created (A-chain or A′-
chain), taking a feature-based view of these distinctions follwoing Van Urk (2015).
(41) Agreement feeds Movement
ProbeP
DP1















That said, there are cases of agreement that are not followed by movement. Whether or
not movement is triggered is gated by whether or not the features involved in agreement
have an EPP property, which encodes the need for certain projections to have their
specifier filled. The novel contribution is to treat the EPP as a property not of heads or
projections per se, but rather of the features of heads. This allows it to be relativized to
prefer XPs with particular properties. This thesis is summarized in (42).
(42) Thesis for the Relativized EPP
The EPP is a property of features not heads. The EPP can be relativized such
that only XPs with a particular feature F can satisfy the EPP.
Specifically, I argue that Voice in Ojibwe has a feature [EPP: uProximate], which is
only checked if a proximate argument fills the specifier of VoiceP. I link this proposal
to the recent account of person-hierarchy effects by Zubizarreta and Pancheva (2017);
Pancheva and Zubizarreta (2017), where certain phase projections appear to require a
local (or proximate) persons to occupy their edge.
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Building on the analysis of Oxford (2014, 2019b) for Algonquin, a northeastern
dialect of Ojibwe, the four descriptive agreement slots in the independent are tied to
four distinct agreement probes, which are in turn tied to particular heads within the
functional sequence, as summarized in (43).
(43) Independent order ϕ-probes, their corresponding heads, and morphology
a. γ-probe = v = Final = -am Noun classification
b. ρ-probe = Voice = Theme Sign = -aa/-igo Obviation
c. π-probe = Infl = Prefix + Central = o- -waa Person
d. ω-probe = C = Peripheral = -n Number
The novel claim is identifying these probes with four distinct types, corresponding to
noun classification (γ), obviation (ρ), person (π), and number (ω). All of these types
have been recognized in previous work (e.g. Béjar and Rezac, 2003), with the exception
of ρ. The types define the core sensitivities of the probe, and provide a link between
the order of probes in the verbal spine and the proposed order of feature composition
within the nominal spine. For example, as seen in Section 1.3.1, the π-probe necessarily
includes a uπ feature, with the specification of additional features being a matter of
parameterization. Furthermore the π-probe always executes AGREE prior to the ω-
probe due to its relatively low association in the spine.
The conjunct order has the same basic set of probes, but the person and number
probes are fused on the head Infl (Coon and Bale, 2014; Roversi, 2020).
(44) Conjunct order ϕ-probes, their corresponding heads, and morphology
a. γ-probe = v = Final = -am Noun classification
b. ρ-probe = Voice = Theme Sign = -aa/-igo Obviation
c. π/ω-probe = Infl = Central = -waad Fused Person/Number
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As a result, there is no probe specified on C, and therefore no peripheral agreement
marker. This is shown to capture the variation in whether Infl appears as a combination
of the prefix and central agreement, or central agreement alone.
Proceeding now to an overview of the account, the heads that host these probes
stand in the following configuration, with the EA and IA in their base positions:


















Recall first the pattern of agreement with the γ-probe on v:
(46) Agreement with γ on v
Show agreement in animacy with IA.
At the point the γ-probe is merged, the only available goal is the IA, accounting for the
uniformity of agreement in this position. No movement is triggered, as any EPP feature
of the probe can be satisfied instead by the merging of the EA into this position.
The pattern on Voice is the main locus of prominence-based effects, showing the
contrast between direct agreement with the proximate EA and the inverse form, as
summarized in (47).
(47) Agreement with ρ on Voice
3→ 3′: Show proximate agreement with EA; 3′ → 3: Show the inverse form
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The ρ-probe is only fully satisfied by uProximate. While the proximate EA fully satisfies
the probe in direct alignments, both the obviative EA and proximate IA are probed with
inverse alignments, leading to gluttony and ultimately the spell-out of the elsewhere
“inverse” form of theme sign morphology.
A critical claim is that only the proximate argument moves to Spec,VoiceP. This is
particularly contentful in inverse alignments, where both the proximate and obviative
arguments are probed. This requirement is enforced by the Relativized EPP on Voice, as
summarized in (48). Given that only the proximate argument can satisfy this require-
ment, the obviative argument remains in situ and the proximate argument moves.
(48) The Relativized EPP on Voice
The EPP on Voice is relativized to uProximate
The major consequence of this is that the proximate argument in Spec,VoiceP is the
highest argument in the clause in both direct and inverse alignments when the probe
on Infl is merged. This feeds uniform proximate agreement in this slot, as summarized in
(49). This agreement patterns holds regardless of whether the probe is a pure π-probe
as in the independent order, or a fused π/ω-probe as in the conjunct.
(49) Agreement with π (independent) or π/ω (conjunct) on Infl
Show full agreement with the proximate argument.
This agreement relation feeds movement of the proximate argument to Spec,IP. Sincet
Infl hosts the final probe in the conjunct order, this fixes the word order such that the
proximate precedes obviative. Assuming that the verb raises no higher than Infl in
embedded clauses, this captures the SVO word order of direct alignments and the OVS
word order of inverse.
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Agreement on Infl has one final consequence: It renders the proximate argument
inactive for further agreement relations. I enforce deactivation through the Activity
Condition (cf. Chomsky, 2000, 2001). The proposed condition is given in (50).
(50) The Activity Condition
An agreement relation with a probe P deactivates a goal G iff the probe shows
full agreement with G.
Full agreement can be defined either in terms of copying or morphological expression.
With Infl, it is evident by the fact that the person, number, animacy, and obviation of
the goal are expressed by the form of agreement.
This provides an account of why agreement with theω-probe on C appears to violate
the PAH by agreeing with the less prominent obviative argument, as summarized in
(51). Since Infl has deactivated the proximate argument, proximate agreement on C is
bled and the probe agrees with whatever is left over.
(51) Agreement with ω on C (independent only)
Show full agreement with the obviative argument.
Though the surface patterns of agreement are identical in direct and inverse alignments
(i.e. agreement with the obviative argument appears), the patterns of word order reveal
underlying differences in the derivation. In the inverse, things proceed with relatively
little complication. The ω-probe on C searches and only finds the obviative EA. Given
the EA is sitting on the edge of the phase defined by v, it can be agreed with directly and
is moved to Spec,CP to satisfy the EPP. Now, assuming that the verb raises to a relatively
high position in matrix clauses such that it takes an initial position (Hammerly, 2019b),
the VSO word order observed in the inverse alignment is derived — the obviative EA is
high in Spec,CP, while the proximate IA is lower in Spec,IP.
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The situation in the direct alignments is more complex. Recall that there is an al-
ternation between VOS and VSO word orders, but no corresponding alternations in ϕ-
agreement. This is captured by a three-step derivation. The first step is ϕ-agreement.
Because the obviative IA is inaccessible within the phase-complement of vP, C ends up
targeting vP itself, which has inherited the features of the IA from its previous agreement
relation. This ultimately unlocks the phase (Rackowski and Richards, 2005; Halpert,
2019; Branan, 2018), allowing the IA to be targeted by a δ-probe on C.This δ-probe is
specifically sensitive to a feature [δ: uObviative]. When the IA is specified for [δ: Ob-
viative], it undergoes A′-movement to Spec,CP. Given the optional nature of A′-features
(Van Urk, 2015), this movement of the IA is also broadly speaking optional. This pro-
vides the final link between the patterns of word order and agreement. When the rele-
vant δ-feature is specified on the obviative IA, this results in the derivation of the VOS
word order, as the IA moves to a position above the EA, which is sitting in Spec,IP. When
the relevant feature is not found, the IA remains in situ, deriving VSO.
1.4 Study III: Prominence in argument structure processing
The third and final part of the thesis considers the role of person-based prominence in
the processing of argument structure. This brings the focus towards considering how
the representations developed in the earlier parts of the thesis are built in real-time. The
processing of argument structure requires forming a link between a noun on one hand,
and thematic roles and syntactic positions on the other. There are three questions at the
heart of this section, with the first being the main focus. First, how is obviation used
to predictively form these links prior to unambiguous bottom-up information. Second,
when bottom-up evidence for argument structure is encountered with direct/inverse
voice marking, how are does the obviation status of the argument affect integration
with this newly encountered material. Third, if the evidence from voice contradicts the
predictively formed parse or interpretation, how does reanalysis proceed?
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These questions are probed by examining the processing of filler-gap dependencies,
where an argument is displaced (via movement) from the position that connects it to the
argument structure of the verb. More particularly, this portion of the thesis examines
how links are formed between the head noun of a relative clause and the embedded
verb. One of the most persistent phenomena in this domain is the so-called Subject Gap
Advantage (SGA). This is the observation that the processing of subject relative clauses
(SRCs) such as that in (52a) is generally easier than object relative clauses (ORCs). This
has been found across a wide range of languages and with a variety of methodologies
(for an overview, see e.g. Kwon, Lee, Gordon, Kluender, and Polinsky, 2010).
(52) a. The senator that quoted the journalist was not well known.
b. The senator that the journalist quoted was not well known.
However, this asymmetry can be neutralized by a variety of factors. For example, when
the filler is inanimate rather than animate, as in (53), the SGA disappears (Mak, Vonk,
and Schriefers, 2002; Traxler, Williams, Blozis, and Morris, 2005; Gennari and Mac-
Donald, 2008; Wagers and Pendleton, 2016).
(53) a. The report that quoted the journalist was not well known.
b. The report that the journalist quoted was not well known.
A variety of accounts have been put forward to capture the effect of animacy on the
SGA. A leading class of theories ties the SGA to predictive mechanisms (Gennari and
MacDonald, 2008; Wagers and Pendleton, 2016; Wagers, Borja, and Chung, 2018).
When an animate filler is encountered, the parse is incrementally extended to include
a subject gap. If the structure is ultimately an SRC, integration proceeds smoothly; if
it is an ORC, the initial prediction must be overcome, resulting in relative processing
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difficulty. With an inanimate filler, no single strong prediction about the upcoming
structure is made, so integration proceeds on equal footing in both SRCs and ORCs.
The experimental study presented here examines whether differences in obviation
status lead to differences in the predictive extension of the parse or interpretation. By
analogy with animacy, where animate nouns are more highly ranked on the PAH than
inanimate nouns, the more highly ranked proximate category should lead to “subject
gap” predictions, while the lower ranked obviative category should result in the neu-
tralization of these predictions.
However, the preceding discussion willfully ignored a distinction that cannot be set
aside when considering Ojibwe: That the term “subject”, when used colloquially, con-
fuses the derived syntactic subject position Spec,IP with the prototypical AGENT thematic
role. This comes about most sharply in active voice sentences, where the noun that takes
the agent role is also promoted to the derived subject position. However, different voice
distinctions can allow the derived subject position and the agent role to be dissociated.
For example, the passive voice of English results in the prototypical PATIENT or THEME
to be promoted to subject.
With these general possibilities in mind, consider the stimuli used in the study,
present in (54). The study manipulates two factors with two levels each: HEAD noun
obviation (proximate versus obviative) and VOICE (direct versus inverse)





















































‘...the elder (OBV) who the man is being laughed at by’
The assumed syntactic structures for each condition, following the account given in
Section 1.3.2, are given in (55). To review, with direct voice, the proximate argument
originates in Spec,vP, where the agent role is assigned, and the obviative argument is
lower, in the complement of
p
P, where the patient/theme role is assigned. Inverse re-
verses the alignment of obviation and thematic role. Additionally, proximate arguments
are always promoted via Spec,VoiceP to the subject position, Spec,IP, prior to undergoing
relativization to occupy the head noun position of the RC. In contrast, obviative nouns
are extracted directly from their base-generated position to the head noun position with
no intermediate movement steps.
(55) Proximate links to a subject gap, obviative to a non-subject gap
a. DPPROX/AG [CP REL-VERB-DIR [IP ... [VoiceP ... [vP ... DPOBV/PAT ] ] ] ]
b. DPPROX/PAT [CP REL-VERB-INV [IP ... [VoiceP ... [vP DPOBV/AG ... ] ] ] ]
c. DPOBV/PAT [CP REL-VERB-DIR [IP DPPROX/AG ... [VoiceP ... [vP ... ] ] ] ]
d. DPOBV/AG [CP REL-VERB-INV [IP DPPROX/PAT ... [VoiceP ... [vP ... ] ] ] ]
This leads to a necessary refinement of the hypothesis for how prediction proceeds
with filler-gap dependencies. Given that proximate nouns are grammatically obliged
to be moved via the subject position, proximate nouns should engender a subject gap
prediction, in the relevant sense of derived position. In contrast, obviative nouns never
grammatically occupy that position, and should therefore never engender a subject gap
41
prediction. This should lead to the appearance of the SGA for proximate nouns. How-
ever, we can additionally consider whether an AGENT or PATIENT prediction will be made
as a function of obviation — the precise hypothesis being that proximate head nouns
should engender the prediction that the filler will be the agent, with prediction being
neutralized with obviative heads.
The study used the visual world method to probe the incremental interpretation
of the sentences in (54). The sentences include a critical period of ambiguity where
the obviation of the head noun has been encoded, but voice marking has not yet been
encountered. This region is the locus of predictive processing of argument structure.
The visual stimuli were presented on a large touch screen monitor. Participants first
saw three visual stimuli (the position of images was randomized on each trial). Two
of the images were role-reversals, where the head noun was either the agent or the
patient of the event. A third distractor image depicted the same event, but excluded the
character associated with the head noun, and thus could be ruled out incrementally (this
image was associated with a correct interpretation of the fillers). After a familiarization
period, the sentence began to play over external speakers. Participants then selected
the image associated with their final interpretation of the sentence by touching the
screen, and confirmed their response by pressing a check mark. Over the course of
the trial, a web camera recorded eye movements. Recordings were used to observe
which image participants looked at as the sentence unfolded to determine incremental
interpretations.
The major findings for the preferential looking behavior and the picture selection
task are summarized in (56).
(56) Main experimental findings
a. Under Ambiguity: Anticipatory looks towards the “head = agent” image
with proximate head nouns, but not obviative head nouns.
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b. Following Disambiguation: More accurate (and faster) responses:
(i) With proximate head nouns.
(ii) When the head noun was ultimately the agent, in both proximate
and obviative conditions.
These findings can be described by the interaction of three independently motivated
processing pressures, given in (57).
(57) Three observed processing preferences
a. Animate/Proximate-Agent Preference: Dependencies where the animate or
proximate noun is the agent are preferred over those where the inanimate
or obviative noun is the agent.
b. Agent-First Preference: Dependencies where the first noun is the agent are
preferred to those where the first noun is non-agentive.
c. Subject Gap Advantage: Dependencies with a subject gap are preferred
over non-subject gap dependencies.
The anticipatory looks towards the agent image with proximate head nouns is due to the
“prototypicality” of the proximate noun as the agent (the Proximate-Agent Preference),
as well as general preference to assign the agent role first (the Agent-First Preference).
The lack of prediction with obviative nouns is the result of these two pressures conflict-
ing and cancelling each other out — the Proximate-Agent Preference places this noun
in the less agentive patient role, while the Agent-First Preference places this noun in
the agent role. Following disambiguation, the higher accuracy with proximate heads
is a reflection of the Subject Gap Advantage, while the generally higher accuracy with
conditions where the head noun was the agent is a reflex of the agent-first preference.
However, the preferences in (58) do not provide a cognitive source of the observed
effects — they are nothing more commonly observed patterns of behavior. I propose a
43
revised implementation of the Active Filler Strategy (Frazier, 1987; DeVincenzi, 1991)
to model the processes that underly these preferences, given in (58).
(58) Main Proposal: The Revised Active Filler Strategy
A filler predictively and incrementally extends a comprehender’s syntactic rep-
resentation to include a movement chain such that:
a. The chain terminates in a theta-assigning position (an A-position)
b. Each link minimizes distance
c. Each link maximizes well-formedness
The main clause of (58) is the predictive extension of the structure triggered by the
recognition of a filler. This builds a movement chain, predictively linking the filler to
its anticipated base-generated A-position (58a) — the position of thematic role assign-
ment. For our current purposes, this is either the External Argument (EA) position,
where the AGENT role is assigned, or or Internal Argument (IA) position, where the PA-
TIENT role is assigned. As a result, the initial thematic role assignment follows directly
from parsing decisions, providing a linking theory between parsing and interpretation.
The particular chains and links that are formed are governed by the pressures in
(58b,c). The clause in (58b) prefers links (and, by extension, chains) that are as short as
possible. While distance can be optimized on a number of dimensions (e.g. temporally,
linearly, structurally), the relevant sense of distance here is with respect to syntactic
structure, as defined in (59).
(59) Definition of Syntactic Distance
Given two linked syntactic positions X and Y, Syntactic Distance is the number
of maximal projections (XPs) that dominate X but do not dominate Y.
44
The proposal is that both the Subject Gap Preference and the Agent-First Preference are
reflexes of the pressure to minimize syntactic distance whenever possible, as stated in
the thesis in (60).
(60) Thesis for the role of minimizing syntactic distance in processing
Both the Subject Gap Preference and Agent-First Preference are the conse-
quence of minimizing syntactic distance.
To see this, first consider the contrast between the structures in (61). Holding the
terminus of the chain constant, a chain that includes a stop through the subject position
will consist of a series of smaller links compared to a chain that does not connect to this
position. Therefore a structure with a subject gap, all else being equal, will be preferred
over one that lacks a subject gap, deriving the Subject Gap Preference.
(61) The Subject Gap Preference
a. FILLER ... [IP SUBJ ... [vP EA [pP IA ] ] ]
b. FILLER ... [IP SUBJ ... [vP EA [pP IA ] ] ]
Now, consider the structures below, where the chain terminates in either the EA position
(62a) or the IA position (62b). In the relevant sense, the chain terminating in the EA
position minimizes distance compared to the chain terminating in the IA position. Given
that these positions are associated with the respective assignment of the agent and
patient roles (e.g. Harley, 2011), minimization also derives the Agent-First Preference.
(62) The Agent-First Preference
a. FILLER ... [vP EA [pP IA ] ]
b. FILLER ... [vP EA [pP IA ] ]
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The final clause of the Revised Active Filler Strategy in (58c) dictates that each link
in the chain must maximize well-formedness. The model of the grammar adopted in
this thesis is strictly-speaking categorical in nature, thus structures either are or are
not well-formed. However, under the conditions of incremental uncertainty presented
by real-time processing — in particular, given that upcoming structures are predictively
formed rather than constructed once all relevant evidence is in hand (or mind) — it
becomes necessary to introduce a competition between possible structures conditioned
on the evidence at a given point.
The proposed model takes advantages of the properties encapsulated within various
prominence hierarchies to determine expectations about incremental well-formedness.
The first relevant hierarchy, the Obviation Hierarchy (a partial form of the PAH), is given
in (63) and ranks the proximate category above the obviative category.
(63) Obviation Hierarhcy
PROXIMATE > OBVIATIVE
The second relevant hierarchy is the General Syntactic Position Hierarchy, which ranks
structurally higher positions above lower positions.
(64) General Syntactic Position Hierarchy
HIGHER > LOWER
For the current purposes, it is necessary to consider a number of more specific hierar-
chies that can be derived from (64). The first is in fact a set of two equivalent Argument
Structure Hierarchies — one couched in terms of structural position (65a) and one in
terms of thematic role (65b). To couch the model purely in terms of parsing and struc-
tural relations, the positional hierarchy is adopted.
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(65) Two equivalent Argument Structure Hierarchies
a. Argument Position Hierarchy: EA > IA
b. Thematic Role Hierarchy: AGENT > PATIENT
Second, there is a hierarchy that ranks the subject position over all non-subject posi-
tions, where “non-subject” positions are restricted to any position contained within the
XP that defines the subject position.
(66) Derived Position Hierarchy
SUBJECT > NON-SUBJECT
By harmonically aligning these various scales (Prince and Smolensky, 1993, p. 136),
we can derive a ranking of markedness constraints that more strongly penalize cer-
tain alignments between person category and structural position. Under a Harmonic
Grammar, these constraints can be weighted to different degrees, leading to stronger or
weaker pressures, or in the extreme case, near categorical requirements. The proposal
is that the parsing algorithm maximizes incremental well-formedness by minimizing the
violation score computed from these constraints.
The first set of constraints, given in (67), captures the pressure that underlies the
Proximate-Agent Preference. These constraints most strongly penalize structures where
the obviative argument is the EA (agent) or the proximate argument the IA (patient),
and therefore prefer alignments where the EA (agent) is aligned with proximate argu-
ments. These penalties are strong enough to create incremental commitments, but not
so strong as to create absolute restrictions on possible parses.




The second set of constraints in (68) enforces the restriction that proximate arguments
associate with the subject position, therefore creating an intermediate subject gap.
These constraints penalize alignments between the subject position and obviative ar-
guments, and as a result prefer alignments where the subject position is filled by the
proximate argument. The proposal is that these constraints are quite highly weighted,
given that the proximate/subject alignment is a hard constraint of the grammar, rather
than simply a preference.
(68) The Proximate-Subject Requirement
*SUBJ/OBV  *SUBJ/PROX
*NON-SUBJ/PROX  *NON-SUBJ/OBV
The push and pull of minimizing the syntactic distance and maximizing well-formedness
provides a general model for the interaction between the pressures of real-time pro-
cessing and obeying the constraints imposed by the grammar. More particularly, it
provides the means to account for the observed patterns in Ojibwe. At a high level,
proximate nouns have the potential for a maximally harmonic path on all fronts: the
well-formedness constraints dictate the formation of an intermediate subject gap ter-
minating in the EA position, which is also the most minimal possible chain — all signs
point to a parse where the proximate noun is encoded as the agent, as reflected in
looking preferences. In contrast, the various pressures conflict with obviative nouns.
The more minimal subject gap is highly marked, as is the more minimal termination of
the chain in the EA position. These pressures play out both incrementally and when at-
tempting to integrate new information or revise the parse and interpretation. This leads
to difficulty and uncertainty at various points, as reflected in both looking behavior and
accuracy in the picture selection task.
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1.5 Additional Background on Ojibwe
This section provides some additional background on the Ojibwe language and the
Border Lakes variety. Given that the core syntactic and morphological phenomena are
detailed as they are considered, and for the most part have been introduced in the
previous section, I do not repeat those descriptions here. I begin with a brief overview of
the historical and typological context of Algic/Algonquian languages and Ojibwe, then
turn to some important cultural contexts relevant to understanding the language. I then
provide an overview of the phonology and writing system of Border Lakes Ojibwe, which
is not covered elsewhere but is important for interpreting the examples that appear
throughout the thesis.
1.5.1 Historical, typological, and cultural context
1.5.1.1 Algic and Algonquian
Algic is a family of indigenous languages that are spoken across a wide swath of the
North American continent. The primary geographic loci are the central and northern
reaches of the Atlantic seaboard, the woodlands east and south of the Hudson Bay
and around the northwestern Great Lakes, the plains of the Rocky Mountains, and an
isolated region on California’s northern coast.
The currently recognized relationships between the Algic languages are shown in
Figure 1.1. The reconstructed mother language of the family, PROTO-ALGIC, con-
tains the costal California languages Wiyot and Yurok, and the reconstructed PROTO-
ALGONQUIAN (Sapir, 1913, 1923; Haas, 1958; Goddard, 1975). At present, the histor-
ical and grammatical properties of Proto-Algic remain unclear (Oxford, 2014). In con-
trast, the descendants of Proto-Algonquian retain a stark similarity and clear history,
facilitating the process of reconstruction. For this reason, the majority of typological











Figure 1.1: Algic genetic relationships (Goddard, 1994, 2015; Oxford, 2019a)
There are three primary branches of Proto-Algonquian, EASTERN, CENTRAL, and
PLAINS. Of these groupings, only the Eastern languages are considered a true genetic
subgroup, with both Central and Plains describing geographical subgroups (Goddard,
1980). Proto-Algonquian is thought to have been spoken around 3,000 years ago in the
region immediately west of Lake Superior (Siebert, 1967; Pentland, 1979). Complex
patterns of migrations followed from this period—the migrations relevant to the Ojibwe
people and language will be reviewed in the following section. Within the Algonquian
family, the deepest division is that between Blackfoot and the rest of the Algonquian lan-
guages, as encoded in the sisterhood relation between Blackfoot and Proto-Algonquian
(Goddard, 2015). The family then divides into the remaining Plains Algonquian lan-
guages, which are genetically grouped with the Central Algonquian languages, and
Proto-Eastern Algonquian, which in turn divides into the whole of the Eastern Algo-
nquian languages. The major languages in each of these subgroups are given in (69).
(69) Major Algonquian languages by subgroup (from Oxford, 2014, p. 19)
a. CENTRAL: Meskwaki-Sauk-Kickapoo, Ojibwe-Potawatomi, Miami-Illinois,
Cree-Innu-Naskapi, Menominee, Shawnee
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b. EASTERN: Mi’gmaq, Maliseet-Passamaquoddy, Abenaki, Southern New Eng-
land Algonquian (e.g. Massachusett), Mahican, Delaware (Munsee and
Unami), Nanticoke, Powhatan
c. PLAINS: Cheyenne, Arapaho-Gros Ventre, Blackfoot
Today, the languages of the Algonquian family are spoken by hundreds of thousands
of people, and continue to play a central role in many communities. However, due to
a long history of often hostile colonization, attempts at religious conversion, and gen-
eral persecution, as well as a more recent history of systematic policies to eliminate
language and culture carried out by both the Canadian and United States governments
(e.g. residential schools and relocation programs), many Algonquian languages are dor-
mant, endangered, or under threat. The most widely spoken language groups (listed
roughly from East to West) are Mi’gmaq (thousands), Cree (tens of thousands), Ojibwe
(tens of thousands) Blackfoot (low thousands), and Cheyenne (low thousands). Many
of the dormant languages belong to the Eastern subgroup, with some having been af-
fected many centuries ago following early contact with European colonizers. However
there are also a number of Central and Plains languages that do not currently have liv-
ing fluent speakers. More recently, there have been revival efforts which have brought
languages such as Wampanoag and Myaamia from dormant states to active use once
again.
1.5.1.2 Ojibwe dialects
Ojibwe (also spelt Ojibwa or Ojibway) is a collection of closely related dialects and
varieties belonging to the Central Algonquian subgroup and spoken by the Anishinaabe
people. In Canada, Ojibwe is spoken in Southwestern Quebec, through much of Ontario
and Manitoba, into Saskatchewan, and in some outlying communities in Alberta. In
the United States, it is spoken in Michigan, in northern Wisconsin, Minnesota, and
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North Dakota, and in relocated communities in Kansas and Oklahoma. As recently
as a generation ago, there were also a number of fluent speakers in the mixed Cree-
Chippewa community of Rocky Boy, Montana. It is estimated to be spoken by around
100,000 people, with relatively high mutual intelligibility across the different groups,
particularly those which are geographically adjacent.
The major dialects of Ojibwe are Algonquin, Nipissing, Eastern Ojibwe, Odawa (Ot-
tawa), Northern Ojibwe, Saulteaux (Plains Ojibwe), Oji-Cree (Severn Ojibwe), and
Southwestern Ojibwe (Chippewa). It is also common to classify the various dialects
of Ojibwe and the Potawatomi language under the wider umbrella of “Ojibweyan” lan-
guages, due to their linguistic similarities and close cultural and historical ties. A more
detailed overview and comparison of these dialects can be found in Valentine (2001).
Anishinaabemowin, known in English as Southwestern Ojibwe or Chippewa, is spo-
ken in the western Great Lakes region, including the Upper Peninsula of Michigan,
northern Wisconsin and Minnesota, North Dakota, Northwest Ontario, and Manitoba.
It is difficult to estimate the exact number of first and second language speakers. Part
of the reason is the community has been split by local, national, and international bor-
ders, as it spans both the United States and Canada, and multiple states, provinces, and
Ojibwe nations within each. This has lead to the recognition of a variety of sub-dialects,
largely corresponding to geopolitical divisions resulting from the modern reservation
and treaty systems, but also to communities and migrations that predate colonial con-
tact. In total, somewhere around 100,000 people ethnically identify as Southwestern
Ojibwe. Ethnologue places the number of speakers at 5,000 (as of 1990), while the
2010 US Census reports 6,986. In contrast, Anton Treuer, a professor of Ojibwe at Be-
midji State who undertook an informal survey of communities in Minnesota in 2009,
estimates the number of first speakers in the United States at 1,000. In any case, the
language is widely considered to be revitalizing, with strong efforts to expose children
and adults to the language occurring across Ojibwe communities (see Sullivan, 2016b)
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Within the Southwestern dialect group, a number of transitional varieties are also
recognized, which are in contact with other dialects of Ojibwe including Saulteaux in
Manitoba and Oji-Cree in Northern Ontario and Manitoba, as well as other Central Algo-
nquian languages including Potawatomi and Cree. One such transitional variety, which
is the focus of this dissertation, is Border Lakes Ojibwe, spoken primarily in Northwest
Ontario including the Treaty 3 communities at Seine River and Nigigoonsiminikaaning
(Red Gut), where the primary fieldwork presented in this dissertation was conducted.
Many of the features characteristic of Border Lakes can also be found across the border
in northern Minnesota, particularly at Nett Lake and parts of Red Lake.
Based on informal conversations with consultants and elders from Treaty 3 commu-
nities, I estimate of the number of speakers of the Border Lakes dialect to be at least
1,000. This estimate should be taken with a grain of salt, as I have not visited every
community where the dialect is spoken, so it relies of the impression of members of
neighboring communities or web-based reports.5 First hand estimates can be provided
for Nigigoonsiminikaaning and Seine River. At Nigigoonsiminikaaning the tribal office
reports that 130 members live on the reserve. The nearby Seine River community is
a slightly larger with an on reserve population of 327. In both cases, I estimate the
percentage of L1 speakers to be around 15%, with most of these speakers being over
the age of 50. Almost all speakers learned English after being sent to residential school
around the age of 6. A number of L1 speakers report speaking only Ojibwe in their
homes and when taking care of children, grandchildren, or great-grandchildren. As a
result, there are children under the age of 10 that have received significant exposure to
Ojibwe from the time they were born in both communities. In addition, many children
are exposed to the language in a more formal setting at schools in Mine Centre and Fort
5I have gathered the following information: Couchiching is said to have very few active speakers; the
website for the community at Whitefish Bay puts the rate at 48% of the 712 on reserve members; Lac La
Croix has 192 on reserve members, with a high percentage of speakers being reported; Mitaanjigamiing
has a population of 99, with a number of L1 speakers being reported, but the exact number is unknown
to me. I have not gathered information on other communities in the area.
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Frances. Adolescents and adults frequently gain exposure to the language at regular
community language tables and other cultural events.
1.5.1.3 Cultural context
Ojibwe speakers are highly aware of the differences and diversity that exists across va-
rieties. In many communities, there are long standing traditions of traveling to other
places for ceremony or social gatherings, which has facilitated this awareness. In gen-
eral, speakers hold positive attitudes towards this diversity, with many teachings and
stories centering around understanding how these differences originated. If asked,
many speakers can supply a substantial list of differences in word-usage, grammatical
construction, or pronunciation that they have observed when communing with people
from other places, with detailed information about where and when they heard it.
One illustrative example is in the names of the months, which are divided by the
waxing and waning of the moon. Many communities share a common set of names,
but the precise month or moon that a given name is used may depend on the timing of
events in the local environment. In other cases, months may have distinct names that
are unique to the particular environmental events of the associated dialect locale. This
fits into a broader way of understanding, where the form of the language used by a
particular group of people is seen as highly dependent on the environment. Differences
in the lexicon, and in some cases grammatical differences, are rightly seen as reflex of
deeper pressures, some of which are unknown or mysterious. Many elders and commu-
nity members stress that they do not believe the particulars of a given way of speaking
is correct or incorrect if the intentions of the person are good.
This appreciation of variation has often been difficult to implement within the lan-
guage learning community. As Standardized Ojibwe, or as one of my consultant calls
it, “book Ojibwe”, is formed and takes hold, less room for variation remains, at least
among adults who are learning Ojibwe as a second language. While there are tens of
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thousands of Ojibwe speakers, with any given dialect or variety the number of speakers
is much smaller. In the decades ahead, one scenario is that much of the micro-variation
in the language will be lost, even as the number of speakers stabilizes or even grows
with revitalization efforts. However, this is not a foregone conclusion. In recent years
some communities have accessed resources that allow more attention to be paid to early
interventions with children ages 0–3 years old, which is a likely path to maintaining the
rich variation in the language.
Oration is a skill that is honed and remains highly regarded. Certain speakers are
known to be particularly creative and evocative with their language, and the skills of
these people are highly sought after for ceremony and entertainment alike. As long as
can be remembered, storytelling has been a central part of Ojibwe life. These stories
range from recollections of childhood events or other stories from one’s past, to legends
that have been passed down orally since time immemorial (these are generally reserved
for telling during the winter months), to recounting and interpreting dreams or visions.
In nearly all cases, the point of a story is to pass on a teaching of some kind, or to share
an experience that might provoke deeper thought or engagement in a particular topic.
However, this is not to say that all such stories, legends, and recollections are stern and
serious — to the contrary, many of them are hilarious, while still exposing personal or
cultural truths, principles, and beliefs.
1.5.2 Phonology
In this section I consider the phonological inventory and processes of Border Lakes
Ojibwe, with some attention paid to comparison across the major dialect groups. I
also introduce the current writing systems of the language, with a primary focus on




As shown in Table 1.2, Boarder Lakes Ojibwe has four contrastive vowels, with three of
the vowels further contrasting in length. As shown in Swierzbin (2003), long vowels






Table 1.2: Broad transcription vowel inventory of Border Lakes Ojibwe (Swierzbin,
2003)
It is important to note that the contrasts in Table 1.2 obscures the fact that vowel
length alone does not conspire to create minimal pairs. Length is combined with other
features such as height. For example, the short vowel /a/ is frequently centralized to
[2]. An example of this is taken from Swierzbin (2003), where the contrast between
the first person (70a) and second person (70b) forms of the embedded verb is encoded
in the vowel of the suffixal agreement morphology. The first person form has a long
[a:], while the second person form is realized as a short [2]. Therefore the distinction is










‘...if you gather firewood...’ (Swierzbin, 2003, p. 344)
Furthermore, there is debate as to whether the contrast should be encoded as length
per se, or rather a contrast in tense (≈ short) versus lax (≈ long)6. This is exemplified
6Generally speaking, tense vowels tend to be shorter than lax vowels even in languages that do not
phonemically contrast vowel length
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by the fact that the short vowel /i/ is often realized as the tense counterpart [I], as can
be observed in (70) with the verb stem meaning ‘gather firewood’.
One of the major dialect markers of Ojibwe is the presence or absence of vowel syn-
copation. Many of the eastern dialects, including Eastern Ojibwe and Odawa, delete or
significantly reduce short vowels in weak or unstressed syllables. To take a salient exam-
ple, the Ojibwe language is referred to as Anishinaabemowin in most non-syncopating
dialects, but Nishnaabemwin in those with syncopation. The Border Lakes dialect is a
non-syncopating variety, where the deletion and reduction of vowels is much more re-
stricted (though not altogether absent). I will not consider these syncopation processes
to any significant degree here, but the interested reader can find a succinct description
starting on page 51 of Valentine (2001).
While there were a number of caveats to the interpretation of vowel length as a
contrastive feature (presented above), vowel length itself does play a crucial role in the
assignment of stress in the Border Lakes dialect. In her detailed study, Swierzbin (2003)
shows that vowels with a longer duration are (nearly without exception) associated with
perceived stress. Both frequency and volume are less stable, though still informative,
correlates of the perception of stress.
1.5.2.2 Consonants
The consonant inventory of Border Lakes Ojibwe is given in Table 1.3.
bilabial dental alveopalatal palatal velar glottal
stop p b t d k g P




Table 1.3: Consonant inventory of Border Lakes Ojibwe (Swierzbin, 2003)
The table hides one significant complication. The obstruents (stops, fricatives, af-
fricates) are distinguished by strength or length of pronunciation. By convention, the
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stronger “fortis” obstruents are written with the voiceless symbol, and the weaker “le-
nis” obstruents with the voiced symbol. Swierzbin (2003) shows that while there is a
significant difference in length between the lenis and fortis counterparts7, the primary
difference between the two is indeed in voicing: the lenis obstruents ranging from sig-
nificantly prevoiced to voiceless and aspirated; the fortis obstruents generally being
voiceless and aspirated. Voicing (or strength, if you will) does not create minimal pairs
within the language, with the appearance of the voiced and voiceless counterparts being
either in free variation or determined by phonological rules and phonotactic constraints.
The glides /j/ and /w/ are frequently epenthesized to resolve vowel hiatus. For
example, the plural suffix /-2g/ often appears with an epenthetic /w/, as in the plural
form of [ikwe:] ‘woman’ being realized as [ikwe:w2g] ‘women’. That said, variation in
the repair process is attested within the Border Lakes dialect, with the same speaker also
producing [ikwe:g] ‘women’ in what at first approximation appears to be free variation,
where hiatus is resolved via elision rather than epenthesis. More work is needed to
understand whether there are particular conditions under which these repairs vary.
1.5.2.3 Writing systems
For most of its history, Ojibwe has been an almost entirely oral language. Prior to Eu-
ropean contact, and for many generations following that time, writing was restricted
to particular religious contexts, where teachings and customs were recorded and pre-
sented on birchbark scrolls. The details of this system are guarded with great care.
It should be noted that these traditions continue to this day, despite centuries of con-
version efforts by Christian missionaries, as well as the banning of indigenous religious
practice in the United States until the passing of the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act in 1978.
7The fortis obstruents on average are 1.2–1.4 times longer than their lenis counterpart; a small




























Table 1.4: Correspondences between orthographic symbols and phonemes in the double
vowel writing system.
Modern orthographies have undergone a number of transformations. There are two
major systems: the syllabic system and the latin-based system. Southwestern Ojibwe
is almost always written with the latin-based “double vowel” orthography, therefore I
will only review this writing system here. It is consistent enough to be useful in the
broad transcription of the language, with a straightforward correspondence between
the phonological inventory and the characters, shown in Table 1.4. For this reason,
most of the examples presented over the course of this dissertation will be written in
the double vowel system.
There are two additional conventions that are observed in the orthography that fall
outside of representing the phonemic inventory (Sullivan, 2016b, p. 83). The first is
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in the use of “h” in the spelling of certain exclamatory particles such as howah ‘wow!’,
ahaw ‘ok’, and hay ‘darn’. The second is the combination of “nh” to encode word-final
nasalization present in words such as abinoojiinh ‘child’ and gwiiwenh ‘supposedly’.
1.6 Overview of the dissertation
The remainder of the dissertation is organized into six chapters.
In Chapter 2, I derive the possible distinctions in person, obviation, animacy, and
number in Border Lakes Ojibwe. Chapter 3 explores the typological predictions for ob-
viation that are generated by the account of Border Lakes Ojibwe in Chapter 2. Chapter
4 marks the shift from deriving categories to deriving the prominence relations between
them. This chapter largely focuses on the narrow person features that encode first, sec-
ond, and generic third persons. In Chapter 5 I apply the system from Chapter 4 to
Border Lakes Ojibwe and the system of obviation. The major goal is to understand the
relationship between agreement and movement, and the role that prominence plays in
each. Chapter 6 marks the final shift in scope, where I turn to how prominence infor-
mation is used in real-time processing. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion
of the nature of features, the relationship between the parser and the grammar, and the
high-level issues therein that are left to future work.
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CHAPTER 2
THE REPRESENTATION OF PERSON IN OJIBWE
2.1 Introduction: What is person?
The goal of this chapter is to put forward a representation for person in Ojibwe that
derives the relevant person categories. Ojibwe shows (ignoring for now the contrasts
introduced by number and animacy-based noun classification) a five-way distinction be-
tween the EXCLUSIVE, INCLUSIVE, SECOND, PROXIMATE, and OBVIATIVE categories. While
the entire inventory of possible person, number, and noun classification distinctions is
considered in this chapter, the primary puzzle at hand, and the main contribution, is to
understand the contrast between the proximate and obviative persons.
Person categories are generally thought of in terms of first person, second person,
and third person. However, the grammatical categories themselves do not make clear
cut distinctions between these three types of person. For example, the so-called “first”
person plural pronoun we in English indeed makes reference to groups including the
speaker (i.e. the “first” person), but is not understood to be reserved for reference only to
groups of speakers—the group may include the listener or addressee (i.e. the “second”
person) and/or a potentially unlimited number of others (i.e. “third” persons).
The view advocated for in this chapter (following Harbour, 2016), is that first, sec-
ond, and third persons are part of the mental ontology that is manipulated and accessed
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by features. These features in turn give rise to categories that allow reference to the on-
tology. To represent the ontology, the symbols i, u, and o, o′, o′′, etc are used. Features,
which denote lattices formed from the ontology, create partitions and allow the ontolog-
ical space to be accessed, resulting in some number of categories that make reference
to particular combinations of first, second, and third persons. These categories are con-
ventionally referred to with labels such as “first singular”, “second plural”, “inclusive”,
or “exclusive”. The correspondences between these categories and the ontology are
sketched in Table 2.1.
Category Referent Set
Generic First Singular {i}
Second Singular {u}
Generic Third Singular {o}, {o′}, {o′′}, . . .
Proximate Singular {o}
Obviative Singular {o′}, {o′′}, . . .
Generic First Plural {i, o, o′, o′′, . . .}, {i, u, o, o′, o′′, . . .}
Exclusive {i, o, o′, o′′, . . .}
Inclusive {i, u, o, o′, o′′, . . .}
Second Plural {u, o, o′, o′′, . . .}
Generic Third Plural {o, o′, o′′, . . .} (o optional)
Proximate Plural {o, o′, o′′, . . .} (o required)
Obviative Plural {o′, o′′, . . .} (lacks o)
Table 2.1: Conventional person categories and their referent sets in the ontological
notation. Note that the full theory will be based in lattices, rather than the sets above,
therefore this table only provides an approximation of the proposed representation.
Put another way, the claim is that there are three closely linked levels of representa-
tion: the ontology, which defines the space of possible reference, the features that make
the interface between the ontology and the linguistic representation, and the categories
that emerge from the interactions between these features. In this view, all languages
have the expressive power to reference the author of an utterance, the addressee, and
others. But languages differ in which features they have available, and therefore which
distinctions are drawn.
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In his original proposal, Harbour argues that there are two features: [±author] and
[±participant] hosted by a head π. These features and the host head denote lattices
(derived from particular power sets of the underlying person ontology), which interact
via operations denoted by the plus and minus values of the features. The subsets used
to derive the lattice for each feature are shown in (1) (where “`” can be read as “is
derived from”).
(1) Ontological subsets proposed by Harbour (2016)
a. JπK ` {i, u, o, o′, o′′, o′′′, . . . , }
b. J[participant]K ` {i, u}
c. J[author]K ` {i}
These features are adopted without adaptation in the present account. The new ex-
tension proposed here is the addition of the feature [±proximate], which represents a
lattice derived from the a subset of the ontology that includes the first person i, the
second person u, and a single third person o, as shown in (2).
(2) Main proposal: An ontological subset for the proximate feature
J[proximate]K ` {i, u, o}
The addition of the proximate feature allows the five-way person distinction in Ojibwe
to be derived. In particular, it derives a contrast between categories that necessarily in-
cludes reference to the “proximate” o, versus one which necessarily excludes reference
to the “proximate” o, as shown in terms of ontological sets in Table 2.1. However, the
proximate feature in particular precipitates a key divergence from the system of feature
combination proposed by Harbour (2016). Rather than utilizing lattice-based opera-
tions, I instead apply the theory of contrastive interpretations to define the interactions
between features (Dresher, 2009; Cowper and Hall, 2019). This is useful on two fronts:
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(i) to provide principled and systematic restrictions on how the sets denoted by features
are interpreted, and (ii) to restrict the composition of certain combinations of features.
The proposal provides new insights into the morphosyntactic footprint of obviation,
and its function in partitioning the person space. Unlike competing representations of
person, such as the feature geometric approach, the present theory has no extrinsic
restrictions or requirements on combinations of person features. Whether a language
lacks or includes a particular feature derives the possible person distinctions attested
across languages, with all logical combinations being typologically attested. The par-
ticular set of features utilized within a given language is then directly tied to general
principles guiding language acquisition.
The chapter also considers how the adopted representation of person and obvia-
tion interfaces with number and noun classification. Discussions of alternative person
representations, in particular the feature geometric approach pioneered by Harley and
Ritter (2002) and the theory of Harbour (2016), are sprinkled throughout the current
chapter and the next (Chapter 3), where I explore extensions of the account to obvia-
tion systems outside of Ojibwe. These discussions also set the stage for Chapters 4 and
5, where I turn to how the current representation of person interacts with a theory of
agreement.
2.2 Deriving person categories: An overview of the puzzle
Person systems provide the means to refer to the author of an utterance, the addressee
of an utterance, and other people who are neither the author nor the addressee. With
our categories we can reference the author, addressee, or an other alone, but we can
also refer to combinations such as the author and addressee together, a group of others,
or everyone at once. The immediate question is how such distinctions are encoded
by the grammar — that is, understanding the mental representations that allow us to
make reference to different persons on their own and in combination. Much ink has
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been spilled on the topic over the decades, and this body of work has sharpened what
a representation of person categories looks like. In this section, I introduce the basic
shape of the puzzle.
2.2.1 The Partition Problem
The goal of this line of inquiry is to develop a person representation is to provide the
means to distinguish all and only the possible person categories within a language,
and to capture differences in what is distinguished across languages. For example,
in English there is no distinction between inclusive and exclusive persons—both are
subsumed under single pronominal form we, commonly called the first person plural. In
other languages, like Ojibwe, the inclusive and exclusive have distinct pronominal forms
(EXCL: niinawind; INCL: giinawind), and also trigger distinct patterns of agreement.
A critical puzzle of this sort was first introduced by Zwicky (1977), who observed
that languages with a three-way person distinction treat ‘you and us’ (i.e. the inclusive)
as a form of ‘us’ (i.e. a type of “first” person) rather than a form of ‘you’ (i.e. a type of
“second” person). Such lumping goes beyond surface-level morphophonological syn-
cretism—two categories that are otherwise distinguished sharing a common form in
some paradigm of the language. It is instead a conflation of categories, in which a lan-
guage erases a distinction that other languages may permit (see, e.g. McGinnis (2005)
for a detailed discussion). However, gaining a meaningfully abstracted perspective on
patterns of conflation, and distinguishing them from mere syncretism, is a challenging
empirical task. The basic form of the challenge is that our primary data for understand-
ing the underlying linguistic categories—paradigms of agreement, pronouns, dietetic
elements, and all the rest—are obscured by accidental homophony, as well as system-
atic morphophonological processes.
The solution to this challenge has long been to compare across paradigms of pro-
nouns and agreement within a language, rather than relying on the categories revealed
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by a single paradigm. The question being: what is the full set of distinctions a language
makes when taking into account all of the relevant paradigms? While by no means the
first study to undertake such a program (see, e.g. Cysouw, 2003, for a particularly ex-
pansive survey), this has recently been productively formalized, and applied to a large
sample of languages, through the superposition method of Harbour (2016).
2.2.1.1 The superposition method
The basic form of the method is shown in (3), where each of the boxes on the left side
of the “equation” are two of the agreement slots of the matrix verbs with animate argu-
ments in Ojibwe (the “independent order VTA” paradigm). For expositional purposes,
just the plural variants of each category are shown (exclusive, inclusive, second plural,
and third plural; obviation is also set aside momentarily). The first paradigm from the
left is for the person prefix, and the second is for the central agreement marker. The
right side of the equals sign shows the result of superposition, which derives the under-
lying partition. The two paradigms are slightly offset from one another to preserve the
visibility of the original cuts, and are shaded to more clearly reveal the correspondences
between the left and right sides.












Observe that neither of the morphological slots alone realizes distinctions between all
four categories. In other words, there are morphophonological syncretisms. The per-
son prefix shows a syncretism between the inclusive and second person; the central
agreement slot shows two syncretisms: the inclusive with the exclusive, and the sec-
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ond person with the third person. If we were to consider the person prefix alone, we
might conclude that Ojibwe exemplifies an exception to Zwicky’s observation that the
inclusive and second person are never conflated when a three-way distinction is being
made. The method shows this would be misguided; when the two paradigms are super-
imposed, a four-way split emerges, and we can surmise that the pattern in the person
prefix is a morphophonological artifact, and not directly indicative of the underlying
“partition” of persons.
What is meant by partition? The notion is at the core of Harbour’s method, and
is equally adopted here as the central fact that must be captured by a representation
of person. Couched in familiar terminology, a partition is the pattern of conflation be-
tween the possible person categories of natural language. Continuing to ignore the dis-
tinctions introduced by obviation, number, and noun classification for the time being,
Ojibwe shows what Harbour labels the quadripartition: a four-way distinction between
exclusive, inclusive, second, and third. English, on the other hand, shows a three-way
distinction between a generic first person, second person, and third person, which Har-
bour labels as the standard tripartition. This is schematized in (4).








2.2.1.2 The lattice representation
With the exposition of partitions comes a new bit of notation. This is explained in
full formal detail during the introduction of the lattice-based account in the coming
sections. The motivation for the shift is to refer to how the ontological space of person is
partitioned, rather than the morphophonological categories of “inclusive”, “exclusive”,
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and so on (though it is difficult to get away from these labels entirely). We can represent
the speaker with i, the hearer with u, and all other persons with a series of o’s (o, o′, o′′,
and so on). The partitions then lump together these primitives into sets and lattices,
which are referred to as partition elements. These are semantically interpreted and
create the restrictions on reference familiar to each category.
The exclusive partition element is represented with i x . This can be re-written as
a set that includes the singleton {i}, the dyads {i, o}, {i, o′}, {i, o′′}, . . ., the triads
{i, o, o′}, {i, o′, o′′}, {i, o, o′′}, . . ., and continuing increases in cardinality from there.
Similarly, the second person element ux includes the singleton {u}, the dyads {u, o},
{u, o′}, {u, o′′}, . . ., the triads {u, o, o′}, {u, o′, o′′}, {u, o, o′′}, . . ., and so on.
The inclusive element iux differs in that the minimal set is the dyad {i, u}, but from
there it increases in a similar fashion from triads {i, u, o}, {i, u, o′}, {i, u, o′′}, . . ., on up.
The generic third person element x x does not have a unique minimal element. It starts
with the singletons {o}, {o′}, {o′′}, . . ., then to the dyads {o, o′}, {o, o′′}, {o′, o′′}, . . .,
again continuing from there.
It is worth introducing what I think is a more intuitive way (for the visually inclined)
to represent the sets denoted by the four elements discussed above: Hasse diagrams.
The diagrams for each of the four persons are shown in Figure 2.1, and become par-
ticularly useful in the discussion of number in Section 2.7.2. The rows in the diagram
are organized, from bottom to top, in increasing cardinality. The minimal element(s)
being on the bottom row, and increasing by one in each ascending row. Each point in
the diagram represents an element of the lattice, and the lines that link the points show
where subset-superset relationships hold.
Because the number of other persons (o, o′, o′′, etc) is unbounded, full Hasse dia-
grams are not shown for any of the sets relevant here. Instead, an abbreviated represen-













Figure 2.1: Hasse diagrams for exclusive i x (top left), inclusive iux (top right), second
ux (bottom left), and third x x (bottom right).
extending lines to the left, right, and upper boundaries. Furthermore, only a sample of
nodes are labeled—just enough to allow the pattern of the diagram to emerge.
2.2.1.3 The original partition problem
This way of thinking about capturing the person space allows us to formulate what
Harbour refers to as the partition problem, a generalized form of the question that arises
from Zwicky’s classic observation: Why are only some of the logically possible person
partitions attested in natural language? In an extended exposition with a large sample
of languages, Harbour shows that only 5 of the 15 possible partitions are attested. So
far we have discussed only two of these five—the quadripartition and the standard
tripartition. The full set is schematized in (5). From left to right, these are referred to as
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the monopartition, participant bibartition, author bipartition, and the already familiar
tripartition and quadripartition.





















Herein lies the original observation of Zwicky: There is no partition that conflates the
inclusive and second person to the exclusion of the exclusive. This unattested partition
is shown in (6).





It is important to emphasize that this still leaves open the possibility that, in some
paradigm, a language might make a syncretism of the sort in (6). The form of agreement
on the person prefix in Ojibwe examined above provides such a case: the second and
inclusive result in the realization of gi-, the exclusive is associated with ni-, and the
third person with o-. However, a wider look at the paradigms reveals that this is not
indicative of a conflation of the inclusive and second person. The underlying partition
is revealed to be the quadripartition when superposition is employed and the patterns
in the central agreement slot are considered.
Again ignoring distinctions introduced by number, in Harbour’s system there is a
maximum of four partition elements, corresponding to the categories exclusive, inclu-
sive, second, and third. The partition problem can be reframed yet again as a question
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of why certain partition elements are attested, while others are unattested; and further-
more why certain partition elements are conflated, while others are not. The goal is to
formulate a theory of the person representation that provides a reasonable answer to
these questions.
2.2.1.4 The proximate-obviative distinction
Ojibwe (and Algonquian more generally) raises a complication to Harbour’s account
via the aforementioned distinction in obviation — Harbour’s account is limited to the
partitions described above, and does not attempt to capture obviation. That said, the
basic morphosyntactic footprint of obviation can be described within the lattice-based
representation. Obviation splits the (animate) third persons into two additional cate-
gories: PROXIMATE and OBVIATIVE. The claim I would like to put forward is that the
burden of capturing this distinction falls to the theory of person.1 The core function
of obviation is to provide a division between the numerous “other” persons (o, o′, o′′,
etc), raising one to be designated proximate, and the rest to be relegated as obviative.
I will adopt the convention of treating the non-prime other o as the proximate third
person, though any one of the other o’s would serve equally well. Proximate persons
necessarily include reference to this proximate o, while obviative persons necessarily
exclude reference to o.
In terms of the subscript notation, ox is the desired partition for the proximate per-
son, while x ′x ′ is the desired partition for the obviative. Moving forward, I refer to the
third person x x discussed above as the generic third person to avoid ambiguity. The
adopted notation is somewhat subtle, but the differences are important. Again, formal
details are given in the coming sections, but the proximate partition element ox ab-
breviates the singleton {o}, the dyads {o, o′}, {o, o′′}, {o, o′′′}, . . ., the triads {o, o′, o′′},
1This claim is not meant to annul the well-attested fact that there are crucial discourse and per-
spectival factors that drive the assignment of which particular referent or argument is proximate versus
obviative. To the contrary, these yet-to-be fully elaborated factors drive which particular entity fills the







Figure 2.2: Hasse diagrams of the proposed proximate (left) and obviative (right) lat-
tices
{o, o′, o′′′}, {o, o′′, o′′′}, . . ., and so on. The key is that every single set includes the
proximate o. In contrast, the obviative partition element x ′x ′ does not have a unique
singleton, and excludes the proximate o from all of its sets. It abbreviates the {o′}, {o′′},
{o′′′}, . . ., then to the dyads {o′, o′′}, {o′, o′′′}, {o′′, o′′′}, . . ., and on from there.
These sets can be visually represented with the Hasse diagrams in Figure 2.2. The
proximate lattice includes a unique bottom element, o. As a result, all further sets
in the ascending rows also include this element. The obviative lattice is analogous to
the generic third person lattice in Figure 2.1, but crucially differs in that it lacks the
proximate third person o. All other third persons (o′, o′′, o′′′, and so on) are present.
2.2.1.5 The quintipartition of Ojibwe
We can use the superposition method to motivate the existence of a partition that in-
cludes obviation. This time I have chosen to use the paradigm of intransitive matrix
verbs with plural arguments (referred to as the independent order VAI paradigm in the
Algonquianist literature). In the left side of the equation, the leftmost paradigm gives
the forms for the person prefix, the center paradigm the forms for the central agreement
slot, and the rightmost paradigm the peripheral agreement slot. The figure on the right
side of the equation is the superposition of these three cuts, again offset slightly.
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I refer to the resulting partition as the quintipartition: a five-way distinction between
exclusive, inclusive, second, proximate, and obviative persons. The primary goal of the
chapter is to capture this additional partition, while not losing the ability to derive the
other partitions of Harbour’s original account. This amounts to treating the generic
third person partition element as a conflation between the proximate and obviative par-
tition elements. The system thus must be able to generate a maximum of five partition
elements given the addition of Ojibwe.2
2.2.2 Interactions with number and noun classification
To derive the full inventory of pronouns and agreement, person representations must
be able to interact with the representations of number and noun classification. The
preceding discussion, and much of the discussion within this chapter, sets aside these
distinctions to focus on the core representation of person. That said, the possible sys-
tems of number and noun class found in natural language is at least as rich an empirical
and theoretical domain as is seen for person.
Ojibwe turns out to have a simple number system, which makes a cut between singu-
lar and plural, and is formally identical to that of English. The basic system of number
adopted here will be largely unchanged from that put forward in Harbour (2016), but is
important to review in order to account for the full range of category distinctions within
2This picture is complicated in Chapter 3 with the discussion of obviation systems outside of Ojibwe.
Blackfoot (Algoqnuain) shows an eight-way distinction between exclusive, inclusive, second, and third,
fully crossed by obviation. Ktunaxa (Isolate) shows a four-way contrast in person, lacking an inclusive-
exclusive distinction, but including a proximate-obviative contrasts in the third persons.
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Ojibwe. Noun classification has not yet received a treatment within the lattice-based
theory, and is covered here in Section 2.7. The proposal suggests that there are close
ties between the function of noun classification and person more generally, with both
serving the basic function of creating partitions of the person ontology. Differences be-
tween the two, at least in Ojibwe, is tied to their association distinct functional heads.
Person is specified on π, while noun classification is specified on n (“little” n, the nom-
inalizing head). This rightly put the animacy distinction in Ojibwe within the cline of
the prominence hierarchy, with the most basic distinction being made between animate
persons (which include first, second, and many third persons) versus everything else
(i.e. all other “non-animate” third persons).
2.3 A lattice-based representation of features
The goal of this section is to introduce the core components of Harbour’s (2016) lattice-
based approach to the representation of person categories and person features, ex-
tending the analysis to include a feature to encode the proximate-obviative distinction.
There are three pieces adopted from Harbour’s account: (i) the make-up of the un-
derlying ontology of person; (ii) the lattice-based representation of features; and (iii)
assumptions about the functional sequence. This sets the stage for the analysis of how
person features combine to provide a solution to the partition problem—i.e. derive all
and only the possible distinctions between person categories both within and across
languages.
2.3.1 Ontological commitments
The starting point of Harbour (2016) is a claim about the underlying ontology of person:
it is assumed that there is a single speaker, i, a single hearer, u, and multiple others, o, o′,
o′′, etc. While this assumption is not strictly necessary, Harbour provides an extended
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argument in favor of a minimal, egocentric ontology over alternatives that allow the
possibility of multiple speakers and/or hearers (i.e. i′, i′′, etc; or u′, u′′, etc).
To briefly summarize the main line of reasoning, a major challenge to the assumption
of minimality is accounting for the possibility of “choric” speech, where first person
plurals such as we appear to reference only those who are speaking (in unison). While
rare, such situations are not implausible and simple to construct. For example, a choric
we could be reasonably licensed by a team of victorious hockey players singing Queen’s
We Are The Champions as an ensemble.
Harbour reasons from two basic points. First, while choric contexts could be de-
scribed by appealing to an ontology with multiple speakers, it is not necessary. Instead,
each speaker can be thought to be egocentrically treating themself as an i, with all
other members of the chorus being conceived of as an o. Second, there is no evidence
that any language differentiates between the choric we denoting a set of speakers, and
the run-of-the-mill we denoting a speaker plus others. The existence of such a parti-
tion would falsify the minimal ontology, but large-scale typological surveys have failed
to uncover such a language (e.g. Cysouw, 2003; Bobaljik, 2008). As a result, I follow
Harbour in assuming an ontology that consists of minimal and egocentric speakers and
hearers, along with multiple others.
Later in the chapter, I motivate an addition to the ontology in the face of Ojibwe’s
animacy-based noun classification system: the inanimate others. This are represented
by a sequence of r ’s (i.e. r, r ′, r ′′,etc). The existence of these members of the ontology
are implictly assumed in Harbour’s original account, but not explored.
2.3.2 Organizing the ontology: Features as lattices
While the ontology provides the basic shape of person-based reference, Harbour posits
that it is not directly accessed by the grammar. Instead, the ontology is organized via
features, which mediate reference. The denotations of these features are derived from
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subsets that include the speaker alone (8a), the speaker and the hearer (8b), and the
whole ontology (8c). The first part of this section is devoted to detailing the steps of
this transformation with Harbour’s original features, then proposing a new feature to
account for obviation within the system, and finally considering the nature of the system
at large.
(8) Subsets of the ontology, used to create the denotation of features
a. {i} ⇒ [author]
b. {i, u} ⇒ [participant]
c. {i, u, o, o′, o′′, . . .} ⇒ π
2.3.2.1 Deriving Harbour’s original lattices
The first and most substantive move is to form the power sets for each of the subsets in
(8). The power set of any given set, represented here by the function P, is a set of all
possible subsets (including the empty set).




= {{i}, {i, u}, {u}, {}}
c. P({i, u, o, o′, o′′, . . .})
= {{i}, {i, o}, {i, o′}, {i, o′′}, . . . , {i, o, o′}, {i, o′, o′′}, . . . , {i, o, o′, o′′}, . . . ,
{i, u}, {i, u, o}, {i, u, o′}, . . . , {i, u, o, o′}, {i, u, o, o′′}, . . . , {i, u, o, o′, o′′}, . . . ,
{u}, {u, o}, {u, o′}, {u, o′′}, . . . , {u, o, o′}, {u, o′, o′′}, . . . , {u, o, o′, o′′}, . . . ,
{o}, {o′}, {o′′}, . . . , {o, o′}, {o, o′′}, . . . , {o, o′, o′′}, . . . , {}}
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Harbour then makes the move of treating the objects in (9) in lattice-theoretic terms
(as lattices of sets), rather than in set-theoretic terms (as sets of sets).3 Along with this
shift comes a change in notation, with the sets in (9) being re-written as lattices via the
exclusion of curly braces, as shown in (10).
(10) Power sets re-written in lattice-theoretic terms
a. {i,∅}
b. {i, iu, u,∅}
c. {i, io, io′, io′′, . . . , ioo′, ioo′′, . . . , ioo′o′′, . . . ,
iu, iuo, iuo′, iuo′′, . . . , iuoo′, iuoo′′, . . . , iuoo′o′′, . . . ,
u, uo, uo′, uo′′, . . . , uoo′, uoo′′, . . . , uoo′o′′, . . . ,
o, o′, o′′, . . . , oo′, oo′′, . . . , oo′o′′, . . . ,∅}
Next, a notational convention is introduced to further simplify the representation of
the structures—the same subscript notation that was introduced in a previous section.
In formal terms:
(11) X Y is the list of sets of the form {x} ∪ y , for x ∈ X , y ∈ P(Y )
I break with the conventions introduced by Harbour in how “other” persons are repre-
sented. This is necessary to properly capture the proximate-obviative distinction. In the
revised notation, i, u, o, o′, o′′, and so on always represent singleton sets. For Harbour,
o represents the set of all possible o’s {o, o′, o′′, o′′′, . . .}, rather than the singleton set
{o}. To represent the set of all possible o’s including the “proximate” o, I use x . Fur-
thermore, to represent the set of all possible o’s excluding the “proximate” o, I use x ′.
To summarize:
3This move is chiefly for expository purposes — according to Harbour the account can be equally
couched in set-theoretic terms. Using lattices rather than sets provides simplified calculations as well as
friendly graphical representations.
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x = {o, o′, o′′, o′′′, . . .}
x ′ = {o′, o′′, o′′′, . . .}
Therefore ux provides an abbreviated representation for lattice elements that con-
tain u and any possible number of o’s, including none (u, uo, uo′, uo′′, . . ., uoo′, uoo′′,
uo′o′′, . . ., uoo′o′′, . . .). i x provides an abbreviated representation for lattice elements
that contain i and any possible number of o’s, including none (i, io, io′, io′′, . . ., ioo′,
ioo′′, io′o′′, . . ., ioo′o′′, . . .) Similarly, iux represents lattice elements containing iu and
any number of o’s (iu, iuo, iuo′, iuo′′, . . ., iuoo′, iuoo′′, iuo′o′′, . . ., iuoo′o′′, . . .).
Turning to the third persons, in Harbour’s original notation, oo represents the list of
any o on its own (o, o′, o′′, . . .), any pair of o’s (oo′, oo′′, o′o′′, . . .), any triple (oo′o′′,
. . .), and so on. I instead represent this same set as x x . In this adapted notation, ox is
fully analogous to i x and ux in that it is reserved for abbreviating lattice elements that
contain the “proximate” element o and any possible number of other o’s, including none
(o, oo′, oo′′, oo′′′, . . ., oo′o′′, oo′o′′′, oo′′o′′′, . . ., oo′o′′o′′′, . . .). Note that every single
element here includes o. This distinction is crucial for the contrast between proximate
and obviative persons, and is discussed further in the coming sections.
The resulting representations are given in (13), with the additional step of removing
the empty set applied.4
4This renders the structures not “lattices” in the technical sense — the absence of the empty set
renders them atomic join-complete semilattices. The distinction does not affect the upcoming account.
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(13) Lattices re-written in subscript notation
a. {i} author lattice L au
b. {i, iu, u} participant lattice L pt
c. {i x , iux , ux , x x} π lattice L π
As (13) shows, moving forward these will be referred to as the author lattice (abbrevi-
ated L au), the participant lattice (abbreviated L pt), and the the π lattice (abbreviated
L π).
2.3.2.2 Proposal: A lattice for [proximate]
To capture obviation, I propose an additional feature, [proximate], whose denotation is
derived from taking the power set of the ontological subset {i, u, o}. This subset includes
the minimal possible specification of each of the ontological primitives. In the case of
first and second person, which as discussed above only have a single token to begin
with, this restriction does not amount to much. In the case of the other persons, this
means including only a single o, which we can conventionally call the proximate third
person. To reiterate, any of the o’s would serve equally well, as long as only a single o is
designated. Indeed, the particular o that is included in this set is a matter determined
by the wider discourse context, where the referent that takes on the proximate status
is determined. I stick with the non-prime o throughout the presentation for simplicity
and clarity. The derivation of the proximate lattice, with the same steps outlined above
for π, [participant], and [addressee] is given in (14).
(14) Derivation of the proximate lattice
a. {i, u, o} define proximate subset
b. P({i, u, o}) take power set of (a)
= {{i}, {i, o}, {u}, {u, o}, {i, u}, {i, u, o}, {o}, {}}
79
c. {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o,∅} lattice notation re-write of (b)
d. {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o}=L px remove empty set from (c)
The four lattices introduced here (L π, L px , L pt , L au) can be manipulated to
derive the five-way person partition of Ojibwe, but are also sufficient to capture the
variation in obviation seen across languages. The general machinery that dictates the
interactions between lattices to capture the different partitions is detailed in Section
2.4.3. The application of the system to Ojibwe is found in Section 2.5. Finally, a discus-
sion of obviation beyond Ojibwe can be found in Chapter 3.
2.3.2.3 Why (these) features? Why (these) lattices?
Before moving forward to these endeavors, a few points of discussion are in order.
First, one may wonder whether the operations posited here that transform subsets
of the ontology from power sets to lattices are independently motivated, or what their
status in the grammar might be. Harbour points out that the employed operations are
not novel in being employed within linguistic theory (see e.g. Link, 1983; Chierchia,
1998; Borer, 2005). In any case, I do not take Harbour to be claiming that such calcu-
lations must be synchronically employed in adults (nor do I necessarily assume this to
be true). The operations that form the lattices can be considered to be a formal model
of how the sets represented by particular morphosyntactic features arose diachronically,
or perhaps arise over the course of language acquisition. Once settled, the lattices rep-
resented by these features are the mental representation that mediates reference to the
ontology, and need not be actively derived upon each use.
A second point is why the particular subsets {i} and {i, u} (restricting the discussion
for the moment to the original subsets proposed by Harbour) are rendered into fea-
tures that connect our grammar to the underlying ontology. Harbour conjectures that
the evolutionary and developmental trajectory of social interaction may be relevant. We
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might reasonably surmise that our most basic level of awareness is inward to ourselves.
This is represented by a solitary {i}, which becomes the author lattice. At some point,
awareness expands to immediate interaction between the self and a single other, rep-
resented by {i, u}, which becomes the participant lattice. Finally, an expansion occurs
to include those beyond the speaker and hearer to an awareness that includes others,
represented by {i, u, o, o′, . . .}, which becomes the π lattice.
This brings to the fore the question of whether the π, participant, author lattices,
and their corresponding features, must be part of a learner’s initial state (e.g. specified
in Universal Grammar), or whether the profile of how social interaction via language
occurs results in languages sharing a common ontology of person and a common set of
possible features. In any case, it is indisputable that the particular set of features that
a given language makes use of, and furthermore how these features combine, must be
learnable from the primary input. This is true whether features are built by learners
from scratch based on this input, or whether the shape of the input triggers the use of
particular representations made available by UG. As a result, the present account need
not take an unflinching stance one way or the other on the question of innateness, and
considers the question to be open for further investigation.
A related point is that the Algonquian languages, with the system of obviation, pro-
vide a case where an additional feature is present. The proposed feature, [proximate],
is derived from a subset of the ontology that includes the speaker, hearer, and a single
other {i, u, o}. One question that arises, given the preceding discussion, is how this
distinction came to be; particularly in light of its typological rarity. If such a feature
is made available by UG, this rarity must be accounted for. Furthermore, based on the
logic of expanding social awareness given above, it would seem a natural progression to
add a single other, forming the proximate subset, rather than jumping immediately to π
where all of the others come in at once. I do not provide a response to these questions,
but note that recent decades have shown that obviation (and closely related distinc-
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tions) may not be as typologically rare as once thought. Understanding this variation
on a descriptive level is a first step to understanding the origins of obviation.
A final point related to the particular set of features regards the absence of a fea-
ture formed from a subset of the addressee alone, {u}. We could call such a feature
[addressee]. For the purposes of deriving the possible partitions, the omission of this
feature is the key to solving Zwicky’s problem. To review, Zwicky observed that if the
inclusive is conflated with another category, it is the exclusive. There is no language
that conflates the inclusive with the second person. This is illustrated in (15).
(15) Illustration of Zwicky’s Problem in the tripartition
a. i x iux |ux |x x
b. *i x |iux ux |x x
Harbour (see also McGinnis, 2005) shows that the problem is general: an analogous
asymmetry holds in the bipartition (i.e. there is an author bipartition, but no addressee
bipartition):
(16) Illustration of Zwicky’s Problem in the bipartition
a. i x iux |ux x x
b. *ux iux |i x x x
In short, there is an asymmetry between i and u in the patterns of conflation. There are
cuts that distinguish authors from everyone else, but not cuts that distinguish addressees
from everyone else. This asymmetry is reflected by the presence of [author], but the
absence of [addressee]. If both of these features could be present at once, then the
theory would incorrectly predict symmetry between these two categories. If the theory
instead lacked [author], but included [addressee], then we would expect the opposite
asymmetry to hold.
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Ultimately, there are two complications to the absolute version of the claim that
languages lack an addressee feature across the board. The first rears its head when
the theory of contrastive interpretations is considered in Section 2.4.1, where I show
that the participant feature is interpreted as an addressee feature in certain cases. I
reserve further discussion for that section. A second, more pointed challenge comes
from languages which privilege agreement with second persons over all other persons
(e.g. Nez Perce; Deal, 2015). Existing accounts of these patterns rely on the presence
of a pure [addressee] feature on the probe. Ultimately, I conclude that it is necessary
to adopt the same view (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2). This reveals a representational
mismatch between the features available to agreement probes versus the possible set of
goals, which I term the Addressee Asymmetry. While agreement probes necessitate the
availability of [addressee], deriving the possible person partitions in a language (i.e.
the possible goals) relies on the absence of this feature. Further discussion of how this
the Addressee Asymmetry might be resolved can be found in Chapter 7, Section 7.2.
2.3.3 The functional sequence
The final piece of the account to put into place before moving on to deriving parti-
tions regards where the head π lives within the functional sequence. I follow Harbour
in assuming that π combines with a head ϕ—the root node of the nominal spine (it
could alternatively be written as
p
following the conventions of Distributed Morphol-
ogy). The addition that is made here, which will be revised in due course, is to add the
proximate feature to the head π.5
5The revision will be that proximate heads its own projection, which sits below π. This is motivated








The head ϕ serves a critical function, in that its denotation, shown in (18), introduces
a variable that ranges over the set S denoted by π. This allows reference to be made
to any of the values of S. In other words, π constrains the variable to the particular
domain denoted by its set (i.e. the members of the lattices we have been referring to as
inclusive, exclusive, second person, third person).
(18) JϕK= λS.λx .x ∈ S, where x ∈ De
This is accomplished via function application, as shown in (19), where F is the set of
features [±proximate], [±participant], and/or [±author] specified on π.
(19) JϕK(JπFK)
= λS.λx .x ∈ S(JFK(L π))
= λx .x ∈ JFK(L π)
The functional sequence is expanded in Section 2.7 with the addition of projections
for number and noun classification, which will provide further constraints on the set
over which the variable ranges. In the next section, I consider how features interact to
provide the domain restriction outlined above.
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2.4 The composition of features
In this section I argue in favor of an account of the partition problem and the interac-
tion of features based in the theory of contrastive interpretations. This is a calculated
departure from the account given in Harbour (2016). An explicit comparison between
Harbour’s theory and the one adopted here is given in Section 2.6. I show the theory of
contrastive interpretations is capable of deriving the original five partitions identified
by Harbour (following the work of Cowper and Hall, 2019), as well as the additional
partition of Ojibwe introduced by obviation and the proximate feature.
The particular account I propose preserves the lattice-based representations pro-
posed by Harbour and introduced in the previous section. I adopt the idea that the
principle of contrastive interpretations operates over the lattices denoted by each fea-
ture. In other words, the lattices are subject to contextually dictated narrowing, de-
pending on the input available to the learner. The relevant context is determined by
an algorithm that finds the minimal feature representation necessary to derive the cat-
egories distinguished within a given paradigm.
Put in the terms of the theory, the precise denotation of a given feature differs de-
pending on its “scope” with respect to the other features it combines with. It is important
to emphasize that “scope” relations are with respect to the contrastive hierarchy rather
than the phrase structure hierarchy. For example, [±participant] ends up marking a con-
trast between hearer and non-hearer (rather than participant versus non-participant)
when it is “within the scope” of [±author] on the contrastive hierarchy. As I show, fol-
lowing the spirit of the proposal by Cowper and Hall (2019), this allows for a solution
to the original partition problem. The theory further provides a principled and properly
restrictive way to smuggle a [±addressee] feature into the representation—a possibil-
ity that can be leveraged when considering the behavior of agreement probes in the
coming chapters, which necessitate the existence of an independent addressee feature.
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The new aspect of the proposal is showing that the theory captures the quintipar-
tition of Ojibwe when [±proximate] is added to the mix. Neither [±participant] nor
[±author] mark a contrast when in the scope of [−proximate], resulting in a lack of
partition between proximate and obviative in the local persons, but ensuring that a
contrast in the third persons is still derived. In contrast, Harbour’s original theory of
feature interaction, with the addition of the proximate feature, is unable to generate the
quintipartition of Ojibwe. Again, a direct evaluation of Harbour’s account can be found
in Section 2.6. The theory of contrastive interpretations therefore covers the same em-
pirical ground, and more, when it comes to capturing all and only the possible person
partitions with obviation (and, ultimately, animacy) added to the mix.
2.4.1 Contrastive interpretations of features
The touching off point for the current section is Cowper and Hall (2019). Like Harbour,
they provide a solution to the partition problem. That is, they put forward a theory of
the representation that generates all and only the five person partitions discussed in
Section 2.2.1. These partitions are repeated in (20) for reference.
(20) The original five partitions. From left-to-right: Monopartition, participant





















I review their original account first, then provide a novel formalization of the features
they propose that allows it to be couched directly in lattice-theoretic therms, and finally
advance the core proposal of the chapter, where I extend the system to capture the five-
way partition of Ojibwe.
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Like Harbour, Cowper & Hall posit two binary person features, which combine to
partition the sets denoted by the head π (i x , iux , ux , x x). They treat these features as
first-order predicates, as summarized in (21):
(21) Person features as first-order predicates (Cowper and Hall, 2019)
a. J[+author]K = ‘includes the speaker’
b. J[−author]K = ‘does not include the speaker’
c. J[+participant]K = ‘includes at least one discourse participant’
d. J[−participant]K = ‘does not include a discourse participant’
For the purposes of introducing the basics of the theory, I retain their original informal
denotations for each feature. I provide a formalization in Section 2.4.3.
It is pertinent to note now that these denotations differ from the proposed interac-
tions between features and lattices in Harbour’s original system, where features com-
bine via operations defined by the positive and negative values of the features. At
present, the details of these operations are not important, but the contrast between
the predicate-based versus function-based interaction of lattices is worth keeping in
back of mind (see Section 2.6 for details and further discussion).
Moving on, Cowper and Hall (2019) show the derivations of the monopartition, au-
thor bipartition, and participant bipartition utilize the same basic inventory of features
as proposed by Harbour, despite the noted differences in how interactions between fea-
tures are conceived. Therefore the accounts share a common core. If there are no
person features specified on π, then no partitions are made and the monopartition is
derived. If the language uses only [±author], then a split is made between a partition
with all sets that include the speaker (i x , iux) with the positive value, versus those that
do not include the speaker (ux , x x) with the negative value. Similarly, the participant
bipartition is derived for languages that only utilize the [±participant] feature, dividing
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π between those that include at least one discourse participant (i x , iux , ux) with the
positive value, and those that do not (x x) with the negative value.
The key difference, and of particular interest here, is in the derivation of the tri-
partition and quadripartition, where more than one feature enters into the derivation.
In this case, the relative scope of features (as schematized by the particular contrastive
hierarchy at play) determines both the possible partitions that a feature can make as
well as the particular interpretation that a feature receives. To preview the arguments
put forward explicitly in Section 2.4.2, the determination of these scope relationships is
assumed to occur over the course of acquisition, when a learner is faced with generat-
ing a particular person partition given the set of grammatical primitives π, [proximate],
[participant], and [author].
Consider the tripartition first, with the relevant contrastive hierarchy shown in (22).
The inventory of π is first split by [±participant], making a division between the first and
second persons versus the third persons. The further split introduced by [±author] then
only serves to separate the members on the [+participant] side of the divide, separating
the sets that include i from those that lack it. This allows for a partition that makes a
distinction between second and first person, but lacks a clusivity distinction.









It is worth spelling out in more detail why [±author] only makes further cuts when
[+participant] has applied, but not [−participant]. In short, [−participant] creates a
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partition that completely excludes any discourse participant. As a result, there is no
further contrast for the feature [±author] to make (i.e. there are no sets that include i).
As a result, any application of the author feature would be entirely vacuous—the generic
third person partition element is derived regardless. In contrast, on the [+participant]
side, [±author] can further partitions the sets into those that include versus exclude the
author, thus providing a relevant contrast to derive first versus second person.
The quadripartition exemplifies a second way in which the notion of being con-
trastive affects the representation of person, as schematized in the hierarchy in (23).












The key difference is that [±author] now takes scope above [±participant]. The first
contrast is therefore between those elements of the π lattice that include the author (i x ,
iux) versus those that exclude the author (ux , x x). In the latter case, [±participant] fur-
ther makes a division between the sets that exclude a discourse participant (the third
person x x) and those that include a discourse participant (the second person ux). The
division made on the [+author] side is more subtle, and crucially relies on the notion
that features introduce some relevant contrast. In particular, Cowper and Hall (2019)
propose the feature is narrowed to mean ‘includes/does not include a discourse partic-
ipant other than the speaker’. This recasts the feature as marking a contrast between
those sets that include versus exclude the addressee (u), allowing the contrast between
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the inclusive and exclusive persons to be derived. I represent the narrowed version of
this feature as [participant*].
To bring the notion of contrast further into relief, imagine if the contrastive princi-
ples did not apply. On the [−author] side, this would leave open the possibility that the
predicate denoted by [−participant], which semi-informally means “does not include a
discourse participant”, becomes redundant with [−author] by simply excluding the ele-
ments that include i, thereby failing to create a cut between the third and second person
elements. By the same token, the positive variant [+participant] could create a contra-
diction with [−author] by denoting a predicate that requires the presence of i. The
issues are analogous on the [+author] side, where the combination of [−participant]
could in principle give rise to a contradiction, while [+participant] might fail to create
the relevant cut. In short, a system without the contrastive interpretation of features
would be far too unconstrained.
Short of conceiving of the absence of a feature as complete contextually dictated
narrowing, a further property of the system is that the author feature will never have
an alternative interpretation. Since this feature only contains a single element i, [au-
thor] is as narrow as a feature can be while still being present at all. This means that
we have now exhausted all of the possibilities of feature combinations and contrastive
meanings under the current two feature system, and have thus derived all and only the
five original partitions—we have provided a solution to the original partition problem.
To briefly summarize, the notion of contrastive interpretations plays two key roles.
First, it restricts a given feature from combining with another feature if the set to be
divided lacks elements that would be contrasted through the use of that feature. This
was seen in the tripartition, where the broad interpretation of [−participant] as lacking
both i and u bled the application of [±author]. Second, it narrows the interpretation of
a given feature depending on the context in which the feature applies. This was seen in
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the quadripartition, where [±participant] was narrowed to mark a contrast in whether
or not an addressee is present (represented as [±participant*]).
2.4.2 Deriving contrastive hierarchies
The reader may wonder about the representational status of the contrastive hierarchies
shown above. In short, they are schematic devices — it is not the case that features
are literally organized into such hierarchies. As a result, the contrastive hierarchies
are not representations per se, but a way of showing the scope relationships between
features, which allows the particular interpretation of the features to be established.
This marks an important conceptual difference from what is claimed under the feature
geometric approach, where a universal geometric hierarchy is directly represented and
manipulated by the grammar.
What, then, is the part of the grammar that gives rise to contrastive interpretations
and these scope relationships? Following the work of Dresher (2009, 2018) on the
derivation of phonological contrasts, these properties can be derived from the Succes-
sive Division Algorithm in (24), which ultimately is active over the course of acquisition.
I eschew the formal details to focus on the principles behind the theory.
(24) Successive Division Algorithm (SDA), informally
Assign contrastive features by successively dividing an inventory until every
member has been distinguished.
The idea is general enough to apply to any number of domains where an inventory
must be divided into some number of categories. In phonology, it is applied to allow
for the inventory of phonemes in a given language to be distinguished. For the present
purposes, it is applied to allow the inventory of person partitions to be distinguished. For
an inventory of person categories, the initial state is one in which there are no divisions
between the persons. In other words, the monopartition created by the presence of π.
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The necessary contrasts (i.e. the patterns of distinction and conflation between partition
elements) to be derived are determined by the primary input to the learner, and features
are added, further dividing the inventory, until the proper number of partition elements
are derived.
There are two major tenants of the theory. The most fundamental, adapted from
Clements (2001) and given in (25), is the notion of Feature Activity.6 This limits the
specification of features to only those that play a role in deriving the inventory—these
features are thus considered “active” in a given language.
(25) Feature Activity
A feature is active if it plays a role in the derivation of the inventory.
The second tenant adapted from Hall (2007) is given in (26), and provides further
clarification on what it means for a feature to be active: only features that provide the
means to generate a contrast are active.
(26) The Contrastivist Hypothesis
The derivation of an inventory only operates with those features that are nec-
essary to distinguish the members of the inventory.
In the case that the hypothesis in (26) holds, then the principle in (27) also holds.
(27) Corollary to the Contrastivist Hypothesis
If a feature is active, then it must be contrastive.
The Contrastivist Hypothesis and its corollary provide the means to capture the two
restrictions seen in the the derivation of the tripartition and quadripartition. First, it
prevents [±author] from combining with [−participant] in tripartition languages, as
6This is not to be confused with the Activity Condition proposed by Chomsky (2000, 2001), which
restricts the types of goals that can be targeted by AGREE.
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there is no further contrast that can be marked by the author feature in this context.
As previously noted, all participants are partitioned off in these cases, leaving author
nothing to divide. While no harm would come from including these features in terms
of deriving the final inventory, the learner lacks evidence to drive the addition of these
features, and is assumed to adopt the most parsimonious representation consistent with
the input. Second, the theory derives restrictions on [±participant] when it is in the
scope of [±author] such that it is contrastive—i.e. it distinguishes between sets the
include and exclude the addressee. As previously noted, without this winnowing, the
[±participant] would either not be contrastive, or generate contradictions.
To summarize the arguments and consider the broader context in which they oper-
ate, the application of the Contrastivist Hypothesis restricts the outputs created by par-
ticular feature combinations. In essence, it is a variant of the Subset Principle, which
results in the generation of maximally restrictive grammars consistent with the input
(e.g. Manzini and Wexler, 1987). On the theory of contrastive interpretations, the in-
terpretations of features are restricted to derive the desired outputs, without any extra-
neous features. In the next section, having introduced the tenants of the Contrastive
Hypothesis, I turn to reformulating the denotation of features in terms of the lattice-
based representation of features.
2.4.3 Application to the lattice-based representation
The goal of this section is to provide a novel formalization of the theory of contrastive
interpretations in terms of the lattice-based representation of person. For the purposes
of this section, I again restrict focus to the author and participant features only, re-
serving discussion of proximate feature and the derivation of the proximate-obviative
distinction to the next section. The (power) sets denoted by each feature as well as the
host head π are repeated in (28) for reference.
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(28) Features as lattices (repeated)
a. J[author]K = {i}
b. J[participant]K = {i, iu, u}
c. JπK = {i x , iux , ux , x x}
The formulas in (29) define the interactions between lattices. Positive interactions
of F with G, shown formally in (29a), results in a lattice consisting of all elements
within L G that contain at least one member of L F . Negative interaction of F with G,
given formally in (29b), results in a lattice consisting of all elements within L G that do
not contain any member of L F .
(29) a. J+F(G)K= {g : ∃ f ∈ g [g ∈L G ∧ f ∈L F]}
b. J−F(G)K= {g : ¬∃ f ∈ g [g ∈L G ∧ f ∈L F]}
In the coming derivations of each partition, I use ⊕ to denote positive interactions be-
tween lattices, and 	 to denote negative interactions, as shown in (30).
(30) a. J+F(G)K=L G ⊕L F
b. J−F(G)K=L G 	L F
The formality of the above definitions may obscure the fact that the proposal is based
in first-order predicate logic. They are generalized versions of the feature definitions put
forward by Cowper and Hall (2019) (see (21)). Positive action confines L G to a lattice
that is comprised of sets that contain a member of L F . Negative action confines L G to
a lattice of the sets that do not contain a member of L F . In other words, the lattice L G
is restricted to only those sets that have/lack the property defined by F . Put in terms of
the features at hand, the lattice denoted by π provides the domain of a variable, which
can be restricted by a feature such as [±author] so that it must include/exclude those
elements of L π that contain i.
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An important feature of the present account is that the order of composition of
features is commutative, as shown in (31). This property is particularly relevant when
evaluating Harbour’s original account of feature/lattice interaction (see Section 2.6),
where the order of composition of features is a matter of parameterization that must
be extrinsically fixed within a given language.
(31) J±H(±F(G))K= J±F(±H(G))K
The major boon is that this property frees the account of a need to stipulate extrinsic
parameters or constraints to organize the composition of features on a head. This al-
lows the feature set to be a truly unordered bundle on a given head, providing a more
parsimonious representation, and as a consequence simplifying the mapping between
syntax and the PF and LF interfaces. Here, heads (and, by extension, the functional
sequence) are the sole locus of restrictions in the order of composition — a fact that
has been widely noted and well-established in current theories of the syntax-semantics
interface, where phrase-structure hierarchies guides semantic composition (e.g. Heim
and Kratzer, 1998). There is no need for additional mappings to be established to guide
the composition of features within a given head.
The remainder of the section is devoted to showing how the proposed reformulation
of features and values as lattices and lattice interactions derives all and only the original
five partitions, given the theory of contrastive interpretations which determines both the
features available in a language and the particular sets that they denote.
2.4.3.1 Monpartition and bipartitions
As is the case across all accounts considered in this chapter, the monopartition is de-
rived when a language lacks both the author and participant features. In short, there is
nothing to derive in terms of feature interaction, as only the head π is specified.
95
The author and participant bipartitions are derived by the presence of either the
[±author] or [±participant] features, respectively. The derivations are shown in (32)
and (33). Both make use of the theory of contrastive interpretations in the sense that
only active features—i.e. those that serve to make a relevant partition—are present in
the grammar. In the case of the author bipartition, the split is between those sets that
include i and those that do not. In the case of the participant bipartition, the split is
between those that include i, u, or iu and those that do not.
(32) Derivation of the author bipartition
a. J+author(π)K
=L π ⊕L au
= {i x , iux , ux , x x} ⊕ {i}
= {i x , iux}
b. J−author(π)K
=L π 	L au
= {i x , iux , ux , x x} 	 {i}
= {ux , x x}
(33) Derivation of the participant bipartition
a. J+participant(π)K
=L π ⊕L pt
= {i x , iux , ux , x x} ⊕ {i, iu, u}
= {i x , iux , ux}
b. J−participant(π)K
=L π 	L pt




The derivation of the tripartition uses both the participant and author features, with
participant denoting its full lattice. In the case of negative interaction between partici-
pant and π, all sets containing participants are removed, leaving only the third person
elements. This is shown in (34), and is equivalent to the negative action seen in the
derivation of the participant bipartition.
(34) Derivation of the third person in the tripartition
J−participant(π)K
=L π 	L pt
= {i x , iux , ux , x x} 	 {i, iu, u}
= {x x}
At this point, it should be relatively clear why any interactions with the author feature
are vacuous in this case—this is true regardless of the order in which features com-
pose with π, further demonstrating the commutativity of feature composition. When
[−participant] composes first, vacuity arises as the lattice does not have any sets that
include i, so there is nothing for an author feature to partition. The case of the author
feature composing first boils down to the fact that the author lattice is a proper subset
of the participant lattice. Therefore the negative effects of the participant lattice will
always supersede any interaction between author and π.
Both the derivation of the generic first person and the second person involve positive
interaction between the participant feature and π, and are indifferent to the order of
composition between the author and participant features. The participant first orders
are shown in (35a) and (36a) for first and second person, respectively; the author first
orders in (35b) and (36b), again for both first and second person.
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(35) Derivation of the first person in the tripartition
a. J+author(+participant(π))K
= ((L π ⊕L pt)⊕L au)
= (({i x , iux , ux , x x} ⊕ {i, iu, u})⊕ {i})
= {i x , iux , ux} ⊕ {i}
= {i x , iux}
b. J+participant(+author(π))K
= ((L π ⊕L au)⊕L pt)
= (({i x , iux , ux , x x} ⊕ {i})⊕ {i, iu, u})
= {i x , iux} ⊕ {i, iu, u}
= {i x , iux}
(36) Derivation of the second person in the tripartition
a. J−author(+participant(π))K
= ((L π ⊕L pt)	L au)
= (({i x , iux , ux , x x} ⊕ {i, iu, u})	 {i})
= {i x , iux , ux} 	 {i}
= {ux}
b. J+participant(−author(π))K
= ((L π 	L au)⊕L pt)
= (({i x , iux , ux , x x} 	 {i})⊕ {i, iu, u})
= {ux , x x} ⊕ {i, iu, u}
= {ux}
2.4.3.3 Quadripartition
The quadripartition is also derived by both the participant and author features being
present. It differs from the tripartition in that the participant feature is realized in its
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narrowed form, [participant*]. As previously discussed, in order to be contrastive and
derive the relevant clusivity distinction, the participant feature is interpreted as a subset
of its full power set such that it only includes u. Again, I represent this winnowed variant
of the feature as [±participant*] and the lattice it denotes as L pt∗.
The derivation of the third person is shown in (37) with both composition orders.
In both cases, negative interaction with the author feature removes those sets which
include i, and negative interaction of the participant* feature removes those sets that
include u, leaving only those that include x .
(37) Derivation of the third person in the quadripartition
a. J−participant*(−author(π))K
= ((L π 	L au)	L pt∗)
= (({i x , iux , ux , x x} 	 {i})	 {u})
= {ux , x x} 	 {u}
= {x x}
b. J−author(−participant*(π))K
= ((L π 	L pt∗)	L au)
= (({i x , iux , ux , x x} 	 {u})	 {i})
= {i x , x x} 	 {i}
= {x x}
The derivation of the second person is shown in (38), again for both composition
orders. Negative interaction with the author feature again removes all elements that
include i, while positive action of the participant* feature restricts the lattice to only
those that include u, leaving only the second person element ux in both cases, regardless
of composition order.
99
(38) Derivation of the second person in the quadripartition
a. J+participant*(−author(π))K
= ((L π 	L au)⊕L pt∗)
= (({i x , iux , ux , x x} 	 {i})⊕ {u})
= {ux , x x} ⊕ {u}
= {ux}
b. J−author(+participant*(π))K
= ((L π ⊕L pt∗)	L au)
= (({i x , iux , ux , x x} ⊕ {u})	 {i})
= {iux , ux} 	 {i}
= {ux}
Both the exclusive (39) and inclusive (40) share positive interactions with the author
feature. When this is combined with negative interaction with [participant*], then
the final set is the exclusive element i x , the lattice that includes the first person i but
excludes the second person u; when this is combined with positive interaction with
[participant*], then the final set is the inclusive element iux , the lattice with elements
that include both i and u.
(39) Derivation of the exclusive in the quadripartition
a. J−participant*(+author(π))K
= ((L π ⊕L au)	L pt∗)
= (({i x , iux , ux , x x} ⊕ {i})	 {u})
= {i x , iux} 	 {u}
= {i x}
b. J+author(−participant*(π))K
= ((L π 	L pt∗)⊕L au)
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= (({i x , iux , ux , x x} 	 {u})⊕ {i})
= {i x , x x} ⊕ {i}
= {i x}
(40) Derivation of the inclusive in the quadripartition
a. J+participant*(+author(π))K
= ((L π ⊕L au)⊕L pt∗)
= (({i x , iux , ux , x x} ⊕ {i})⊕ {u})
= {i x , iux} ⊕ {u}
= {iux}
b. J+author(+participant*(π))K
= ((L π ⊕L pt∗)⊕L au)
= (({i x , iux , ux , x x} ⊕ {u})⊕ {i})
= {iux , ux} ⊕ {i}
= {iux}
Again, the preceding derivations exhaust all of the possible feature interpretations,
composition orders, and values for the participant and author features. Having derived
each of the five original partitions, and nothing more, we have provided a solution to
the partition problem. In the next section, I return to consideration of the proximate
feature and to deriving the quintipartition of Ojibwe in the context of the theory of
contrastive interpretations.
2.5 The representation of person in Ojibwe
To review, the present claim is that Ojibwe, and many other Algonquian languages,
show what can be characterized as a quintipartition: a five-way distinction between
the partition elements. The quintipartition builds on the quadripartition by adding a
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contrast between the proximate and obviative third persons, in addition to the already
familiar distinctions between second, exclusive, and inclusive. This partition is shown
in (41) alongside the original five, now reframed to include the patterns of conflation
between proximate and obviative third person partition elements.
(41) Revised partitions. From left-to-right: Monopartition, participant biparti-































The desired lattices for the proximate and obviative elements in the partitions above,
ox and x
′
x ′ , are repeated in (42).
(42) Proximate and obviative partition elements
a. PROX = ox = {o, oo′, oo′′, oo′′′, ..., oo′o′′, oo′o′′′, oo′′o′′′, ..., }
b. OBV = x ′x ′ = {o′, o′′, o′′′, ..., o′o′′, o′o′′′, o′′o′′′, ..., o′o′′o′′′, ..., }
To review, the desired proximate lattice contains all elements that include the proximate
o, plus some number of others (including none). On the other hand, the obviative lattice
consists of those sets that exclude the proximate o.
As the partitions imply, joining together the proximate and obviative lattices ox and
x ′x ′ simply results in the generic third person lattice x x . In other words, the proxi-
mate and obviative lattices represent two non-overlapping subsets of the generic third
person—the two are entirely disjoint, but together exhaust the space of third persons
represented by the generic third person in other languages. This situation is fundamen-
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tally the same as the contrast in whether languages distinguish or conflate the inclusive
and exclusive first person, but applied within the third person.
In the previous section, it was shown that the two-feature system neatly captured
all and only the five original partitions. The proposal put forward here relies on the
addition of the feature [±proximate], the denotation of which is repeated in (43) for
reference.
(43) J[proximate]K = P({i, u, o}) = {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o}=L px
Before moving into the account of Ojibwe, it is important to dwell for a moment on
the fact that the addition of this feature increases the number of feature combinations
generated by the account, and as a result predicts a number of additional partitions
than have been discussed thus far. Like the participant feature, the proximate feature
represents a non-singleton set and can thus be subject to narrowing. In principle, two
possibilities can arise: (i) if it is in the scope of [author], then it is narrowed to contrast
u and o; (ii) if it is in the scope of participant, then it is narrowed to contrast o.
In this chapter, I focus on showing that a feature combination that generates the
quintipartition of Ojibwe is present among these new possibilities. In Chapter 3 I re-
turn to the question of whether the additional feature combinations that are predicted
must be restricted in some way to prevent over-generation or other ill-begotten parti-
tions, or whether they are all necessary to generate the typological profile of obviation.
This discussion is somewhat speculative due to the relative rarity of obviation across
languages. (Or, perhaps more likely, rarity in the rate at which has been identified and
documented). That said, the predictions of the account can still be concretely outlined
and tentatively evaluated.
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2.5.1 The Ojibwe quintipartition
I propose that the contrastive hierarchy in (44) is sufficient to capture the quintipar-
tition of Ojibwe, where a five-way split is made between exclusive, inclusive, second,
proximate, and obviative persons. All three person features are present, with proximate
taking widest scope, followed by author, and finally by participant. By the same logic as
seen in the quadripartition, the participant feature is narrowed to participant*, making
a split based on the presence/absence of the addressee, to become contrastive in the
context of the author feature taking wider scope.















I consider the derivation of each of the five partition elements. The simplest is the
obviative third person element x ′x ′ , which is derived by negative action of proximate
on π. This removes all sets from the person lattice that contain any of the proximate
persons i, u, or o, leaving only those that contain the non-proximate o′’s.
(45) Derivation of the obviative person in the quintipartition
J−proximate(π)K
=L π 	L px
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= {i x , iux , ux , ox , x ′x ′} 	 {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o}
= {x ′x ′}
Analogously to the split made by [−participant] in the tripartition, where the [±author]
feature was not composed, there is no further possible partition that can be gained
through an interaction with either [±participant] nor [±author] following the negative
action of the proximate feature. Again, this is due to the fact that both the participant
and author lattices are proper subsets of the proximate lattice. The application of these
features would be entirely vacuous, therefore under the SDA the features are not posited
by the learner and not encoded by the grammar. Though formally, there would be no
ill effects to adding these features in deriving the relevant partition.
The proximate third person is derived, as shown in (46), by positive action of the
proximate feature, which maximally allows for the lattice {i x , iux , ux , ox}, essentially
removing the obviative third person element x ′x ′ . This is paired with negative action
of the author feature, removing those sets of the lattice that include i, and negative
interaction with participant*, which removes all sets that contain u. This leaves only
the desired output, the proximate element ox .
(46) Derivation of the proximate person in the quintipartition
J−participant*(−author(+proximate(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L px)	L au)	L pt∗)
= ((({i x , iux , ux , ox , x ′x ′} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o})	 {i})	 {u})
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} 	 {i})	 {u})
= {ux , ox} 	 {u}
= {ox}
The derivation in (46) is shown for only a single composition order of proximate first,
followed by author, and then finally participant*. But again, all composition orders will
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produce the same result. I do not exhaust these possibilities here for reasons of space,
but the principles are the same as those seen in the derivation of the tripartition and
quidripartition in the previous section.
In essence, the derivation of the second, exclusive, and inclusive are the same as
those seen in the quadripartition, and thus should be familiar. The second person,
shown in (47), takes positive values for the proximate and author features as was seen
in (46), but differs in that the participant* feature positively interacts, leaving only ux .
(47) Derivation of the second person in the quintipartition
J+participant*(−author(+proximate(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L px)	L au)⊕L pt∗)
= ((({i x , iux , ux , ox , x ′x ′} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o})	 {i})⊕ {u})
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} 	 {i})⊕ {u})
= {ux , ox} ⊕ {u}
= {ux}
The derivation of the exclusive in (48) again includes positive action of the prox-
imate feature. Additional positive action of the author feature selects those sets con-
taining i, and negative action of participant* removes those containing u, leaving only
the desired exclusive element i x .
(48) Derivation of the exclusive person in the quintipartition
J−participant*(+author(+proximate(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L px)⊕L au)	L pt∗)
= ((({i x , iux , ux , ox , x ′x ′} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o})⊕ {i})	 {u})
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} ⊕ {i})	 {u})
= {i x , iux} 	 {u}
= {i x}
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Likewise, the inclusive is derived by positive action of the proximate and author
features, leaving only sets that include i. In contrast to the exclusive, positive action of
participant* selects sets that include u, leaving only the inclusive element iux .
(49) Derivation of the inclusive person in the quintipartition
J+participant*(+author(+proximate(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L px)⊕L au)⊕L pt∗)
= ((({i x , iux , ux , ox , x ′x ′} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o})⊕ {i})⊕ {u})
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} ⊕ {i})⊕ {u})
= {i x , iux} ⊕ {u}
= {iux}
The above derivations derive all and only the five person categories found in Ojibwe.
Crucially, this particular feature combination does not predict a distinction between
proximate and obviative outside of the third person—the local persons do not alternate
on this dimension, and instead show the profile of the typical quadripartition. Finally,
the original five partitions retain their analysis. Lacking evidence of a contrast between
proximate and obviative, these languages do not make use of the proximate feature, and
therefore conflate the proximate and obviative partition elements into the generic third
person. As such, all six partitions, the five original plus the quintipartition of Ojibwe,
have been derived.
In the next section, I show that the definition of feature interaction advanced in
Harbour (2016) is unable to derive the quintipartition of Ojibwe.
2.6 Comparison to Harbour (2016)
Like the theory of feature composition based in the theory of contrastive interpreta-
tions, Harbour’s proposal provides a solution to the original partition problem. In this
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section, I first review his account, and then show that it is unable to capture the addi-
tional partitions introduced by obviation, given the addition of proximate feature. Since
both Harbour’s proposal and Cowper and Hall’s capture the original five partitions, this
provides decisive empirical evidence against the adoption of Harbour’s theory of feature
composition account (and, as a result, in favor of the currently adopted proposal).
2.6.1 Harbour’s solution to the original partition problem
2.6.1.1 Values as operations
The key difference between the adopted proposal and Harbour’s original system is in
the composition of features — the lattice-based representation underlying the features
is identical, and the desired partitions the same. In the system Harbour proposes, lat-
tices combine via operations defined by the positive (+) or negative (−) values. Semi-
informally, the + value, denoted in the coming derivations by the operator ⊕, joins
every possible duo of elements in a pair of lattices. The technical definition, taken from
Harbour (2016), is shown in (50).
(50) J+F(G)K= {g t f : f ∈L F , g ∈L G}
As written, F is positively acting on G. But the addition operation is commutative (as in
regular arithmetic addition; 1+ 2 = 2+ 1), as shown in (51), so it can equivalently be
written as G positively acting on F .
(51) J+F(G)K=L G ⊕L F =L F ⊕L G
The− value, denoted by the operator	, cumulatively subtracts every element in one
lattice from every element in the other. Conveniently, this operation can be simplified,
because each of the sets that will come into play have a unique maximal element. Given
an action −F(G), subtracting the maximal element of F from each element of G renders
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any further subtraction redundant (the rest of the elements in the set are subsets of the
maximal element).
(52) J−F(G)K= {g\max(L F) : g ∈L G}
Analogously to the positive value, −F(G) is negative action of F on G. Therefore the
maximal element of F is subtracted from each element of G. This operation is critically
non-commutative (again, as in arithmetic subtraction; 1− 2 6= 2− 1). This is shown in
(53).
(53) J−F(G)K=L G 	max(L F) 6= max(L F)	L G
The non-commutativity of the negative value marks a crucial difference between the
proposed account, where features could be freely ordered, and the account of Harbour,
where features will be critically ordered within a head. These parameters are detailed
in the next section.
2.6.1.2 The parameters of π
Harbour (2016) proposes that the features on π are parameterized on two basic dimen-
sions: (i) a feature can either be present in a given language, or absent; (ii) if two (or
more) features are present, then languages can differ with respect to the order that the
features compose with π. These parameters are given in (54).
(54) Parameters of π from Harbour 2016
a. The author feature is (not) present.
b. The participant feature is (not) present.
c. The author/participant feature composes first.
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For the moment, I set aside the proposed proximate feature to focus on Harbour’s orig-
inal account. This gives rise to five possible feature specifications and composition
orders, corresponding to the five attested partitions, as summarized in (55).
(55) Five partitions and their feature parameterizations from Harbour (2016)
a. Monopartition: π = i x iux ux x x
b. Participant bipartition: [±participant](π) = i x iux ux |x x
c. Author bipartition: [±author](π) = i x iux |ux x x
d. Tripartition: [±participant]([±author](π)) = i x iux |ux |x x
e. Quadripartition: [±author]([±participant](π)) = i x |iux |ux |x x
In the next section, I walk through the derivations for each case.
2.6.1.3 Capturing the original five partitions
Two final formal pieces for the derivations. First, over the course of the derivations,
empty sets are introduced by negative actions between lattices. The presence of the
empty set does serve an important role over the course of the derivation, but causes
problems when it is present in the final partition. Recall that these features are creating
sets that restrict the domain of entities that can be referenced by particular person
categories. The presence of the empty set implies that it should be possible to make
reference to nothing or no one—a possibility that is not attested. The solution lies in
adding a constraint to the domain restrictor De that is introduced by ϕ so that it cannot
include the empty set.
The second issue is that certain outputs overlap in their denotations. This is seen
specifically in the tripartition and quadripartition, where both the participant and au-
thor features are present. The derivations of these two partitions are schematized below
in (56) and (58). The details of how the lattice operations give rise to a particular out-
put in each step is not important for now—what is relevant is the difference between
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the left and right side of the dashed arrows, after both features have composed with π.
The reader is referred to Harbour’s book for a step-by-step exposition of the derivations.
Starting with the tripartition in (56), we see that [+author]([+participant](π))
gives rise to i x , iux . This overlaps with the output of [−author]([+participant](π)),
which ends up being i x , iux , ux . The issue here is that none of the feature combinations
pick out the second person partition element ux on its own—it only occurs in combi-
nation with the two first person elements. In essence, the features fail to derive the
second person category in the tripartition.
(56) Derivation of the tripartition (Harbour, 2016)
i x iux ux x x
i x iux
∅, ux x x
i x iux
∅, x x
















The solution comes from the principle of Lexical Complementarity. This is invoked when
two distinct feature outputs stand in a subset-superset relationship, and is used to elim-
inate the overlap between the two denotations. The result is that the feature combina-
tion with the larger denotation is restricted to only those elements that are not already
covered by the feature combination with the smaller denotation. In formal terms:
(57) Lexical Complementarity (Harbour, 2016, p. 80)
Let F and G be feature specifications where JF(π)K ⊂ JG(π)K. Then use of
JG(π)K is restricted to JG(π)K\JF(π)K.
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The two overlapping feature combinations of the tripartition stand in a subset-
superset relationship. Therefore Lexical Complementarity can be applied to restrict
the [−author]([+participant](π)) feature combination such that it only includes the
second person element ux .
More precisely, if the lattice denoted by a feature combination G is subsumed by the
feature combination F , then G is used just in case F cannot be used; subsequently, if F
can be used instead of G, then F must be used. This principle has analogues across a
number of domains, perhaps most saliently in the literature on scalar implicatures (e.g.
the sentence some students love syntax gives rise to the implicature that not all students
love syntax, due to the scalar relationship between some and all). It also has a direct
antecedent in the literature on the interpretation of person features; in particular, the
subset principle put forth by McGinnis (2005).
The same issue arises in the quadripartition, shown in (58). Lexical Complementar-
ity applies in two cases: (i) to restrict the [+participant]([+author](π)) combination
to only the exclusive element iux ; and (ii) to restrict the [+participant]([−author](π))
combination to only the second person element ux .
(58) Derivation of the quadripartition (Harbour, 2016)
i x iux ux x x
i x iux ux
∅, x x
i x iux























The final three partitions — the monopartition, the author bipartition, and the par-
ticipant bipartition — do not require the application of Lexical Complementarity. The
monopartition is simple: there are no features specified, and the output is exactly the
lattice denoted by π. The author and participant bipartitions are derived by the compo-
sition of the author and participant features with π, respectively. These derivations do
require the application of the restriction on De to remove the empty set, but otherwise
the feature combinations themselves produce the desired results. Schematizations of
the bipartition derivations are given in (59) for reference.
(59) Derivations of the author and participant bipartitions (Harbour, 2016)
i x iux ux x x
i x iux







i x iux ux x x
i x iux ux
∅, x x






To summarize this section and take a look forward, Harbour’s proposal provides
the means to derive all and only the five attested person partitions observed across the
world’s languages, setting aside distinctions of number, noun classification, and obvia-
tion. The immediate question is whether the system that Harbour proposes to solve the
partition problem is capable of capturing all and only the further distinctions introduced
by the addition of obviation. Most relevant is capturing the quintipartition of Ojibwe,
where obviation provides a further partition of the third persons between proximate
and obviative, but leaves the local persons unchanged. Ultimately, this asymmetry be-
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tween the local and non-local persons cannot be captured by Harbour’s system. This
under-generation problem calls the theory into question.
2.6.2 Harbour and the proximate feature
As already noted in the context of the theory of contrastive interpretations, the addition
of the proximate feature leads to a plethora of new feature combinations and compo-
sition orders—11 more, with 16 in total counting the original five. The question then
is, using Harbour’s theory of lattice actions, does one of these combinations result in
the quintipartition? It is easy to immediately rule out a number of the 16 possibilities.
First, all of those that lack the proximate feature, i.e. the original five combinations of
the author and participant features, can be ruled out.
This leaves the 11 new combinations implied by the addition of the proximate fea-
ture. Some of these can be ruled out simply on the grounds that they will not predict the
right number of partitions (i.e. fewer than five). The combination with the proximate
feature alone can only maximally make a partition of two, with the feature taking ei-
ther a positive or negative value. Similarly, the four two-feature combinations can only
maximally create four-way partitions when the value of each feature is fully crossed.
So the five single and double feature specifications can all be ruled out.
This leaves the six three-feature combinations, which I have repeated for reference
in (60).
(60) Feature combinations in contention for deriving the quintipartition









An immediate suspicion can be raised, again based simply on the number of partitions
that these combinations predict. Three features, each taking two values, when fully
crossed leads to eight possible combinations. This, of course, is more than the five-way
contrast observed in Ojibwe and many other Algonquian languages. This highlights one
of the major differences between Harbour’s theory and one based in contrastive inter-
pretations. Short of stipulating additional parameters for the way features combine,
Harbour’s theory is locked in to generating the number of possibilities logically possible
given the number of features crossed by their possible values. On the other hand, the
addition of contrastive interpretations creates principled limits on these combinations,
so that not all possibilities are generated. For example, the author feature does not
combine following a negatively valued participant feature (as seen in the tripartition),
and neither author nor participant combine following a negatively valued proximate
feature. In both cases, the features would fail to make any contrast.
However, this property of Harbour’s account has already been observed in the prior
discussion, and it does not necessarily lead to complete catastrophe. The tripartition,
which fully crosses two bivalent feature, has four unique feature-value combinations.
Harbour shows that this does not result in four unique partitions, but rather two paths to
deriving the third person—one where the author feature takes a positive value, and one
where the author feature takes a negative value. Harbour in turn argues that there is a
subsidiary parameter that governs whether a given language creates this partition with
the negative versus positive value. From this, we can conclude that it will not necessarily
be the case that we will have eight distinct partitions flowing from the eight feature-
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value combinations in a three-feature system. It is possible that some combinations
lead to the same partitions, and most particularly that the relevant five-way distinction
will emerge from one of the six combinations above, with some of the elements being
doubled. This turns out not to be the case—none of the feature combinations provide
the correct result.
2.6.2.1 Evaluating the possibilities
The full derivations for each of the six live possibilities can be found in Appendix A. In
each feature order, there are eight unique combinations—going through all 48 deriva-
tions in the main text is not crucial to understanding the issues that arise, but consid-
ering the resulting partitions is. When presenting the results, I collapse across those
values that lead to the same result, therefore most combinations have fewer than 8
partitions. I use an equals sign (=) for the result of the derivation, and a triple bar
(≡) to show the result after Lexical Complementarity and domain restriction have both
applied (if they are applicable).
I begin by considering the three derivations where participant composes before au-
thor. The first, shown in (61), builds directly from the derivation of the quadripartition
in Harbour’s original account, with the proximate feature combining last. All cases
where the proximate feature takes a negative value converge to the obviative element
x ′x ′ , regardless of the values of the lower features. When the proximate feature is posi-
tive, two partitions emerge, which are crucially differentiated by the value of the author
feature. The positive author feature partition is a subset of the lattice that results from
the negative author partition. Therefore the negative value is restricted by Lexical Com-




J−proximate(±author(±participant(π)))K = {∅, x ′x ′} ≡ {x ′x ′}
J+proximate(+author(±participant(π)))K = {iux , i x}
J+proximate(−author(±participant(π)))K = {iux , i x , ux , ox} ≡ {ux , ox}
Again, the particulars of the derivation are not important. What is crucial is that only
a tripartition emerges is this case, which is not sufficient to derive the person contrasts
of Ojibwe.
Next, consider the case where the proximate feature is composed in between the
participant and author features, shown in (62). Here a quadripartition emerges, so
again it is clear that such a combination of parameters is not active in Ojibwe.
(62) J±author(±proximate(±participant(π)))K
J−author(−proximate(±participant(π)))K = {∅, x ′x ′} ≡ {x ′x ′}
J−author(+proximate(±participant(π)))K = {∅, ux , x x} ≡ {ux , ox}
J+author(−proximate(±participant(π)))K = {i x ′}
J+author(+proximate(±participant(π)))K = {iux , i x} ≡ {iux , iox}
Of note is one result of the application of Lexical Complementarity that leads to the
partition on the final line. Notice that the element i x within this partition, which results
from the feature actions alone, turns to iox when Lexical Complementarity is applied.
This is due to the fact that i x ′ is a subset of {iux , i x}. Focusing on the relationship
between i x ′ and i x , consider the lattices that each represents. The lattice i x is the
element i alone, plus the dyads that include i and some o (e.g. {io}, {io′}, {io′′}),
the triads that include i and some pair of o’s (e.g. {ioo′}, {ioo′′}, {io′o′′}), and so on.
The lattice i x ′ is a subset of these cases, including only those sets that lack the proximate
o. So its dyads include {io′}, {io′′}, {io′′′} etc, and its triads include {io′o′′}, {io′o′′′},
{io′′o′′′}, and so on. This triggers Lexical Complementarity, resulting in i x (the generic
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exclusive) to be restricted to only those sets not captured by i x ′ (the obviative exclusive),
which are those that include the proximate o, as represented by iox .
Recall that the narrow goal is to see if any of the partitions lead the quintipartition
to emerge. (Spoiler: None of them do). But it is also relevant to consider whether the
partitions that are created would be sensible for some language to make — all of these
should be attested if the paramteers of π are kept unrestricted, with all feature-value-
order combinations being generated. The quadripartition in (62), I believe, is rather
suspicious. There is a partition for the obviative third person alone, but the proximate
third person is conflated with the second person. Furthermore, a special category of
the exclusive obviative is generated, while the exclusive proximate is conflated with
the generic inclusive. These divisions, while by no means formally ill-formed in the
sense that the sets and lattices can be readily formulated, do not seem likely to appear
as categories in natural language, and have not (to my knowledge) been observed to
date.
In the next derivation, where proximate composes first, Lexical Complementarity
again results in proximate-obviative splits within the local persons. This time, the splits
are more complete, leading to a full set of eight distinct partitions—an octopartition.
This feature combination is the closest we come to capturing the quintipartition of
Ojibwe: it is the only one that generates both a split between proximate and obvia-
tive third persons, as well as the inclusive and exclusive in the first persons.
(63) J±author(±participant(±proximate(π)))K
J−author(−participant(−proximate(π)))K = {∅, x ′x ′} ≡ {x ′x ′}
J−author(−participant(+proximate(π)))K = {∅, x x} ≡ {ox}
J−author(+participant(−proximate(π)))K = {∅, x ′x ′ , ux ′} ≡ {ux ′}
J−author(+participant(+proximate(π)))K = {∅, x x , ux} ≡ {uox}
J+author(−participant(−proximate(π)))K = {i x ′}
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J+author(−participant(+proximate(π)))K = {i x} ≡ {iox}
J+author(+participant(−proximate(π)))K = {i x ′ , iux ′} ≡ {iux ′}
J+author(+participant(+proximate(π)))K = {i x , iux} ≡ {iuox}
The issue is that all of the local persons, as noted above, are also split between their
proximate and obviative counterparts. This is, generally speaking, not an undesirable
result. As previously mentioned, and as explored in detail in Chapter 3 Blackfoot shows
a split between proximate and obviative counterparts in the local persons.7 That said,
the immediate issue is that these partitions are not present in Ojibwe, so this combina-
tion over-generates.
We can now shift our attention to the three combinations where author combines
before proximate. As before, I consider first the one in which proximate combines last,
which builds directly from the tripartition of Harbour’s original account. This provides
what is probably the most familiar result so far. Like the original tripartition, the exclu-
sive and inclusive are conflated. This differs in that the proximate and obviative third
persons are also distinguished from one another, and occupy their own partitions (after
Lexical Complementarity has applied). While this result is generally attested (see the
discussion of Ktunaxa in Chapter 3), it is not the partition represented by Ojibwe.
(64) J+proximate(−participant(±author(π)))K
−proximate(±participant(±author(π))) = {∅, x ′x ′} ≡ {x ′x ′}
+proximate(−participant(±author(π))) = {i x , iux , ux , ox} ≡ {ox}
7But even when applied to Blackfoot, this output runs into issues given how Lexical Complementarity
acts on the proximate and obviative locals. Following Lexical Complementarity, the proximate counter-
part does not include a set with only the local person(s) (i.e. {i}, {u}, or {iu}). Since these sets are
found within the smaller obviative counterpart, and Lexical Complementarity restricts the larger of the
two lattices to those elements not included within the smaller lattice, the local-only sets are always re-
stricted to be referenced through use of the obviative counterpart. This provides the wrong result when
in comes to interpretation: Both the proximate and obviative counterparts in Blackfoot are capable of
making reference to the local-only sets, as evidenced by the existence of singular forms that exclude third
persons in both cases.
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+proximate(+participant(+author(π))) = {i x , iux}
+proximate(+participant(−author(π))) = {i x , iux , ux} ≡ {ux}
The final two orders in (65) and (66), with proximate in the middle of author and
participant or with proximate composing first respectively , provide the first instances
where a five-way partition is derived by the features. In fact, both orders result in the
same partitions, with the same relationship between features and values, despite the
differences in order of composition.
(65) J±participant(±proximate(±author(π)))K
J−participant(−proximate(±author(π)))K = {∅, x ′x ′} ≡ {x ′x ′}
J−participant(+proximate(±author(π)))K = {∅, x x} ≡ {ox}
J+participant(−proximate(±author(π)))K = {i x ′ , iux ′ , ux ′}
J+participant(+proximate(+author(π)))K = {i x , iux}
J+participant(+proximate(−author(π)))K = {i x , iux , ux} ≡ {uox}
(66) J±participant(±author(±proximate(π)))K
J−participant(±author(−proximate(π)))K = {∅, x ′x ′} ≡ {x ′x ′}
J−participant(±author(+proximate(π)))K = {∅, x x} ≡ {ox}
J+participant(±author(−proximate(π)))K = {i x ′ , iux ′ , ux ′}
J+participant(+author(+proximate(π)))K = {i x , iux}
J+participant(−author(+proximate(π)))K = {i x , iux , ux} ≡ {uox}
The derived partitions, while having the right number, do not give rise to the proper
categories. While a partition is made between the proximate and obviative third per-
sons, there are not separate partitions for the inclusive and exclusive persons. More
generally, the partitions of the local persons are strange. There is a three-way divide
between a category with all obviative locals, generic first person, and a second person
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plus proximate. This is not attested in any known language, and I believe it is unlikely
to be found as more paradigms are described.
2.6.2.2 A different definition of proximate? No.
One objection to the above discussion is that much depends on the particular subset of
the person ontology that the proximate feature denotes. It is the power set generated
from {i, u, o}, which then interacts with the already established features from Harbour’s
original account. In this section, I argue that there is not an alternative feature with the
ability to make these cuts, given the machinery that Harbour proposes.
The options for alternatives is rather limited. We can rule out two types of possibili-
ties immediately: (i) the full ontology, which is already taken by π; and (ii) a subset that
only includes the discourse participants i and u, either on their own or together—these
would lack the basic property of including a third person. There are thus two types of
live alternatives. One which includes only the proximate third person (i.e. {o}), one
that includes the proximate third person o and either i or u on its own (i.e. {i, o} or
{u, o}).
It is not necessary to consider derivations with each of these features to see why
these alternatives will not provide the correct result. We are looking for a feature that
creates a proximate/obviative distinction in the third persons, while leaving the local
persons unchanged from the quadripartition. In terms of the lattice operations denoted
by the feature values, the key is to ensure that the proximate o is removed from the
third person only lattices, but retained when the lattice includes a local person as the
bottom element. This requires restricting when the feature can apply, not which par-
ticular elements are added or subtracted. That is, we need to ensure that the minus
proximate feature only applies when both author and participant feature also take neg-
ative values. As we saw, restrictions of this sort are part and parcel in the theory of
contrastive interpretations, but under Harbour’s theory would need to be stipulated.
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A final point is that the particular subset proposed here, which includes both local
persons and the single proximate third person o, provides the means to connect the rep-
resentation with the theory agreement proposed in Chapter 4. The place of the prox-
imate feature in person-based prominence effects requires the original subset, where
the two local persons and the proximate person form a natural class to the exclusion
of all other third persons. This property is not shared by any of the other alternative
formulations of the proximate feature discussed above, where either one or both of the
local persons are lacking.
2.7 Interactions with number and noun classification
To finally yield the full set of partition elements, it is necessary for the representation of
person to interact with representations of number and noun classification. This section
is devoted to showing how these interactions proceed in Ojibwe.
A keystone of the proposal is the functional sequence in (67). I have included projec-
tions up to DP, noting that nominals of different types may vary in how much functional
structure they contain (see Déchaine and Wiltschko, 2002). The structure is in line
with decades of cross-linguistically informed work on the functional sequence of nomi-
nal projection (e.g. Ritter, 1991, 1993; Picallo, 1991; Kramer, 2014, 2015), with noun
class occupying the lowest position on n, followed by person in an intermediate pro-
jection, labelled π, and finally number in the highest position, labelled #. The present
account utilizes the hierarchy of functional heads in order to determine the order of
composition of the set-restricting operations in each case: noun classification restricts
first, followed by person, and finally followed by number.
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I first consider the role of animacy in Ojibwe, which creates a partition between
(approximately speaking) living and non-living things. Noun classification systems have
yet to be integrated in a meaningful way with the lattice-theoretic approach. Section
2.7.1 takes concrete steps towards such an account.
The proposal for number in Section 2.7.2 is based on the lattice-theoretic approach
of Harbour (2014, 2016). Harbour provides an account of how a variety of number
distinctions, including singular, dual, trial, paucal, and plural, are derived with respect
to the full suite of possible person partitions. This level of detail is not necessary here, as
Ojibwe only has a singular-plural distinction. I argue in favor of a [±group] (in contrast
to the [±atomic] feature proposed by Harbour) to capture this contrast, and show how
it operates to derive the relevant number distinctions in the quintipartition of Ojibwe.
2.7.1 Noun classification
Noun classification in Ojibwe is semantically grounded in animacy. All living things
(e.g. humans, plants, animals) are classified as animate, and nearly all other things or
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concepts are inanimate. There are a number of interesting exceptions, where concep-
tually inanimate objects are classified as grammatically animate; but no conceptually
animate nouns are grammatically inanimate. In the discussion so far, we have ignored
animacy distinctions and have treated all o’s (as well as i and u) as falling within the
animate category. This will be rectified in this section.
2.7.1.1 The [±animate] feature
The main proposal is that “others” can be further divided on the basis of nominal clas-
sification, with certain entities being in the animate category and others being in the
inanimate category. I represent this difference through the continued use of o for an-
imate entities, with r being used to represent inanimate entities.8 Therefore the full
ontology of possible “person” distinctions includes a unique i, a unique u, as well as
an indefinite number of animate o’s (o, o′, o′′, . . .) and inanimate r ’s (r, r ′, r ′′, . . .). The
goal then is to put forward a feature that partitions the animate elements i, u, and the
o’s from the inanimate r ’s.
The feature needed, which I refer to as [animate], is in fact already familiar, as it
comprises the same power set used to denote π. This is shown in (68).
(68) J[animate]K = P({i, u, o, o′, o′′, . . .}) = {i x , iux , ux , x x}
The difference between the animate feature and the head π is [animate] can alternate
between positive and negative values, thereby creating a partition. The positive variant
[+animate] creates the exact lattice we have been working with for the bulk of the
chapter, which comprises of i, u, and the animate o’s. The negative variant [−animate]
leaves only the inanimate elements, the r ’s.
8I have chosen r as a shortening for res, meaning ‘thing’ in Latin. I opted not to use t (would-be for
thing) in order to avoid any potential confusion with truth values; furthermore i (would-be for inanimate)
is already used for the first person, and should not do double duty.
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2.7.1.2 Person and noun classification
As we have seen in great detail already, those elements falling on the grammatically
animate side of the divide are further partitioned by the features on π. Those falling
on the inanimate side of the divide, on the other hand, will not be affected by these
features, regardless of the value that they take. The author and participant features,
and, as it is currently configured, the proximate feature, all create divisions between
the animate elements i, u, and the o’s. Given the theory of contrastive interpretations,
we can thus adopt the notion that the features of π (author, participant, and, with a
coming caveat, proximate) are not specified when the animate feature takes a negative
value. This results in the extended contrastive hierarchy in (69).


















A critical constraint on the theory comes from the association between heads in the
functional sequence and particular features. Given that the [animate] feature is speci-
fied on the lower projection n, it can only take wide scope within the hierarchy over the
125
features on π. In other words, the addition of the animate feature does not necessitate a
consideration of a potential typology where, for example, the participant feature takes
scope over the animate feature, thus winnowing the denotation of [animate] to include
only non-participants.
This logic gives rise to a path for explaining what becomes an extant constraint on
the typology of obviation. I show that the proximate feature never takes intermediate
scope between the author and participant features, but can alternate between taking
widest scope over these features (as seen in Ojibwe), or being within the scope of these
features (as will be shown to be the case in Blackfoot; see Chapter 3). The reason for
this constraint could thus be that the proximate feature is not in fact associated with
the functional head π, but rather alternates between a the lower functional position
(deriving widest scope) or a higher functional position (deriving narrow scope). I return
to these ideas in the next chapter.
This line of thought leads to more immediate questions about that nature of what
we’ve been referring to as “person”. Ojibwe blurs the definition of this category both
with the system of obviation and animacy-based noun classification. On a narrow def-
inition of person, one based on which features can be specified on the functional head
π, we might say that there are only two person features (i.e. [author] and [participant],
given the discussion in the preceding paragraph, where it was hypothesized that proxi-
mate is not specified on π). However, both obviation and animacy have long been noted
to be a part of a shared person-animacy hierarchy, restated in (70) for reference.
(70) 1/2 (LOCAL) > 3 (PROXIMATE) > 3′ (OBVIATIVE) > 0 (INANIMATE)
Despite occupying different positions within the functional hierarchy, on the present
account, the features [animate], [proximate], [participant], and [author] all share the
same basic function of mediating access to the “person” ontology (perhaps now more
accurately referred to as the “phi” ontology). Again, this partitioning is accomplished
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by defining each feature as denoting a particular subset of the overall ontology, with
feature values defining the precise nature of the restriction. As a result, all features,
independently of how they associate with functional heads within the nominal spine,
stand in the proper subset relationships in (71).
(71) Proper subset relationships between person/animacy features (and ϕ)
a. ϕ ⊃ [animate] ⊃ [proximate] ⊃ [participant] ⊃ [author]
b. P({i, u, o, o′, o′′, . . . , r, r ′, r ′′, . . .}) ⊃ P({i, u, o, o′, o′′, . . .}) ⊃ P({i, u, o}) ⊃
P({i, u}) ⊃ P({i})
The full ontology is represented by ϕ; the animate feature represents a subset that
excludes the inanimate r ’s; the proximate feature a subset that excludes inanimates
and all but one animate third person; participant additionally excludes the proximate
o; and finally author excludes everything but the first person i. These relationships are
integral in the theory of agreement formulated in the next chapter, where prominence
effects takes center stage.
Recent work on Zapotec by Foley and Toosarvandani (2019) has come to converging
conclusions about the fundamentally parallel relationship between noun classification
and person systems. Foley and Toosarvandani show that the animacy-based noun clas-
sification system of a number of closely related Zapotec languages, which maximally
creates a four-way distinction between elders, non-elder humans, animals, and inani-
mates, shows hierarchy-based agreement effects that restrict cliticization in a parallel
manner to the Person Case Constraint (for a review of the PCC, see Anagnostopoulou,
2017, as well as Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.1). This indicates that the relationship be-
tween noun classification systems and person is by no means unique to the Algonquian
languages, with comparisons and unifications expected to provide fruitful grounds for
further investigation.
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However, it should be noted that not all noun classification systems are expected
to play so clearly into the hierarchy. In their concluding remarks, Foley and Toosar-
vandani raise the general possibility that the appearance of these effects correlates with
whether gender categories can be “characterized in semantic terms”. In particular, these
effects can arise (but need not necessarily arise, as we will see in the coming chapters),
in languages in which noun classification creates entailment relationships of the type
that can be described by a hierarchy or feature geometry. The current lattice-based
account further sharpens the picture of what sorts of partitions should give rise to hi-
erarchy effects—i.e. languages in which noun classification features stand in proper
subset-superset relationships to the wider collection of ϕ-features. This generalization
therefore excludes more familiar noun classification systems, such as many of those
observed in Romance and Bantu languages, which create orthogonal splits.
2.7.1.3 Obviation and noun classification
The account so far has assumed, somewhat apocryphally, that obviation is restricted to
the animate noun class. While Border Lakes Ojibwe does not show overt obviative mor-
phology on inanimate nouns, it does show obviative agreement under certain conditions.
The relevant example is given in (72), where the obviative agreement marker -ni-, seen


















Intended: ‘The woman sees a canoe that is big’ [NJ 08.30.19]
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Other dialects of Ojibwe (and other Algonquian languages) have innovated obviative
morphology for inanimate nouns. The relevant example, which comes from Innu (a





‘S/he (PROX) finds the boat (OBV)’ (Clarke, 1982, p. 30)
I do not develop a full analysis here, but a few pointers can be established. Aside
from the conspicuous morphological differences in how obviation generally appears
with animate versus inanimate nouns, there is a fundamental asymmetry between the
two categories. Animate nouns can clearly alternate between proximate and obviative
forms in the context of other animate nouns (and even local nouns). This is shown
with the Border Lakes Ojibwe example in (74), with the classic direct-inverse alternation
characteristic of all Algonquian languages, where either animate noun can be associated














‘The boy (OBV) saw the woman’ (PROX)’ (Hammerly, 2019b)
In contrast, inanimate nouns either show a lack of proximate/obviative marking
(when in the context of a local person), or show evidence of being (in some cases
covertly) obviative marked (when in the context of an animate third person). It is
therefore not clear that inanimate nouns are proximate qua proximate, so much as
unmarked for obviation in certain contexts. This is perhaps most directly evidenced by
the fact that, in languages with overt proximate marking, proximate-marked inanimate
nouns cannot then trigger obviative marking on a clause-mate animate nouns. In fact,
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such cases are entirely ungrammatical, as shown in the Blackfoot example in (75). The
sentence in (75a) provides a baseline where the animate noun is marked proximate and
the inanimate noun obviative marked. Such a sentence is grammatical. In contrast,
(75b) shows that the reverse relationship—marking the inanimate noun proximate and






















Intended: ‘The meat was eaten by the dog’ (Bliss, 2005a, p. 14)
A similar situation arises in Ojibwe, though since inanimate nouns are not themselves
marked for obviation the contrast is less stark. In short, when animate and inanimate
nouns are co-arguments of a verb, the inanimate noun cannot trigger obviative mark-















Intended: ‘The woman (OBV) cleaned the plate’ [NJ 08.18.19]
To summarize, there is a fundamental asymmetry between animate and inanimate
nouns in how they relate to obviation, though the system is active in both cases to
some degree. Animate nouns show clear alternations between proximate and obviative
marking, which is triggered (in some sense) by the presence of another third person an-
imate noun. Inanimate nouns show alternations between being unmarked for obviation
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and showing evidence of being obviative, but do not seem to ever be proximate per se.
Similarly, animate nouns trigger obviative marking on inanimate nouns in certain con-
structions (albeit, in most cases, covertly), but inanimate nouns do not trigger obviative
marking with animate nouns. This constitutes a reasonably clear set of generalizations
for a future analysis to contend with.
2.7.2 Number
As with π, there are a number of different features that can be specified on #. Also like
person, number partitions lattices according to some property, in this case cardinality.
Ojibwe makes cut between atomic (singular) and non-atomic (plural) sets, thus only
a single number feature is necessary. The nature of this feature is the focus of the
first subsection. While Harbour posits a feature [±atomic], I adopt a complementary
feature [±group] in anticipation of accounting for cross-linguistic patterns of number
agreement. Other languages are known to make other cuts, with categories such as
dual or paucal, requiring additional features such as [±minimal] and [±additive] to be
specified on #. These features are not considered here, as they are not immediately
relevant to the data at hand.
2.7.2.1 The number feature: [±group] or [±atomic]?
As previously noted, number in Ojibwe makes a cut between atomic/non-group (singu-
lar) and non-atomic/group (plural) sets. This is the same cut as is made in English and
many other Indo-European languages. In his theory, Harbour makes use of a feature
[±atomic] to make this distinction. Informally, the feature creates a partition between
atomic sets (i.e. sets with a cardinality of one) and non-atomic sets (i.e. sets with a
cardinality of greater than one). Harbour treats atomicity as a basic concept, simply
denoting it as a predicate atom(x). In (77), I provide a formal definition of the predi-
cate in terms of set notation.
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(77) J[atomic]K = { f : | f |= 1∧ f ∈L ϕ}
More precisely, the feature denotes the subset of the ϕ lattice with a cardinality equal
to one. This is shown in (78).
(78) {i, u, o, o′, o′′, . . . , r, r ′, r ′′, . . . , }
In many theories of number, such as those based in the feature-geometric approach,
the number feature in singular/plural type languages has been thought to make a split
based on group rather than atomicity. Arguments for such a [group] feature are gener-
ally based in the fact that plural is morphologically marked, while singular unmarked.
Given that these theories use privative features (i.e. features that lack values), morpho-
logical markedness is encoded by representational markedness, with singular being the
default interpretation of the number node # (literally, the interpretation # when it is
unmarked for features).
While these sorts of arguments strictly based in markedness are less directly relevant
for the current system, where features are bivalent and both singular and plural are
equally marked in the representation, a similar logic comes to the fore when agreement
is considered. Number agreement uniformly targets plural goal over singular goals. In
order to define an agreement probe that prefers plural over singular (i.e. groups over
atoms), a [group] feature is necessary.
With all of this in mind, it is perfectly possible to define a group feature in terms of
sets, as shown in (79).
(79) J[group]K = { f : | f |> 1∧ f ∈L ϕ}
The difference between the group and atomic features is that group includes all sets
with a cardinality of greater than 1, rather than all sets with a cardinality equal to 1.
As such, the group feature defines a lattice that is the complement of that defined by
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[atomic], with respect to the full ϕ-lattice. As a result, in terms of deriving the proper
partitions, the two turn out to be equivalent.
To see this, consider the proposed denotations of feature values for number, shown
in (80). The positive value in (80a) is equivalent to set intersection between the lattice
denoted by the number feature F (either borne of the atomic or group feature) and the
lattice denoted by G (for our purposes, the lattice produced following composition with
noun classification and person). The negative value in (80b) is relative complementa-
tion or set difference. This produces a partition of the lattice denoted by G with only
those elements not found in the lattice denoted by F (i.e. the complement of the lattice
denoted by F).
(80) Feature values as lattice interactions with number
a. J+F(G)K= {g : g ∈L G ∧ g ∈L F}
b. J−F(G)K= {g : g ∈L G ∧ g /∈L F}
Returning to the contrast between [atomic] and [group], both produce the same two
partitions, but with opposite correspondences the feature values. With [atomic], the
positive value picks out the “singular” sets, and negative value the “plural” ones. With
[group], the positive value picks out the “plural” sets, and the negative value the “singu-
lar” ones. Again, with the coming analysis of agreement in mind, I frame the singular-
plural number contrast in terms of [group] rather than [atomic], though nothing yet
hinges on this difference.
It should be noted that the interactions between lattices with number is different in
some key ways from what was seen with person and noun classification, but the two
also share a core similarity. The denotation of the values used for person is repeated in
(81) for reference.
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(81) Feature values as lattice interactions with person and noun classification
a. J+F(G)K= {g : ∃ f ∈ g [g ∈L G ∧ f ∈L F]}
b. J−F(G)K= {g : ¬∃ f ∈ g [g ∈L G ∧ f ∈L F]}
The commonality between person and number is that the negative value is associated
with logical negation. But how negation operates points to the crucial difference in
how lattices interact with person versus number. Number is simply intersection (with
the positive value) or complementation (with the negative value) between L G and L F .
Person is more complex. It creates a partition of L G such that every element contains
(as with the positive variant) or does not contain (as with the negative variant) some
element of L F . Homing in on the negative variant, with number, a partition of L G
that includes only those elements in the complement of L F is derived; with person, a
partition of L G is derived such that each element does not include any member of L F .
The existence of these differences is not problematic—despite both person and num-
ber serving to create partitions of lattices, the two features exist on different functional
heads and create partitions based on different properties, thus we should not necessar-
ily expect their semantics to be uniform. Indeed, the semantics of values and lattice
action/interaction is not uniform in Harbour (2016) either, the clearest antecedent to
the present account. Harbour takes positive and negative values on person to represent
pairwise addition and cumulative subtraction, respectively (see Section 2.6 for details).
In contrast, Harbour takes negative values on number features to be logical negation of
the predicate denoted by the number feature (and positive values to be the absence of
negation with the predicate). From this point of view, to the degree that unifying the
denotation of values across features should be a goal, the current account satisfies this








Figure 2.3: Proximate (left) and obviative (right) lattices with singular-plural number
distinction
2.7.2.2 Application to Ojibwe
I turn now to showing the derivation of number contrasts in Ojibwe, with respect to
the five person categories derived in Section 2.5. The most straightforward way of
representing the partitions made by the group feature is through the use of the Hasse
diagrams introduced at the start of the chapter (see Section 2.2.1). The lattices denoted
by the proximate and obviative third person feature combinations are shown in Figure
2.3. The group feature makes a cut between the singleton elements on the bottom row
(e.g. o and o′), and everything else (e.g. oo′ and o′o′′). This cut is represented by the
dashed line.
The Hasse diagrams for the local persons are shown in Figure 2.4. The group feature
operates as follows. For i x and ux , whose bottom elements are respectively the singleton
sets {i} and {u}, are partitioned with these bottom elements on the [−group] side,
and everything else falling into the [+group] partition. In the case of iux , none of the
elements are atomic: the bottom element is the dyad {i, u}, so no element in that lattice
falls into the [−group] partition. As a result, on the theory of contrastive interpretations,
we might expect the inclusive person in Ojibwe to be unmarked for number: The group
feature (and also, for the record, the atomic feature) fails to make a contrast in these















































Figure 2.4: Lattices for the local person partitions with singular-plural number dis-
tinction. From bottom to top (or left to right if looking sideways) the lattices are ux
(second), i x (exclusive), and iux (inclusive).
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Having also considered the animacy in the previous section, I close by noting that
the group feature can also serve to make a cut between singular and plural within the
inanimate noun class. This would constitute a cut that is analogous to that seen with
the obviative persons (but with the lattice being made up of r, r ′, r ′′, . . . rather than
o′, o′′, o′′′, . . .). The [−group] feature creates a partition of all singleton sets, while the
[+group] feature creates a partition of all non-singleton sets.
2.7.3 Summary
In this section, the interaction of the representation of person with noun classification
and number was considered for Border Lakes Ojibwe. This amounted to creating a
partition of the ϕ lattice based on the noun classification feature [±animate], followed
by the obviation feature [±proximate], then the two person features [±author] and
[±participant*], and finally the number feature [±group]. The composition order of
noun classification first, obviation/person in the middle, and noun classification last is
independently motivated by the association of the features with different projections
within the functional sequence. The overall result can be summarized with the con-
trastive hierarchy in (82). I have reverted to category labels for the terminals rather
than the subset notation for clarity (number contrasts are difficult to represent with
the notation), but emphasize that the hierarchy represents the derivation of partition
elements rather than the categories per se.
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The hierarchy produces 11 non-overlapping and exhaustive partitions of the lattice de-
noted by the root node ϕ, which restrict the range of the variable introduced by this




3.1 Introduction: Actual and predicted typologies of obviation
The previous chapter introduced a representation of person, obviation, noun classifi-
cation, and number that captured the ϕ-based partitions of Border Lakes Ojibwe. The
particular focus was on the system of person/obviation, where there is a five-way dis-
tinction (a quintipartition) that contrasts inclusive, exclusive, second, proximate, and
obviative. In this chapter, I consider the wider typological profile of obviation. I show
that there are at least three further attested partitions: (i) the octopartition of Blackfoot,
where obviation is contrasted not only in the third persons, but also in the exclusive,
inclusive, and second persons; (ii) the proximate quadripartition of Ktunaxa, where ob-
viation is present in the third persons but no contrast is made between the inclusive and
exclusive first persons (i.e. the categories are conflated into the generic first person);
and (iii) the hexapartition, the existence of which remains controversial, but has also
been claimed for Ktunaxa, where obviation contrasts third, second, and the generic first
persons.
Besides providing an abbreviated typological survey of obviation systems, there is
a theoretical motivation to this endeavor. The account put forward in the previous
chapter predicts a rather significant expansion of the number of possible partitions.
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This is due to the additional factorial possibilities that arise when moving from a two-
feature representation of person, with only [±author] and [±participant], to a three-
feature representation, where [±proximate] is added to the mix. These possibilities are
outlined in (1), with all possible feature combinations and scope possibilities within a
contrastive hierarchy. (Note, I have not marked features in their “winnowed” versions
such as [±participant*], though such winnowing applies in many cases based on these
scope relations).
(1) Feature combinations predicted with the addition of [±proximate]
a. Proximate only
[±proximate]
b. Proximate + Author
[±proximate] [±author]
[±author] [±proximate]
c. Proximate + Participant
[±proximate] [±participant]
[±participant] [±proximate]
d. Proximate + Participant + Author (Participant Author)
[±participant] [±author] [±proximate] Ktunaxa II
[±participant] [±proximate] [±author]
[±proximate] [±participant] [±author] Ktunaxa I
e. Proximate + Participant + Author (Author Participant)
[±author] [±participant] [±proximate] Blackfoot
[±author] [±proximate] [±participant]
[±proximate] [±author] [±participant] Ojibwe
The languages for which the predicted feature sets and scope relations are attested are
marked in the right margin in (1). Notice the conspicuous lack of an attested language
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in many cases. As will become evident over the course of the chapter, these gaps fall
into two classes: (i) likely to exist, but not yet attested; (ii) unlikely to be attested in any
human language. Sorting the gaps into these two categories leads to further insights on
the nature of obviation, both in how the proximate feature relates to the other ϕ-based
categories of person and number, as well as where it is specified within the functional
sequence. While strong claims about the typology of obviation should still be taken
with a grain of salt, given the likelihood that there are simply accidental gaps in our
knowledge, the goal of this chapter is to come away with a system that produces all and
only the extant and likely partitions involving obviation—that is, provide a solution to
the partition problem.
I begin in Section 3.2 with a discussion of Blackfoot (Algonquian), which again
shows an 8-way distinction between exclusive, inclusive, second, and third, fully crossed
by a proximate-obviative contrast. In other words, the proximate-obviative distinction
extends to contrast the various local persons, in addition to the third persons. Ojibwe
and Blackfoot both distinguish the inclusive from the exclusive. I continue with a dis-
cussion of the language isolate Kutenai in Section 3.3, which lacks a clusivity distinc-
tion, but also has a proximate-obviative contrast, providing evidence of obviation in
what would otherwise be classified as a tripartition language. In Section 3.4 I turn to
prospects for observing the currently unattested feature/scope combinations predicted
under the current account, leading to a discussion of further constraints on the current
theory of obviation.
3.2 The Octopartition of Blackfoot
3.2.1 Obviation in Blackfoot
Blackfoot is a Plains Algonquian language spoken in Southern Alberta and Northwestern










Table 3.1: Blackfoot (Siksika dialect) pronominal inventory (Frantz, 1991; Wiltschko
et al., 2015)
fact that Blackfoot shows that proximate/obviative contrasts can arise within the local
persons. I refer to the contrast as the octopartition. Ignoring number, it shows an eight-
way contrast between exclusive, inclusive, second, and third, fully crossed by obviation.
This can be seen from the inventory of independent pronouns, given in Table 3.1.
At this point, it is critical to note that the precise interpretation of the local forms
in the context of this contrast is not yet clear. That is, the particular sets that are ref-
erenced by the proximate versus obviative flavors of the local persons has not, to my
knowledge, been reported in the literature on the Blackfoot obviation system (though
see Bliss (2005a, 2013) for critical discussion). This is important to emphasize, as the
present account can be shown to generate an octopartition that marks a proximate-
obviative contrast in the local persons, but it remains to be seen whether it is the oc-
topartition that Blackfoot speakers actually make.
3.2.2 A contrastive hierarchy for the octopartition
Caveats aside, the contrastive hierarchy to generate the octopartition is shown in (2).
Like the quintipartition, the basis of the octopartition is the original quadripartition. As
such, the author feature takes scope over participant, resulting in the narrowing of this
feature to participant*. Critically, the proximate feature is in the scope of both [author]
and [participant*], so the set denoted by this feature is also subject to narrowing to
ensure it is contrastive. In particular, [proximate] is narrowed to only differentiate
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between those sets that include versus exclude the proximate o, and does not mark a
contrast between local and non-local as it does in its full form. I represent this narrowed
feature as proximate*.
























Parsing the categories generated in (2) from left to right, we see first that the basic
proximate-obviative contrast in the third persons is generated, but this time with the
critical inclusion of negative interaction from the author and participant* features. This
interaction is necessary, as the proximate* feature is narrowed to only contrast sets that
include/exclude o. Each of the three basic categories of local persons—second, exclu-
sive, and inclusive—show an analogous split from positive versus negative interaction
with proximate*. The negative side excludes all sets with the proximate o, and the pos-
itive side includes those with the proximate o. The relationship between the subscript
notation and the lattices are shown in (3) for clarity.
(3) a. ux ′ = {u, uo′, uo′′, uo′′′, ..., uo′o′′, uo′o′′′, uo′′o′′′, ...,uo′o′′o′′′, ..., }
b. uox = {uo, uoo′, uoo′′, uoo′′′, ...,uoo′o′′, uoo′o′′′, uoo′′o′′′, ..., }
c. i x ′ = {i, io′, io′′, io′′′, ..., io′o′′, io′o′′′, io′′o′′′, ..., io′o′′o′′′, ..., }
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d. iox = {io, ioo′, ioo′′, ioo′′′, ..., ioo′o′′, ioo′o′′′, ioo′′o′′′, ..., }
e. iux ′ = {iu, iuo′, iuo′′, iuo′′′, ..., iuo′o′′, iuo′o′′′, iuo′′o′′′, ..., iuo′o′′o′′′, ..., }
f. iuox = {iuo, iuoo′, iuoo′′, iuoo′′′, ..., iuoo′o′′, iuoo′o′′′, iuoo′′o′′′, ..., }
An oddity of the account as it currently stands, which deserves immediate attention, is
that the generated lattices for the proximate locals lack an element with only the local
persons—all elements of these lattices have at a minimum the relevant local person(s)
plus the proximate person o.
This raises a red flag when considering the interface with number, where there are
singular forms for both the proximate and obviative variants of the exclusive and second
persons. The basic problem is that the singular-plural number system divides the lattice
between those elements with one member (singular) versus those with more than one
member (plural). The above account results in all elements of the proximate exclusive
and second person lattice having more than one member, which should mean it does
not have a singular form—an incorrect result given the data at hand (see Table 3.1).
The solution that I propose is to change where in the nominal spine the proximate
feature associates in Blackfoot. Rather than associating with the functional head π, I
will argue that the proximate feature can appear in two possible places within the nom-
inal spine: (i) right above n, therefore composing after noun classification, but before
person (4a); or (ii) above number, therefore composing last, after noun classification,
person, and number (4b). Blackfoot is a language where the proximate feature com-
poses after number and person, while Ojibwe is a language where proximate composes
before person and number. Ultimately, the difference between Ojibwe and Blackfoot,
and the proposed difference in composition order, points to a path for a more general
restriction on how the proximate feature can interact with the other ϕ-features.
144
































3.2.3 Number and the Blackfoot octopartition
To reiterate, the solution I propose is that the proximate feature is not in fact specified
on π, as has been assumed thus far. If instead number makes its partition prior to the
proximate feature (i.e. proximate composes last), the situation in the previous section,
where no proximate singular forms of the local persons are predicted, can be avoided.
On this account, the lattices that serve as input to number are simply the original quadri-
partition. The full contrastive hierarchy, with number composing first, followed by the
proximate feature, is given in (5). This derives the 14 possible person/number cate-
gories of Blackfoot (noting that certain complications arise for the proximate-obviative
distinction in the singular local persons, as discussed in detail below).










































I begin by considering the situation following the composition of number. The ini-
tial distinctions are identical to the lattices represented by the Hasse Diagrams from
Chapter 2 (Figures 2.3 and 2.4). As such, a singular-plural distinction is derived for
both third, exclusive, and second person lattices (again, with the inclusive only falling
on the “plural” or group side of the divide). This is summarized using the subscript
notation in (6).
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(6) a. THIRD: x | x y x
1
b. SECOND: u | ux x
c. EXCLUSIVE: i | i x x
d. INCLUSIVE: iux
The partition created by the proximate feature then divides those sets that include the
proximate o from those that lack it. That is, the [±proximate*] feature, the winnowed
version of the proximate feature, is composed with each lattice in (6). While the proxi-
mate feature is not specified on the π head on this analysis, it is still bound by contrastive
principles. This is the same logic already seen, which lead the animate and number fea-
tures to be part of a contrastive hierarchy with person. Given that the proximate feature
is, in the relevant sense, within the scope of the participant feature, it is narrowed to
only contrast elements that include/exclude only o, rather than i, u, and o.
I begin with the more familiar case of the third person. The subscripts correspond
to the following sets (i.e. the singular-plural distinction in the generic third person):
(7) a. x = {o, o′, o′′, o′′′, . . . , }
b. x y x = {oo′, oo′′, oo′′′, o′o′′, o′o′′′, o′′o′′′, . . . ,
oo′o′′, oo′o′′′, oo′′o′′′, o′o′′o′′′ . . . , oo′o′′o′′′, . . . , }
The application of the proximate feature divides these into those sets that either include




x ′ = {o′, o′′, o′′′, . . . , }
1The added variable y here clarifies that the two third persons o’s that form this set must be distinct
in order to ensure, at a minimum, a dyad is derived.
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c. 3PL
ox ′x = {oo′, oo′′, oo′′′, oo′o′′, oo′o′′′, oo′′o′′′, oo′o′′o′′′, . . . , }
d. 3′PL
x ′ y ′x ′ = {o′o′′, o′o′′′, o′′o′′′, . . . , o′o′′o′′′ . . . , }
This derives the expected partitions for both the proximate and obviative person forms
in both the singular and plural.
I now turn to the local plural persons. Applying the proximate feature in each case
results in the six partitions shown in (9).
(9) a. 2PL (PROX)
uox = {uo, uoo′, uoo′′, uoo′′′, ...,uoo′o′′, uoo′o′′′, uoo′′o′′′, ..., }
b. 2PL (OBV)
ux ′x ′ = {uo′, uo′′, uo′′′, ...,uo′o′′, uo′o′′′, uo′′o′′′, ..., uo′o′′o′′′, ..., }
c. EXCL (PROX)
iox = {io, ioo′, ioo′′, ioo′′′, ..., ioo′o′′, ioo′o′′′, ioo′′o′′′, ..., }
d. EXCL (OBV)
i x ′x ′ = {io′, io′′, io′′′, ..., io′o′′, io′o′′′, io′′o′′′, ..., io′o′′o′′′, ..., }
e. INCL (PROX)
iuox = {iuo, iuoo′, iuoo′′, iuoo′′′, ..., iuoo′o′′, iuoo′o′′′, iuoo′′o′′′, ..., }
f. INCL (OBV)
iux ′x ′ = {iu, iuo′, iuo′′, iuo′′′, ..., iuo′o′′, iuo′o′′′, iuo′′o′′′, ..., iuo′o′′o′′′, ..., }
It should be emphasized again that, at present, whether or not the proximate/obviative
forms of each local plural person denote the sets shown in (9) has yet to be confirmed
with a speaker of Blackfoot. But at least concrete predictions, which have a priori plau-
sibility, have been made. To summarize these predictions in plain language, based on
the lattices in (9), the proximate counterpart of each should necessarily include refer-
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ence to whichever third person animate person has been designated proximate within
the discourse along with the relevant local person(s), while the obviative counterpart
should necessarily exclude reference to this person.
As previewed above, the situation on the local singular side of the divide leads to
a conflict with our contrastive principles, and runs even further into the limitations of
what can be said given the data at hand. The issue is this: Given that [proximate*]
contrasts those sets that include/exclude the proximate o, and both the lattices {i} and
{u} lack these elements altogether, then the proximate feature should not be specified in
this case, as there is no partition-based contrast to be made. This is the same logic that,
for example, restricts the author and participant features from applying in the context
of [−proximate] in the Ojibwe quintipartition. Given that there is indeed a contrast in
obviation within the singular local persons, this presents a problem for the analysis.
At present, it is not possible to provide a fully informed solution to this issue. The
major roadblock is a lack of clarity about the contexts for use of the proximate versus
obviative counterparts of the local persons within Blackfoot. Some clues do exist, mostly
in the form of positive evidence. The picture suggests that there may be motivation
outside of creating partitions, in the domain of discourse, for specifying a feature related
to obviation. This would mean the contrastive hierarchy is sensitive not just to those
contrasts relevant to creating partitions, but also to contrasts relevant to other domains
of the grammar.
The first relevant generalization related to this point that can be gleaned from the
existing literature is that local thematic patients or goals, in the context of an animate
third person actor, take the obviative form, as shown in (10), while local actors in the





































Intended: ‘I (OBV) love that man (PROX)’ (Wiltschko et al., 2015, p. 276)
This differs crucially from obviation between two third persons, where, as in Ojibwe
and all other Algonquian languages, both actors and goals can alternate with respect to
obviation—the categories of proximate and obviative are not tied to particular thematic
roles.
Furthermore, when both arguments are local, these restrictions do not appear to be
active. This is demonstrated in (12), where either the first person actor (12a) or the
second person goal (12b) can appear in a proximate form of the pronoun. Note that
sentences with two pronouns are ungrammatical, therefore the obviations status of the
second argument is unknown in both cases. In any case, the fact that the object pronoun
in (12b) appears in the proximate rather than obviative form stands in contrast to the
generalization gleaned from local persons combining with an animate third person in










‘I (?) love you (PROX)’ (Bliss, 2013, p. 253–254)
It is therefore possible that the derivation of the local obviative forms may be subject
to additional factors — in the most extreme case, we may question whether the the
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proximate feature in the local cases serves the function of making partitions at all.
This is akin to what was seen with obviation in the inanimate nouns in Chapter 2,
Section 2.7.1.3, where there are asymmetries and constraints in how obviation behaves
in the local persons that suggest something else is at play. One likely candidate is the
extension of the obviative system to mark discourse related roles (in essence, this is
what is conjectured by Bliss, 2005a, et seq). As such, the specification of the proximate
feature would not be bound by the need to create contrasts between partitions per se,
marking instead strictly discourse-based contrasts. Again, determining these factors,
and fitting an account into the present analysis, must be left to future work where more
clarity on the usage conditions and denotations for the proximate and obviative forms
of the local persons can be established.
3.2.4 Interlude: An issue for the feature geometric account
At this stage, it is pertinent to consider again the major alternative account: the fea-
ture geometry. In this section I show that the presence of the octopartition of Blackfoot
creates issues for the feature-geometric analysis. Recall the proposed entailment de-
pendencies of Oxford (2019b), repeated in (13).






While this geometry works for Ojibwe and many other Algonquian languages, where
obviation is only visibly creating contrasts between third persons, it is too strong for
Blackfoot. In particular, it makes the incorrect prediction that both the first and sec-
ond persons should always be proximate, as the [participant] (and [author] and [ad-
dressee]) features entail the presence of [proximate]. On this representation, it is simply
not possible to specify a feature that marks a local person without also specifying the
proximate feature, thus the presence of obviative local persons cannot be accounted for.
An initially promising solution that maintains the geometric representation comes
from Bliss and Jesney (2005), as well as my own previous work that further builds on
the account of Bliss and Jesney (Hammerly, 2018). Both analyses attempt to alleviate
issues with the strict entailment between [participant] and [proximate] by placing the
feature that encodes obviation elsewhere in the geometry. Bliss and Jesney (2005)
place it within the domain of persons under a separate branch (14a), which breaks the
entailment relationship with the rest of the person features.2 Hammerly (2018) places
it under the individuation (i.e. #) node (14b), which also allows these entailments to
be broken.
(14) Alternative feature geometries to capture local obviation





2Bliss and Jesney (2005) in fact have an additional node, STAGE, which dominates [obviative], but
the presence of this is not relevant to the current argument.
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These proposals both ensure that local persons can be obviative in addition to proxi-
mate, and therefore cannot be ruled out by the existence of the Blackfoot octopartition.
However, they run into issues when implanted into theories of agreement that make
use of feature geometries. In particular, there is nothing that allows third person prox-
imate and local arguments to be targeted by an agreement probe to the exclusion of
obviative third person. This is shown to be the pattern in Ojibwe in Chapter 5. This
issue arises because while there is a feature, [obviative], that uniquely picks out third
obviative arguments to the exclusion of third proximate, there is no feature that picks
out third proximate and local to the exclusion of third obviative.3 In effect, one of the
core prominence-based generalizations for agreement in Ojibwe (and, ultimately, Al-
gonquian more generally) is lost. These issues are discussed at greater length in the
coming chapters.
3.3 The proximate quadripartition/hexapartition of Ktunaxa
In this section I show that the proximate feature is active in systems that lack an inclusive-
exclusive distinction. Put in terms of Harbour’s original terminology, to show that more
3One many wonder whether changing the feature in the geometry to make [proximate] marked
rather than [obviative]might alleviate these issues. It does not. There is still no feature that will pick out
third proximate and local together to the exclusion of obviative, as local arguments do not obligatorily
have a proximate feautre.
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than just the baseline quadripartition languages contrast proximate and obviative. I
show that a baseline tripartition language can also give rise to the additional partition
between proximate and obviative. I refer to this as the proximate quadripartition. The
example language is Ktunaxa, which is a language isolate of British Columbia and the
adjacent areas of Montana, spoken today by approximately 345 individuals.
While there is clear evidence for an obviation distinction in the third persons in the
language, it has also been claimed that the local persons show a proximate-obviative
contrast. I refer to this as the hexapartition. I show that, if this does turn out to be the
proper analysis, this too can be captured by the present analysis.
3.3.1 The proximate quadripartition
Ktunaxa resembles the Algonquian family in some key areas, including the use of proximate-
obviative marking on third persons and a direct-inverse agreement system. Both of
these features are shown in (15). (15a) is a direct alignment, which is unmarked on
the verb, where the subject is proximate and the object obviative. (15b) exemplifies an
inverse alignment, marked by -aps- on the verb, where the subject is obviative and the
object proximate.














‘The man (OBV) saw the woman (PROX)’ (Dryer, 1994, p. 65)
More broadly, the language shows object agreement, exemplified in (16) with plural
local person objects. I assume that both the subject and object in these cases are encoded
by a null pro. For the purposes of this discussion, I treat the null direct and inverse
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marker in (15) as a form of object agreement, effectively making the agreement in (15)
and (16) as part of a single paradigm of agreement.






‘He/she/it/they saw you (PL)’ (Dryer, 1994, p. 67)
In the object agreement in (15) and (16), first, second, proximate, and obviative persons
are distinguished from one another, but there is no difference in the exclusive versus
inclusive. The same basic pattern holds with the subject proclitics in (17), but with no
evidence of a distinction in obviation in the third persons, which does not have an overt
subject proclitic form.










‘You (PL) talked’ (Dryer, 1994, p. 67)
c. cxa-ni
talk-IND
‘He/she/they talked’ (Dryer, 1997, p. 34)
On the whole, we can return to use of the superposition method introduced earlier, and
see that the language conflates inclusive and exclusive, but makes distinctions between
the second, proximate, and obviative persons.
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As such, we have an example of a language with a different base partition than that
of Ojibwe and Blackfoot, but that still makes use of a system of obviation. The relevant
contrastive hierarchy is given in (19). Like Ojibwe, the proximate feature composes
prior to the other person features, and thus only makes a cut between proximate and
obviative third persons. However, like the original tripartition, participant takes scope
over author, and thus the set that participant denotes is not winnowed, and no clusivity
distinction is derived.











i x , iux
3.3.2 The hexapartition
A final note is the possibility that Ktunaxa shows a hexapartition—as with Blackfoot,
such a partition would show a proximate-obviative distinction in the local persons as
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well as the third persons (Boas, 1926; Mast, 1988; Underhill, 2019). The relevant data







‘I (OBV?) ran to Mary (PROX)’ (Underhill, 2019)
I do not take a stand on whether or not this analysis is correct. In any case, a contrastive
hierarchy is available to capture such a partition, should it turn out to be the right
analysis for Ktunaxa, or should it be found elsewhere in the world. This is given in
(21), and differs from the initial analysis of Ktunaxa in that the proximate feature is
specified after both person and number.




































As with the contrast between Ojibwe and Blackfoot, the difference is in the scope of
the proximate feature, which is now within the scope of both author and participant,
rather than taking scope over the two features. This results in the same narrowing of
the feature to proximate*, to create a contrast between those sets that lack o in the
negative case, and those that include o in the positive. Overall, the system predicted is
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exactly like that of Blackfoot, except the inclusive and exclusive persons are collapsed
into the generic first person.
Again, like Blackfoot, more careful work needs to be done to understand whether
this predicted partition is extant. In any case, the predicted partition is not a priori
unreasonable.
3.4 The remaining partitions
In the preceding sections, evidence was given to support the existence of an octoparti-
tion, proximate quadripartition, and a hexapartition, in addition to the quintipartition
of Ojibwe. To my knowledge, these four partitions exhaust the current typological pro-
file of how obviation serves to further partition the person space.4 However, given that
obviation has so far been observed in generally understudied language families and
geographical regions, it is possible that the absence of additional partitions is due to a
failure to observe these patterns, rather than true typological gaps.
Furthermore, in Harbour’s (2016) survey, almost all examples of monopartitions
and bipartitions are in the domain of deixis and motion, which Harbour considers to
be grounded in the same basic ontology and representation of person. For example,
spacial terms like here-there or this-that or verbs of motion come-go. It is possible that
the predicted cuts to be outlined in this section will be found by a careful survey of
these broader domains, but so far a survey of this type has not been undertaken.
With the constraint on the order of composition with proximate that was proposed
within the context of capturing the contrast between Ojibwe and Blackfoot, the ad-
ditional predictions are already partially constrained. To review, the idea is that the
proximate feature either composes immediately after noun class and before person and
4One notable gap in the current survey is that grammatical animacy has been largely set aside. To
reiterate, Ojibwe shows obviation most clearly in the animate nouns, inanimate nouns also participate
“covertly”, and certain dialects have innovated obviative morphology for inanimate nouns (Bliss and
Oxford, 2017). This is discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.7.1.3.
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number, or after noun class, person, and number. The revised possibilities with this
constraint in hand are summarized in (22).




b. Proximate + Author
[±proximate] [±group] [±author]
[±group] [±author] [±proximate]
c. Proximate + Participant
[±proximate] [±group] [±participant]
[±group] [±participant] [±proximate]
d. Proximate + Participant + Author (Participant Author)
[±group] [±participant] [±author] [±proximate] Ktunaxa II
[±proximate] [±group] [±participant] [±author] Ktunaxa I
e. Proximate + Participant + Author (Author Participant)
[±group] [±author] [±participant] [±proximate] Blackfoot
[±proximate] [±group] [±author] [±participant] Ojibwe
We have seen all possibilities under a three feature system. The task is therefore to
consider the plausibility of the predicted partitions under one and two feature systems.
3.4.1 One and two-feature systems
The goal of this section is to sketch the predictions of the system, and provide a tentative
evaluation of how plausible they might be. This section is meant to set the stage for
future work: a wider search for evidence of these partitions, or, in the event that we
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can be convinced that certain predictions are improbable, to plot out the edge of what
a revised theory should account for.
The first predicted partition builds off of the baseline monopartition, thus only a
proximate feature makes a cut. This is shown in (23). (Note: In this and the other







i x , ux , iux , ox
Intuitively, the predicted cut here is between a partition of the π lattice that include
at least one of the proximate persons i, u, or o, and the partition that excludes these
persons. Considering plausibility within the domain of space or path, this seems to be a
likely cut. For example, the relationship that has been observed between obviation and
perspective-taking (e.g. Bliss, 2005a,b; Hammerly and Göbel, 2019) provides a line of
evidence for unifying the first and second persons (which are undeniably perspectival)
with the proximate third person to the exclusion of the obviative persons.
The next two combinations involve the baseline author bipartition. Given the possi-
ble compositions orders, the proximate feature can either compose prior to the author
feature, or after the author feature. The former case is discussed first, and derives the










i x , iux
This hypothetical partition adds to the proximate only case in (23) with the a distinction
between those “proximate” persons that exclude versus include the speaker, predicting
a three-way split between obviative o’s, sets that include the proximate o or u, but lack i,
and those that include i. This is just like the author bipartition, with the added partition
of those elements in the lattice that exclude i, u, and the proximate o. As a result, it
seems likely to be attested upon careful consideration of deixis and motion systems.
The first case that initially appears implausible is the author-proximate feature com-













This contrastive hierarchy leads to the winnowing of the proximate feature to what
is marked as [proximate**]. Given that the proximate feature is within the scope of
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author, the theory of contrastive interpretations predicts that the feature should be re-
stricted to u and o (excluding i), since the author feature already marks a contrast be-
tween sets that include/exclude i. This leads to a four-way split between (i) the third
person obviative, (ii) the non-speaker proximates o and u, (iii) the speaker on their
own, and (iv) the speaker with the other proximate persons o and u. When phrased
this way, the cut is certainly complex, but not entirely implausible. The chief cut is be-
tween whether the author is or is not present, then, within each of these possibilities,
whether the other proximate persons o and u are present.
The final two possibilities extend the baseline participant bipartition, again adding
the proximate feature either prior to the participant feature or after the participant









i x , iux , ux
This predicts what appears to be a plausible three-way set of partitions between the
obviative third person, the proximate third persons, and the local persons. This is simply
the original participant bipartition with the additional cut introduced by obviation.
The last case is that of participant-before-proximate. This leads to the narrowing of
the proximate feature to [proximate*] (i.e. making only a cut between those elements
that do or do not include the proximate o), given that it is within the scope of the
participant feature and need not make a cut between those elements that include or











i x ′ , iux ′ , ux ′
[+proximate*]
iox , iuox , uox
Again, the predicted partition here does not seem particularly implausible. In an analo-
gous manner to Blackfoot, it simply adds a general distinction between the local persons
that do or do not combine with the proximate o.
3.4.2 Three-feature systems and intermediate scope of proximate
Even though they are ruled out based on the assumption that the proximate feature
either composes before or after the core person features, it is worth considering the
additional two three-feature partitions that could in principle be generated under the
current theory to further bolster the assumption. Both involve the proximate feature
taking an intermediate position between the two person features with respect to scope
within the contrastive hierarchy.
The first is the possibility of participant taking scope over the proximate, and both
participant and proximate taking scope over author. This is schematized with the con-
trastive hierarchy in (28). This particular case results in an identical partition to the al-
ready discussed hexapartition, which is potentially exemplified by Ktunaxa. The reason
is that the critical scope relationship has not changed: participant takes scope over both
proximate and author. The former relationship ensures that proximate is winnowed to
proximate* (contrasting sets that include/exclude o), and the latter relationship en-
sures that participant is realized with its full set.
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Ignoring the issues the would arise with these elements combining with number, there
is in fact no principled reason to rule out the possibility that a learner might end up
with a grammar consistent with the hierarchy in (28) if faced with primary linguistic
data that supports a hexapartition. The content of the features (i.e. the adult grammar)
is identical to that derived from a hierarchy in which proximate is within the scope of
author (and author is still within the scope of participant).
The second possibility is a contrastive hierarchy in which author takes scope over
proximate, and both author and proximate take scope over participant, as shown in
(29). This case also produces a hexapartition, but one that is unlikely to be observed in
natural language. The key issue is that author takes scope over the proximate feature
without participant also taking scope. This results in a different winnowing of the prox-
imate feature than we have seen thus far: it is narrowed to contrast sets that include
versus exclude u and/or o. I represent this with proximate**.
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The strange result that this predicts is a contrast between proximate and obviative forms
of the exclusive person (and the third person), but no obviation contrast with second
or inclusive person. I believe such a partition is unlikely to be observed in any language
of the world.
In light of these two results, one which is redundant with another contrastive hier-
archy, and one which produces an unlikely partition, the generalization put forward,
that the proximate feature cannot take scope between either the author or participant
features, finds support.
3.5 Where does [±proximate] live?
The relationship between different categories ofϕ-features and the functional sequence
is well-established in many cases. It has long been noted that person features show evi-
dence of being lower in the phrase structure hierarchy than number (see Harbour, 2016,
p. 153–168 for an extended discussion). Similarly, noun classification has been recog-
nized as being structurally lower than both person and number (e.g. Kramer, 2015). All
signs point towards a nominal spine in Ojibwe that is consistent with this basic func-
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tional sequence that places noun classification before person, which are both before
number.
An emergent issue over the course of the past two chapters has been to determine
where the proximate feature should associate within the functional sequence. The ini-
tial hypothesis associated the proximate feature withe π. This assumption turned out to
lead to issues with Blackfoot, and languages with an obviation system in the local per-
sons more generally, when interactions with number were considered. Furthermore,
associating the proximate feature with π leads to the possibility that the proximate
feature should take intermediate scope between the other two person features, which
generated partitions that were either redundant (when ignoring number) or unlikely
to be attested. The solution that was put forward is to specify the proximate feature
on its own projection that cam sit either right above nP, where noun classification lives,
or #P, where number lives. This ensures that it can only take wide or narrow scope
with respect to the features of π, and more generally, it ensures that proximate will
compose either right before person (as was evidenced in Ojibwe) or after number (as
in Blackfoot).
The case of the “high” proximate feature did lead to questions about whether this
feature ultimately serves the same role as the “low” proximate feature. In particular, the
fact that there are proximate/obviative distinctions within the singular local persons
in Blackfoot raised the possibility that obviation in these cases is related to contrasts
in rooted in discourse factors rather than the partitioning of the ontological space of
person. The remarks that follow remain in the realm of speculation, given that much is
still unknown about the possible differences in reference that the obviative local persons
render, and furthermore that the particular discourse contexts that might license the
proximate versus obviative local forms are currently underspecified.
The hint that the difference in syntactic height corresponds to either a “partition-
ing” function versus “discourse” function corresponds more broadly to what is known
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about the relation between syntactic height and function. This has been perhaps most
extensively articulated by the Universal Spine Hypothesis of Wiltschko (2014), outlined
in (30). The highest levels of the functional sequence correspond to a linking function,
which connects propositions or referents to the discourse. Below that is the anchoring
layer, which connects events and individuals to the utterance. The next layer is for
point-of-view, which establishes the perspective of the event or individual. Finally, the
classification layer broadly categorizes events and individuals.





The multifaceted nature of the proximate feature can therefore be connected to much
higher level generalizations about the functional sequence, and sheds light on the shape-
shifting nature of obviation systems, which have often appeared to defy description. On
one hand, obviation is deeply rooted in the lower function of making divisions between
different categories of persons, with a cut being made between the proximate and ob-
viative persons. On the other hand, it is highly discourse sensitive, with the particular
identity of the “proximate” o ostensibly being determined by these factors. To mud-
dle matters even more, yet other work has suggest that obviation systems are related
to point-of-view (Bliss, 2005a) or the anchoring of events (Zubizarreta and Pancheva,
2017). The present work has focused almost completely on the classificatory properties
of obviation. Detailed analysis of the precise nature of the discourse, perspectival, and
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anchoring facets of obviation systems, which must be left to future work, will in turn




A SET-BASED THEORY OF AGREE
4.1 Introduction: Agreement and prominence
Person does not only live on the arguments on which it originates: it appears elsewhere
in the clause via agreement. The goal of this chapter is to build a theory of how the
person representation motivated in the previous chapter participates in agreement, with
some attention also paid to agreement with number and noun class. This puts the pieces
in place for the analysis of the Ojibwe verbal agreement system in Chapter 5.
The major empirical goal is to formulate a syntactic representation of person and
a theory of agreement that captures person-based prominence effects, as described by
the scale in (1).
(1) 1/2 (LOCAL) > 3 (PROXIMATE) > 3′ (OBVIATIVE) > 0 (INANIMATE)
Two basic types of prominence effects are attested in agreement systems: (i) omnivorous
agreement, where particular agreement slots show preferences for agreement according
to which argument is highest ranked on the scale in (1), and (ii) alignment effects,
where agreement shows sensitivities to the relationship between the syntactic position
of arguments and their rankings on the person-based prominence scale. The full range
of these effects will be captured by the proposed person representation and theory of
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AGREE presented in this chapter. In Chapter 5, I show that the system also captures
prominence effects in Border Lakes Ojibwe.
Up to this point, the system has treated the features [proximate], [participant], and
[author], as well as the head π, as the primitives of the syntactic representation of
person—they are only realized as sets or lattices of elements of the person ontology
when their denotations are inserted at LF. In this chapter, I argue that there is a syntactic
instantiation of the set-based representation, resulting in a richer representation for
features in syntax. The same basic sub-sets that were used to form the denotations of
features in the previous two chapters are realized syntactically. These sets are shown
with their corresponding features in (2).
(2) A syntactic set-based representation for person
a. [Author] = {I}
b. [Addressee] = {U}
c. [Participant] = {I , U}
d. [Proximate] = {I , U , O}
e. [Animate] = {I , U , O, O′, O′′, . . . , On}
f. Π = {I , U , O, O′, O′′, . . . , On}
g. Φ = {I , U , O, O′, O′′, . . . , On, R, R′, R′′, . . . , Rn}
Providing a definition of features in terms of these primitives allows us to redefine
the operation AGREE with respect to the internal structure of features and the set-based
representation. In this view, it is no longer sensible to formulate the Match condition
on AGREE as a process of checking feature identity per se (i.e. checking whether the
features of the probe match the features of the goal, in label and/or value). Instead,
Match is reformulated as a process of determining whether the sets represented by the
features of the probe intersect with the goal’s set. This reformulation has a number of
interesting downstream effects.
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The major boon is that the relevant entailments between features and person cate-
gories fall out of the first-principles of the system, without stipulating these relationships
via second-order representations such as the feature geometry or prominence hierar-
chy. This is because the sets that the features represent are in proper subset-superset
relationships, as shown in (3). Under the proposed reformulation of Match, a goal that
Matches (and Satisfies) any given feature on a probe will also Match (and Satisfy) all
of the features that are in a superset relationship. For example, a match with [author]
entails a match with all other features, because I is a member of every other set as well.
(3) Subset/superset relationships between person features
a. Φ ⊃ [Animate] ⊃ [Proximate] ⊃ [Participant] ⊃ [Author], [Addressee]
b. {I , U , O, . . . , On, R, . . . , Rn} ⊃ {I , U , O, . . . , On} ⊃ {I , U , O} ⊃ {I , U} ⊃ {I}, {U}
In the feature geometry, the entailments between person categories are due to the fact
that probes and goals cannot be specified for a feature such as [author] without also
entailing the presence of [participant], [proximate], and π. The relationships are stip-
ulated, rather than derived. Therefore if a goal has the ability to Satisfy the [author]
feature of a probe, it also necessarily has the features to Satisfy [participant], and so
on—a goal cannot have an author feature without also having all others. Here this will
not be the case, with features being allowed to vary freely on both probes and goals.
In the previous two chapters, we saw that languages parameterize which features
are or are not present within the nominal domain to capture the range of available per-
son distinctions within a languages. Freeing the system of the geometry similarly opens
up new possibilities for which sets of features can be specified on the probe. Within the
feature geometric system, probes with [author] also necessarily include [participant],
[proximate], and π—the same entailments that hold for goals hold for probes. This
is not the case in the set-based theory presented here. The system allows for the fea-
tures on the person probe to be attested in all combinations, and without any internal
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organization—for example, a person probe π can include [author] but not [partici-
pant]. I show that this captures the exact range of person-hierarchy effects observed
across languages.
The chapter is divided into five parts. Section 4.2 provides a comprehensive review
the possible range of person-based prominence effects in agreement systems, setting
the parameters for what a complete theory of person agreement must account for. Sec-
tion 4.3 details the proposed syntactic set-based representation of features for both
agreement probes and goals. In Section 4.4, I review and reformulate the components
of AGREE with this new representation in hand. Section 4.5 shows how the system ac-
counts for all and only the range of person-based prominence effects reviewed in Section
4.2. I close with Section 4.6, which provides a direct comparison to previous accounts
based in the feature geometric representation, where, besides having conceptual dis-
advantages, I show the geometry fails to capture the full range of possible prominence
effects.
4.2 Empirical underpinnings
In this section, I provide an overview of the agreement phenomena that can be described
by the person-based prominence hierarchy. Consider the logically possible rankings,
given the “basic” categories of first, second, and third (ignoring obviation and number):
(4) Logically possible rankings
1 > 2 > 3
2 > 1 > 3
*1 > 3 > 2
*3 > 1 > 2
*2 > 3 > 1









Those rankings which are unattested across all languages are indicated with “*” above,
with all others appearing in one language or another. It should be clear that the varia-
tion in possible effects is wide, but still circumscribed. There are two maximal rankings,
1> 2> 3 and 2> 1> 3, which alternate in which of the local persons is highest ranked.
All other rankings flow from the possible collapses of these two rankings, with a col-
lapse grouping together adjacent categories onto one level. This means that while the
local persons and the third person can be unranked with respect to one another by being
collapsed into a single level of the scale, a ranking where third is above a local person is
not possible. While rankings are seen here as a descriptive tool, it provides the means to
express the generalizations that our syntactic representation and theory of AGREE must
account for, and guides the discussion of this section.
I split hierarchy-based effects into two basic classes: (i) omnivorous agreement,
where a probe shows a preference for a higher ranked argument regardless of its syn-
tactic role, and (ii) alignment effects, where agreement is affected by a combination of
prominence ranking and the syntactic position of the arguments (e.g. indirect versus
direct object or subject versus object). These effects provide the motivations, and define
the basic needs and limits, for a theory of agreement.
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4.2.1 Omnivorous agreement
Omnivorous agreement (a term coined by Nevins, 2011) occurs when a given agree-
ment slot shows a preference to agree with a particular category. This section overviews
three cases where a pattern of this sort appears: (i) Kichean Agent-Focus, (ii) Nez Perce
Complementizer agreement, and (iii) Cuzco Quechean Subject Marking Anomalies. The
latter two patterns ultimately support the existence of a more refined person-based
prominence hierarchy, where it becomes necessary to specify a ranking between first
and second persons.
4.2.1.1 Kichean Agent-Focus
As discussed at length in Preminger (2011, 2014), agreement in the Agent-Focus con-
struction of Kichean (Mayan) displays such a pattern for person.To start, consider the
baseline cases in (5), where both arguments are third person (animate) arguments.
Here, the agreement marker takes the third person form, which happens to be null.


























‘It was the woman who saw the man.’ (Preminger, 2014, p. 18)
Consideration of agreement in mixed clauses, where one argument is a local person
and the other a third person, sharpens the picture. The examples in (6) and (7)—with
second and first persons, respectively—show that local agreement arises regardless of
whether the local argument is the subject as in (6a) and (7a), or the object, as in (6b)
and (7b). In all cases, realizing third person agreement is ungrammatical.
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‘It was the man that heard you (SG).’ (Preminger, 2014, p. 18)






















‘It was the man that heard me.’ (Preminger, 2014, p. 20)
The connection to the person-based prominence hierarchy should be immediately
apparent: show agreement with the highest ranked noun in person.1 When the subject
is higher ranked, agreement indexes the subject; when the object is higher ranked,
agreement indexes the object.
One restriction not captured by the generalization above is the observation that local
only combinations are entirely ungrammatical, regardless of choice of agreement. This
is shown in (8).


















Intended: ‘It was me that heard you (SG).’
1I do not review the patterns here, but Preminger shows that considering non-singular nouns gives
evidence that number is also realized. So this generalization would more accurately be stated as agree-
ment in person and number.
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This restriction is more broadly linked to the observation that all local persons must
be “licensed” by an agreement probe. Certain probes are only able to license a single
argument, leaving the other unlicensed. This results in ungrammaticality.
4.2.1.2 Nez Perce Complementizer Agreement
A related, though importantly distinct, omnivorous agreement pattern can be seen with
complementizer agreement in Nez Perce (Deal, 2015). As with Kichean Agent-Focus,
agreement in a transitive clause with two third person singular arguments is null:











‘When A. calls T.’ (Deal, 2015, p. 4)
The initial patterns are omnivorous in the same way as seen above, with local per-
sons being agreed with regardless of whether they are the subject or object when they
are combined with a third person. This can be seen for the combination of first and
third person in (10), and with second and third person in (11).






















‘When A. calls me’ (Deal, 2015, p. 4)























‘When A. calls you’ (Deal, 2015, p. 4)
The new pattern comes with the local-only configurations. Rather than being ungram-
matical, with 2→ 1 configurations, only second person agreement appears. With 1→
2, both first and second person agreement appears.






















‘When I call you’ (Deal, 2015, p. 6)
It is clear that Nez Perce contrasts with Kichean in allowing argument combinations
with more than one local person—in these cases, it generally privileges second person
agreement over first, but shows agreement with both if the first person argument is a
subject. Again, our agreement theory must allow for such variation. In terms of thef
hierarchy, the pattern can be described as 2> 1> 3: both first and second are preferred
over third, while second is in turn preferred over first.2
4.2.1.3 Cuzco Quechua Subject Marking Anomalies
A third and final pattern within the “omnivorous” agreement family comes from so-
called Subject Marking Anomalies (SMAs) in Cuzco Quechua. The concern here is the
form of the outer agreement suffix, which, as shown in the examples in (13), generally
2A challenge is to account for why both first and second person agreement appear in the 1 → 2
configurations, rather than second person alone. If it were a “pure” omnivorous preference for 2 > 1,
then we might expect no first person agreement at all to appear in these cases. This is discussed further
in Section 4.5.4.3.
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shows agreement with the subject. With 1→ 3 the marker shows agreement with the
first person, and in the reverse case (3→ 1) it shows agreement with the third person.






‘S/he washed me’ (Hoggarth, 2004; Myler, 2017)
So far, this pattern is not omnivorous. However, omnivorism appears with second per-
son arguments. As shown in (14), when a second person is combined with a third
person either as a subject (14a) or an object (14b), agreement is shown with the sec-
ond person (shown in bold).






‘S/he washed you’ (Hoggarth, 2004; Myler, 2017)
The same basic generalization holds between local-only combinations, shown in (15),
where second person agreement is shown regardless of whether it is the subject (15a)
or the object (15b).







‘I washed you’ (Hoggarth, 2004; Myler, 2017)
Like the patterns in Nez Perce, agreement preferences target the second person over
the first person. However, the pattern can be more straightforwardly be described as a
2 > 1/3 pattern, where agreement targets a second person over all others, while if no
second person is available, then agreement defaults to targeting the subject.
4.2.2 Alignment effects
Alignment adds an additional layer of complexity to hierarchy effects. These effects are
described by considering the relationship between two scales, in this case the person-
based prominence hierarchy, repeated in part in (16a), and a syntactic position hierar-
chy, which ranks syntactically higher nouns above syntactically lower nouns.
(16) a. 1/2 > 3 Partial person-based prominence hierarchy
b. HIGH > LOW Syntactic position hierarchy
The contrast between “high” and “low” is not specific to sitting in a particular projection
within the phrase structure—rather, it is relativized. The relation is broadly schema-
tized in (17). Here, DP2 is more deeply embedded than DP1; therefore we can derive a
ranking of DP1 > DP2, based on their relative positions in the hierarchy. Such configu-
rations are observable in a variety of familiar constructions, including between subject
(high) and object (low) of a transitive clause, or indirect object (high) and direct object
(low) of a ditransitive.
(17) [. . . DP1 [. . . DP2 ]]
The scales in (16) can be aligned in two different ways, which we are broadly referred
to as DIRECT and INVERSE. These alignments are schematized in (18). The DIRECT
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alignment (18a) matches the higher ranked element on one scale with the higher ranked
element on another (and, correspondingly, matches lower to lower). In our case, this
means the syntactically higher argument is also a “more prominent” person (i.e. first or
second). The INVERSE alignment (18b) crosses high and low between the two scales—
here, this results in the syntactically higher argument being “less prominent” than the
syntactically lower argument.






In the next few sections, I review two categories of alignment effects: (i) the Person-
Case Constraint (PCC), generally recognized as a family of restrictions on indirect/direct
object clitics; and (ii) direct-inverse marking, a pattern of Voice agreement (and one of
the main focuses of the upcoming analysis of Ojibwe).
4.2.2.1 The PCC
While not the main focus of the dissertation, the PCC provides critical background for
understanding the basic form of alignment effects. It is the most studied of these effects,
and therefore provides a solid baseline and exemplifies the range of variation that these
effects can show.
The basic phenomenon can be observed in Basque, a language isolate of the Pyre-
nees. As previously noted, the PCC restricts the possible combinations of indirect/direct
objects (IOs and DOs). Here, we see that the alignment where the structurally higher
IO is first person and the lower DO is third person as in (19a) is grammatical. This is a
DIRECT alignment. In contrast, the combination where the IO is a third person and the
DO a first person as in (19b)—the INVERSE alignment—is ungrammatical.
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Intended: ‘You have sold me to the butcher.’ Basque: *3DAT > 1ABS
Many languages around the world show PCC effects, but the exact combination of ar-
guments that is ungrammatical is a matter of variation. There are four basic “strengths”
of the effect, summarized in Table 4.1. Basque shows what is referred to as the Strong
PCC. We have only see a subset of the relevant examples, but the Strong PCC restricts
all combinations where the DO is a first or second person. Like the Strong variant, the
Weak PCC bans combinations where the DO is a first or second person, but only when
the DO is a third person. The Ultra Strong PCC bans the same configurations as the
Weak PCC, plus configurations where the IO is a second person and the DO first. Fi-
nally, the Me-First PCC bans all combinations with a first person DO. (Then, there are
languages like Moro, that have cliticization but are not reported to have PCC effects).
IO > DO Languages
Strong *2/3 > 1, *1/3 > 2 Slovenian, Basque, Greek, Kiowa
Ultra Strong *3 > 1/2, *2 > 1 Classical Arabic
Weak *3 > 1/2 Catalan varieties, Italian, Sambaa
Me-First *2/3 > 1 Romanian, Bulgarian
No PCC — Moro
IO DO Strong Ultra Strong Weak Me-First No PCC
1 3 Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø
2 3 Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø
1 2 * Ø Ø Ø Ø
2 1 * * Ø * Ø
3 1 * * * * Ø
3 2 * * * Ø Ø
Table 4.1: Summary of PCC effects, shown two different ways. Summaries based on
those found in Coon and Keine (2020) and Deal (2020).
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At first blush, the distribution of these restrictions may appear to be somewhat scat-
tered. However, the cline of effects can be described, with one caveat to capture the
Strong PCC in certain languages, via the alignment of the person-based prominence
and syntactic position hierarchies. This is shown in (20). The Strong PCC (20a) shows
evidence of both 1 > 2 and 2 > 1 rankings, with both local persons being ranked above
the third person. The ranking of 1 > 2 > 3 captures the Ultra Strong PCC (20b), a
collapse of first and second the Weak PCC (20c), a collapse of second and third the
Me-First PCC (20d), and a full collapse a language that lacks PCC effects entirely (20e).
(20) Observed PCC types and correspondence to possible rankings
a. Strong: {1 > 2, 2 > 1} > 3
b. Ultra Strong: 1 > 2 > 3
c. Weak: 1/2 > 3
d. Me-First: 1 > 2/3
e. No PCC: 1/2/3
It should be emphasized that collapsing adjacent rankings in this way is not a violation
of the person-based prominence hierarchy, but rather shows that the realization of a
given ranking is variable across languages (and, ultimately, particular constructions).
Patterns that would constitute a true violation of the hierarchy, for example a ranking
of 3 > 1/2, which puts third persons above local persons, are unattested. The lack of
this ranking can be observed by the fact that, in all languages, regardless of strength
of the PCC, it is grammatical for a third person to be a DO under a first or second
person IO. This is shown in the first two rows of the bottom table in 4.1, where there
are checkmarks across the board.
There is one final step. Taking each of the possible rankings in (20) and deriving
alignments with the syntactic position hierarchy shows that there is an unbroken corre-
spondence between INVERSE alignment and ungrammaticality (and, similarly, DIRECT
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alignment and grammaticality). This is schematized for each case in (21), noting that
a language with no ranking will not give rise to any inverse alignments, deriving the
lack of PCC effects.



























But, as previously noted, the Strong PCC has some internal variation, with different
languages showing these basic effects of the surface receiving different explanations.
The “Canonical” Strong PCC of Basque has been analyzed by treating dative marked
arguments as third persons for the purposes of agreement (Coon and Keine, 2020).
There is independent evidence for this move, which I set aside here in the interest of
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streamlining the discussion. Considering the example in (21), the dative first person is











Intended: ‘They have sold you to me.’ *1DAT > 2ABS
The violation within the local-only configurations therefore reduces to an INVERSE align-
ment under the 2 > 3 ranking. In the second person IO over first person DO (again, not
shown), where the second person is then dative, this can be captured by an INVERSE
alignment under the 1 > 3 ranking. Therefore the Canonical Strong PCC of Basque is
derived from the same basic ranking as the Weak PCC (1/2 > 3), with the additional
assumption that dative arguments are treated as third persons. There is this no need
for any ranking between first and second person to account for the Basque pattern.
That said, the so-called “Reversible” Strong PCC of Slovenian (Stegovec, 2020) pro-
vides evidence for a case where the 1 > 2 and 2 > 1 rankings truly co-exist within
a single paradigm. With certain groups of speakers, restrictions against 1 + 2 com-
binations occur independently of case marking, supporting an analysis where certain
varieties of the Strong PCC are not due to independent properties of dative nouns, but
to person restrictions proper. From the point of view of the hierarchy itself, the exis-
tence of this pattern is problematic, as it requires paradoxical rankings to be maintained
(i.e. 1 must be ranked both above and below 2). However, as is discussed further in
Section 4.5.2, the possible probe structures under the current account can capture these
patterns. This further bolsters the view that such hierarchies are simply approximations
of the actual representation that underlies prominence effects.
That said, it is worth highlighting the logically possible rankings of the three basic
categories that are, so far, not attested in PCC configurations in any language of the
world. These are given in (23). Most of these unattested rankings boil down to the
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generalization that first and second person are never ranked below third person, ei-
ther together or alone. However two rankings, which are bolded in (23), stand out as
exceptions to this general rule. These are the so-called You-First patterns, where the
second person is ranked above third person. Again, no language has yet surfaced that
provides evidence for a PCC effect of this sort. The 2> 3/1 ranking would be analogous
to the Me-First PCC, but instead banning second persons from appearing in the object
position. The 2 > 1 > 3 ranking would be exemplified by a language with restrictions
like the Ultra Strong PCC, but with a ban on a first person IO over a second person DO,
rather than the other way around.
(23) Remaining logically possible rankings, some attested outside of the PCC
2 > 1 > 3 Nez Perce
3 > 2 > 1
3 > 1 > 2
1 > 3 > 2
2 > 3 > 1




The puzzle is that while evidence for such rankings has not been found within the PCC
family, a number of languages show agreement patterns and restrictions where second
person appears to be privileged. The first such example was seen with Nez Perce, where
local-only combinations always showed agreement with second person over first person
in local-only configurations, and local over third person in mixed configurations. The
second case was with Cuzco Quechua, where agreement targeted second person over
both third and first, with no evidence of a ranking between first and third persons. This
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raises the possibility that the failure to observe PCC effects of these sorts are simply
accidental gaps in our typological knowledge, rather than true gaps in the typology of
possible PCC types (for a recent discussion, see Deal, 2020). We should therefore expect
future work to reveal clear patterns of this sort within the PCC family.
4.2.2.2 Direct-inverse marking
Like the PCC, direct-inverse marking agreement systems can be described via the align-
ment of arguments with the person-based prominence and syntactic position hierar-
chies, and show variation (both within and across languages) in the distribution of the
marking. The basic form of the direct-inverse alternation is exemplified in (24) in Bor-
der Lakes Ojibwe. Note that these are independent order verbs (matrix verbs), which
differ from the conjunct order in where inverse marking arises. Here, we see that the
direct alignment 1→ 3 leads to what is descriptively referred to as a direct marker -aa
(which in fact is third person proximate agreement—agreement with the object), while
the inverse alignment 3→ 1 leads to the inverse marker -ig—a form that is unmarked
for person.














‘s/he (PROX) sees me’
For now, I forgo the morphological details of direct-inverse marking — this is the focus
of the Chapter 5. While inverse marking is found across a wide number of language
families, here I restrict focus to variation within the Algonquian languages. The general
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range of variation of inverse marking within the conjunct verbal order (i.e. embedded
clauses) is summarized in Table 4.2, which is adapted from the work of Oxford (2014).
EA IA Ojibwe Delaware Massachusett Blackfoot
1 3 — — — —
2 3 — — — —
1 2 — — — —
2 1 — — — INV
3 1 — — INV INV
3 2 — INV INV INV
3 3′ — — — —
3′ 3 INV INV INV INV
Table 4.2: Distribution of inverse (“INV”) and non-inverse (“—”) across Algonquian in
the conjunct order, setting aside number (all forms above are singular, which obscures
some additional complications). Adapted from Oxford (2014).
The first and most striking observation is that all languages that distinguish proxi-
mate and obviative show evidence of a ranking between proximate and obviative per-
sons. This can be seen by the uniformity of the final two rows. There is no language
within the family that fails to show inverse marking with the 3′ → 3 combination. This
corresponds to the ranking in (25) being present for all languages that make a proxi-
mate/obviative distinction in the first place.
(25) Obviative hierarchy: 3 > 3′
This differs from what we have seen so far with rankings between other types of person
categories. While the patterns emerging from the PCC showed that third person is never
ranked above either of the local persons, there was evidence suggesting these rankings
could be collapsed, rendering all categories “equally prominent”. In other words, even
in a language that, for example, distinguishes the categories of first and second person,
it is not necessarily the case that the agreement system will provide the means to show
a ranking between these categories. With obviation, it appears that such a collapse in
the ranking never occurs if those categories are present within a language.
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The remaining patterns in Table 4.2 largely follow from ranking variation within the
original hierarchy, and is summarized in (26).
(26) a. Blackfoot: 1 > 2 > 3 > 3′
b. Massachusett: 1/2 > 3 > 3′
c. Ojibwe: 1/2/3 > 3′
Of interest is the fact that Algonquian lacks one of the possible collapses of the hierarchy,
given a 1 > 2 ranking. The Me-First type pattern that collapses second and third with
first person ranked above both (1 > 2/3), is unattested. Furthermore, it entirely lacks
evidence of the You-First class of patterns where second is ranked above first and/or
third persons. As with apparent gaps in the variation within the PCC family of effects,
at this point, it is unclear whether such gaps are accidental, or if they are indicative of
a wider generalization about how hierarchy effects arise.
There is one exceptional case, which is missing from the summary in (26): The
pattern exemplified by Delaware in Table 4.2. Here, inverse is (aside from the universal
3′ → 3 cases) only triggered by 3→ 2. This implies a hierarchy, shown in (27), where
second person is ranked above third person, but there is no specification of first person
within the ranking at all.
(27) Delaware: 2 > 3 > 3′
This differs from the previously seen collapses, where two categories end up co-ranked.
Any collapse of this sort would overgenerate the expected distribution of inverse. For
example, if there were a collapse between first and second rather than simply an absence
of first person within the ranking, we would additionally predict inverse with 3 → 1
(the pattern seen in Massachusett). If there were a collapse between first and third, we
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would expect inverse to arise with 1→ 2 (the inverse analogue of a You-First alignment
effect).
While the pattern exemplified by Delaware is exceptional, it is not singular. Hi-
erarchy effects described by 2 > 3, without any reference to first person, can also be
seen with argument co-occurrence restrictions in languages such as Halkomelem (Gerdts,
1988; Wiltschko and Burton, 2004) and Chamorro (Chung, 1998). Past accounts of this
pattern, such as Wiltschko and Burton (2004), have argued that the analogy of these re-
strictions to other hierarchy effects is a red herring, instead treating them as accidental
paradigmatic gaps. I do not take a strong stance on the correct analysis for the various
2 > 3 patterns. However, given that they have received treatments that allow them to
fall outside of the direct scope of person-based prominence effects, I set them aside and
exclude them as part of the core patterns to be explained in this chapter.
4.2.3 Summary
In this section, we have seen evidence that the full range of expected prominence-
based effects is observed. Given three basic person categories of first, second, and third,
with a strong constraint against a ranking that places third person above either of the
local persons, there are six possible patterns. The two maximal rankings can either
put first above second or second above third (Ultra Strong effects) or realize both of
these rankings at once (Strong effects). The ranking of first and second person can be
collapsed (Weak effects), second or first person can be collapsed with third (deriving
Me-First or You-First effects), or the categories can be unranked (No Effect). This range
of variation, and the name associated with each possibility, is summarized for reference
in (28).
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(28) Summary of Person-Based Prominence Effects
Ultra Strong (Author): 1 > 2 > 3 Blackfoot, Classical Arabic
Ultra Strong (Addressee): 2 > 1 > 3 Nez Perce
Strong: {1 > 2, 2 > 1} > 3 Slovenian
Weak: 1/2 > 3 Massachusett, Kichean, Italian
Me-First: 1 > 2/3 Romanian
You-First: 2 > 1/3 Cuzco Quechua
No Effect: 1/2/3 Ojibwe, Moro
The addition of a proximate-obviative distinction, if present in a given language, always
results in a ranking of the proximate category over the obviation category. There is no
example of a language that contains this distinction, but collapses the ranking between
these categories.
(29) Obviative hierarchy: 3 > 3′
The goal now is to formulate a theory of agreement, and adopt a representation of
person, that allows the semi-constrained variation in person-based prominence effects
to be captured.
4.3 Features as sets (in syntax)
To reprise the main claim of the chapter, the major representational move to be made
is to treat each ϕ-feature as a set in syntax. The focus here is almost entirely on per-
son, where the sets that constitute each feature are made up of a combination of I , U ,
and/or some number of O’s. This means that features will no longer be the most prim-
itive representation within morphosyntax. This job is now taken up by the syntactic
analogues of the ontological primitives, which ultimately denote the author, addressee,
and others.
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To understand the consequence of this claim, it is important to start by considering
the feature representation that is generally accepted within current theories of mor-
phosyntax. The same basic motivations drive the current proposal. Again taking per-
son features as our example, we have three basic features [proximate], [participant],
and [author]. For the purposes of syntactic computations such as agreement, the labels
“proximate”, “participant”, and “author” are completely arbitrary. They could equally
be called “F”, “G”, and “H”, or any other trio of labels, as long as they are distinct from
one another. These labels are nothing more than addresses or look-up codes (i.e. indices
in the relevant sense), which, when transferred to the interfaces, condition the inser-
tion of particular denotations and morphophonological exponents. In this way, they
are associated with particular meanings and forms, without themselves containing that
information at each given point in the derivation.
Given this assumption of modularity, the manipulation of features in syntax occurs
without any direct reference to a feature’s eventual semantic and morphophonological
interpretation. Operations such as agreement, movement, and selectional restrictions
on MERGE thus involve simple identity-matching between feature labels. In the case of
AGREE, the need for such “checking” is ultimately driven by one of these features having
the additional property of being uninterpretable, unvalued, or unsatisfied—features with
the attribute define probes. The other feature involved in checking is a counterpart that
matches in label, with the ability to delete, value, satisfy, or otherwise alleviate the needs
of the feature that triggers the checking relationship—these features define potential
goals for agreement.
The system I propose has the same basic feature structure as reviewed above, con-
sisting of a value and a label, and also has the goal of retaining the modularity and au-
tonomy of syntactic generation. The difference is in what the sub-pieces of the feature
represent. Rather than each feature representing a single index such as “proximate”,
“participant”, or “author”, they instead represents a set of primitive indices {I , U , O},
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{I , U}, or {I}, respectively. These collections of syntactic primitives are the analogues of
the basic distinctions within the ontology of person, but are not themselves semantically
interpretable to preserve the modularity of syntactic generation.
It is important to highlight that while syntactic representations have the potential to
be infinite via, for example, the recursive properties of the grammar, the representation
itself is finite and bounded. Therefore one restriction on the syntactic theory of features
put forward here is ensuring that each feature represents a bounded set. This differs
from the semantic representation discussed in the previous two chapters, where the
number of o’s within the ontology was unbounded, and therefore created a non-finite
lattice of the power set of the entire π/ϕ ontology.
4.3.1 Feature sub-parts: Labels and values
As discussed above, a feature consists of two basic parts: I refer to these as the label
and the value. Both of these properties were discussed at length in Chapter 2 for the
purposes of creating partitions of the semantic space of person. The label denoted
a (power set of) some subset of the person ontology, and values denoted operations
that allowed features to interact and partition this ontological space. In this section, I
cover the properties of labels and values relevant to formulating a theory of syntactic
agreement.
The label is proposed to be shorthand for a set that consists of a collection of primi-
tive indices. To represent the syntactic instantiations of each of these primitives, which
crucially do not have a semantic interpretation, I use capital letters I , U , and O, respec-
tively. All features are minimally comprised of these set-based labels. In the coming
sections, I continue to use the notation [proximate], [participant], and [author] a con-
venience, keeping in mind that these labels are now shorthand for the sets {I , U , O},
{I , U}, and {I}, respectively.
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The second property is the value. So far, we have seen binary values where fea-
tures are either positive (+) or negative (−). These values will play a role in syntax by
defining the sets on possible agreement goals (see Section 4.3.3). However, the major
focus of the chapter is with cases where a feature lacks a value altogether—i.e. when a
feature is unvalued. Unvalued features trigger checking relationships, often leading to
agreement. The notational conventions for each type of feature is shown in (30).




Despite the potential for confusion, I retain the notational convention of using [uF] to
represent features that trigger checking/agreement, using it to represent a feature that
is unvalued (or, if you wish, unsatisfied). This should not be confused with the notion
of (un)interpretability, which has no role in the current theory either as a driver of
checking/agreement (Preminger, 2011, 2014) or as a way to restrict the interpretation
of features at LF (Hammerly, 2019a). In other words, there is no “interpretable” [iF]
counterpart within the theory.
To summarize, much should be highly familiar already. Unvalued features are used
to define the features on agreement probes, while valued features define the features
of goals. For the current purposes, we can roughly split these features between “verbal”
and “nominal” domains, keeping in mind that agreement probes are not necessarily
limited to the verbal spine (i.e. many analyses of nominal concord make use of same
mechanisms as verbal agreement). In the next section (Section 4.3.2), I expand on the
nature of probes under this representation. In Section 4.3.3 I detail the nature of goals,
those element that are targets of agreement.
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4.3.2 ϕ-features on person probes: Defining the possibilities
The major benefit of the move towards a set-based representation of features is that the
number of possible person probes opens up. The focus of this section is not to define
how these probes participate in agreement — those aspects of the theory are covered
in Section 4.4 — but rather to outline the possible feature combinations that can be
specified on the person probe. I also largely set aside direct comparisons to the leading
alternatives such as the feature geometry, which are discussed in Section 4.6.
The following features/heads are relevant to the person probe.
(31) Person features as sets (probe domain)
a. [uAuthor] = u{I}
b. [uAddressee] = u{U}
c. [uParticipant] = u{I , U}
d. [uProximate] = u{I , U , O}
e. [uAnimate] = u{I , U , O, O′, O′′}
f. [uΠ] = u{I , U , O, O′, O′′}
g. [uΦ] = u{I , U , O, O′, O′′, R, R′, R′′}
There are two things to note immediately. First, both the [participant] and [ad-
dressee] features are generally available to be specified on a probe. This differs from
the representation seen within the nominal domain, where the addressee feature was
derived via contextually triggered winnowing of the [participant] feature to [partici-
pant*], which is functionally an addressee feature. In Chapter 1, I termed this Addressee
Asymmetry. One might imagine a theory of the features of the probe that mirrors this
tradeoff between having a full participant feature versus a winnowed feature. How-
ever, the empirical patterns do not support this view, as shown in more detail in Section
4.5.2. While this raises questions about how to manage having different representa-
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tions of person within two syntactic domains (i.e. nominal versus verbal; goal versus
probe), it is motivated not by theory-internal considerations but the empirical footprint
of prominence-based agreement effects. Again, for further discussion, see Chapter 7.
Second, the [animate] feature represents the same set as the head π. As a result, the
animate set and the set Π can be used more or less interchangeably. That said, both are
broadly necessary given that [animate] defines a feature, while π defines a functional
head. In particular, I assume following Béjar and Rezac (2003) that the person probe (π)
can be specified separately from the number probe (#).3 This mirrors the claims made
for the nominal spine, where person and number features were specified on separate
functional projections. I assume that a “pure” person probe minimally and necessarily
contains the set uΠ, which is the set defined by the person probe defining functional
head π. In contrast, the [animate] feature can appear in places other than a pure person
probe, allowing agreement based on this set to appear in the absence of π.
For the time being, I focus on the core person features [author], [addressee], and
[participant], and only so-called pure person probes that are defined by the functional
head π and as a result necessarily contain the uΠ set. As discussed at length in the pre-
vious two chapters, there is evidence from the typology of possible person distinctions
that both [animate] and [proximate], while operating over the same representation
and serving the same basic function of the core person features, are not necessarily as-
sociated with the functional head π. We will see that these features can appear on a
probe with the core person features (as well as elsewhere in the clause), but I reserve
deep discussion of these probes to Chapter 5, where I explore the agreement patterns
of Ojibwe. Given these three features, and the restriction that the pure person probe
must be specified for uΠ, there are 8 possible probes, summarized in (32).4
3This is not meant to exclude the possibility of fused probes, where person and number interact
conjunctively (Coon and Bale, 2014); These are discussed in Section 4.5.3.
4Note, there are two probes that can capture the Strong patterns of the distribution of inverse. This
is discussed further in Section 4.5.2.
195
(32) a. {uΠ} 1/2/3
b. {uΠ, uParticipant} 1/2 > 3
c. {uΠ, uAuthor} 1 > 2/3
d. {uΠ, uAddressee} 2 > 1/3
e. {uΠ, uParticipant, uAuthor} 1 > 2 > 3
f. {uΠ, uParticipant, uAddressee} 2 > 1 > 3
g. {uΠ, uAddressee, uAuthor} {1 > 2, 2 > 1} > 3
h. {uΠ, uParticipant, uAddressee, uAuthor} {1 > 2, 2 > 1} > 3
The goal is to show how these 8 probes capture the typology of person agreement
systems, as particularly exemplified by the typology person-based prominence effects
reviewed in Section 4.2. The correspondence between these different patterns, and the
different types of person probes, is also indicated in (32).
To preview what is explored further in Section 4.6, where a direct comparison to
the feature geometric approach is made, the major difference between the set-based
representation above and the feature geometry is the availability of the probes such as
those in (32c) or (32d), which lack “intermediate” features (i.e. [participant]). On the
feature geometric approach, representationally encoded entailments between features
block probes of this sort from being specified. Since the current account allows features
to freely combine within the limits of a particular functional head, probes of this sort
become possible.
4.3.3 ϕ-features on goals: Encapsulation and collection
Agreement requires the interaction between a probe and a goal. In the case canonical
verbal agreement, goals are ϕ-bearing nominal element. More particularly, I claim that
goals are a set comprised of the basic primitives I , U , and a finite set of O’s collected
on DP. The goal of this section is to define the sets that govern different possible goals.
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The idea that having a single set on DP (or, perhaps more broadly, the maximal
projection highest functional head on the nominal spine) provides a path to explain
how probes on the verbal spine gain access to information encapsulated within the
nominal spine. The basic shape of the nominal spine is repeated in (33). Again, certain
nominal categories such as pronouns, clitics, and nouns may be layered with different
levels of structure both within and across subtypes (Déchaine and Wiltschko, 2002),
in Algonquian nominals can be specified up to the full DP structure (see, for example,
Oxford, 2017)5.
















If we assume that DP defines a phase (e.g. Svenonius, 2004), and we further assume
that AGREE is subject to phase-based locality requirements (e.g. Chomsky, 2000, 2001),
then a probe that sits outside of the nominal spine such as that on Voice, Infl, or C
should be blocked from accessing the features contained within the complement of DP,
and thus agreement with these features should be blocked.
However, the phasehood of DP is not without controversy, so reasonable objections
may be raised to the arguments in the previous paragraph, which ties the need to collect
nominal features to phase impenetrability. That said, the fact that ϕ-features are dis-
5In fact, it is claimed that nominals can be specified up to KP. We could equally adopt this notion
without any untoward consequences. For simplicity, I treat DP as the highest nominal projection.
197
tributed across the nominal spine causes other issues. In particular, it violates the notion
of ϕ-completeness first put forward by Chomsky (2000, 2001). Chomsky used this no-
tion to create a cut between complete and defective (i.e. incomplete) goals. In current
theories of AGREE, the notion of a goal being defective is questionable at best—such
ϕ-incomplete goals were argued to be unable to delete the uninterpretable feature of
the probe, causing derivational crashes. Under current models, the failure of AGREE to
find a suitable goal is not thought to create a crash, but rather is tolerated (Preminger,
2011, 2014).
This shift in the theory calls into question the relevance of a requirement for goals
to be ϕ-complete. However, I believe the insight that ϕ-features otherwise distributed
across the nominal spine are collected onto a single head is still crucial, if not for the
reasons originally put forward by Chomsky. Again following the proposal of Béjar and
Rezac (2003, 2009) to have split person and number probes, AGREE may conduct the
search for a goal based on person or number features alone. That said, these probes
frequently express a greater set of features than those used to select the goal—for ex-
ample, person probes may express the number features of the goal or vice verse. The
prevalence of this featural coarseness, the observation that agreement often leads the
full set of the goal’s ϕ-features to be copied to the probe, provides evidence in favor
of ϕ-feautures ultimately being collected on a single head or phrase, which is then the
target of AGREE. If the person and number features remain distributed across separate
heads, then one must explain how a probe can agree with one head (e.g. π), but copy
the features of another (e.g. #). If all features are collected on a single head, such issues
do not arise.
4.3.3.1 Previous approaches: Concord
One solution to the general problem of ϕ-feature distribution has been to commit to
some notion of feature collection, which consolidates these features on the D head (or
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whatever the highest projection within the nominal is thought to be). This includes
“feature-sharing” versions of AGREE put forward by Frampton and Gutmann (2006)
and Pesetsky and Torrego (2007), and applied to the these issues directly by Danon
(2011). On these formulations, D is a probe, and through nominal-internal agreement
relationships collects person, number, and gender features. This provides a solution to
both potential issues: (i) D is outside of the phase-complement, thus the features are
rendered accessible to probes outside of the nominal projection; and (ii) D has collected
all of the phi-features otherwise distributed across the nominal spine, and is therefore
ϕ-complete.
The criticism of this system advanced here is that “external” agreement relation-
ships are rendered dependent on the presence of nominal concord, but the empirical
basis for such a relationship is lacking. Perhaps most suspiciously, this system requires
concord with person. However, person-based concord is exceedingly rare, if it can even
be considered to be observed at all (Baker, 2008; Norris, 2017). Furthermore, putting
nominal concord in a feeding/bleeding relationship to verbal agreement should predict
a lack of verbal agreement in languages that lack concord (unless one advances a con-
spiracy about invisible concord in these cases). In the same vein, languages that lack
gender or number concord alone should then lack verbal agreement in these categories.
This can readily be shown to be false. Norris (2019) provides a large-scale survey
of concord across languages. One example of a language from this survey that entirely
lacks concord across demonstratives, numerals, and adjectives is Ainu, a language iso-
late of Northern Japan. As seen in the examples below, taken from Shibatani (1990),
nouns can be marked plural (34a) or singular (34b), but the demonstrative nean is in-
variant in both cases—it does not show concord. In contrast, the verb in (34a) shows
plural agreement. This falsifies the generalization that concord is a necessary prerequi-
site to for ϕ-features to be accessed external to the noun phrase.
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in order to. . .




old man. . .
‘That old man. . . ’ Ainu (Shibatani, 1990, p. 53)
4.3.3.2 A set-based solution
To summarize, the goal is to provide the means to represent the ϕ-features of the goal
otherwise distributed across the nominal spine such that they are: (i) complete, in
the sense that all of the features are collected in a single location, and (ii) accessible,
such that the location of collection is not subject to locality conditions such as phase
impenetrability. The solution I put forward is to represent theϕ-features of the nominal
spine with a set of the syntactic primitives I , U , and the O’s, which is then accessed by
the syntactic agreement mechanism. The set is formed by (i) collecting the features in
one place, and (ii) transforming this collection into a set.
The proposed mechanism for collection is based in the Feature Percolation Principle
of Norris (2014), shown in (35). This provides a general solution to collecting features
distributed across a given extended projection into the highest projection within the
spine, and is not specific to the set-based representation advocated for here.
(35) Feature Percolation Principle (adapted from Norris, 2014, p. 135)
a. All projections of a head X have the features that X has.
b. Let [±F] be a valued feature on XP.
Let Z be a head lacking the feature [F].
Let X and Z be members of the same extended projection. When Z merges
with XP, projecting ZP, ZP also has the valued feature [±F].
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The principle has two pieces, which I take this to be part of a wider labeling algorithm.
The exact nature of the labeling algorithm (and its relation to these principles) is left
to future work. Informally, the first part in (35a) ensures that all projections of a given
head share the same features. The second part in (35b) allows for the features of orig-
inating in a lower projection to be passed on to the next, given that the next projection
is not headed by a phrase that contains that feature already and is part of the same
extended projection. The result is all features of the nominal spine are collected on the
highest projection of the functional sequence, as schematized in (36).
(36) The nominal spine following feature percolation
DP
{±anim, ±prox, ±auth, ±part, ±group}(Φ)
D #P

















One immediate question is whether the adopted percolation account is fundamen-
tally different than the invisible concord account discussed (and rejected) in the previ-
ous section. While there are similarities in that features end up collected into the D(P)
domain, the two accounts critically differ in where this collection of features lives. With
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a concord-based account, the D head itself is agreeing (concording) and collecting fea-
tures; with a percolation-based account, features are passed along the nominal spine
up to DP, and do not feed back to the head D itself. The result is that we do not predict
a relationship between the form of D, the terminal node that is target by spell-out, and
the types of features that can be collected by agreement probes on the verbal spine.
This ensures that concord on D and ϕ-completeness are entirely independent.
However, the present account has contended that features are not unary indices (a
label), but rather sets of indices (primitives). I therefore propose that feature perco-
lation results in the restriction of the full set of possible primitives represented by Φ
based on the set of value of each of the collected feature. The set Φ can restricted ei-
ther via set intersection with a feature F , as in (37a), or via the set difference (relative
complement) of F , as in (37b), depending on the value that the feature is specified for.
(37) Syntactic definition of feature values
a. +F(Φ) = Φ∩ F = {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ F}
b. −F(Φ) = Φ\F = {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x /∈ F}
An arbitrary number of features could combine to restrict the set Φ, with the order of
the features within the percolated set being arbitrary as well (this follows from the fact
that each membership relationship is combined via conjunction, which is fully commu-
tative).
(38) Order doesn’t matter with multiple features
a. +F(+G(Φ)) = +G(+F(Φ)) = {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ F ∧ x ∈ G}
b. −F(−G(Φ)) = −G(−F(Φ)) = {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x /∈ F ∧ x /∈ G}
c. −F(+G(Φ)) = +G(−F(Φ)) = {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x /∈ F ∧ x ∈ G}
d. +F(−G(Φ)) = −G(+F(Φ)) = {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ F ∧ x /∈ G}
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To review, each feature, and the root node Φ, represents the sets in (39). Whether a
given language utilizes the full participant feature, or the winnowed participant*, is a
matter of variation that tracks with whether the language encodes a distinction between
the exclusive and inclusive, as discussed at length in Chapter 2.
(39) Person features as sets (goal domain)
a. [Author] = {I}
b. [Participant] = {I , U}
c. [Participant*] = {U}
d. [Proximate] = {I , U , O}
e. [Animate] = {I , U , O, O′, O′′}
f. Φ = {I , U , O, O′, O′′, R, R′, R′′}
For our current purposes, we can derive the correspondences between (pro)nominal
category, set of primitives, and percolated feature sets, shown in Table 4.3. This takes
into account the possible feature combinations posited under the theory of contrastive
interpretations (again, see Chapter 2). As a result, the author and participant features
are not specified in the presence of [−Proximate]. This is reflected by the absence of
these features below in the obviative (3′) categories.
I take for granted the existence of a definition of [Group] that allows for the cuts
shown in Table 4.3, where singleton sets are represented with [−Group] and non-
singleton sets [+Group]. The precise definition of this feature in syntax is left to future
work (though see Chapter 2, Section 2.7.2 for the denotation of this feature).
Setting aside number distinctions, I show the derivation of the syntactic sets for the
five possible person categories seen in Ojibwe (the “quintipartition”) in (40).
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Category Set Features
1SG {I} {+anim, +prox, +auth, −part*, −group}(Φ)
2SG {U} {+anim, +prox, −auth, +part*, −group}(Φ)
3SG {O} {+anim, +prox, −auth, −part*, −group}(Φ)
3′SG {O′} or {O′′} {+anim, −prox, −group}(Φ)
EXCL {I , O, O′, O′′} {+anim, +prox, +auth, −part*, +group}(Φ)
INCL {I , U , O, O′, O′′} {+anim, +prox, +auth, +part*}(Φ)
2PL {U , O, O′, O′′} {+anim, +prox, −auth, +part*, +group}(Φ)
3PL {O, O′, O′′} {+anim, +prox, −auth, −part*, +group}(Φ)
3′PL {O′, O′′} {+anim, −prox, +group}(Φ)
Table 4.3: Possible goals with set and feature based syntactic representations in a
quintipartition language with a singlar-plural number distinction (e.g. Border Lakes
Ojibwe).
(40) Syntactic sets in a quintipartition system
a. INCL = {+anim, +prox, +auth, +part*}(Φ)
= {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ {I , U , O, O′, O′′}∧ x ∈ {I , U , O}∧ x ∈ {I}∧ x ∈ {U}}
= {I , U}
b. EXCL = {+anim, +prox, +auth, −part*}(Φ)
= {x : x ∈ Φ∧x ∈ {I , U , O, O′, O′′}∧x ∈ {I , U , O}∧x ∈ {I}∧x /∈ {U}}
= {I}
c. 2 = {+anim, +prox, −auth, +part*}(Φ)
= {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ {I , U , O, O′, O′′} ∧ x ∈ {I , U , O} ∧ x /∈ {I} ∧ x ∈ {U}}
= {U}
d. 3 = {+anim, +prox, −auth, −part*}(Φ)
= {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ {I , U , O, O′, O′′} ∧ x ∈ {I , U , O} ∧ x /∈ {I} ∧ x /∈ {U}}
= {O}
e. 3′ = {+anim, −prox}(Φ)
= {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ {I , U , O, O′, O′′} ∧ x /∈ {I , U , O}}
= {O′, O′′}
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The inclusive person in (40a) includes both I and U , and therefore is a non-singleton set
without any action from number. Given the assumption from the theory of contrastive
interpretations that the number feature need not be present in these cases to form the
partition, this bodes well for a parallelism between the two domains in terms of feature
specification. Perhaps more puzzling at first is the fact that the obviative person also
results in a non-singleton set without any action from number. However, given that
the vast majority of Algonquian languages fail to show a singular/plural distinction in
the obviative persons — Border Lakes Ojibwe is an outlier in extending the number
system to these cases, rather than the other way around. This could provide a path
for understanding why that might be the case: in the absence of a number feature the
obviative person is derived as a non-singleton set.
For clarity, I include the other two most common partitions. The sets for the standard
quadripartition are shown in (41). This differs from the quintipartition in that there is
no proximate feature present (and as a result, no obviation distinction in the third
persons).
(41) Syntactic sets in a standard quadripartition system
a. INCL = {+anim,+auth, +part*}(Φ)
= {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ {I , U , O, O′, O′′} ∧ x ∈ {I} ∧ x ∈ {U}}
= {I , U}
b. EXCL = {+anim, +auth, −part*}(Φ)
= {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ {I , U , O, O′, O′′} ∧ x ∈ {I} ∧ x /∈ {U}}
= {I}
c. 2 = {+anim, −auth, +part*}(Φ)
= {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ {I , U , O, O′, O′′} ∧ x /∈ {I} ∧ x ∈ {U}}
= {U}
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d. 3 = {+anim, −auth, −part*}(Φ)
= {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ {I , U , O, O′, O′′} ∧ x /∈ {I} ∧ x /∈ {U}}
= {O, O′, O′′}
Finally, the syntactic sets for the standard tripartition are shown in (43).
(42) Syntactic sets in a standard tripartition system
a. 1 = {+anim, +part,+auth}(Φ)
= {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ {I , U , O, O′, O′′} ∧ x ∈ {I , U} ∧ x ∈ {I}}
= {I}
b. 2 = {+anim, +part, −auth}(Φ)
= {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ {I , U , O, O′, O′′} ∧ x ∈ {I , U} ∧ x /∈ {I}}
= {U}
c. 3 = {+anim, −part}(Φ)
= {x : x ∈ Φ∧ x ∈ {I , U , O, O′, O′′} ∧ x /∈ {I , U}}
= {O, O′, O′′}
Note that the generic first person, though ambiguous in reference between sets that in-
clude versus exclude the addressee, only contains the first person I within the syntactic
representation. This captures the fact that, for the purposes of agreement, this category
is treated unambiguously as a “first” person.
These various possible sets, which again ignore number, are sufficient to show how
the system derives the full range of possible person-based prominence effects. First, it




With our representation of both probes and goals in hand, we can now provide a formal
model of agreement. I consider AGREE not to be a single operation per se, but rather
the sequence of operations shown in (43). There are four basic steps: Search, Match,
Copy, and Satisfy.
(43) Sub-components of AGREE (cf. Deal, 2015; Coon and Keine, 2020)
a. Search: A ϕ-probe with unsatisfied features [uF] searches its locality-
restricted6 c-command7 domain for the (next) closest goal with a set G,
where G ⊆ Φ8
b. Match: A probe determines Match with a goal via set intersection between
each feature [uF], and the set G of the goal. Match holds if G ∩ F 6= ∅
c. Copy: If Match holds, the goal’s set G is Copied to the probe
d. Satisfy: An unsatisfied feature [uF] is Satisfied if Match holds, and Search
is halted if all unsatisfied features of the probe [uF] are Satisfied (i.e. if
the probe is Satisfied)
Given these steps, the basic outline of an AGREE relation is first that a probe with [uF]
features searches for the (next) closestϕ-bearing goal within its domain. Search occurs
no matter what — if there is no Matching goal, then the procedure is halted. If there is a
goal satisfies the Match condition, then the set from the goal is copied back to the probe
and the [uF] feature is satisfied (i.e. checked). The procedure repeats until either all
potential goals have been searched, or all [uF] features of the probe have been checked.
6i.e. the domain defined by a Phase, Horizon, Barrier, etc.
7(Preminger, 2014, p. 96) argues (following Chomsky, 1995) that c-command is extraneous if we
assume that derivations are cyclic and AGREE is triggered immediately when a probe is merged. All
available structure in this case will be in the c-command domain of the probe.
8A generalized version could include in this set the δ-features, on a system where A′-movement is
driven by AGREE.
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This section considers each of these pieces in turn, setting the stage for the account
of person-based prominence effects in Section 4.5.2.
4.4.1 Search and Satisfy
The current formulation leaves Search as unrestricted as possible — it crucially sepa-
rates the notions of Search and Match such that a probe with unsatisfied interrogates
ϕ-bearing elements even if they do not provide a Match. In other words, I assume
that agreement can “fail” (Preminger, 2011, 2014; Deal, 2015), in that features of the
probe do not need to be Satisfied (i.e. Match with a goal) in order to have a well-formed
derivation. This is stated in (44).
(44) Tolerance of Dissatisfaction
AGREE can apply without resulting in Match (and by extension, without Copy-
ing or Satisfaction).
While Satisfaction is not a necessary consequence of AGREE being applied, the need
for a feature to be Satisfied is fundamentally responsible for driving the application of
AGREE. This is stated in (45).
(45) Obligatoriness of AGREE
If a probe P has unsatisfied features [uF] then AGREE must apply.
This condition requires that the sequence of events in (43) be commenced if an element
containing [uF] is merged into the structure. Given that Search in the current formu-
lation is divorced from Match, I believe that a particularly precise characterization of
failed agreement is available. Failed agreement occurs when there is an unsatisfied
feature with no available matching goals. This differs from previous formulations, in-
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cluding FIND( f ) proposed by Preminger (2011, 2014) (see also Deal, 2015), where a
matching condition was baked into the search operation.
(46) FIND( f ) original formulation; replaced by principle in (45)
Given an unvalued feature F on a head Ho, find an XP bearing a valued instance
of F, and assign that value to Ho
With the current formulation of fallible AGREE in (45), no reference to feature matching
is involved—Match is not a precondition for interacting with or evaluating a potential
goal. Instead, Match is contingent on Search recovering a ϕ-bearing goal to evaluate
against the probe.
There are two relevant considerations for when Search is triggered and when AGREE
halts. First, we can speak of an individual feature being satisfied when Match holds.
This is defined in (47).
(47) Definition of Feature Satisfaction
A feature [uF] is Satisfied by the set G on a goal iff G ∩ F 6=∅ (i.e. Match holds)
Relatedly, we can say that a probe is satisfied when all of the individual features in its
set are satisfied.
(48) Definition of Probe Satisfaction
A probe P is Satisfied when all features [uF] on P are Satisfied
The sequence of operations we call AGREE halts either when the probe is Satisfied, or if
all ϕ-bearing goals (within a locally accessible domain) have been Searched. Further-
more, the AGREE sequence may apply more than one time with a given probe, in order
to satisfy the maximum number of features possible. As will be shown in more detail in
Section 4.5.1, if interactions with a first goal satisfies some, but not all, of the features
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of the probe, then Search is initiated again. If this second goal can satisfy additional
features, then a second set of features is interacted with and copied to the probe.
4.4.2 Match
Satisfaction occurs as a direct consequence of a Match between the features of the probe
and the goal. The definition of Match is repeated in (49).
(49) Match: A probe determines Match with a goal via set intersection between
each feature [uF], and the set G of the goal. Match holds if G ∩ F 6= ∅
In other words, if the set of primitives for a given feature overlaps with the set of prim-
itives of the goal, then the two can be said to Match. The overlap need not be complete
— it is possible for either the probe or the goal to have indices that are not shared
between the two. All that is necessary is for the intersection to be non-null.
To preview what is discussed in more detail in the Section 4.5.2, the derivation
of person-based prominence effects can be attributed to Match, given the definition
of features we have been working with. To review, the features (and the sets they
represent) stand in the following subset-superset relationships.
(50) Proper subset/superset relationships between person features
a. Φ ⊃ [Animate] ⊃ [Proximate] ⊃ [Participant] ⊃ [Author], [Addressee]
b. {I , U , O, . . . , On, R, . . . , Rn} ⊃ {I , U , O, . . . , On} ⊃ {I , U , O} ⊃ {I , U} ⊃ {I}, {U}
The basic entailment relationships that are the hallmark of person-based prominence
effects are captured. Consider the difference in Match between a first person singular
{I} and third (proximate) singular {O}. The first person Matches all features that are a
superset of [Author], while the third person proximate matches all features that are a
superset of [Proximate], but not those that are a subset of this feature.
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In many ways this definition of Match is identical to that used with other feature
representations, in that it evaluates whether there is overlap in the representation of
the probe and the goal. The critical difference is that Match is not defined over the
labels “π”, “proximate”, “participant”, or “author” — everything is defined with respect
to the set-based representation.
One theory-internal motivation for the move towards the set-based representation is
that, with a bivalent feature structure alone, it is not possible to identify a single feature
that picks out all of the local persons to the exclusion of the third person (regardless of
obviation distinctions). Consider the feature specifications for the inclusive, exclusive,
second, proximate, and obviative persons in (51), where both the current set-based
representation, a “pure” bivalent specification, and the privative feature specification
under the feature geometry are shown for each case.
(51) a. INCLUSIVE
Set-Based: {I , U}
Bivalent: {[+Anim], [+Prox], [+Auth], [+Part*]}
Privative: {[Anim], [Prox], [Part], [Auth], [Add]}
b. EXCLUSIVE
Set-Based: {I}
Bivalent: {[+Anim], [+Prox], [+Auth], [−Part*]}
Privative: {[Anim], [Prox], [Part], [Auth]}
c. SECOND
Set-Based: {U}
Bivalent: {[+Anim], [+Prox], [−Auth], [+Part*]}










With bivalent features, there is no one feature/value combination that picks out the
three local persons. The second and inclusive persons are both [+Participant*], but
the exclusive is [−Participant*]; both the inclusive and exlcusive share [+Author],
but the second person is [−Author]. The local persons all share a [+Proximate] and
[+Animate] feature, but these features are also shared by the proximate and/or ob-
viative persons, so the local persons alone cannot be isolated as a natural class. This
differs from the privative geometric representation, where the local persons all share
the [Participant] feature, and this feature is not specified on the proximate and obvia-
tive persons. The set-based representation creates a natural class by ensuring that the
sets that define the local person categories intersect with the set {I , U} that defines the
feature [Participant], while neither the proximate or obviative persons intersect with
this set.
A second reason for adopting the set-based feature representation is that it does not
require the stipulation of extrinsic dependencies between features to ensure that Match
captures entailment relationships between categories. Again, this is explored in greater
detail in Section 4.6, but previous accounts based in the feature-geometric represen-
tation capture person-based prominence effects through second-order representations
that hardcode the entailments between features. The current definition and represen-
tation takes advantage of the subset-superset relationships between the sets that each
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feature represents, and does not need to explicitly encode these dependencies into the
syntactic representation.
4.4.3 Copy
Copying is the mechanisms by which the ϕ-representation of the goal is transferred to
the probe. When Match holds, I adopt the view that the full set of the goal is copied
to the probe. This is the direct analogue of the featural coarseness principle, now com-
monly employed in theories AGREE. Because features themselves are not the objects
that are Copied in the present system (sets are copied), I simply refer to this principle
as coarseness. The difference from its original formulation is that coarseness is not re-
stricted only to situations of clitic doubling (cf. Preminger, 2014), but rather applies to
all instances of ϕ-agreement (see also Coon and Keine, 2020). This does not mean that
there is no difference between clitic doubling and standard agreement, but rather that
coarseness alone is not a sufficient condition for positive identification of clitic doubling.
Moving on from coarseness, it is now well established that probes can agree with
more than one goal—as already noted, this occurs when an initial Matching relationship
leaves some of the features of the probe unsatisfied and there is another goal which
Matches these yet unsatisfied features. This raises the question of what is done with
the sets Copied from each goal. I propose the following principle:
(52) Preservation of History
If a probe P Matches with and Copies the set of a goal G on the first cycle, and
then the set of a goal H on the second cycle, the Copied sets are kept in an
ordered set (G, H)
This is an extension of a claim by Deal (2015), who argues that when a probe agrees
with multiple goals, it keeps the features of each goal in a structured list. The addition
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is that the set of features is ordered—it matters what was agreed with on the first versus
second cycle. Formally:
(53) (G, H) 6= (H, G)
This is necessary to capture differences in how portmanteau morphology arises in Ojibwe.
I show that even if a probe agrees with the same two goals, the order in which this
agreement occurs leads to different portmanteau forms. That does not necessitate that
order matters to the insertion of morphology—spell-out can be easily formulated to be
impartial to order—but Ojibwe shows that it must be available in the system.9
There are other cases where agreement with multiple goals causes break-downs
down the line—this will give rise to the alignment-based hierarchy effects discussed at
length in Section 4.2, and which I return to in the context of the current system in the
next section. The existence of cyclic agreement of this particular sort, and the sets of
sets that it gives rise to, results in a number of possible effects including portmanteau,
inverse marking, or in some cases outright ungrammaticality.
A final point concerns the correspondences between sets and features. While sets are
the representations that are manipulated by AGREE, nothing prevents them from being
re-written as particular combinations of valued features for the purposes of spell-out at
PF. This can be seen by considering the correspondences between the combinations of
bivalent features and the sets in (51). Each particular combination of valued feature
gives rise to a unique set, and each relevant set gives rise to a single combination of
valued features. Similarly, the syntactic sets as a whole can be used to define insertion
rules for the semantically contentful lattices of i, u, and various o’s to be manipulated
at LF to create partitions. Which particular representation is used in each module of
9Related to this discussion is the difference between cyclic AGREE, where on each cycle of the probe a
single goal is considered, and multiple AGREE, where a multiple goals are entertained by the probe. The
principle in (52) is most straightforwardly consistent with a strictly cyclic theory.
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the grammar is therefore fluid, but information preserving rewrite rules can be defined
to give rise to each.
4.5 Hierarchy effects and the set-based feature representation
The goal of this section is to put all of the pieces together by showing that the set-based
representation and the revised sequence of operations underlying AGREE can capture
the exact range of person-based prominence effects described in Section 4.2. The range
of possible effects, as described through the prominence-based hierarchy, is repeated in
(54). Setting aside obviation for the moment, if there is a ranking between the local
persons and the third person, it is 1/2 > 3 (*3 > 1/2). There are two basic points of
variation: (i) whether a possible ranking is realized or collapsed, and (ii) if there is a
ranking between 1 and 2, whether it is 1 > 2 or 2 > 1.
(54) Summary of Person-Based Prominence Effects (repeated)
Ultra Strong (Author): 1 > 2 > 3 Blackfoot, Classical Arabic
Ultra Strong (Addressee): 2 > 1 > 3 Nez Perce
Strong: {1 > 2, 2 > 1} > 3 Slovenian
Weak: 1/2 > 3 Massachusett, Kichean, Italian
Me-First: 1 > 2/3 Romanian
You-First: 2 > 1/3 Cuzco Quechua
No Effect: 1/2/3 Ojibwe, Moro
In Section 4.3.2, the possible set of probes was outlined. In this section, I walk through
the expected behavior of the possible probes and show how each gives rise to a partic-
ular hierarchy effect. The analysis is couched in the broader feature gluttony analysis of
hierarchy alignment effects (Coon and Keine, 2020), where markedness, special forms,
or ungrammaticality arise just in case a probe interacts with multiple goals by Match-
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ing and Copying multiple feature sets. I therefore begin by reviewing the major tenants
of the gluttony approach to alignment effects, which can be adapted to apply to the
current representation and definition of AGREE.
4.5.1 Feature gluttony
The present account adopts the view that alignment effects have their root cause in a
situation termed feature gluttony, or for our purposes a more general notion of gluttony,
which is neutral to the particular representation at play. Gluttony is defined by a given
probe having what ultimately amounts to “too much agreement”. These configurations,
while not ill-formed by virtue of gluttony alone, give rise to issues as the derivation goes
on. The grammar’s “response” to gluttony, be it impoverishment, portmanteau forms,
fission, or ineffability, defines the different classes of alignment effects (e.g. the PCC
and direct-inverse marking).
Gluttony arises when two basic conditions are met. The first is that a probe c-
commands multiple potential goals, as shown in (55) with DP1 and DP2. The second
is that the probe agrees with (i.e. Matches and Copies the features of) more than one
goal, also shown in (55) with the two dashed arrows.
(55) [Probe [. . . DP1 [. . . DP2 ]]]
These multiple agreement relationships, and therefore gluttony, arise just in case the
further goal (DP2) provides a better match for the probe than a closer goal (DP1). As
such, these configurations can be labeled INVERSE alignments—as will be shown ex-
plicitly in a moment, gluttonous configurations are all marked by a lower-to-higher
alignment between the person-based prominence scale and the syntactic position hier-
archy. On the current account, this specifically arises as a function of the subset-superset
relationships between person features, and ultimately as a function of the particular
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feature set that is specified on the probe. In contrast, DIRECT alignments are the result
of a high-to-high (and low-to-low) alignment between the person-based prominence
hierarchy and the syntactic position hierarchy, and never lead to gluttony.
Two hypothetical direct and inverse alignments are shown in (56) with a toy set
primitives F and G that make up the features. Notice that the two features of the probe
stand in a subset-superset relationship, with both including F , but only one including
both F and G. Recall that Match holds when the set of a given feature and the set of the
goal overlap (i.e. intersect), even if they do not fully overlap. Therefore in the direct
alignment in (56a), where the closer DP1 is specified for a set containing F , both features
are satisfied with this single relationship, and only one feature set is copied. There
is no motivation to interact with DP2, as DP1 fully satisfies the probe. This contrasts
with the inverse alignment in (56b), where the same feature structure of the probe
leads to multiple agreement relationships. In this case, DP1, which is specified for G,
only satisfies a single feature of the probe. Subsequent agreement with DP2, which is
specified for F , is able to satisfy the second feature. This leads to gluttony, as both goal
sets are copied to the probe.


































To further clarify the situation, consider the copied sets, shown in (57), which define
the probe following the agreement relationships in (56). In the direct alignment, there
is a single set copied; in the inverse, two sets, one from each goal, are copied and kept
in an ordered set (following Preservation of History).
(57) a. DIRECT: P = ({F})
b. INVERSE: P = ({G}, {F})
As previously mentioned, there is nothing absolutely ill-formed about the multiple
agreement relations that occur with inverse alignments, nor the gluttonous sets that
are produced from these configurations. The issues arise elsewhere. In the next section
I consider the behavior of each possible probe. I then provide an accounting of the
known behaviors that arise from gluttony, including PCC effects, direct/inverse mark-
ing, fission, and portmanteau forms.
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4.5.2 Possible probes and the typology of inverse
The possible set of probes, and the proposed correspondences to the person-based
prominence hierarchy, are repeated in (58).
(58) Correspondence between probes and Person-Based Prominence effects
a. {uΠ} Flat: 1/2/3
b. {uΠ, uParticipant} Weak: 1/2 > 3
c. {uΠ, uAuthor} Me-First: 1 > 2/3
d. {uΠ, uAddressee} You-First: 2 > 1/3
e. {uΠ, uParticipant, uAuthor} Ultra Strong (Author): 1 > 2 > 3
f. {uΠ, uParticipant, uAddressee} Ultra Strong (Addressee): 2 > 1 > 3
g. {uΠ, uAddressee, uAuthor} Strong: {1 > 2, 2 > 1} > 3
h. {uΠ, uParticipant, uAddressee, uAuthor} Strong: {1 > 2, 2 > 1} > 3
The subset-superset relationships between each different feature, repeated in abbrevi-
ated form in (59), provide the link that allows different classes of effects to arise. The
relevant question to ask is this: Which configurations will lead the further or structurally
lower goal to provide a more complete match for the probe than the closer or structurally
higher goal? This is relative to the particular features that are specified on the probe.
(59) Proper subset/superset relationships between person features
a. π ⊃ [Participant] ⊃ [Author], [Addressee]
b. {I , U , O, O′, . . . , On} ⊃ {I , U} ⊃ {I}, {U}
For the sake of the current discussion, I am limiting consideration to animate goals,
and again setting aside the proximate-obviative distinction. With these restrictions, the
correspondence between inverse/gluttony and probe structure is shown in Table 4.4—
note that this tracks perfectly with the expected distribution of direct/inverse based
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on the hierarchies indicated in (58) (see Section 4.2 for details on the correspondence
between the hierarchy and inverse structures).
(58a) (58b) (58c) (58d) (58e) (58f) (58g,h)








1 3 — — — — — — —
2 3 — — — — — — —
1 2 — — — INV — INV INV
2 1 — — INV — INV — INV
3 1 — INV INV — INV INV INV
3 2 — INV — INV INV INV INV
Table 4.4: Correspondence between possible probes, alignment effects, and the distri-
bution of inverse.
Considering a Flat probe first, which only contains uΠ, all possible higher DPs will
fully satisfy the probe. The set represented by π contains I , U , and the O’s, therefore
any (animate) goal will have a non-null intersection, thereby satisfying the probe. This
means there will never be a gluttonous/inverse configuration.
A Weak probe additionally has the feature [uParticipant]. As a result, configurations
where there is a high local person, be it first or second person, will fully satisfy the probe
without a second cycle. However, if the higher argument is a third person and the
lower argument a local person, then two probing cycles will be triggered and gluttony
will result—the higher third person cannot satisfy the participant feature, but the lower
local person can, and therefore interacts with the probe.
Both the Me-First and You-First probes behave in a similar fashion, but differ in
whether they include (in addition to uΠ) a uAuthor or uAddressee feature, respectively.
The Me-First probe results in an inverse/gluttonous configuration whenever the lower
argument is a first person, and the You-First probe is gluttonous when the lower argu-
ment is a second person. Again, this follows from the fact that only a first or second
person, respectively, will provide a match to satisfy uAuthor or uAddressee.
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The two Ultra Strong probes include both uΠ and uParticipant, as well as either
the uAuthor or uAddressee feature. This pattern is a hybrid between the Weak probe,
which has includes uParticipant, and Me/You-First patterns, again respective to whether
uAuthor or uAddressee is present. As a result, both are inverse with a high third person
and low local combination, but additionally lead to gluttony with either second over
first (with the uAuthor variety) or first over second (with the uAddressee variety).
The final case is the Strong probe, which can be derived either by a probe with
all possible features, or one that lacks uParticipant but includes both uAuthor and
uAddressee. As such, it can be seen as either a combination of the patterns produced by
the Me-First and You-First probes, or the two Ultra Strong probes. With either of these
probes, there is only one situation where the lower DP does not provide an additional
Match for the probe following agreement with the higher DP: When the lower DP is a
third person. Because there is both uAuthor or uAddressee, there will always be an ad-
ditional Match to be had with a lower local person, resulting in the widest distribution
of gluttony. This is true regardless of whether the uParticipant probe is present, because
the inclusion of both uAuthor and uAddressee ensures this drive for an additional local
person will always be present.
4.5.3 Beyond pure person probes
To close the discussion of probes, I would like to ruminate briefly on the question of
how obviation and (animacy-based) noun classification fits into this system of probes.
A general assumption has been adopted here to separate person probes from number
probes, and a new assumption has been made to restrict “pure” person probes to only the
four features uΠ, uParticipant, uAuthor, and uAddressee. That said, number and noun
classification also participate in agreement, sometimes interacting with pure person
features in interesting ways. What should be made of these additional possible probes
in languages where features related to noun classification and obviation are active?
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The past few chapters have made progress on understanding how the core person
features, noun class, and obviation all share a common type of relationship to the per-
son ontology. That said, the precise relationship that governs the interactions between
these three classes of features within the probe system is still underdetermined. To
take an analogy that sharpens the point, consider the proposal that, within the nomi-
nal domain, number, person, obviation, noun classification were each associated with
separate functional projections (in descending order). Importing this to the verbal do-
main, we might expect each to associate with a unique “type” of probe. As discussed,
this is widely assumed to be the case with person and number, where person probes
precede number probes (Béjar and Rezac, 2003, 2009), with noun classification being
less studied, but also having been argued to head its own probe. The proposal is to
extend this further to give us the hypothesis that each domain of ϕ-features can head
its own probe, with a universal order of these probes, as shown in (60) (where “γ” =
noun classification, “ρ” = obviation, and “.” is read as “precedes”).
(60) Four ϕ-probes and the ordering relations between them
γ . ρ . π . #
The hypothesis is that each type of probe differs in its minimal feature specification.
For example, as proposed for the π-probe, there is necessarily a uΠ feature, with the
other three person features being subject to variation. For the γ-probe, the minimal
specification may be equivalent to uΦ; for the ρ-probe, uProximate; and the number
probe u#. There may be additional differences between probe types, for example in
how they evaluate match, what features or portion of the set they copy from the goal,
or in how their features are defined, but this constitutes a reasonably broad starting
point for a theory of probe-type variation.
The assertion that the ρ-probe is necessarily specified for a uProximate feature can
account for the fact that all Algonquian languages show inverse marking with the 3′→ 3
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configurations (see Section 4.2.2.2 for a review of these patterns). In Chapter 5, I argue
that the ρ-probe governs direct-inverse marking on Voice in Ojibwe — the argument is
also summarized below in Section 4.5.4.2, and the reader is referred there for details.
In short, the presence of uProximate ensures that gluttony will always arise when the
proximate argument is more distant than the obviative argument, as is the case in the
3′ → 3 alignments. Assuming that the ρ-probe governs agreement on Voice across the
Algonquian languages, this can explain the invariance with which inverse appears in
these cases.
That said, it is also widely known that probes can become fused (Coon and Bale,
2014) such that they are sensitive to features from multiple ϕ-domains. This makes
it possible to have a probe that blurs the boundaries between different classes of fea-
tures. This has been well documented in the domain of person and number, where cer-
tain probes appear to prefer agreement with, for example, a plural participant rather
than participants in general (this is the case in Mi’gmaq, the case explored by Coon
and Bale). More recently, fused person/number probes have shown “disjunctive” pref-
erences. For example, in Äiwoo (Austronesian), encountering either a participant or
augmented argument satisfies the probe, suggesting that either satisfying the person or
number features satisfies the probe as a whole (Roversi, 2020).
The fact that probe types can mix together does not falsify the intuition that different
domains of the clause are more strongly associated with particular types of ϕ-features.
Again, the probe types are meant to define the minimal specification, rather than put a
ceiling on what can be specified. This makes fused probes perfectly possible within the
theory. Furthermore, probes may be entirely absent within a language. For example, it
is reasonable to assume that languages that do not show a distinction in noun classifi-
cation or obviation will lack the probe corresponding to that feature type. In Chapter
5, all four of the probes in (60) will be argued to be active in Ojibwe in matrix clauses,
with embedded clauses showing a fused π/# probe.
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4.5.4 Why gluttony (inverse) causes issues
The previous section showed that the present account captures all and only the ty-
pology of inverse/gluttony as it is currently understood. With eight different possible
π-probes, all seven possible instantiations of the person-based prominence hierarchy
are accounted for. However, as noted previously, gluttony does not create ineffable
structures on its own. As a result, an additional link is needed to explain the three
key patterns that formed the empirical basis of this chapter: (i) PCC violations, where
ineffability arises with inverse alignments; (ii) direct-inverse marking, where inverse
alignments lead to an elsewhere form; and (iii) omnivorous agreement, where only the
features of the highest ranked argument are exponed. In addition, there are at least
two other effects that arise out of gluttony: (i) fission, where a single probe is split
in two resulting in the feature sets of each DP to be spelled-out separately; and (ii)
portmanteau forms, where a form that covers the entire set of features is spelled-out.
4.5.4.1 The PCC
To review, the PCC can be described as a ban on IO and DO clitic combinations when the
IO and DO stand in an inverse alignment. The question is then why cliticization fails
in inverse alignments. The argument summarized here directly follows that of Coon
and Keine (2020), with the only new pieces being the framing of Matching and Copy
in terms of the set-based representation of features.
The starting point is to consider cliticization, or clitic doubling, in direct alignments,
where nothing goes wrong. Cliticization is triggered by the features of the probe (the
exact trigger is not important here): When a feature of a probe with a cliticization
requirement enters into an agreement relationship with a DP, the D head of the goal
undergoes long head movement to the head of probe’s projection (Anagnostopoulou,
2003; Preminger, 2019; Coon and Keine, 2020). This is schematized in (61).
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Coon and Keine formulate this requirement with the generalization in (62).
(62) If a feature of a clitic-doubling probe on a head H has agreed with a DP, this
DP must cliticize onto H (Coon and Keine, 2020, p. 17).
Besides triggering movement of D, cliticization also results in removing the targeted
goal DP as an intervenor for further agreement relationships (Anagnostopoulou, 2003;
Béjar and Rezac, 2003; Preminger, 2009). Therefore once a DP has undergone cliti-
cization, it cannot be targeted by another agreement probe.
A final piece of background, which as already been discussed to some degree, is
that person and number agree separately with probes π and #, and furthermore that π
always probes before # (Béjar and Rezac, 2003).
The head v governs cliticization in PCC-type languages, and contains both the π
and # probes. Licit IO/DO combinations arise when the π probe agrees with the IO
and the # probe agrees with the DO, resulting in separate sequences of probing and
cliticization; illicit combinations arise when π agrees with (and attempts to cliticize)
both the IO and DO. I consider the licit and illict cases in turn with a Weak probe, as
exemplified by Catalan (Bonet, 1991). The relevant contrast is shown in (63), where
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2 » 3 combinations are grammatical (63a), and 3 » 2 combinations are ungrammatical
(63b).
































intended: ‘She (Mireia) recommended you to him (Josep).’
The derivation of the IO and DO clitics for the grammatical 2 » 3 combinations is
shown in (64). The π probe Searches first (64a), finding the second person DP, which
satisfies both the uΠ and uPart features, resulting in a fully satisfied probe. The IO
is then cliticized onto v and the IO is deactivated. The # probe then Searches (64b),
skipping the deactivated IO and agreeing with and cliticizing the DO.


















{uΠ, uPart} ⇒ {U},







This contrasts with the ungrammatical 3 » 2 configuration schematized in (65),
where the π probe agrees with both the IO, which satisfies the uΠ feature, and the DO,
which satisfies the uPart feature. The conflict that arises in this case is with the cliticiza-
tion operation. This operation requires both the IO and DO to be cliticized to the probe,
as both have agreed with a feature that triggers this requirement. Given the assumption
that all features of a given probe are agreeing simultaneously, for the derivation to be
well-formed (i.e. for the cliticization requirement to be met at all points), simultane-
ous head movement of the IO and DO clitic is necessary. Given that head movement
structures are formed by MERGE, and MERGE is a binary operation, combining two clitics
with v at once is impossible. This results in an ungrammatical structure. Note that the
simultaneity issue does not arise with the 2 » 3 configurations, as the π and # probes
agree and cliticize in separate stages of the derivation. Therefore at each given step,
the derivation is well-formed and only a single clitic is being formed.
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This conflict caused by the need for cliticization holds of all cases where an inverse
alignment is found (in languages where the features of a probe trigger cliticization).
Therefore the logic presented here in terms of the Weak PCC of Catalan extends to the
entire PCC family. As discussed at length, what differs is which particular argument
configurations trigger gluttony, given that probes can be relativized for different sets of
features.
4.5.4.2 Direct-inverse
The second key empirical pattern borne out of gluttony is direct-inverse agreement.
While indicated as a gluttonous pattern by Coon and Keine (2020), they do not provide
an analysis. An account of the direct-inverse system of Ojibwe is one of the major
focuses of Chapter 5, but I review the basics of how my proposal of how gluttony leads
to inverse marking under the current system.
The basic pattern of direct-inverse marking can be observed in (66), where the two
arguments of the transitive verb are proximate and obviative. The relevant agreement
marker on Voice is in bold. When the proximate noun is the External Argument (EA) and
the obviative the Internal Argument (IA) as in (66a), Voice shows a so-called “direct”
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agreement marker -aa, indexing the proximate subject. When the alignment is reversed
as in (66b), so the EA is obviative and the IA proximate, the “inverse” marker -igoo
appears—this marker does not index any features in particular.


















‘s/he (OBV) sees h/ (PROX)’
For the purposes of this basic illustration of the direct-inverse system, a probe with
[uΠ] and [uProximate] on the head Voice is sufficient. Unlike the PCC, these cases
involve so-called pure agreement probes, which do not trigger cliticization.
Agreement with the direct and inverse alignments from (66) are shown in (67).
With the direct alignment, the single agreement relationship with the proximate EA
is sufficient to satisfy both features of the probe. In contrast, with the inverse align-
ment, both the obviative EA, which satisfies [uΠ], and the proximate IA, which satisfies
[uProximate], must interact with the probe for full satisfaction.
(67) a. DIRECT alignment
VoiceP
Voice
















As expected, this results in gluttony with the inverse alignment. The resulting copied
sets of primitives for the direct and inverse alignments are shown in (68). The direct
alignments have a single set, consisting of the single (proximate) O, while the inverse
alignment has an ordered set from each of the two arguments of the verb.
(68) a. DIRECT: Voice = {O}
b. INVERSE: Voice = ({O′}, {O})
To account for the spell-out of Voice, a simple pair of Vocabulary Item (VI) insertion
rules suffices. These are given in (69).10
(69) Voice{O}⇔ -aa
Voiceelsewhere ⇔ -igoo
When Voice is specified for {O} alone, then the direct marker -aa is inserted. In all other
cases, the elsewhere form -igoo appears — the VI insertion operation does not make a
10As noted previously, it is possible to define these rules either in terms of the set representation or the
feature-value representation, as one can define re-write rules to go between these two representations.
Nothing hinges on this here, and for consistency with what is used for agreement, I retain the set-based
representation.
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choice about which set to spell-out, and instead inserts an unmarked form. The full set
of VI insertions rules ultimately must include forms for the obviative, first, and second





To summarize, the gluttonous collection of goal sets that ends up on the probe in
inverse alignments is dealt with through the insertion of an elsewhere form. As should
be clear, the gluttonous configuration does not cause any issues, but does lead to the
emergence of the unmarked form of Voice.
4.5.4.3 Omnivorous agreement
As described in detail in Section 4.2.1, omnivorous agreement occurs when an agree-
ment slot shows a preference for showing agreement with DPs with certain features. A
summary of the case of omnivorous person agreement in the Kichean Agent-Focus (AF)
construction is given in (71), where third person only combinations show a null form,
the presence of a first person results in a first person agreement marker, and the pres-
ence of a second person a second person agreement marker. Note that this sets aside the
case with local persons only, which is ungrammatical outright for independent reasons,
again related to person licensing requirements.
(71) a. 3↔ 3 = ∅
b. 1↔ 3 = -at
c. 2↔ 3 = -in
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If we assume a probe relativized with [uΠ] and [uParticipant], then this probe will
interact with both the third person and the local person in the 3→ 1/2 configurations,
but only the local persons in the 1/2→ 3 configurations. However, the same spell-out
occurs in both cases. As such, we can define spell-out rules, shown in (72), that are
both insensitive to the hierarchical order of the goals (as indicated by the shift from “(
)” to “{ }” below), as well as indifferent to the particular second set that is present. This
set could be either null (as in 1/2→ 3 configurations), or the third person (as in 2→
1/2 configurations).
(72) {{U}, {X }}⇔ -at
{{I}, {X }}⇔ -in
Elsewhere⇔ ∅
This proposed reformulation of Kichean AF agreement brings it more in line with direct-
inverse marking, where the particular VI insertion rules of the language determine how
gluttonous configurations are realized. Here, the rules privilege the spell-out of first or
second person over all else.
There is however another way of looking at Kichean AF agreement where the probe
entirely skip arguments that lack the participant feature, rather than interacting with
them on the way. This is much closer to Preminger’s original analysis, and can be
accomplished by specifying a probe that lacks uΠ, but includes [uPart]. While this
probe is not in the original set of 8, such a probe is in principle possible if probe-based
person features are specified on a head other than π. The result of such a probe is
that gluttonous configurations will not be created in 3 → 1/2 configurations. In fact,
(singular) third persons will never be interacted with at all. Instead, the probe would
interact with and copy only the features of local persons, if there is one in the clause.
The spell-out rules can then be simplified to never make reference to a complex set-
of-sets, and can simply spell-out the single set of the goal, or the elsewhere form if no
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local person was found. I do not decide between these two possible analyses, as either
would in principle work under the current system.
4.5.4.4 Fission
Fission is a case where a single agreement probe is split, with each set ending up on
its own head for the the purposes of spell-out. While couched in terms of omnivourous
agreement during the review in Section 4.2.1, Nez Perce complementizer agreement
first put forward in Deal (2015) provides a case that can be analyzed with fission.
The pattern of agreement is summarized in (73). With third persons only (73a),
agreement is null. When there is a second person either as an EA or IA with a third
person (73b), the second person marker -m appears. Similarly, the first + third combi-
nations (73c) invariably lead to the first person marker -x. The critical case is that of
the local-only combinations, shown in (73d), where 2 → 1 results in only the second
person markers, while 1→ 2 both the first and second person markers.
(73) a. 3↔ 3 = ke-∅
b. 2↔ 3 = ke-m
c. 1↔ 3 = ke-x
d. 2→ 1 = ke-m
1→ 2 = ke-m-ex
As previously discussed, the agreement shows a 2 > 1 > 3 hierarchy effect, where
the probe is only fully satisfied when it has encountered a second person. This can
be captured by a probe specified for [uΠ], [uParticipant], and [uAddressee]. Focusing
on the critical cases with local arguments only, this results in gluttony with the 1 → 2
configuration, where the probe must interact with both the first person EA and second
person IA to be fully satisfied, but not with 2→ 1, where the probe only needs to interact
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with the IA to be fully satisfied. This results in the now familiar single versus multi-set
structures following agreement, shown in (74).
(74) a. 2→ 1 (DIRECT): C = {U}
b. 1→ 2 (INVERSE): C = ({I}, {U})
The puzzle arises when we consider the plausible set of spell-out rules, shown in (75).
The presence of the set {U} results in the insertion of -m, similarly {I} results in the
insertion of -(e)x, and all other cases are the null elsewhere form. Given this, the com-
bination of both the first and second person VIs in the case of the inverse/gluttonous
1→ 2 configurations is surprising: the conflict should lead the elsewhere inform to be




The solution is for fission to apply, as shown in (76) (Noyer, 1992; Halle, 1997). This
splits the single C head into two different heads for the purposes of spell-out, with each
carrying one of the two sets. As a result, each of the heads separately spells out the first
and second person VIs, allowing for the pattern of Nez Perce complementizer agreement
to emerge (setting aside the issue of the order in which the morphemes appear).
(76) C({I}, {U}) =⇒ C′{I} C′′{U}
At present, the exact motivation for why fission should apply in these cases is not entirely
clear. Indeed, this points to a wider question of why different languages deal with
gluttonous collections in different ways—an answer to this typological question is not
provided here, but the basic shape of what must be explained should be clear.
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4.5.4.5 Portmanteau
The final way that gluttony emerges is with portmanteau forms, which are pieces of
morphology that index multiple arguments. This effect has not yet been introduced in
the preceding discussion, but can be seen with Ojibwe, and provides what is perhaps the
strongest evidence in favor of a single probe collecting the index sets of multiple goals,
and for the need to collect these sets within an ordered set (following Preservation of
History). As with the direct-inverse system, I review the basic profile of portmanteau
here, with a deeper discussion in Appendix B.
Consider the central agreement slot (which is identified as agreement with Infl)
in the conjunct order of Border Lakes Ojibwe. Two alternating alignments with first
singular and second plural arguments are shown in (77). The 1SG → 2PL alignment
in (77a) shows a portmanteau form, which indexes both the first person singular and















‘...if y’all see me’
Again setting aside the details, which raise a number of complications, following the
work of Oxford (2019a) on the closely related Ojibwe dialect Algonquin, I assume for
now that Infl is agreeing with both arguments in both alignments above. This results
in the same collection of sets, but in reverse order depending on the alignment of the
two arguments with the EA and IA positions, as shown in (78).
(78) a. 1SG → 2PL: Infl = ({I}, {U , O, O′, O′′})⇔ -agog
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b. 2PL → 1SG: Infl = ({U , O, O′, O′′}, {I})⇔ -yeg
In the case of (78a), a form is available that indexes the two sets of features collectively,
and in that particular order. Note that if the sets were unordered, we would expect the
portmanteau form to be inserted in both cases, as the sets involved are the same. In
contrast, the set in (78b) only ends up spelling out the first of the two sets, the second
person plural.
4.5.5 Summary
In this section, I reviewed the feature gluttony account of Coon and Keine (2020), where
inverse alignments uniformly lead to situations where multiple goals are agreed with
by a single probe. I further reviewed their account of how gluttony can give rise to PCC
effects, but couched it within the revised set-based representation of probes and goals.
I then outlined new proposals for how gluttony (and by extension inverse alignments)
give rise to direct-inverse marking systems, fission, and portmanteau morphology. Each
of these “reactions” to gluttony are further detailed in the discussion of the Border Lakes
Ojibwe agreement system in the next chapter.
One bigger question that has not been answered is: why are there different reactions
to gluttony in different languages and with different probes? A full typology of the
downstream effects of inverse configurations is only just beginning to emerge. One
clear difference is between cliticization, which can give rise to PCC effects and outright
ineffability, versus pure agreement, which gives rise to either unmarked forms, fission,
or portmanteau, but not complete ungrammaticality. This review very likely does not
exhaust the full range of possibilities in the classes of effects that gluttony can give rise
to, but it constitutes a starting point for a theory that seeks to provide such an account.
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4.6 Agreement and the feature geometric representation
The goal of this section is to evaluate the feasibility of the feature geometric representa-
tion of person, which has been the leading account of hierarchy effects in agreement for
the past two decades (Harley and Ritter, 2002; Béjar and Rezac, 2003). I first detail the
core attributes of the feature geometric representation (Section 4.6.1). I then fully out-
line the range of probes predicted under this system (Section 4.6.2), which turns out to
be a more narrow set than predicted under the current account. Ultimately, I show that,
while the feature geometric representation can capture much of the variation in person-
based prominence effects, it fails to capture Me-First and You-First patterns, which lack
so-called “intermediate” features.
4.6.1 A review of the feature geometry
Feature geometries provide the means to give internal organization to features. An ex-
tended feature geometry, which includes nodes for both person and proximate features,
is shown in (79) (Harley and Ritter, 2002; McGinnis, 2005; Oxford, 2019a). I again set
aside number for the purposes of this discussion, but note that there is a separate ge-
ometry to define these contrasts. The geometry can be used to define both the features
of the probe and the goal.






It is first important to note that, while these have been drawn in a tree structure similar
to that familiar from phrase-structure representations, the lines between these features
are used to represent implicational relationships rather than a phrase structure hierar-
chy. The key attribute of the representation is that the presence of a lower feature on
the geometry entails the presence of all other higher features. These representation-
ally encoded entailments are based on the semantic entailments between features, but
must be syntactically realized. For example, the first person exclusive is differentiated
by the presence of the [Author] feature, but is also necessarily specified for [Partici-
pant], [Proximate], and π. The only two features that do not stand in an entailment
relationship of this sort are [Author] and [Addressee], which are both immediate co-
dependents of the [Participant] node.
The feature specification for each local person category in a language with the max-
imal possible person distinctions (ignoring number) is in (80). The inclusive is repre-
sented with the full feature structure, the exclusive lacks the [Addressee] feature, and















The specification of the second person points to how relative markedness guides the ulti-
mate interpretation of these structures. While there is an [Addressee] feature within the
system, which could in principle be employed to represent the second person, second
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person instead is represented by a geometry specified up to [Participant]. This (rela-
tively) unmarked form is interpreted as a second person in the context of the wider
paradigm, and the [Addressee] feature is only employed to make the distinction be-
tween the exclusive and inclusive. In a language that lacks a clusivity distinction, such
as English, there would be no [Addressee] feature at all, and the generic first person
would be represented by the geometry in (80b).
The proximate-obviative distinction, as it is realized in Ojibwe, can also be encoded
by this geometry. This is shown in (81), where the proximate is marked up to the






The original use of the geometry in Harley and Ritter (2002) was to solve the parti-
tion problem, which is to derive all and only the typology of possible person distinctions
within and across languages. However, as already discussed, there are empirical chal-
lenges that arise. To review, one critical issue for obviation is that the geometry cannot
capture the dissociation between proximate and local seen in languages like Blackfoot,
where all local persons alternate between proximate and obviative forms. Given that
the geometry encodes entailments between features, it is not possible to specify any of
the features that distinguish local persons without also specifying the proximate feature,
making the incorrect prediction that all local persons should be inherently proximate
(see Chapter 3 for further discussion, and Bliss (2005a) for the origins of this observa-
tion).
These issues aside, the representation has also been applied to give internal struc-
tures to probes, allowing person-based prominence effects to be captured without ap-
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pealing directly to the prominence hierarchy. The next section is devoted to outlining
the predicted probes under this representation, and showing that it under-generates
based on the observed range of hierarchy effects outlined in Section 4.2.
4.6.2 Possible and impossible probes
Like person categories, person probes under the feature geometric representation can
differ in the degree to which they are articulated. Given the maximal geometry from the
previous section, and ignoring the proximate feature for the sake of discussion, the five
probes in (82) are predicted. All of these probes conform to the entailment relations
encoded by the geometry, where a lower feature such as [Author] implies the presence
of all lower features.
(82) Possible probes under the feature geometric representation
a. {uπ} 1/2/3
b. {uπ, uPart} 1/2 > 3
c. {uπ, uPart, uAuthor} 1 > 2 > 3
d. {uπ, uPart, uAddressee} 2 > 1 > 3
e. {uπ, uPart, uAuthor, uAddressee} {1 > 2, 2 > 1} > 3
Adopting the same basic model of AGREE, but instead formulating match as operating
over the features rather than sets, each probe corresponds to a different predicted hier-
archy effect, depending on to what degree it is articulated. On the geometric account,
this is the direct result of the entailment relationships between features as expressed
by the geometry. Since all persons contain the feature [π], then the flat uπ probe can
be satisfied by any animate person, and thus shows no hierarchy effects. To the other
extreme, a probe specified with uAuthor will only be fully satisfied by interacting with
a first person, therefore it will Search and Copy until a first person is found. So far, this
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is exactly analogous to what was seen with the set-based representation of features and
the proposed formulation of AGREE.
The difference between the two accounts is with the probes in (83), which lack
the intermediate [Participant] feature and thus cannot be specified under the feature
geometric representation. The issue is that the feature geometry encodes universal
entailments that hold between the features — it is not possible, short of stipulation, to
break these entailments on a case-by-case basis.
(83) Impossible probes under the feature geometric representation
a. *{uπ, uAddressee} 1 > 2/3
b. *{uπ, uAddressee} 2 > 1/3
c. *{uπ, uAuthor, uAddressee} {1 > 2, 2 > 1} > 3
Given the existence of both Me-First (as exemplified by the PCC of Romanian) and You-
First (as exemplified by Subject Marking Anomalies in Cuzco Quechua), the feature
geometric representation fails to generate the full range of observed person-hierarchy
effects. This provides a strong empirical argument for the proposed set-based feature
representation, and against the feature geometric representation.
4.6.3 Abandoning second-order representations of entailment
The major contribution of this chapter was to propose a set-based syntactic represen-
tation of person features. By shifting away from a representation where each feature
label represents a single index, to a model of where labels are instead shorthand for sets
of primitives, it was possible to define features with inherent entailment relationships.
Both prominence scales/hierarchies and feature-geometric representations are sec-
ond order in that they describe the entailment relationships that hold between either
person categories (as in the case of a scale) or person features (as in the case of the
geometry). The claim here is that the most basic (i.e. first order) level of representa-
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tion is sets of primitives, not features. With the set-based representation of features,
features do not have entailment relations with one another as the result of an extrinsic
arrangement, but rather as a result of the intrinsic properties of the sets they represent.
Entailment follows from the proper subset-superset relationships between features.
To see this more clearly, it is worth highlighting the differences between the hierarchy-
based versus feature-geometric representation of entailment, as there is a sense in which
the move from unstructured feature bundles to the feature geometric representation
mirrors the current move from the feature geometry to the set-based representation of
features. In short, the feature-geometric representation results in the following subset-
superset relationships between categories, one of the core insights of the original pro-
posal to apply the geometric approach to agree by Béjar (2003):
(84) Proper subset/superset relationships between person categories
a. 1 ⊃ 2 ⊃ 3 ⊃ 3′
b. {π, [Prox], [Part], [Auth]} ⊃ {π, [Prox], [Part]} ⊃ {π, [Prox]} ⊃ {π}
With the feature-geometric representation, the relationships between the categories in
(84a) are directly derived from the feature representations in (84b), which stand in
the relevant subset-superset relationships given their proposed representation. In this
sense, the bones of the account are identical, by deriving hierarchy effects through
subset-superset relationships. However, hiding under the hood of (84) is the extrinsic
(second-order) requirement that a lower feature of the geometry cannot be specified
without also specifying all of its dependents, as encoded within the feature geometry.
This forces, for example, the representation of first person to include not only the fea-
ture that actually does the work of distinguishing it as referring to the speaker (i.e.
[Author]), but also all other features, which only serve the purpose of ensuring the
proper entailment relationships hold between categories.
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The current theory takes this set-based representation to the next level—to the in-
ternal structure of each individual feature—as repeated again in (85).
(85) Proper subset/superset relationships between person features
a. Π ⊃ [Proximate] ⊃ [Participant] ⊃ [Author], [Addressee]
b. {I , U , O, O′, . . . , On} ⊃ {I , U , O} ⊃ {I , U} ⊃ {I}, {U}
The features themselves are no longer the most primitive building blocks of the syntac-
tic representation—it is now the ontologically-based primitives I , U , and the O’s which
serve this role. Features are defined as different sets of these primitives, thereby de-
riving the entailment relations from intrinsic properties of the representation, rather
than directly encoding them with the addition of a geometric representation. Because
these features in turn determine how the Match function of AGREE operates, the entail-
ments between features flows up to the level of person category, providing a first-order
explanation of person-based prominence effects as described by a hierarchy or scale.
The result is a system with no stipulated dependencies between the features them-
selves. Feature combinations on both probes and goals vary freely on all relevant di-
mensions. In the domain of the probe, all possible combinations of unvalued features
are attested, as evidenced by the variation in prominence-based effects. On the goal,
all logical combinations of features and feature-value pairs are attested, as evidenced
by the variation in the possible partitions of the person space.
On the current theory, the only glaring extrinsic restriction is on the particular set of
features that is available—a restriction that is shared with all representations of person
discussed so far. The set-based feature representation has the expressive power to,
in principle, encode other types of features. For example, one could imagine a “third
person” feature, let’s call it [Other], which would represent the set {O, O′, O′′}. However,
no known language shows a pattern that motivates the existence of such a feature. If
such a feature did exist, we would expect to find a case where third person agreement
243
is privileged above local person agreement—i.e. a pattern that would be described by
a ranking of 3 > 1/2.
Why should this be the case? At present, the answer to this question remains
speculative—perhaps the maximal set of features is defined by UG and makes up part
of the initial state, or perhaps an explanation can be found by appealing to independent
functional pressures. However the possible set of features comes to be restricted, the
line between possible and impossible grammars, as is currently understood, is defined
by the proposed representation.
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CHAPTER 5
AGREEMENT AND WORD ORDER IN OJIBWE
5.1 Overview
The goal of this chapter is to provide a formal account of the patterns of agreement and
word order in Border Lakes Ojibwe. The analysis is couched in terms of the set-based
person representation and AGREE procedure put forward in the previous chapter, and
the gluttony-based theory of person-based prominence effects.
The verbal agreement system of Ojibwe is notoriously complex. The present ac-
count recognizes up to four possible probes within the verbal projection, corresponding
(roughly) to agreement with noun classification, obviation, person, and number. In
this chapter, a small, but representative, part of the paradigm is examined. The tradi-
tional description of Algonquian verbs is divided into four “classes” and two “orders”,
not counting the imperative and reflexive constructions. Classes indicate transitivity
of the verb and animacy of the arguments: VAI (Verb Animate Intransitive) are verbs
with a single animate argument; VII (Verb Inanimate Intransitive) are verbs with a sin-
gle inanimate argument; VTA (Verb Transitive Animate) are verbs with two (or more)
arguments, with the theme/goal arguments being animate (the agentive argument is
generally animate); the VTI (Verb Transitive Inanimate) are verbs with two (or more)
arguments, with an inanimate theme/goal (the agentive argument again is generally
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animate). The orders vary between the independent (matrix clauses) and conjunct (em-
bedded clauses). Examples of the four classes in the conjunct and independent orders,
all formed from the root agaas translating to “small”, are in (1). All varying morphology
seen across forms is tied to agreement and argument structure alternations.
(1) a. Verb Animate Intransitive (VAI)
(i) Independent: agaashiinyi ‘s/he (PROX) is small’
(ii) Conjunct: agaashiinyid ‘...if s/he (PROX) is small’
b. Verb Inanimate Intransitive (VII)
(i) Independent: agaasin ‘it is small’
(ii) Conjunct: agaasing ‘...if it is small’
c. Verb Transitive Animate (VTA)
(i) Independent: odagaasi’aan ‘s/he (PROX) makes h/ (OBV) small’
(ii) Conjunct: agaasi’aad ‘...if s/he (PROX) makes h/ (OBV) small’
d. Verb Transitive Inanimate (VTI)
(i) Independent: odagaasitoon ‘s/he (PROX) makes it small’
(ii) Conjunct: agaasitood ‘...if s/he (PROX) makes it small’
The study is limited in scope to agreement in clauses with two grammatically animate
arguments in matrix and embedded contexts (i.e. the independent and conjunct order
VTAs, as exemplified in (1c)). Even more narrowly, the focus is on agreement in clauses
with two third person arguments, as exemplified above. This slice of the agreement
paradigms provides a representative sample of the basic workings of the system, and
has been the major object of study in previous analyses of Algonquian languages within
the generative tradition (e.g. Bruening, 2005; Oxford, 2014, 2019b). The starting point
of the account is therefore informed by two decades of analysis within the generative
theories, and well over a century of documentation within the Algonquianst tradition.
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The goal of this first section is introduce the agreement system of Ojibwe as a whole,
and narrow in on the main patterns, questions, and proposals that drive the remainder
of the chapter. I begin with an overview of the verbal spine, which gives way to a
description of the four major agreement slots within the language, and a survey of the
theoretical proposals to account for each. I then turn to a description of word order
and introduce the adopted theoretical link that between agreement and movement.
5.1.1 The verbal spine
The Ojibwe verbal complex consists of a single prosodic word with a complex morpho-
logical structure. The examples in (2) provide the morphological template for the in-
dependent order, and (3) the template for the conjunct. In both cases, the sub-example
(a) gives the terms common to the Algonquianist literature. This can be correlated with
sub-example (b), where the phrase-structural heads are given. Finally, sub-example (c)
provides a verb form where every slot is overtly evidenced, with glosses indicating the
Algonquianist terms for each.
(2) Ojibwe verbal template for the independent order—adapted from Oxford (2014)
a. Prefix + root + Final + Theme + Negation + Central + Mode + Peripheral
b. Infl +
p



















‘They (PROX) are not seeing h/ (OBV)’
(3) Ojibwe verbal template for the conjunct order—adapted from Oxford (2014)
a. root + Final + Theme + Negation + Central + Mode
b.
p













‘...if they (PROX) are not seeing h/ (OBV)’
247
One high-level goal is to understand the similarities and differences between the two
verbal orders. In addition to the surface-level differences in morphophonological form
in shared slots, the conjunct order only realizes a subset of the morphological slots
found in the independent order — it lacks both the person prefix and the peripheral
agreement marker. Furthermore, the conjunct and independent orders show distinct
patterns of agreement in the slots they do share, which reveals deeper differences in
the probes that underly each clause type.
All of the morphological slots introduced above come into play on some level over
the course of the chapter, but the focus is on the four that participate in agreement: v
(the Final), Voice (the Theme Sign), Infl (the Person Prefix + Central Agreement), and
C (Peripheral Agreement). Both mode and negation do not show interactions with the
agreement system.
For the current purposes, mode is useful to consider as a conditioner of the phono-
logical environment, allowing allomorphs to appear and disappear and informing the
spell-out of each slot. More generally, Mode comes in four flavors. The indicative or
neutral mode; the dubitative, which expresses doubt or uncertainty; the preterit, which
is shown in the examples above, and is used for uncompleted or attempted actions; and
the preterit-dubitative, which combines the meaning of the two non-neutral modes.
Negation, which is bipartite in the independent order and monopartite in the conjunct
(for an analysis, see Tilleson, 2019), is leveraged to examine scope with respect to the
arguments of the verb.
The maximal possible verbal spine in Ojibwe is given in (4), again with the Algo-
nquianist labels written below each node.
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5.1.2 Overview of agreement: v, Voice, Infl, and C
As noted above, the focus of the chapter is to account for the agreement system of
Ojibwe. The following generalizations govern the basic agreement behavior of the four
agreement probes:
(5) a. v: Agree with the IA in animacy.
b. Voice: If the EA is ranked lower than the IA, show INVERSE marking, other-
wise show DIRECT agreement in obviation/person.
c. Infl: Agree in person and number with the highest ranked argument. If
both the EA and IA are equally ranked, index both.
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d. C: Agree in number, animacy, and obviation with the lowest ranked argu-
ment.
At a high level, the four agreement slots correspond to the four possible types of ϕ-
probes posited in Chapter 4. This correspondence is shown in (6). The probe on v,
which is sensitive to noun class, is the γ-probe. Voice marking, which consistently
indexes the alignment of argument positions and obviation (and varies in whether it
indexes the alignment between position and the core person features), is the ρ-probe.
The probe on Infl is the π-probe, but also expones number information. Finally, the
#-probe on C generally marks number contrasts, but also expones information about
animacy and obviation.
(6) Four types of ϕ-probes and their relation to functional heads in Ojibwe
a. Noun classification: γ ≈ v
b. Obviation: ρ ≈ Voice
c. Person: π ≈ Infl
d. Number: # ≈ C
The relationship between the four probes of Ojibwe and the four probe types is approx-
imate. It represents general trends in the sensitivities and exponence of each probe,
rather than clean cuts. For example, Voice not only evaluates matches with the goal
based on obviation status, but also to person distinctions proper (e.g. the local versus
non-local distinction). To review, the insight here is not that a ρ-probe can never be
sensitive to distinctions outside of obviation; rather, that it always will be particularly
sensitive to obviation, if nothing else. There is more work to be done on understand-
ing the consequences of these posited relationships, but these types serve as guideposts
for understanding the layers of complexity in the agreement system, and connects the
probe structure to wider theories of the functional spine (e.g. Wiltschko, 2014).
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In the remainder of the section, I expand the descriptions of each of these agreement
probes, laying the groundwork for an analysis. For completeness, I present the patterns
across the full VTA paradigms, while the analysis focuses on a case study of the “non-
local only” configurations that combine proximate and obviative arguments only. Some
discussion of the “local-only” and “mixed” patterns can be found in Appendix B.
5.1.2.1 Animacy agreement on v
Agreement with v is frequently overlooked or passed over in analyses of the Algonquian
agreement system. v is realized as a closed-class set of morphemes, which are referred
to in descriptive circles as the verb finals. Finals alternate based on two properties:
(i) noun classification, with the animacy of the internal argument being marked in
transitive verbs, and the sole argument with intransitives, and (ii) argument structure,
with both transitivity and other semantic information related to thematic roles being
indicated. Following the split-VP hypothesis, Spec,vP is the position where the external
argument is introduced, and agent/causer theta roles assigned. I further assume that
this projection defines a phase boundary, a fact which comes into play over the course
of the analysis.
A full presentation of the possible verb finals goes beyond the scope of this work
(see Riccomini, 2016, for a recent analysis of finals in Eastern Ojibwe), but the basic
form that the alternations take can be observed with the examples in (7) with the al-
ternation between the animate and inanimate forms of the causitive final, and (8) with










































The present analysis limits its scope to animate arguments only, therefore the final
will not show any significant alternations as a function of argument alignment. That
said, as a marker of a phase-boundary, the projection plays an integral role in gating
accessibility of the internal argument for agreement over the course of the derivation.
This is particularly explored in Section 5.6.
5.1.2.2 Direct-inverse agreement on Voice
There major factor that determines the form of Voice is the alignment of arguments, as
described by the combination of the person-based prominence scale and a scale that
encodes syntactic hierarchy (i.e. subject vs. object; external argument vs. internal ar-
gument; or, most simply, higher vs. lower). This factor determines whether a so-called
direct marker appears (which can arise as person agreement with either the subject or
object) or whether inverse marking appears, as summarized in Table 5.1.
EA→ IA Independent Conjunct
Local LOCAL → LOCAL Object Object
Mixed
LOCAL → 3/3′ Object Object
3→ LOCAL Inverse Object
Non-local
3→ 3′ Subject Subject
3′ → 3 Inverse Inverse
Table 5.1: Distribution of object agreement, subject agreement, and inverse marking
on Voice in the conjunct and independent orders.
It is important to highlight that the hierarchy is articulated to different degrees in the
independent and conjunct order—this is reflected in the difference whether the inverse
arises in the “mixed” argument combinations. In the independent order hierarchy in
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(9a), the local persons are ranked over the proximate, resulting in inverse marking
in the 3 → LOCAL configurations. This ranking is not realized in the conjunct order
hierarchy in (9b), and as a result the inverse does not arise in these cases. However,
in both cases the proximate (and the locals) are ranked above the obviative, therefore
inverse appears with 3′ → 3 in both the independent and conjunct orders.
(9) The Person-Based Prominence Hierarchy for Ojibwe
a. The Independent Hierarchy: {1, 2} > 3 > 3′
b. The Conjunct Hierarchy: {1, 2, 3} > 3′
The collapse of the hierarchy in this way is easily captured in under the current theory of
agreement by changing how the relevant agreement probe is relativized in the conjunct
versus independent order. As the ρ-probe, in both orders the probe will be specified for
a uProximate feature. In the independent order, the addition of a uParticipant feature
extends the hierarchy effects to contrast local and non-local persons.
Readers who are familiar with Algonquian languages may question the description
above, where Voice marking in the 3 → 3′ configurations is claimed to mark the sub-
ject. The received analysis of the theme sign, as the name implies, is that it alternates
between inverse marking and indexing the object (the “theme”). One of the major in-
novations of the current study is a reanalysis of the theme sign in the 3→ 3′ alignments
as subject agreement, rather than object agreement. This is based on analysis of the di-
rect marker -aa a proximate marker, rather than a generic third person animate marker.















‘S/he (PROX) saw Ziibiins (OBV)’
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Analyses that treat -aa as a generic third person marker cannot account for the fact that
there is a specific obviative theme sign, glossed here as a single morpheme -imaa, which
appears in all other cases where there is an obviative object. For example, the LOCAL
















‘I saw Ziibiin’s (PROX) mother (OBV)’
The theme sign -imaa cannot appear with a proximate object, where instead -aa ap-













‘I saw Ziibiins (PROX)’
What is immediately important is that -imaa appears with an obviative object in all
















‘S/he (PROX) saw Ziibiins (OBV)’
The most natural analysis of these patterns is to treat the theme sign -aa in this case as
proximate subject agreement. If instead one adopted the object agreement analysis for
these cases, it becomes necessary to explain why the less specific “generic” third person
form appears instead of the more specific obviative form, even though agreement is
occurring with an obviative argument. On the proposed analysis of -aa as a subject
1Ultimately, I believe that this theme sign is bipartite, with -im indexing obviative nouns and -aa
being the familiar proximate marker. An analysis of this construction can be found in Appendix B.
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marker, the burden instead becomes configuring the probe to target the subject in some
cases, the object in others, and for inverse to arise elsewhere.
Again, the focus of this chapter is on the non-local only configurations, where Voice
alternates between subject marking and inverse. This alternation follows from the
gluttony-based system adopted in the previous chapter. To capture the mixed and lo-
cal only alignments, where object marking arises, additional assumptions are necessary.
An analysis based in an extension of the Person Licensing Condition (Béjar and Rezac,
2003, 2009) is sketched in Appendix B.
5.1.2.3 Person and number agreement on Infl
The third agreement probe is on Infl, which shows person-based agreement sensitivities
described as indexing the “highest ranked” argument in the clause. This slot is by far
the most morphophonologically complex. Infl shows portmanteau forms, in the sense of
having a single morpheme that indexes the features of more than one argument, as well
as fission, where person and number are spelled out in separate slots, but are collected
by a single agreement relationship.
The patterns of underlying agreement are given in Table 5.2. The simple cases, and
the main focus here, are the non-local only forms, where agreement simply targets the
proximate argument (the EA in direct alignments and the IA in inverse alignments). In
both the mixed and local-only configurations, Infl agrees with both arguments (with
spell-out rules showing complex patterns of portmanteau and fission).2
These agreement relationships are fed by the movement triggered by Voice. Follow-
ing Oxford (2019b), I argue that Infl simply agrees with the closest goal, which in this
case is the argument (or, as the case may be, arguments) sitting in the specifier of VoiceP.
2In the independent order, this creates the contrast between Set A and Set B morphology indicated in
Table 5.2. Following a recent analysis by Despić, Hamilton, and Murray (2019) of cognate morphology
within Cheyenne (Plains Algonquian), the insertion of Set B is conditioned by multiple agreement with
a local and non-local person, while Set A occurs elsewhere. The conjunct order does not show a Set
A/B distinction, but the proposal that agreement occurs with both arguments is clear from the rampant
presence of portmanteau forms
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EA→ IA Independent Conjunct
Local LOCAL → LOCAL Portmanteau (Set A) Portmanteau
Mixed
LOCAL → 3/3′ Subject (Set B) Portmanteau
3→ LOCAL Object (Set B) Portmanteau
Non-local
3→ 3′ Subject (Set A) Subject
3′ → 3 Object (Set A) Object
Table 5.2: Distribution of object agreement, subject agreement, and multiple agreement
on Infl in the conjunct and independent orders.
In the non-local only alignments, only the proximate argument sits in that position; in
the mixed and local only alignments, the EA and IA are in a multiple specifier config-
uration on Voice, and therefore both are targeted for agreement with Infl via Multuple
AGREE (Hiraiwa, 2001).
More generally, I argue that the presence of full agreement with Infl results in the
deactivation of arguments. I provide a formulation of the Activity Condition (Chomsky,
2000, 2001) that instantiates this claim: When Infl spells-out the full set of features of a
given argument, this argument cannot be targeted by further agreement relationships.
This knocks out the proximate argument in the non-local only alignments, and the local
arguments in the mixed and local only alignments, bleeding the possible agreement
relationships that C can engage in.
5.1.2.4 Obviative and number agreement on C
The final slot is number/animacy/obviation agreement on C. This slot only appears in
the independent order — I assume this difference follows from a wider theory of clause
typing between the independent and conjunct orders, where the probe on Infl in the
conjunct order is a fused person/number probe. The distribution of the agreement is
shown in Table 5.3.
As previewed in the previous section, the possible agreement relationships in this
slot are bled by the deactivating properties of Infl. In the non-local only configurations,
where the proximate has been deactivated, C always agrees with the obviative argu-
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EA→ IA Independent Conjunct
Local LOCAL → LOCAL — —
Mixed
LOCAL → 3/3′ Object —
3→ LOCAL Subject —
Non-local
3→ 3′ Object —
3′ → 3 Subject —
Table 5.3: Distribution of object and subject agreement on C in the conjunct and inde-
pendent orders.
ment; in the mixed configurations, where the local argument has been deactivated, C
agrees with the non-local argument; in the local only configurations, where both argu-
ments are deactivated, there is no visible agreement on C.
C plays crucially into understanding the patterns of word order observable in the
non-local only configurations, which are reviewed in the next section. I argue that C
has not only a ϕ-probe, but also a δ-probe. In the direct alignments, the δ-probe is
responsible for the alternation between VOS and VSO word orders. The absence of this
probe in the conjunct order in turn is linked to the lack of word order alternations in
these cases, where agreement and movement triggered by Infl has the final say.
5.1.3 Word order
A major goal of this chapter is to link the patterns of word order and agreement in
Ojibwe, in both the independent and conjunct orders. In this section, I introduce the
patterns of word order in the non-local only cases. Given the rampant argument and
pronoun drop present in the language, the non-local only cases provide the only oppor-
tunity to observe word order alternations between both arguments of a transitive clause,
therefore the patterns in the mixed and local only alignments are not considered.
The independent order has basic verb-initial word orders, with the ordering of the
arguments differing depending on whether the alignment is direct or inverse. In direct
alignments, there is a general preference for the VOS word order, but VSO is also fully
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grammatical. In contrast, the inverse shows rigid VSO word order, with VOS being
ungrammatical.




























Intended: ‘The boy (OBV) saw the woman (PROX)’ *VINVOPROXSOBV
Without going into detail, the verb-initiality of the independent order can be tied to
local head movement, which begins at the root and culminates within the CP domain
(Hammerly, 2019b).3 This accounts not only for the initial position of the verb, but the
head adjunction structure leads to the prevalence of mirror-principle obeying suffixal
morphology. More generally, I argue that obviative-precedes-proximate word orders are
the result of the probe on C, which as described in the previous section shows agreement
with the obviative argument, bringing it to a high position in clause. The alternating
order in the direct alignment, and the rigid order in the inverse, is in turn attributed
to whether the trigger of movement is ultimately a function of optional A′-movement
triggered by the δ-probe on C, or A-movement triggered by ϕ-agreement directly.
The conjunct order shows different patterns of word order on a number of dimen-
sions. First, the verb is found in a medial rather than initial position — I attribute this
3The analysis in Hammerly (2019b) articulates a split-CP. Therefore the final point to where the verb
is raised (FinP) is higher than the C probe discussed here.
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to a difference in the height of verb raising, with the operation stoping at Infl rather
than traveling all the way to the CP domain. Second, the proximate argument is always
to the left of the obviative argument, both with direct and inverse alignments.









‘I heard that the woman (PROX) sang to the child (OBV)’









‘I heard that the child (PROX) was sung to by the woman (OBV)’
d. *ingii-noondam ikwewan gii-nagamotawigod abinoojiinh
Given that there is no probe on C, the word order in these cases are driven by A-
movement of the proximate argument to Spec,IP, with the obviative argument remaining
in situ.
5.1.4 Agreement and movement
One of the major insights of the analysis is to tie together the patterns of ϕ-agreement
and movement in Ojibwe. As was implicit in the overview of the previous section, this
is accomplished by assuming a model where movement is always preceded by an agree-
ment relation (e.g. Chomsky, 2000, 2001; Bošković, 2007; Van Urk, 2015). However,
there will be cases of agreement that are not necessarily followed by movement. This
relationship is schematized in (16). The AGREE relation will be indicated with a dashed
line terminating in both ends with filled dots, and the movement relation a solid line
with an arrow indicating the landing site.
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Note that the above schematization specifically abstracts away from the type of move-
ment and agreement relationship involved. Following the featural view of movement
proposed by Van Urk (2015), I assume the difference between A-movement and A′-
movement stems from the features at play, rather than the particular position to which
movement occurs. In this view, A-movement occurs following ϕ-agreement, while A′-
movement occurs following δ-agreement. The major addition to the system over the
course of the chapter is a “discourse” version of the obviative feature [δ: Obviative],
which again is ultimately responsible for the VOS/VSO word alternation introduced in
the previous section. The novel idea is that obviation is a property that spans both sides
of the ϕ/δ divide.
The relationship between agreement and movement is the consequence of the fea-
tures that participate in AGREE being optionally specified with an EPP property. This
results in the one-way implicational relationship, where again all movement is pre-
ceded by agreement, but not all agreement is followed by movement. The refinement
to this theory proposed over the course of the analysis is to relativize the EPP. The pro-
posal is that a given ϕ-probe may be picky about which arguments can satisfy its EPP
feature. Rather than being a general requirement for the specifier position to be filled,
a probe with a relativized EPP feature will only be satisfied if the specifier is filled by a
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D(P) with a particular type of feature such as [Participant] or [Proximate]. I link this
proposal to the recent account of person-hierarchy effects by Zubizarreta and Pancheva
(2017); Pancheva and Zubizarreta (2017), where certain phase projections appear to
require a local person to occupy their edge.
Besides capturing the surface word order facts, the adopted relationship between
agreement and movement provides the means to create feeding/bleeding relationships
between agreement probes. Agreement/movement of Voice in particular feeds the pos-
sible agreement relationships that arise on Infl, with Voice having a relativized EPP that
moves proximate and/or local arguments to its specifier, but not obviative arguments.
This has the consequence of ensuring Infl never shows agreement with obviative nouns.
5.2 Overview of non-local only alignments
The non-local only configurations provide a baseline for the basic workings of the sys-
tem, with both mixed and local only configurations adding further layers of complexity.
Additionally, non-local only configurations provide the possibility of directly observing
the relationship between word order and agreement, as arguments can be realized as
regular, overt DPs rather than null or emphatic pronominals. This section presents the
patterns of agreement for 3↔ 3′ argument combinations in both the independent and
conjunct orders. The inflectional template are repeated in (17) for reference.
(17) Inflectional templates (repeated in part)
a. Independent: Infl-
p




I first note again that there are no alternations in the form of v (the final) in the
examples that follow, as all arguments are animate, and it is therefore always realized
in its animate form. As discussed, the precise form can also differ as a function of which
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thematic role is assigned to the external argument. Given that all elicited examples use
the same verb waabam translating to “see”, with the experiencer final -am, no alterna-
tion is present in the examples.
The basic alternation between the direct and inverse on Voice can be seen with the
two examples in (18), with the 3SG → 3′SG alignment leading to the “direct” marker
-aa, which is recognized to be proximate agreement, and 3′SG → 3SG leading to the
inverse marker -igoo. This contrast between direct and inverse holds in all forthcoming
examples, regardless of the number marking of the arguments and the independent
versus conjunct order distinction. The remaining agreement is invariant across the two
alignments. Agreement with Infl in these examples shows the proximate person prefix
o-, paired with a phonologically null singular central agreement marker. Finally, C is
realized as the obviative singular form -n in both cases.


























‘S/he (OBV) sees h/ (PROX)’ 3′SG → 3SG
Changing the proximate argument from singular to plural, shown with both direct and
inverse alignments in (19), results in a single change (ignoring the phonologically con-
ditioned shift in the inverse marker from -igoo to -igo), with central agreement on Infl
now being realized in the plural form -waa rather than the null singular form.



























‘S/he (OBV) sees them (PROX)’ 3′SG → 3PL
Considering now the patterns with a plural obviative, we see this changes the form of
C, now realized as a glottal stop -’, with all other morphemes remaining constant.


























‘They (OBV) sees h/ (PROX)’ 3′PL → 3SG
Finally, both the proximate and obviative nouns can be plural, as shown in (21), result-
ing in the expected forms of both the central agreement marker of Infl and C, given the
examples in (19) and (20).


























‘They (OBV) sees them (PROX)’ 3′PL → 3PL
The conjunct order is similar in many ways to the independent in the non-local
only configurations: the direct/inverse alternation occurs in the same contexts, and
Infl unformally indexes the person and number of the proximate argument. However,
there are two major differences. First, there is a complete lack of C agreement, resulting
in a lack of obviative agreement, and thus a lack of contrast (in agreement) with the
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singular and plural forms of the obviative. The second is Infl is realized only in the
central agreement slot. The baseline form, with a singular proximate argument, is
shown in (22). As expected, the direct and inverse alternation tracks with the alignment
of proximate and obviative arguments, and the central agreement slot is realized as
proximate agreement -d.






















‘if she/he/they (OBV) see h/ (PROX)’ 3′SG/PL → 3SG
Shifting the proximate argument from singular to plural results in the addition of a
plural marker -waa to the central agreement slot in addition to the proximate marker
-d, with all other slots being unaffected by this difference.






















‘She/he/they (OBV) see them (PROX)’ 3′SG/PL → 3PL
The above claim is not without controversy. Previous accounts (e.g. Oxford, 2019b)
have glossed the central agreement marker in this case as a single morpheme -waad
rather than two separate morphemes -waa and -d. However the single morpheme
analysis misses two surface-level generalizations: (i) that -waa always combines in a
transparently decompositional manner between the singular and plural forms; and (ii)
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that the two morphemes can reverse their linear order via phonologically conditioned
metathesis. I return to these points and more in Section 5.5.3.
A summary of the morphology from each of the examples above is given in (24).
The form of v, in (24a), was constant across all examples, as all had an animate inter-
nal argument. Voice, shown in (24a), alternates between proximate subject agreement
with 3 → 3′ alignments, and inverse marking with 3′ → 3 alignments, regardless of
number and clause type. Infl agreement, shown in (24c) is the major locus of morpho-
logical variation between the independent and conjunct orders. However, agreement
always occurs with the proximate argument and alternates depending on the number of
that argument. C, shown in (24d), appears only in the independent order. Agreement
always appears with the obviative argument and alternates according to the number of
that noun.
(24) a. v: -am = ANIM.EXP
b. Voice: -aa = 3; igo(o) = INV
c. InflIND: o- -∅ = 3SG; o- -waa = 3PL
InflCON: -d = 3; -waa-d = PL-3
d. C: -n = 3′SG; -’ = 3′PL
Given this basic description, I now turn to a step-by-step derivation of the non-local
only independent and conjunct order agreement.
5.3 Agreement on v
The first step of the derivation is agreement with v, which always occurs with the IA,
as shown in (25). The probe itself can be completely flat, with invariance in which
argument is targeted by the probe being due to the downward nature of AGREE. Given
that v c-commands the IA, and given that the IA bears ϕ-features (as is the case in all
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possible argument combinations), the probe on v will always be fully satisfied by this
relationship and no further probing is necessary.










Two claims that are implicit in the representation in (25) deserve some attention. First,
I assume that the set copied to the probe is projected to the phrasal level. This follows
from the Percolation Principle presented in Chapter 4, where all features of a head are
present on the projections of that head. Given that the AGREE relation occurs prior to
the projection of the head, the projected features (or more precisely, the projected set)
will be those copied from the IA. This assumption is ultimately critical for understanding
the relationship between C agreement and movement, explored in Section 5.6, where
I argue that in direct alignments C ϕ-agrees with the IA indirectly via the features
inherited by vP. The second is that agreement does not result in movement of the IA to
the specifier of vP. I assume any EPP requirement of v can be satisfied by the EA. This
follows from the common economy principle that ensures, if possible, direct MERGE is
employed over movement (Chomsky, 2000).
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5.4 Agreement on Voice
There are two different versions of the probe on Voice: one for the independent order,
and one for the conjunct order. As shown in (26), the probe on Voice in the independent
order includes a [uParticipant] feature, while the conjunct order probe only includes
[uΠ] and [uProximate]. Each probe is given in both the feature and set-based notation.
(26) a. VoiceIND = ρ: {uAnim, uProx, uPart}
= ρ: {u{I , U , O, O′, O′′}, u{I , U , O}, u{I , U}}
b. VoiceCON = ρ: {uAnim, uProx}
= ρ: {u{I , U , O, O′, O′′}, u{I , U , O}}
This difference is critical for capturing the difference in the distribution of the theme
sign, where 3 → LOCAL leads to inverse marking in the independent, but not the con-
junct. However, for the 3↔ 3′ configurations we are concerned with here, the change
in the probe as a function of clause type has no impact — because there is no local
person in the clause, the presence/absence of the participant feature is irrelevant. That
both probes contain both uΠ, and uProx is the relevant fact, which allows the patterns
of direct-inverse to remain constant in both the independent and conjunct orders with
the non-local only configurations. Furthermore, the lack of a number probe accounts
for the invariance in direct-inverse marking when it comes to number.
While the derivation was already previewed in Chapter 4, I walk through the steps
again here in the context of the full paradigms of agreement and with added considera-
tion of movement. The inverse alignment in particular, where a single probe enters into
agreement relationships with multiple arguments, requires further comments. I argue
that the EPP on Voice is relativized such that it is only satisfied by a proximate or local
argument. This is formally implemented by the presence of a feature [EPP: Proximate],
which requires a DP with either I , U , or the proximate O in its set to be satisfied. This
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results in the movement of proximate arguments, but not obviative arguments, to the
specifier of VoiceP.
Given that the probe on Voice and the spell-out of the head is impartial to number,
the same steps result regardless of the number of the two arguments. I show agreement
with singular arguments only for simplicity, beginning with the mechanics of AGREE,
then turning to the spell-out of Voice and a brief comparison to previous accounts.
5.4.1 Subject agreement in direct alignments
With direct alignments (3→ 3′), as shown in (27), the probe hits the proximate EA first.
This satisfies all unvalued features and results in the EA’s set to be copied to Voice, which
is ultimately spelled-out as proximate (subject) agreement. Finally, the EA undergoes
A-movement to the specifier of VoiceP (I discuss the nature of the EPP feature driving
this movement below).













We can see that in the direct alignments the IA is not probed at this stage of the
derivation, and therefore remains in situ. The main consequence is that the IA becomes
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trapped within the vP phase complement—a fact that becomes relevant when agree-
ment with C is considered in Section 5.6.
5.4.2 Gluttony and the relativized EPP in inverse alignments
The derivation of inverse alignments (3′ → 3) is shown in (28). These cases involve
the same probe on Voice, but differ in that the obviative argument is the EA and the
proximate the IA. As a result, the first agreement relationship between Voice and the
EA only satisfies uΠ, with uProx being satisfied by a second cycle of agreement with the
proximate IA. This results in a gluttonous set from two goals on Voice.













The final piece in (28) is determining movement, given that both arguments have
been targeted by the probe. I argue that only the proximate IA undergoes movement
to Spec,VoiceP, despite both the EA and IA being target by agreement. One can imagine
a number of possible ways to derive the movement of the proximate argument alone,
rather than ending up with movement of the obviative argument alone, or movement
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of both the proximate and obviative arguments into a double specifier configuration.
I put forward the idea that the EPP feature on Voice, which is ultimately responsible
for triggering movement, is articulated such that it specifically requires a proximate
argument (i.e. an argument with either I , U , or the proximate O within its set) rather
than any DP.
In this view, the canonical EPP requirement of a language such as English is analo-
gous to a flat probe, as shown in (29a). In these cases, the particular features of the DP
that fills the specifier position are not important, and anything will suffice. When the
EPP is relativized, it specifically requires a participant DP (29b), or as argued for Voice
in Ojibwe, a proximate DP (29c).
(29) Relativized EPP
a. Generalized DP: [EPP: Φ]
b. Participant Specific: [EPP: Participant]
c. Proximate Specific: [EPP: Proximate]
Returning to (28), adopting the idea that Voice in Ojibwe has a feature [EPP: Proxi-
mate], only movement of the proximate IA would suffice to check this feature, and only
a proximate argument will be triggered to move. This means a derivation where the
obviative argument moves to Spec,VoiceP is ruled out — it cannot check the relativized
EPP feature, and thus there is nothing to trigger its movement.
On the theory sketched here, one can imagine a range of relativized EPP features
equal to the range seen with probes. However, I do not believe that the EPP is neces-
sarily an independent property of the probe. An important avenue for future work is to
examine whether the full range of variation in EPP preferences is indeed borne out, or
whether there are restrictions that need to be put in place to limit generation. This av-
enue of work will surely provide more insight between the relationship between agree-
ment and movement. For example, one restriction that constitutes a worthy hypothesis
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for future work is that the EPP is never relativized to be pickier than the ϕ-probe. This
would rule out the possibility of, for example, a flatϕ-probe being relativized to require
a participant in its specifier. On the other hand, a picky ϕ-probe may not necessarily
result in a picky EPP all occasions.
This idea has echos with a recent proposal by Zubizarreta and Pancheva (2017) and
Pancheva and Zubizarreta (2017), who propose the P(erson)-Constraint, which states
that certain phases require a participant D(P) within their edge (i.e. Specifier) position.
For Zubizarreta and Pancheva, the requirement is formulated as a bespoke interface
condition — a direct filter on the derivation following the syntactic component. They
argue that if a phase-head bears an interpretable participant feature, then this filter
requires that projection to have a participant-bearing D(P) in its edge position, or else
the structure is ill-formed. The current proposal argues that this rather specific filter
can be derived from the more general patterns of the EPP, with no need for a new
type of constraint on well-formedness at the interfaces. Like the P-Constraint, the EPP
is ultimately enforced by a filter at the interfaces such that it must be satisfied for a
derivation to be well-formed, therefore the proposal does not rid us of such constraints
entirely. The particular extension proposed here is that the EPP can be relativized such
that a specific type of argument—for example, a participant or proximate—must occupy
the specifier position of the phrase.
The relativized EPP proposed here also has an antecedent with the EPP Best Match
principle proposed by Coon and Bale (2014). This principle states that, in cases where
multiple arguments provide a (partial) match to the probe, the one that matches the
most segments of the probe is moved to satisfy the EPP. Both the current proposal and the
EPP Best Match share the assumption that it is not necessarily the closest argument that
is attracted to the specifier of the probe: The probe prefers to move an argument with
some particular feature, rather than the closest one. In the non-local only alignments,
the proposal of Coon and Bale and the current proposal make equivalent predictions.
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A difference arises in the mixed alignments, where I argue that both the local and prox-
imate arguments are moved to Spec,VoiceP. The EPP Best Match predicts that only the
local argument (the one that matches the most segments of Voice) should move.
5.4.3 The spell-out of Voice
Returning again to the patterns of agreement and away from movement, recall the
two sets of primitives, isolated in (30), which are derived for the direct and inverse
alignments. The direct alignments have a single set, consisting of the single (proximate)
O, reflecting the single agreement relation that probe engaged in. On the other hand,
the inverse alignment has an ordered set from each of the two arguments of the verb.
(30) a. DIRECT: Voice = {O}
b. INVERSE: Voice = ({O′}, {O})
Again, the remaining discussion follows what was previously laid out in Chapter 4. The
spell-out rules in (31) are immediately relevant, but note that additional rules for each
possible person distinction will be added when the mixed and local-only configurations
are considered, and the inventory of theme signs is widened.
(31) Voice{O}⇔ -aa
Voiceelsewhere ⇔ -igoo
When Voice is specified for {O} alone, then the so-called direct marker -aa is exponed,
which can be described as proximate subject agreement. With the gluttonous collection
of features, the elsewhere form -igoo appears—the VI insertion operation is unable to
make a choice about which set to spell-out, and therefore inserts an unmarked form
that does not index any particular set. This is descriptively referred to as the inverse
marker.
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5.5 Agreement on Infl
To review, agreement on Infl is described as indexing the person and number of the
highest ranked argument. In the independent order, it appears as the combination of
the person prefix and central agreement, while the conjunct order only shows a form
in the central agreement slot. Besides this difference in the number of agreement slots,
the particular forms in the independent and conjunct differ quite significantly. This
contrasts with the theme sign on Voice, where the same basic forms are shared across
both the independent and conjunct orders.
Morphophonological differences aside for the moment, the underlying geometry of
probe and goal is parallel between the independent and conjunct orders. In all cases,
regardless of clause type and the initial alignment of the arguments, Infl agrees with the
proximate argument. This is the result of agreement and movement driven by Voice,
which was shown to be parallel across the two clause types in the previous section.
I argue that Infl simply ends up agreeing with (and moving) whichever argument is
closest (i.e. whichever argument has moved to Spec,VoiceP). As a result, Voice feeds
agreement with the proximate subject in the case of a direct 3→ 3′ alignment, and the
proximate object in the case of the 3′ → 3 alignment.
In the conjunct order, Infl agreement is also the final agreement relationship within
the clause. This means the movement patterns derived from this relationship are re-
flected in the final surface word order. This contrasts with the independent order, where
the final word order is established following agreement with C.
5.5.1 The probe on Infl
Given that Infl simply agrees with the closest argument, the person probe that governs
Infl agreement can therefore be “flat”, as shown in the examples in (32). As a result,
the probe simply agrees with the first argument that Matches its uninterpretable person
feature uΠ. However, there are underlying differences between the two clause types in
273
how they relate to the number probe. The two possible probes are shown in (32), with
the difference between the two orders being whether Infl hosts just a flat person probe
(32a), or a fused person and number probe (32b) (cf. Coon and Bale, 2014).
(32) a. InflIND = π:{uΠ}
b. InflCON = π/#:{u{Π, #}}
The fused probe in (32b) is distinct from one in which person and number constitute
separate probes on a single head, which I will refer to as an ordered probe. The nota-
tional difference between two can be seen abstractly in (33). The probes of the ordered
probe are in an ordered set, with person preceding number, and each with a separate
need for satisfaction. In the fused probe, both person and number are in a single set,
with a single satisfaction requirement taking scope over both.
(33) a. PORDERED = (π:{uΠ}, #:{u#})
b. PFUSED = π/#:{u{Π, #}}
For the purposes of AGREE, the major difference is in whether the probing for person
and number occurs at once (as in a fused probe) or separately (as in an ordered probe).
Separate person and number probes on a single head show effects consistent with per-
son probes first, and continuing until it satisfies all of its features, followed by number,
which does the same (for extensive discussion, see Béjar and Rezac, 2003; Coon and
Keine, 2020). This was seen in the analysis of the PCC given in Chapter 4, but will not
appear as part of the analysis of Ojibwe.
With a fused probe, both person and number probe in parallel. This can result in
two possibilities: Conjunctive or disjunctive satisfaction conditions. The original case
of a fused probe discussed by Coon and Bale (2014) was a conjunctive probe, that would
only be fully satisfied by a plural participant, rather just any participant, regardless of
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number. The case here is a disjunctive probe (see also Roversi, 2020), where a goal fully
satisfying either the person or number features results in full satisfaction of the probe.
In other words, fusion links together the satisfaction conditions of person and num-
ber so if one is satisfied, the other is too. For our purposes, this means probing stops
after a single cycle, as all arguments involved in the current derivation will satisfy the
uΠ feature of the probe. That said, both the person and number features of the probe
request copies of a goal if it Matches their particular features. This has consequences
when it comes to spell-out, which provides the means to account for the difference in
how Infl surfaces in the independent versus conjunct orders.
5.5.2 Schematizing the patterns
To review, the probe on Infl simply agrees with the first argument that Matches its
uninterpretable person feature uΠ—this is invariably the DP sitting in the specifier of
VoiceP. This holds true regardless of the clause type and the number marking of the
object (though, as detailed above, the copying procedure is affected by number — this
is discussed in the next section).
The basic probing geometry is schematized with the direct alignment in (34). As
noted above, agreement and movement on Voice has moved the proximate external
argument to the specifier of VoiceP in these cases, therefore it is targeted for AGREE.
The EA fully satisfies the probe, and its features are copied to Infl.
275





{O} Voice . . .
Infl agreement in the inverse alignment occurs with the same geometry as seen in (34),
with the closest goal sitting in the specifier of VoiceP. The difference is that agreement
and movement on Voice promoted the proximate IA to this position, thus Infl shows
what can be described as “object” agreement. Again, the proximate IA fully satisfies the
probe, and its features are copied to Infl.





{O} Voice . . .
With these derivations in hand, we can return to see that the surface word order
generalizations for the conjunct order have been derived. The proximate argument,
sitting in Spec,IP, is higher than (linearly, to the left of) the obviative argument, which
is in its base-generated position within the VP. Again, assuming that the verb is raised
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via head movement to a projection between these two arguments, an SVO word order
is derived in direct alignments, and an OVS word order in the inverse alignments.
This analysis of the conjunct order will be levied in Chapter 6, where the processing
of obviation and argument structure in Border Lakes Ojibwe is examined. In short, the
specifier of IP will be recognized as the derived subject position. As a result, relative
clause extractions in these clause types will be “subject” relative clauses with proximate
nouns, and “non-subject” relative clauses with obviative nouns, by virtue of the fact
that proximate nouns always occupy this prominent syntactic position, while obviative
nouns remain in situ.
5.5.3 The spell-out of Infl
The discussion up to this point has ignored number, but it must now be brought to bear
given that Infl in both the independent and conjunct order expresses person and number
agreement. As previewed above, this is also where the fused person/number probe in
the conjunct order rears its head, allowing for an explanation of why Infl agreement is
realized discontinuously as the person prefix and central agreement in the independent
order, and sequential person-number suffixes in the conjunct order.
Following the assumption of coarseness, the full set of the probe is copied in all cases.
In the independent order, this set is copied onto π, while the conjunct order copies back
to both π and #. This results in the structure of copies in (36).
(36) Copy structure and spell-out rules on Infl
a. 3SG: InflIND = π: {O}⇔ o- -∅
3PL: InflIND = π: {O, O’, O”}⇔ o- -waa
b. 3SG: InflCON = π: {O}, #: {O}⇔ ∅-d or -g-∅
3PL: InflCON = π: {O, O’, O”}, #: {O, O’, O”}⇔ -waa-d or -g-waa
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Setting aside the differences in phonological form, which can be attributed to sensitivity
in clause-typing, the major explanandum is the discontinuous and flanked spell-out
of person and number in the independent order, and the sequential spell-out in the
conjunct. I argue that both follow the same basic principles of vocabulary insertion,
and attribute the difference to whether person and number are spelled-out in a single
step, or in two sequential steps.
The analysis follows from Harbour (2008), which has been suggested to be applied
to account for the spell-out of Infl agreement in Algonquin by Oxford (2019b). Harbour
proposes that there are two basic constraints that must be obeyed as person and number
morphology is spelled-out and linearized. First, each piece of morphology must be
linearly adjacent to the stem. The stem consists of the root plus whatever pieces of
morphology have been spelled-out so far, with that spell-out proceeding from the root
out. Second, the (universal) functional order of person and number must be obeyed
such that person precedes (is to the left of) number.
Given that both person and number are specified within a single set in the indepen-
dent order, the spell-out of both person and number occurs at once, and both of these
constraints must be satisfied. There are four logically possible linearizations of the per-
son and number morphology, as shown in (37). These possibilities assume that spell-out
is operating over a head-adjunction structure, which is formed by head movement of
the root through each layer of the verbal spine. This results in all heads being spelled-
out with suffixal morphology, if all else is equal (Hammerly, 2019b). However, not all is
equal in this case. Only the linearization where person and number flank the stem and
person is realized as a prefix, shown in (37a), satisfy both the adjacency requirement
and the ordering requirement assuming that both morphemes are being realized in the
same step. Having both morphemes follow the stem, as in (37b,c), violates adjacency
(and, in the case of (37c), the ordering constraint); the alternate flanking option with






The conjunct order is subject to the same constraints, but differs in that the person
and number markers are realized one by one. The ordering constraint dictates that
person is realized to the left of number — however, in the examples so far we have seen
that this constraint appears to be violated in the final surface realization. However, the
#-π ordering of -waa-d is conditioned by a particular phonological environment. This
can be seen in an alternation between -waa-d or -g-waa, as condition in the examples
























‘...if they (PROX) don’t see h/ (OBV)
I therefore assume that the insertion of morphology follows the ordering constraint,
with person being inserted before number, with phonologically conditioned metathe-
sis causing the observed surface alternations. Given this ordering, each of the two
morphemes can individually satisfy the requirement to be adjacent to the stem while
remaining suffixal. The person morphology is inserted first, becoming part of the stem




5.5.4 Infl and the Activity Condition
The final piece of the picture for Infl is the idea that agreement results in the deactiva-
tion of the targeted goal. Much recent work on agreement, going back to the Activity
Condition of Chomsky (2000, 2001), has recognized that certain probes leave argu-
ments open to additionally satisfy a subsequent probe, while others appear to block
their goal(s) from entering into further agreement relationships. An example of this is
clitic doubling, where cliticization deactivates arguments for further agreement.
The literature on Infl agreement in Ojibwe, and Algonquian more generally, has os-
cillated over the past few decades on whether the agreement is an instance of clitic dou-
bling or “pure” agreement (Oxford, 2014, 2019b; Bruening, 2019). One conspicuous
piece of evidence in favor of a clitic doubling analysis is that the form of the morphology
bears a resemblance to the strong pronouns—a common occurrence in languages with
more clear-cut instances of cliticization (e.g. Kichean, see Preminger, 2014, p. 58). This
can be shown to be the case in Ojibwe, as shown by the comparison in (40), noting that
w- and o- are allophones.




This analogy works well in the limited case of the non-local only forms of agree-
ment in the independent order, but becomes more difficult to maintain in the local-only
and mixed alignments, where agreement often takes a portmanteau form. This is de-
scribed in more detail in the coming section, but generally speaking it is not clear what
sort of cliticization operation would allow for the formulation of portmanteau clitics,
which combine the features of multiple arguments in a single form (for a related line of
argumentation, see Deal, 2015). In contrast, a pure-agreement based account readily
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accommodates the realization of these forms by copying the sets of multiple goals to a
single head, as will be shown in more detail in the coming sections.
That said, there is an additional commonality between clitic doubling and Infl agree-
ment in Ojibwe, which could serve as the link to the deactiviation of arguments: Both
show full agreement. That is, both Infl agreement in Ojibwe, and clitic doubling gen-
erally, express the full set of features of the goal argument. I therefore propose the
following formulation of the Activity Condition:
(41) The Activity Condition
An agreement relation with a probe P deactivates a goal G iff the probe ex-
presses the full set of ϕ-features of G
I acknowledge that this formulation makes the syntactic activation of the goal depen-
dent on its ultimate morphophonological form, which presents a derivational look-ahead
problem. I assume that this could avoided with a more nuanced view of Copying than
has been taken here, where all copying is assumed to be coarse (i.e. the complete set
of features/primitives is copied). If this is relaxed, then, for example, the Activity Con-
dition could be formulated such that when copying is fully coarse, then the goal is
deactivated. Anything less than the full set would not lead to deactiviation of the tar-
geted argument. I leave the expansion of this idea to future work that takes a more
careful look at copying and spell-out.
In the next section, I show that the proposal that Infl deactivates the argument with
which it agrees provides an explanation for the apparent hierarchy violating behavior
of C agreement in the independent order.
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5.6 Agreement on C
In this section, I provide an analysis of agreement and movement with the number probe
on C. There are two key properties to account for with C agreement qua agreement.
First, agreement on C descriptively indexes the lowest ranked argument, appearing to
violate the person-based prominence hierarchy. I argue that, rather than following from
any particularly special properties of the probe on C, it is the result of the fact that Infl
has deactivated the more prominent proximate argument, bleeding the possibility of
agreement with the argument on C. Second, C does not appear in the conjunct order at
all. I assume that C agreement is an expression of the number probe #. Given that Infl
is analyzed as a fused person-number probe in the conjunct order, this provides a path
for explaining the absence of a pure number probe on C in those types of clauses.
The second aspect of C is its role in providing an explanation for the word order
effects in the independent order described in Section 5.1.3. I argue that C has a δ-probe
in addition to a ϕ-probe. This provides the means to explain the VOS/VSO alternation
characteristic of direct alignments as optional A′-movement of the obviative IA following
agreement with the δ-probe. In contrast, the rigid VSO word order of inverse alignments
is due to (obligatory) A-movement of the obviative EA stemming from ϕ-agreement.
Given the above objectives, I propose the probe in (42) governs ϕ/δ-agreement on
C, with the flat #-probe searching before the δ-probe, which searches specifically for an
obviative argument that has been specified for the appropriate δ-feature [uObviative].
(42) CIND = (#:{u#}, δ:{uObv})
5.6.1 Direct alignment
I begin with a walkthrough of the direct alignments, schematized in (43). There are
three basic steps to walk through: ¬ϕ-agreement, ­ δ-agreement, and ® A′-movement.
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The first step is ϕ-agreement with vP. Given that the EA has been deactivated by Infl,
and the IA (at this point) is trapped within the phase complement of v, the closest active
ϕ-bearing element is vP, which previously collected the ϕ-set of the internal argument
via agreement (see Section 5.3). This step of the derivation always occurs, accounting
for the invariance of the agreement morphology in these cases—there is no relation-
ship between the word order alternations discussed in Section 5.1.3 and the obviative
agreement on C. I further argue that this agreement alleviates the Phase Impenetra-
bility Condition (Chomsky, 2000, 2001) on the vP phase complement via unlocking
(Rackowski and Richards, 2005; Halpert, 2019; Branan, 2018). This allows the phase
complement to be open for subsequent operations, most pertinently A′-extraction.
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Given that the ϕ-probe on C has an EPP feature, one may wonder why the vP tar-
geted by agreement does not move to satisfy the EPP in this case. I advance the claim
that there is a certain degree of relativization of the EPP on C, such that only nominal
elements (i.e. syntactic elements with the relevant nominal-defining features) can sat-
isfy the requirements of this projection (cf. Halpert, 2019, for Zulu). The vP, being part
of the verbal spine, is not specified for such a feature, and therefore is not fronted to
this position. Consistent with this, in previous work I have shown evidence against a
VP fronting analysis for Ojibwe (Hammerly, 2019b).
Moving forward, step ­ is δ-agreement, which targets the obviative IA. I assume
that the δ-feature has an EPP feature, therefore probing is followed by A′-movement,
shown in step ®. Given that δ-features are optional on DPs (Van Urk, 2015), these final
two steps are optional. In derivations where the feature is present on the obviative
argument, then the IA is attracted to Spec,CP and undergoes A′-movement, as shown
in (43). In derivations where the IA lacks this feature, it remains in situ. Whether or
not this A′-movement to Spec,CP occurs (i.e. whether the obviative IA has the relevant
δ-feature) accounts for the optional VOS/VSO word order alternations in the direct
alignments. Furthermore, given that the feature is specifically [uObviative], I propose
that proximate arguments cannot be specified for the relevant feature, and therefore
are never targeted by the δ-probe on C.
Given this analysis, different word orders should correspond to different scope re-
lationships between the an existential quantifier on the IA and negation. As reviewed
in Section 5.1.1, negation is projected immediately above Voice. Therefore when the
object undergoes movement, it should be able to take wide scope (44a), while it should
be interpreted with narrow scope when it remains in situ (44b).
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(44) a. Moved object (VOS), ∃ » NEG predicted
gaawiin ogii-waabamaasiin ikwewanIA gwiiwizensEA [NegP NEG ... <IA> ]
b. In situ object (VSO), NEG » ∃ predicted
gaawiin ogii-waabamaasiin gwiiwizensIA [NegP NEG ... ikwewanOBJ ]
As reported in Hammerly (2019b), the two different word orders are associated with
distinct scope interpretations with respect to negation. An indefinite object with the
VOS word order is rigidly interpreted with wide scope, as shown in (45), while an












‘Ziibiins (PROX) didn’t meet one boy (OBV)’
a. *NEG » ∃: There is no boy x such that Ziibiins met x.











‘Ziibiins (PROX) didn’t meet one boy (OBV)’
a. NEG » ∃: There is no boy x such that Ziibiins met x .
b. *∃ » NEG: There is a boy x such that Ziibiins did not meet x . VSO
Given that movement is ultimately the result of an δ-probe rather than a ϕ-probe,
one may wonder why it is not possible to reconstruct and get a narrow scope reading
in (46)—one of the hallmark properties of A′-movement is reconstruction. I propose
that, in principle, the reconstructed interpretation is possible, but access to this inter-
pretation is blocked by the availability of the in situ counterpart, which can only have
the narrow scope reading. This is analogous to the situation with scalar implicatures,
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where, for example, the meaning of some in a sentence such as some students like syntax
results in the implicature that not all students like syntax, because use of all provides
an unambiguous was of expressing the meaning all students like syntax. In the case of
Ojibwe, the VSO word order unambiguously has a narrow scope interpretation, while
VOS is associated with both narrow and wide scope readings. However, given that there
is a more specific alternative to indicate narrow scope, the VOS order is only felicitous
under the wide scope interpretation, appearing to block reconstruction.
5.6.2 Inverse alignment
The inverse alignment differs from the direct in that the remaining active argument is
the external argument, and is therefore not trapped within the vP phase. As a result,
the ϕ-probe on C agrees with the EA directly, triggering A-movement independently of
the δ-probe to satisfy the general EPP feature of C. This is schematized in (47).















As a result, the EA moves in all possible derivations, with no optionality in the word
order. This derives the rigid VSO word order characteristic of the inverse alignments. I
further assume that the δ-probe on C can be satisfied by the Spec-Head relationship with
the moved obviative DP, and therefore does not need to engage in a separate probing
relationship to have that feature satisfied.
Like the direct alignments, the scope facts support the analysis. As shown in (48),
again taken from Hammerly (2019b), indefinite subjects take wide scope with respect











‘A boy (OBV) didn’t meet Ziibiins (PROX)’ VSO
a. ?NEG » ∃: There is no boy x such that x met Ziibiins.
b. ∃ » NEG: There is a boy x such that x did not meet Ziibiins.
In this case, the marginality of the narrow-scope reading follows from the nature of
A-movement, which is widely recognized to resist reconstruction.
5.7 Comparison to previous accounts
As alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, there are a number of relevant an-
tecedents to the present account. No previous analysis of agreement within the gener-
ative tradition has focused on Border Lakes Ojibwe, however analysis of closely related
dialects and languages are considered, as many of the patterns are shared. In this sec-
tion I detail what the proposed analysis has in common with previous analysis, and also
where the proposal differs and/or makes headway.
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5.7.1 Previous accounts of the theme sign
The biggest change made within the current account is to treat the direct marker -aa
as agreement with the proximate subject in 3→ 3′ alignments. As reviewed in Section
5.1.2.2, the motivation for this is the fact that in all other conditions with an obviative
IA, that is, the LOCAL→ 3′ alignments, the more specific theme sign -imaa appears. To
my knowledge, no previous account of Ojibwe, most relevantly Béjar and Rezac (2009)
and Oxford (2019b), has considered the presence of the obviative theme sign in the
the LOCAL → 3′. As a result, both of these accounts treat -aa as a generic third person
marker resulting from agreement with the obviative IA.
The recognition of -aa as a specific proximate agreement marker has consequences
for both of these proposals. Both Béjar and Rezac (2009) and Oxford (2019b) argue that
the probe that governs theme sign agreement is part of the projection that introduces
the external argument. To maintain this geometry while accounting for the presence of
agreement with the EA, it would be necessary to relax the assumptions that (i) AGREE is
immediately triggered when the probe is merged so that the IA is not agreed with prior
to the EA being merged, and (ii) AGREE proceeds downwards first, given that this would
require the probe to AGREE first with its specifier. This alone is not necessarily untenable
if an upward model of AGREE is adopted (e.g. Bjorkman and Zeijlstra, 2014). What
becomes problematic is that Béjar and Rezac (2009) and Oxford (2019b) require the
assumptions of downward AGREE with the mixed and local only alignments to capture
what is clearly object agreement in these cases. By my estimation, it is not obvious
how one could create a principled split such that non-local alignments trigger upward
AGREE, while all others trigger downward AGREE.
The present account circumvents these issues by placing the probe on Voice above
both the EA and IA, introducing the EA in v rather than Voice. This produces a geometry
that allows the probe to c-command both potential goals, and also places the EA in
the specifier of the head that is associated with the “verb final”, which introduces the
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experiencer and agent thematic roles. This allows for a single model of AGREE to be
maintained across all alignments, and places the EA in a sensible argument position
for the assignment of a thematic role. While the mixed and local-only cases were not
covered here, with some additional independently motivated assumptions about person
licensing, it is possible to motivate IA agreement in these cases (see Appendix B for a
sketch of this analysis).
The question then arises about whether it is possible to change the geometry and
maintain the analysis of inverse marking in Béjar and Rezac (2009) and Oxford (2019b).
For Béjar and Rezac (2009), the inverse marker is the spell-out of an added probe of
Voice, which is triggered by the presence of an unlicensed argument, where licensing
is required for local arguments and occurs via agreement. Even if licensing conditions
are extended to include proximate persons in addition to local persons, there is no way
to motivate the insertion of an added probe in this case: The proximate argument has
already been agreed with, and therefore licensed, by the “core” probe on Voice.
For Oxford (2019b), inverse agreement is triggered by an impoverishment operation
which deletes the features of Voice just in case both Infl and Voice agree with the same
argument. The inverse marker is thus the spell-out of an elsewhere form that arises with
impoverishment. Recalling the Infl agrees with the proximate argument in all cases, if
Voice is treated as subject agreement in the 3 → 3′, the analysis erroneously predicts
that impoverishment should apply and the inverse marker should appear.
5.7.2 Previous accounts of word order
Another major advance with the current analysis is providing an analysis of the periph-
eral agreement marker (C), and tying its absence or presence to the patterns of word
order. The account of Oxford (2019b), which outlines general word order predictions
for Ojibwe, was not been able to test these predictions with word order judgments from
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speakers of the Algonquin dialect. Moreover, Oxford (2019b) provides an analysis of
agreement and movement with Voice and Infl, but does not consider the role of C.
As a result, on the face of it, the current analysis contradicts the word order pre-
dictions of Oxford (2019b), who argues that VOS should occur in inverse clauses, and
VSO should occur in direct—the opposite of what was observed here. These claims are
driven by A-movement of the proximate argument triggered by agreement with Infl, the
same basic movement that was proposed here. In direct alignments, the EA is targeted,
predicting VSO. In the inverse, the IA is targeted, predicting VOS.
The difference is that the present account considered the role of C agreement. There
is no fundamental disagreement between the current analysis and Oxford’s in this re-
spect. As noted above, the current account also maintains that proximate arguments
are promoted to Spec,IP (for a related claim for the Eastern Algonquian language Pas-
samaquoddy, see Bruening, 2005). The difference is that agreement on Infl is (i) re-
sponsible for deactivating the proximate argument under the Activity Condition, mak-
ing it unavailable for further agreement relations, and (ii) followed by agreement with




PROCESSING OBVIATION AND VOICE
6.1 Introduction
Language processing occurs incrementally: information relevant to determining the
structure and meaning of a sentence unfolds over time. However, as comprehenders, we
do not always wait for direct evidence to build a parse or interpretation. In many cases,
we engage in predictive processing, where certain aspects of a sentence are anticipated
in advance of unequivocal bottom-up input. Following these predictions, the major task
is to integrate new information as it constantly comes online. Often, our predictions
match the new input, and integration proceeds with ease. However, in cases where
there is a mismatch between expectations and reality, we must then engage in reanalysis
to attempt to reach a grammatical parse and sensible interpretation.
The main goal of this chapter is to investigate how prominence-based information,
and more particularly obviation, is used to put together the pieces of argument struc-
ture in real time. Understanding argument structure involves creating a link between a
noun on one hand, and syntactic positions and thematic roles on the other. Three basic
questions animate the discussion, with the first being the primary focus: (i) how does
prominence information factor into predictive processing of syntactic structure and the-
matic roles? (ii) how does prominence information affect the integration of previously
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encountered material as direct evidence of structure and interpretation comes online?
And (iii) if predictions are violated as new information becomes available, what role
does prominence information play in reanalysis?
The petri dish in which these effects will be isolated and examined are filler-gap de-
pendencies, exemplified with the English relative clause in (1). These structures require
the formulation of a “long-distance” link between a displaced filler noun and a gap site
in order to create a final representation of syntactic and thematic structure. Many the-
ories of parsing and interpretation include a predictive component of some sort which
can be exploited in these cases: for example, when the moved element (i.e. the filler;
the senator in (1)) is identified, comprehenders make predictions about the thematic
role (e.g. agent, experiencer, patient) and/or syntactic launching site (i.e. a gap; the
blank underline in (1)).
(1) Aaron voted for the senator from Minnesota who spoke with the journalist.
Different aspects of fillers have been argued to affect the way prediction, integra-
tion, and renanalysis occur over the course of a sentence. One well-studied type of
information is animacy. Many studies have observed that animate fillers (e.g. the sen-
ator) lead to the appearance of a subject-gap advantage, where subject relative clauses
(SRCs) such as those in (1) and (2a) are easier to process than object relative clauses
(ORCs), as in (2b). Crucially, inanimate fillers (e.g. the report) decrease or eliminate
these effects, with processing difficulty being roughly equal for both SRCs and ORCs
(e.g. Mak et al., 2002; Traxler et al., 2005; Gennari and MacDonald, 2008; Wagers and
Pendleton, 2016).
(2) a. The report/senator that quoted the journalist was not well known.
b. The report/senator that the journalist quoted was not well known.
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Decades of research on animacy and filler-gap processing has lead to the broad conclu-
sion that animacy information on the noun has an immediate impact on incremental
parsing and interpretation. When an animate noun is encountered, a parse or interpre-
tation with subject gap is predicted or activated. If this is followed by direct evidence of
a subject gap, integration proceeds smoothly, accounting for the ease of SRC process-
ing. If instead this prediction is violated, and an ORC is encountered, then the predicted
structure must be reanalyzed, or a competition arises between these possible structures.
In either case, this resolution process takes time, and is not always successful, account-
ing for the relative difficulty of ORCs with an animate head noun. Inanimate nouns, on
the other hand, have not been found to engender strong subject gap predictions, and
therefore both SRCs and ORCs end up on equal footing, as neither violates the initially
predicted parse or interpretation.
The contrast between animate and inanimate nouns has long been connected to a
broader class of person-animacy hierarchy (PAH) effects, as described by the scale in (3).
From this articulated scale, other more general sub-hierarchies can be extracted, such as
the animacy sub-hierarchy in (3a), which ranks animate nouns over inanimate nouns, or
the obviation sub-hierarchy in (3b), which ranks proximate nouns over obviative nouns.
These two sub-hierarchies are the focus of the current chapter. One general hypothesis
is that the higher a given filler is on the scale, the more likely it is to be predictively
connected to the subject position and/or an agentive thematic role.
(3) Person-Animacy Hierarchy
1/2 (LOCAL) > 3 (PROXIMATE) > 3′ (OBVIATIVE) > 0 (INANIMATE)
a. Animacy Sub-Hierarchy: 3/3′ (ANIMATE) > 0 (INANIMATE)
b. Obviation Sub-Hierarchy: 3 (PROXIMATE) > 3′ (OBVIATIVE)
The major question of the chapter is whether obviation is used to anticipate the as-
signment of thematic roles and guide the parser towards a syntactic representation of
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filler-gap dependencies. This is investigated through a preferential looking experiment
with speakers of the Border Lakes dialect of Ojibwe. On a theory that broadly subscribes
to the view that person, animacy, and obviation all make up a part of the prominence
hierarchy, we should generally expect the contrast between proximate and obviative
nouns to behave in a similar fashion to the contrast between animate and inanimate
nouns: proximate nouns should associate with agentive roles and more prominent syn-
tactic positions, leading to a subject gap advantage, while obviative nouns should not
lead to such predictions and advantages.
A secondary goal of the work is to examine how the connection is made between
fillers and the final parse/interpretation. While obviation information may allow com-
prehenders to predictively anticipate the interpretation or parse, voice morphology dis-
ambiguates the ultimate syntactic and semantic representation. There are two basic
types of voice morphology known as direct and inverse. As schematized below, direct
marking appears when the proximate noun is acting on the obviative noun (4a), and
inverse marking appears when the obviative noun is acting on the proximate noun (4b).
(4) Relationship between voice, obviation, and thematic role (AGENT→ PATIENT)
a. DIRECT = 3→ 3′
b. INVERSE = 3′ → 3
A proximate filler should therefore be readily integrated when a verb with direct voice
is encountered compared to inverse voice, as direct marking is congruent with the hy-
pothesis that proximate nouns are predictively encoded with an agentive thematic role.
However, the picture painted above turns out to be even more complex, which pro-
vides a tie to an even higher level consideration that serves as a motif over the course
of the chapter: What is the nature of the relationship between syntactic structure and
thematic roles? Or even more broadly, syntactic structure and interpretation? Classical
theta-theory within the Government & Binding (GB) era framework utilized so-called
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“theta grids”, where the relationships between arguments of the verb and theta roles
were lexically specified (for a critical review, see Harley, 2011). Current Minimalist the-
ories have developed a generative account of argument structure by connecting theta
roles one-to-one with particular functional positions within the VP, leading the core lexi-
cal material of the verb to be largely separated from thematic structure. The proposal of
a deep link between syntactic structure and theta structure raises interesting questions
for the linking between parsing and interpretation, which are explored over the course
of the chapter.
These issues are yet further complicated by the fact that, in modern generative gram-
mar, derived syntactic positions such as “subject” (a term which I have been using loosely
thus far) are not representationally primitive, and are readily dissociable from thematic
roles such as “agent” and “patient”. These dissociations are observed by examining
voice systems. The voice system of English dissociates derived syntactic position and
thematic role via the active-passive distinction, with the active being associated with
agentive subjects, and the passive being associated with non-agentive subjects. In this
chapter, the direct-inverse voice system of Ojibwe takes the stage, where a similar disso-
ciation can be found. As discussed at length in Chapter 5, direct voice is associated with
the promotion of the proximate agent to the “subject position”, and inverse voice with
the syntactic promotion of the proximate patient. This dissociation allows us to gain
traction in examining the independent and interacting processing effects of syntactic
structure building and thematic role assignment.
6.2 Existing approaches to prominence in sentence processing
In this section, I outline the range of previous approaches to how prominence-based
information is used in sentence processing. The discussion is framed in terms of the
animate-inanimate distinction, which has been the most extensively studied aspect of
prominence. I first cover the overarching parameters over which the models vary. I start
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with an outline of the class modular model (e.g. Frazier and Fodor, 1978), where promi-
nence information is hypothesized to come into play only in later stages of processing. I
then turn to its historical competitor, the classic constraint-based model (e.g. MacDonald,
Pearlmutter, and Seidenberg, 1994), where prominence information instead plays an
immediate role in parsing and interpretation. Next, I shift to the (Extended) Argument
Dependency Model (e.g. Bornkessel, 2002), which hypothesizes a direct link between
prominence hierarchies and online processing. Finally, I consider the maximize incre-
mental well-formedness framework (Wagers and Pendleton, 2016; Wagers et al., 2018),
which also makes direct appeal to grammatical prominence constraints, but under a
distinct architecture.
6.2.1 The parameters of discussion
One of the fundamental discrepancies between the theories covered in this section is
in the deeper representation of animacy information. In the previous chapters of the
dissertation, the major focus was understanding how prominence information, and in
particular obviation status and animacy, are representationally encoded such that they
can be (i) manipulated by syntactic operations such as AGREE, and (ii) give rise to the
proper semantic interpretations. These two facets of animacy highlight a fundamental
tension present among the models to be discussed: is animacy part of the lexical seman-
tics of a noun, thus constituting part of our world knowledge? Or is animacy part of the
syntactic representation, thus constituting a core component of the grammar? Both the
classic modular and constraint-based models take the former view, albeit with very dif-
ferent consequences. On the other hand, the eADM and incremental well-formedness
framework adopt the latter view without necessarily ruling out a wider role for the
lexical semantics of animacy.
Taking for granted that animacy information is represented at some level, there are
two basic questions that can guide the discussion of the four models at hand: one con-
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cerning the timing of when animacy information is used, and another of which aspects
of processing are influenced by animacy information.
The question of timing can be framed in terms of the three core components of
language processing: prediction, integration, and reanalysis. The question is whether
animacy information is used immediately to inform language processing by guiding the
initial parsing and interpretive decisions (i.e. to restrict the space of possible parses or
interpretations that are being entertained, or to guide the processor towards the single
most likely parse), or whether it is only used in a later stage of processing to evaluate
semantic plausibility and guide reanalysis.
The question of influence can be thought of as determining what types of processing
commitments are triggered by animacy: does it influence the adoption of a syntactic
parse, an interpretation, or both? This closely interacts with the question of timing,
in that possible processing activities may or may not be sequenced within a model. To
take a concrete example, the modular model posits that parsing precedes interpretation,
while the constraint-based model is fully interactive, with parsing and interpretation
occurring in parallel. Therefore, though both treat animacy information as conceptual,
initial processing decisions are expected to be influenced by animacy in the constraint-
based model in a way that they are not in the modular model.
With these questions and considerations as background, I turn now to an exposition
of each model and the key results that support their advancement.
6.2.2 The classic modular model
The classical modular model of sentence processing, also known as the “garden-path
theory” (e.g. Frazier and Fodor, 1978; Frazier and Rayner, 1982; Ferreira and Clifton,
1986, a.o.), advances the view that sentence processing occurs in two basic stages.
The first is an initial parsing stage, which makes use of basic category information and
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the parsing principles in (5) to construct a single syntactic representation of the input,
which is then interpreted in the second stage.
(5) Parsing principles under the classic modular model (Frazier, 1979)
a. Minimal Attachment: Do not postulate any potentially unnecessary nodes.
b. Late Closure: If grammatically permissible, attach new items into the clause
or phrase currently being processed.
These basic principles can lead the parser to make commitments earlier in a sentence
that turn out to be inconsistent with information encountered at a later point. This
triggers a process of selective reanalysis, which is guided by additional information
such as animacy, plausibility, frequency, and other world-knowledge, to revise the parse
to be consistent with the new input.
In the current context, the key claim of the classic modular model is that animacy in-
formation should not show evidence of informing the initially adopted parse, but should
show effects at a later stage in sentences where reanalysis is required. In other words,
animacy is part of world knowledge rather than the narrow syntactic representation
that constraints the possible syntactic representations of a language.
The classic case of sentences that trigger reanalysis are the titular garden-path sen-
tences, where comprehenders initially parse a structurally ambiguous sentence in a way
that turns out to be inconsistent with the later input. At the point at which this misparse
is recognized, the modular theory suggests that the parser must engage in reanalysis,
a process which takes time and must overcome the bias of the initially adopted repre-
sentation. An early and influential test of this hypothesis was presented by Ferreira and
Clifton (1986), who used eye tracking to examine the processing of sentences that were
ambiguous between a main clause and reduced relative clause interpretation (Rayner,
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Carlson, and Frazier, 1983). The key twist that Ferreira and Clifton added was to ma-
nipulate the animacy of the initial noun, as shown in the example in (6).
(6) Sample item from Ferreira and Clifton (1986)
a. The defendant examined by the lawyer turned out to be unreliable.
b. The evidence examined by the lawyer turned out to be unreliable.
Based on the principle of Minimal Attachment from above the sentences should receive
a main clause analysis, where the string the defendant examined... is parsed with the
defendant as the subject (and agent) of the verb examined. This parse is ultimately
inconsistent with the presence of the subsequent string by the lawyer, which must be
analyzed as a passive by-phrase of the verb examined, providing direct and unambigu-
ous evidence for a reduced relative analysis. Therefore the modular model predicts a
disruption in processing due to reanalysis at the by-phrase, compared to the unambigu-
ous baseline of a non-reduced relative clause (i.e. The defendant that was examined by
the lawyer...).
Ferreira and Clifton reasoned that if animacy is used in the first stages of processing,
it should influence the choice of main clause versus reduced relative analysis in a way
that does not fall out of the two structural parsing principles of the modular theory. In
particular, the disruption in reading that is predicted to be present with the animate
noun in (6a) should disappear with the inanimate noun in (6b), because evidence is not
a plausible subject (or agent) of the verb examined. It is, however, a plausible theme
of the verb, and therefore should provide a boost to the reduced relative parse, which
would place this noun into that thematic role. Ultimately, Ferreira and Clifton found
no discernible difference between the amount of disruption in (6a) versus (6b), which
they took as evidence to support the modular theory, where the initial noun is treated
as the subject in the main clause analysis despite the violation of plausibility that this
incurs.
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These findings were subsequently questioned in a number of studies, most promi-
nently Trueswell, Tanenhaus, and Garnsey (1994) and Just and Carpenter (1992). I
consider these studies in more depth in the discussion of the classic constraint-based
model in Section 6.2.3. For the current purposes, what is relevant is that these cri-
tiques led to the follow-up study of Clifton, Traxler, Mohamed, Williams, Morris, and
Rayner (2003), who used a refined set of stimuli and compared individuals with high
versus low memory spans, but otherwise examined the same basic contrast as discussed
above.1 Besides replicating the pattern of disruption at the by-phrase in both animate
and inanimate conditions, and failing to replicate the memory-span effect reported by
Just and Carpenter (1992), Clifton et al. found that later processing measures were
slower in the ambiguous animate condition, with these conditions also proving harder
to accurately interpret. These findings were taken to indicate that the reanalysis pro-
cess, which requires reinterpreting the initial noun as a patient rather than agent, is
affected by animacy such that the initial agent parse is more difficult to override when
the noun is animate, as animate nouns are strongly associated with more agentive roles.
A related insight developed within the context of the modular sentence processing
architecture, and which is immediately relevant to the question of how prominence in-
formation affects processing, is the Active Filler Strategy (Crain and Fodor, 1985; Stowe,
1986; Frazier, 1987). The basic principle is that, in sentences where a filler has been en-
countered, gaps are posited by the parser as soon as possible. Here, I present a general
formulation of this strategy with the Minimal Chain Principle (MCP), stated in (7).
(7) Minimal Chain Principle (MCP; DeVincenzi, 1991)
When a filler is encountered, postulate a chain link (e.g. a gap) at the earliest
point grammatically possible, but do not postulate unnecessary links.
1Readers familiar with the Clifton et al. (2003) study will note that they also used a boundary change
paradigm, which is discussed further in Section 6.2.3
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The MCP can be readily couched within predictive terms: the first clause of the MCP
dictates that when a filler is encountered, the syntactic representation should be incre-
mentally extended to include a gap at the earliest point possible. Postulating a gap in
the subject position, and therefore forming an SRC, is generally minimal (i.e. forms the
shortest chain). To take a simple example of the effect, with ambiguous relative clauses
in Dutch, Frazier (1987) found that responders choose SRC-consistent interpretations
74% of the time (with ORC interpretations making up the remaining 26%). This class
of effects has come to be known as the Subject-Gap Advantage (SGA).
Yet stronger evidence for this effect comes from the filled-gap experimental design.
In these types of sentences, a filler is introduced early on, but the first grammatically
possible gap site (usually the subject position) is filled by another noun, with the actual
gap appearing later in the sentence. Therefore these sentences are globally grammati-
cal, but given the modular model, finding a noun at the position where the parser has
posited a gap should trigger reanalysis, slowing down processing at that point. The ex-
amples in (8) are taken from Lee (2004), who showed that readers slow down following
a filled subject position in sentences such as (8a), but not in the pied-piping control of
(8b), where the preposition within the filler is grammatically inconsistent with a subject
gap parse, blocking the possibility of resolving to a subject gap.
(8) Sample item from Lee (2004)
a. That is the cult which, in the early eighties, Elaine inspired many friends
to make a deep commitment to .
b. That is the cult to which, in the early eighties, Elaine inspired many friends
to make a deep commitment .
Evidence directly from relative clause processing that supports the prediction + re-
analysis account of filled subject gaps comes from Staub (2010), who found in a series
of eye tracking studies that processing difficulty with ORC structures begins at the em-
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bedded subject, prior to encountering the critical verb, and therefore prior to direct
bottom-up evidence of the gap site. While other interpretations of the results are pos-
sible, this can be seen as a classic filled-gap effect, which triggers reanalysis, requiring
the parse to be revised such that the next closest grammatically possible gap site is
predicted to house the filler.
The simple version of the MCP makes the prediction that prominence information
should not factor into the active filler strategy, therefore the SGA should be impervious
to the animacy of the filler. However, animacy of the head noun does appear to influence
the strength of the SGA. For example, it has been shown that the contrast between
SRCs and ORCs is less pronounced in sentences like those in (9), where the head noun
is inanimate (Mak et al., 2002; Traxler, Morris, and Seely, 2002; Traxler et al., 2005;
Wagers and Pendleton, 2016)
(9) SRC-ORC contrast with an inanimate head noun
a. The report that quoted the journalist was not well known.
b. The report that the journalist quoted was not well known.
The question is then one of timing: does animacy modulate the prediction of a sub-
ject gap, or does it influence the process of reanalysis? Early studies using eye tracking,
such as Mak et al. (2002), declined to decide between these possibilities, stating simply
that animacy had an effect on the relative ease of processing. More recent work by Wa-
gers and Pendleton (2016) argue based on a filled-gap design in self-paced reading that
animate heads are predictively linked to the highest subject position, while inanimate
arguments are not. If correct, the proposed analysis complicates the MCP by making
the structural prediction of a subject gap conditional on the animacy of the filler, rather
than borne of chain-length alone (the particular account put forward in Wagers and
Pendleton (2016) is discussed and evaluated in detail in Section 6.2.5).
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To summarize, the classic modular model makes concrete predictions on the di-
mensions of timing and influence of prominence information such as animacy. Initial
parsing decisions are not influenced by animacy, while the process of interpretation,
and if necessary reanalysis, are guided by this information.
6.2.3 The classic constraint-based model
The immediate competitor to the classic modular model is the classic constraint-based
model MacDonald et al. (1994), which is broadly based on the connectionist approach
to cognition. The two classic models differ on a number of fundamental levels, but
the focus here will be on the source, timing, and influence of animacy effects. The key
properties of the constraint-based model with respect to these effects are (i) experience,
that animacy effects are fundamentally the results of statistical generalizations and as-
sociations over verbal behavior, (ii) immediacy, that animacy has an effect right away,
and is not reserved only for use at a later stage of precessing, and (iii) interactivity, that
animacy information is used for both syntactic and semantic processing (and that these
processes occur in a fully parallel fashion).
These properties provide a key wedge between the two theories, which was ex-
ploited in many studies in the 90’s and 00’s. While the classic modular theory predicts
that animacy information is only used on reanalysis (i.e. at a later stage of process-
ing), the classic constraint-based model argues that this information should be used
immediately to inform parsing and interpretation decisions. Furthermore, the clas-
sic constraint-based model explicitly links parsing and interpretation to co-occurrence
frequencies between words, the so-called lexical properties of words, and the distri-
butional properties of the linguistic input more generally, predicting that processing
difficulty should follow from the strength of association between, for example, a partic-
ular noun-verb combination, or the number and strength of the competing structures
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that are (partially) activated by the lexical items encountered over the course of the
sentence.
A study that was taken as early evidence for the classical constraint-based approach,
and against the modular model, was Trueswell et al. (1994), which as discussed above
attempted to replicate the results of Ferreira and Clifton (1986) with new materials.
Trueswell et al. argued that the stimuli used in the original Ferreira and Clifton study
were not adequately biased away from the main verb analysis. In other words, they ar-
gued that participants could have reasonably entertained the main verb analysis based
on their world knowledge, rather than the independent parsing principles of the mod-
ular approach. With normed materials that were meant to ensure the conceptual im-
plausibility of the main clause analysis, Trueswell et al. found a weakened disruption
in the inanimate noun condition. The authors argue that this finding provides support
for the view that the semantic fit of a noun is used to guide initial parsing decision —
a finding which formed a large part of the foundation for the classic constraint-based
model.
As detailed in the previous section, the subsequent follow-up study of Clifton et al.
(2003), which also used the same improved materials of Trueswell et al. (1994), suc-
ceeded in replicating the symmetry between the animate and inanimate conditions ob-
served by Ferreira and Clifton (1986). The reasoning that Clifton et al. put forward for
this difference between these three studies ultimately lies in the nature of the eye track-
ing method. Reading time in eye tracking is calculated by grouping words into regions
of interest, and adding up the time of individual fixations within that region.2 However,
the information that is being processed at any given fixation is not only dependent on
what is at the center of the fixation point, but also what is within the parafoveal preview
2Which fixations are added up allows for different measures. The initial fixation in an ROI is used to
calculate first fixation; the sum of all fixations before fixating outside of the ROI is first pass; the sum of
all fixations after entering an ROI until fixating to the right of the ROI is go-past; the sum of all fixations
within an ROI is total time.
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of that point. As a result, fixations on the right edge of a region can also index the initial
processing of upcoming material.
Setting aside the most technical details, all of this adds up to the idea that, in the
critical sentences, processing at the verb examined included parafoveal preview of the
by-phrase in the failed replication by Trueswell et al., but not in the original study of
Ferreira and Clifton. As a result, early parsing decisions in the Trueswell et al. study
about whether to adopt the main clause versus reduced relative analysis could be made
on the basis of this preview, leading to the appearance of a reduced relative advantage
based on grammatical information alone, rather than the animacy of the noun. Clifton
et al. provided a direct test of this hypothesis by including a boundary change manipula-
tion in their initial experiment, where participants were allowed either a valid or invalid
preview of the upcoming materials. The authors found that the valid preview condi-
tion replicated the result of Trueswell et al., while the invalid preview replicated the
findings of Ferreira and Clifton, supporting the view that the availability of parafoveal
processing of the by-phrase can explain the difference in results, rather than an issue
with the content of the items as claimed by Trueswell et al..
Despite this contentiousness, the constraint-based model has been widely adopted,
with many studies testing the predictions of the model at an increasingly granular level.
One such family of work, which is particularly relevant to the current studies, was con-
ducted by Mak et al. (2002), Gennari and MacDonald (2008, 2009), Gennari, Mirković,
and MacDonald (2012), and Reali and Christiansen (2007). These studies all sought to
examine whether various distributional properties of relative clauses, such as the fre-
quency of co-occurance between inanimate nouns and ORC structures (as measured by
their distribution in experimental production and corpus studies), are in turn associated
with the ease or difficulty with which comprehension proceeds.
For example, Gennari and MacDonald (2008, 2009) examined the relationship be-
tween the production of object relative clauses headed by animate versus inanimate
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nouns and the relative ease of comprehension. In their 2008 study, Gennari and Mac-
Donald used an initial gated sentence completion study to measure the range and dom-
inance of alternative sentence interpretations as a sentence unfolds. This provides a
measure of semantic indeterminacy at different points in the sentence. Higher semantic
indeterminacy is associated with more possible competing interpretations at a given
point. Gennari and MacDonald found that ORCs with animate nouns were associated
with higher incremental semantic indeterminacy compared to inanimate nouns. In a
second experiment, they measured comprehension difficulty of these sentences via self-
paced reading (SPR), finding a correlation between the distribution of competing in-
terpretations in the production task and button press latency in the SPR task. This
provides an alternative means to capture the difficulty difference between animate and
inanimate nouns based on systematic differences in the presence of competing alterna-
tive interpretations.
The constraint-based model therefore makes a number of testable predictions. First,
that there should be a tight link between the co-occurance frequencies and processing
difficulty. Most relevantly, the strength of association between prominence informa-
tion and various argument structure possibilities. Second, that prominence information
should be used immediately to constrain and inform both parsing and interpretation in
real time.
6.2.4 The Extended Argument Dependency Model
The Extended Argument Dependency Model (eADM; Bornkessel, 2002; Schlesewsky
and Bornkessel, 2004; Bornkessel and Schlesewsky, 2006; Bornkessel-Schlesewsky and
Schlesewsky, 2008, 2009), can be interpreted as finding a middle ground between the
classic modular and classic constraint-based models. The two classic models occupy
opposite ends of a continuum of how much information is used to formulate the ini-
tial syntactic representation in real time processing. The modular model has a more
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restricted view (i.e. functional category information is used, animacy and plausibility
are not), while the constraint-based theory contains no principled distinctions between
different types of information for the purposes of sentence processing.
Like the the classic modular model, the eADM is a syntax-first model at its core, and
thus shares the basic assumption that world knowledge and plausibility are reserved for
later stages of processing. The novel insight, which brings it a notch closer to the clas-
sic constraint-based model, is a principled expansion of what constitutes grammatical
knowledge, by allowing a restricted set of prominence information to be employed in
the early stages of processing. This prominence information includes case, specificity,
definiteness, person, and, most importantly for our immediate consideration, animacy.3
The scales that govern these various types of prominence information are shown in (10),
as adapted from Bornkessel-Schlesewsky and Schlesewsky (2009).
(10) Prominence Hierarchies within the eADM
a. Thematic: AGENTIVE > NON-AGENTIVE
b. Case: NOMINATIVE > ACCUSATIVE; ERGATIVE > NOMINATIVE
c. Linear: INITIAL > NON-INITIAL
d. Definiteness: DEFINITE > INDEFINITE
e. Animacy: ANIMATE > INANIMATE
f. Person: LOCAL > THIRD
g. Obviation: PROXIMATE > OBVIATIVE
What unites these different types of information is that they can all be demonstrated to
be grammatically active in some language of the world. That is, they constrain the pos-
sible syntactic representations that are available. For example, as examined at length in
preceding chapters, animacy and person (and obviation) are all active in syntactic phe-
3Bornkessel-Schlesewsky and Schlesewsky (2009) do not discuss obviation, but given their adoption
of the PAH more broadly, it can be assumed to be included in this class of information.
307
nomena such as the person-case constraint and direct-inverse marking, and are argued
within generative theories to have a direct representation via features in the syntac-
tic computation module. Similar effects of this prominence information can be seen
in split-ergative case marking systems, differential object marking, argument mapping
and co-occurance restrictions, and more. Even in English, animacy and person can be
seen as being grammatically active: animacy creates selectional restrictions on comple-
mentizers, as shown in the contrast in (11a), while person is involved in subject-verb
agreement, as shown in (11b).
(11) Grammatical effects of animacy and person in English
a. The report that/*who quoted the journalist.
b. I am/*are/*is the one who stole the rutabaga.
The idea is then that languages differ in how strong these various constraints are, and
where in the grammar they take effect. These differences can be encoded by tuning
the relative weights of constraints derived from the various prominence hierarchies (I
discuss the general nature of these constraints in more detail in Section 6.2.5). In
a language like English, the grammatical influence of a property such as animacy is
relatively weak, but on the eADM it can still factor in to the earlier stages of processing.
I now walk through the basic flow of the model to exemplify how prominence in-
formation affects processing. Following an initial stage of word category identification,
given that a nominal argument is identified, the language processing mechanism en-
gages in a step known as COMPUTE PROMINENCE. In a language like English, this step
leads to the assignment of a prototypical role to the argument as either a generic ac-
tor or undergoer. The actor role is associated with being an animate, definite, and/or
local person, while undergoers have no particular defining properties, and are defined
in contrast to an actor. This predicts an “actor-centered” computation of role, where a
sentence with multiple arguments results in a competition, based on the prominence
308
features of each argument, for who occupies the actor role. Once a predicate (e.g. a
verb) is reached, again following the initial stage of category identification, the pro-
cessor engages in a step called COMPUTE LINKING, where nouns are connected to the
argument structure of the verb, allowing the actual thematic roles to be identified, with
the initial stage of prototypicality-based assignment as a guide.
Capturing the differences between languages falls into the specification of COMPUTE
PROMINENCE. As outlined above, animacy and other prominence-based information in
a language like English simply determines the role that argument would prototypically
take, not what it must take. Languages may differ in the strength with which different
types of prominence information associates with the generic actor role. In the most
extreme case, a language may not just determine roles at the level of prototypicality,
but require certain arguments to fill the actor (or undergoer) role. This accounts for
the language (or construction) particular restrictions, while still allowing prominence
information to have a weaker effect in languages and constructions where it is not,
strictly speaking, a part of restricting the possible syntactic representations.
A wide swath of cross-linguistic research has observed particular neurological sig-
natures under ‘role prototypicality mismatches’, which have been associated with the
N400 (a negative ERP deflection 300-500ms following the critical stimulus) in fully
grammatical sentences (for a comprehensive review see Bornkessel-Schlesewsky and
Schlesewsky, 2009). An example of such a contrast can be seen with the ORCs in (12).
In (12a) there is a mismatch between grammatical role and animacy: the inanimate
noun movie is the agent and the animate noun novelist the patient. This pattern is
reversed with the match condition in (12b).
(12) Example stimuli from Weckerly and Kutas (1999)
a. The novelist that the movie inspired praised the director for staying true
to the complicated ending.
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b. The movie that the novelist praised inspired the director to stay true to
the complicated ending.
Weckerly and Kutas (1999) found that N400s were triggered at the initial inanimate
noun in sentences like (12b), as well as at the inanimate agentive argument in sen-
tences like (12a). The former effect can be attributed to a general preference for higher
ranked arguments to appear earlier in the sentence, while the latter effects is due to a
direct prototypically mismatch between animacy and role, with an inanimate argument
taking on the more agentive role. Similar findings have been found for role prototypi-
cality violations in German (Frisch and Schlesewsky, 2001), Mandarin Chinese (Philipp,
Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, Bisang, and Schlesewsky, 2008), and Tamil (Muralikrishnan,
Schlesewsky, and Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, 2008), which have all been argued to be
captured under the eADM model (Bornkessel-Schlesewsky and Schlesewsky, 2009).
The major shift that the eADM exemplifies is to treat prominence information as
part of the grammar, rather than the lexical specification of nouns. This follows from
the fact that there are hard grammatical constraints that beg to be described in terms
of prominence. Variation in the strength of these restrictions follows from the weight
given to different constraints, but the range of possible constraints is hemmed in by
the grammar, as described, for example, by a prominence scale. The flow of the eADM
instantiates the view that thematic roles are determined first (with COMPUTE PROMI-
NENCE), and then integrated into the argument structure of a predicate (with COMPUTE
LINKING). Therefore it is most clearly an interpretation-first model, with parsing deci-
sions flowing from the assignment of thematic roles, rather than the other way around.
6.2.5 The maximize incremental well-formedness model
The final model I consider is the maximize incremental well-formedness model, put for-
ward in a nascent form in Wagers and Pendleton (2016), and also articulated in Wagers
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et al. (2018). The idea behind the model is that the parser attempts to incrementally
build a structure that is, given the input at any given point, most likely to be well-
formed. Well-formedness is determined on the basis of grammatical constraints. This
model shares many of the same assumptions of the eADM, making use of prominence-
based constraints at early stages of processing, but without necessarily carrying forward
the precise architectural claims of the eADM (e.g. the steps of COMPUTE PROMINENCE
and COMPUTE LINKING). Given the recency with which this approach has been proposed,
the model can be seen as a work in progress, with a number of degrees of freedom that
require further articulation. Here I focus on the current state of the model, which I
extend and evaluate in more detail in the discussion of the current study.
The supporting evidence for the model comes again from animacy effects in filler-
gap processing. Using a filled-gap design inspired by that of Lee (2004), Wagers and
Pendleton (2016) examined whether both animate and inanimate heads are predictively
linked to the highest subject position. The design of the stimuli is given in (13), with
the animate versus inanimate filler shown within the curly braces. The examples in
(13a) versus (13b) differ in whether the preposition from the ultimate gap site remains
in situ or is pied piped, with the pied piping condition serving as a baseline that foils
any expectation of a subject gap independently of animacy.
(13) Sample item from Wagers and Pendleton (2016)
a. The scholar looked to {his aging mentor who | the controversial text
which}, only recently, the academic community owed much of their find-
ings to
b. The scholar looked to {his aging mentor to whom | the controversial text
to which}, only recently, the academic community owed much of their find-
ings
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Using button press latency in SPR, Wagers and Pendleton found a filled gap effect at the
relative clause subject (in italics above) in the animate filler conditions, but no effect in
the inanimate filler conditions. From this finding, they reason that animate fillers led to
a subject-gap prediction, resulting in a reanalysis cost at the filled-gap position, while
inanimate nouns are not predictively linked to the subject position, accounting for the
lack of filled-gap effect in these conditions, and a lack of reanalysis. As previewed in
Section 6.2.2, this leads to a complication for a purely structural account of the active-
filler strategy under the classic modular model, as animacy information appears to come
online immediately, affecting the probability of a predictive encoding of the subject gap.
This view is summarized in (14), where (14a) provides the formulation of the AFS.
(14) Wagers & Pendleton’s account of the animacy effect on the SGA
a. Relativized arguments, Rel, predictively and incrementally extend com-
prehenders’ partial syntactic representation to include a gap.
b. There is a probability, s, that the gap is inserted into the subject position.
c. sANIM = p(Inser tSub jGap|Rel = ANIM)
sINAN = p(Inser tSub jGap|Rel = INAN)
sANIM > sINAN
d. The chance, r, that reanalysis will be required is directly proportional s.
e. rANIM > r INAN
f. Reanalysis exacts some cost.
Wagers and Pendleton put forward two possible accounts of how the differing probabil-
ity of a subject gap between animate versus inanimate nouns encompassed in (14a-b)
is established. The first idea is fundamentally based on linguistic experience, where the
probability of positing a subject gap is conditioned on experiential probability (what
is most likely given what they have observed in the past) — a theory that, as the au-
thors acknowledge, bears a clear relation to the classic constraint-based account. The
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second account, and the one of particular interest here, is one in which the probability
of a subject gap is conditioned on maximizing expected well-formedness as dictated by
language-general constraints.
The question, then, is what such constraints could look like. The avenue that Wagers
and Pendleton put forward is to derive these constraints from language-general hier-
archies, following the work of Aissen (1999), who uses prominence scales to account
for markedness effects within various voice systems. Aissen takes advantage of the fact
that prominence scales are indeed fundamentally an expression of relative markedness
between different categories. However, prominence scales alone, such as those in (15),
do not provide direction as to where restrictions should be applied. The idea is that, for
example, animate nouns are not inherently marked compared to inanimate nouns; ani-
mate nouns are less marked as agents or derived subjects compared to inanimate nouns.
To capture this, we must combine the prominence scale with a scale that expresses the
relative markedness of a grammatical relation, such as those in (16).
(15) Person-Animacy Hierarchy
1/2 (LOCAL) > 3 (PROXIMATE) > 3′ (OBVIATIVE) > 0 (INANIMATE)
a. Animacy Sub-Hierarchy: 3/3′ (ANIMATE) > 0 (INANIMATE)
b. Obviation Sub-Hierarchy: 3 (PROXIMATE) > 3′ (OBVIATIVE)
(16) Relational Hierarchies
a. Thematic: AGENTIVE > NON-AGENTIVE
b. Syntactic: HIGH > LOW (e.g. SUBJECT > OBJECT)
c. Linear: INITIAL > NON-INITIAL
The combination of two hierarchies to derive a constraint can be accomplished via har-




Suppose given a binary dimension D1 with a scale X > Y on its elements {X,
Y}, and another dimension D2 with a scale a> b> . . .> z on its elements. The
harmonic alignment of D1 and D2 is the pair of Harmony scales:
Hx: X/a  X/b  . . .  X/z
Hy: Y/z  . . .  Y/b  Y/a
The constraint alignment is the pair of constraint hierarchies:
Cx: *X/z . . . *X/b *X/a
Cy: *Y/a *Y/b . . . *Y/z
Where  is “more harmonic than” and is “ranked higher than”
Given the PAH and the syntactic prominence hierarchy, we can therefore derive the
following constraints:
(18) Constraints via harmonic alignment of the PAH and syntactic hierarchy
a. *SUBJ/INAN *SUBJ/OBV  *SUBJ/PROX  *SUBJ/LOCAL
b. *OBJ/LOCAL  *OBJ/PROX  *OBJ/OBC  *OBJ/INAN
Given the full power of the PAH, the derived constraints and rankings account for a
wide range of markedness effects under competition (e.g. as arises when there is struc-
tural ambiguity with multiple parses and/or interpretations to select from). To take an
extreme case, all else being equal, if given an inanimate and a first person noun and
asked to formulate a sentence, these constraints would lead to a preference to place the
local noun in the subject position and the inanimate noun in the object position, incur-
ring violations of the two lowest ranked constraints *SUBJ/LOCAL and *OBJ/INAN. Such
a sentence is less marked than the reverse alignment, which would incur violations of
the highest ranked constraints *SUBJ/INAN and OBJ/LOCAL.
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Returning to the more immediate case at hand, we can simply consider the con-
straints that are derived from the harmonic alignment of the Animacy Sub-Hierarchy
and the syntactic hierarchy, shown in (19).
(19) Constraints from the animacy and syntactic hierarchies
a. *SUBJ/INAN *SUBJ/ANIM
b. *OBJ/ANIM  *OBJ/INAN
This set of constraints encompasses the idea that aligning an inanimate noun with the
subject position is marked relative to aligning it with an object (or non-subject) position.
By the same token, an alignment of an animate argument with the object (non-subject)
position is more marked than aligning it with the subject position.
The final step is to treat these constraints not as a filter on well-formedness, but
as a predictor of well-formedness. As a result, when an animate filler is encountered,
of all the structures consistent with the input at that point, the structure that is most
likely, and therefore the one that is adopted (or most competitive) is the one that is
the least marked (i.e. the most harmonic or well-formed). This would be a structure
where the animate filler is resolved to the subject position, therefore a subject gap is
predicted. On the other hand, an inanimate noun is relatively marked in the subject
position, therefore no expectation is made for a subject gap in that case.
Before moving forward, I would like to raise an alternative interpretation of the
findings of Wagers and Pendleton (2016) that is not considered by the authors: That
it is in fact the reanalysis cost of recovering from the subject gap prediction that dif-
fers between the animate versus inanimate conditions, not the prediction of the subject
gap. This interpretation would maintain the original assumption of the classic modular
model, in that the commitment to the subject gap is equal in both cases, but the reanal-
ysis process goes forward more smoothly in the inanimate compared to the animate
conditions, resulting in a difference in button press latency at that point. Ultimately,
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this shows a limitation of the filled-gap design: we are unable to see what incremental
commitments are being made until bottom-up evidence that the prediction is incorrect
comes online. The study of Ojibwe presented in the forthcoming sections provides the
means to (indirectly) observe these commitments by examining incremental preferen-
tial looking behavior over the course of an open filler-gap dependency — the logic being
that comprehenders direct their gaze towards the scene that is congruent with their in-
crementally formed interpretation. To preview the results, I ultimately find support for
the idea that Wagers and Pendleton put forward: that prominence-sensitive prediction
at the filler plays a role in processing filler-gap dependencies.
This concern aside, a model where the central guide for parsing and interpretation
is the evaluation of well-formedness, as deduced by markedness constraints, provides
the means for prominence information to factor into the initial parsing decisions in a
principled way that connects to the deep-seated role of prominence across all languages
of the world: constraints are derived from universally obeyed hierarchies, which are in
turn informed by the typology of possible human grammars. More broadly, on this
model prominence information shows an immediate influence, with the potential to
guide both parsing and interpretation decisions via the alignment of the PAH with both
syntactic and thematic hierarchies.
6.2.6 Summary & synthesis
The goal of this section was to present four of the existing models of how prominence
influences the processing of argument structure, and in particular filler-gap dependency
processing. The first, the classic modular model, argues that prominence information
does not come into play when forming an initial parse, but does guide the subsequent
interpretation of the parse and, if necessary, reanalysis. The classic constraint-based
model takes a fully interactive approach, with all types of information immediately
having the potential to inform initial parsing and interpretation decisions. The eADM
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argues that prominence information, being integral to the grammar of many languages,
is used to immediately inform interpretive decisions, with nouns competing to be as-
signed the agentive role, and a linking process at the predicate relating these roles to
argument structure. Finally, the maximize incremental well-formedness model predicts
an immediate influence of prominence information, with both parsing and interpreta-
tion decisions being made on the basis of constraints derived from the harmonic align-
ment of independently motivated and universal grammatical hierarchies.
In addition to outlining the assumptions of these models, a portion of the empirical
landscape of how prominence affects processing was covered. I argue these results can
be described through the interaction of the three processing preferences in (20).
(20) Three hypothesized processing pressures
a. Animate/Proximate-Agent Preference: Animate nouns are more prototypi-
cally agentive than inanimate ones; proximate nouns are more prototypi-
cally agentive than obviative ones.
b. Agent-First Preference: The prototypical agent role is assigned first.
c. Minimal Dependency Preference: Shorter dependencies are preferred over
longer dependencies.
Each of these preferences can be tied to a more fundamental processing pressure. Dif-
ferent aspects of the four models reviewed so far make significant progress on this front.
For example, the Minimal Dependency Preference, or more specifically the subject-gap
advantage, falls out of the Minimal Chain Principle, which prefers shorter dependencies
to longer ones. The Animate/Proximate-Agent Preference can be derived the align-
ment of a thematic role hierarchy with the PAH within either the eADM or the well-
formedness account. The Agent-First Preference is captured by the primacy of actor
within the eADM, where nouns compete to be assigned this role. Each model has some-
thing to say about how (or whether) each of these pressures should arise.
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These three particular pressures differ in some fundamental ways that tie into one of
the high-level questions of the chapter: What is the relationship between syntactic struc-
ture and thematic roles? Or parsing and interpretation more generally? In particular,
the Minimal Dependency Preference is a structural preference, while the animate-agent
and agent-first preferences are interpretive preferences. To fully evaluate the validity
of these preferences, and to understand the interactions between each, it is necessary
to take a more careful view of the relation and dissociation between syntactic positions
and thematic roles. This is the major focus of the next section, which also leads neatly
into a more detailed discussion of obviation, setting up the immediate context of the
present experiment.
6.3 Obviation and voice in sentence processing
The review so far has focused largely on understanding the basic role of prominence in-
formation, and more particularly animacy, in the processing of argument structure. One
important fact that has been purposefully set aside is the relationship between voice al-
ternations and argument structure. Using voice alternations, it is possible to dissociate
thematic role and derived syntactic positions such as “subject”. These properties of lan-
guage have effects on the production and comprehension of filler-gap dependencies,
as well as affecting the interpretation a number of experimental results. In Ojibwe,
argument structure, the system of obviation, and direct-inverse voice marking are inti-
mately linked, thus understanding the representations that underly these facets of the
language, and reviewing the relevant experimental evidence, is essential to understand-
ing the motivation behind the current study.
6.3.1 Background
In this section, I provide the relevant background related to voice alternations. I begin
with an overview of thematic roles and syntactic positions in current linguistic theory,
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then turn to a more Ojibwe-specific discussion of the direct-inverse voice system, which
reviews the essentials of the analysis put forward in Chapter 5.
6.3.1.1 Dissociating syntactic position and thematic role
The starting point is the observation that the notions of “subject” and “object” as cat-
egories, despite centuries of use, lack necessary conditions and do not currently serve
as primitive representations in current theories of grammar (e.g. McCloskey, 1997).
While there is a cluster of derivationally linked properties associated with subjecthood
pertaining to case, thematic role, structural position, scope-taking and binding capabili-
ties, and promotion via movement, none of these properties can be uniquely associated
with the classical notion of a grammatical subject.
The immediately relevant consequence is that there is no necessary relationship
between the thematic role of agent and the traditional syntactic subject position (i.e.
the specifier of TP/IP). This is not a novel observation: one must look no further than the
active/passive voice alternation in English (e.g. Chomsky, 1957). In the active voice,
the agent is promoted to a syntactic subject position and the patient a direct object
position; in the passive voice, the patient is associated with a syntactic subject position,
with the agent, if realized, as an oblique argument.
That said, there is a close link between structural position and thematic role, as
encompassed by generalizations such as the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypoth-
esis (UTAH; see Baker, 1988), which postulates (i) that thematic roles are assigned at
“deep-structure” (or, in current terms, in the base-generated positions of arguments);
and (ii) that there is a one-to-one correspondence between structural position and the-
matic role. Crucially, there are syntactic positions that do not participate in thematic
role assignment, thus the claim is not at odds with the point that the derived “subject”
position of Spec,TP/IP can be filled by either agentive or non-agentive arguments, and
thus does not show a one-to-one correspondence with thematic role.
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For current purposes, I consider just two thematic roles: AGENT and PATIENT. Their
association to base-generated argument positions is given in (21), with agent being
assigned to the specifier of vP, and patient to the specifier of
p
P.








Both of these specifier positions have conventional names, with Spec,vP being the EX-
TERNAL ARGUMENT position, and Spec,
p
P being the INTERNAL ARGUMENT position.
Again, these two positions are associated one-to-one with the agent and patient the-
matic roles. In contrast, the conventional SUBJECT position (in languages like English)
is Spec,IP. Arguments of the verb are not base-generated there, but can undergo A-
movement to occupy it as a derived position.











Moving forward, I exclusively use the term “subject” to refer to the argument sitting
in the specifier of IP, providing clear disambiguating language if any deviation from
this convention is required. To be perfectly clear, “subject” does not imply a particular
thematic role, argument type, or any other of the numerous possible properties that
have been associated with the term in its classical use.
With this background in hand, it is possible to provide a basic analysis of the active-
passive distinction in English to guide the coming review, and to provide a baseline with
which to contrast the direct/inverse system of Ojibwe, which is presented in the next
section. For concreteness, I adopt the smuggling approach of Collins (2005). The core
of the account is schematized in (23). Eschewing the details, active (23a) receives a
standard analysis, with the external argument (agent) being promoted to the subject
position. The passive (23b) is derived in two basic steps: (i) movement of the partici-
ple phrase, which includes the internal argument (patient), to the specifier of VoiceP,
followed by (ii) movement of the internal argument to the derived subject position.
(23) A smuggling approach to English active/passive (Collins, 2005)
a. [IP DPAGENT ... [vP <DPAGENT> ... [pP DPPATIENT ] ] ]
b. [IP DPPATIENT ... [VoiceP [PartP <DPPATIENT> ] ... [vP DPAGENT ... <PartP> ] ] ]
The major takeaway is that passive voice results in a reversal of which argument occu-
pies the highest position in the clause (i.e. the subject position), with active resulting
in the agent (external argument) to be promoted, and the passive leading to the pa-
tient (internal argument) to be promoted. This critically allows the effects of derived
structural position and thematic role to be untangled.
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6.3.1.2 Obviation and direct/inverse voice
From a functional perspective, direct/inverse voice marking in Ojibwe indicates the
alignment of obviation status and thematic role. Consider the sentences in (24), where


































‘The woman (PROX) was seen by the boy (OBV) ’
As noted throughout this thesis, encountering direct marking indicates an alignment of
proximate acting on obviative (3 → 3′), and inverse marking indicates an alignment
of obviative acting on proximate (3′ → 3). Given that word order is relatively flexible,
or at least not reliably useful in establishing thematic roles, voice marking provides the
critical cue in Ojibwe to the alignment of nouns with the argument structure of the verb.
How these connections are made in real time is largely the focus of the remainder of
the chapter.
An additional piece of voice marking is the syntactic promotion of the proximate
argument to the subject position — in the examples in (25), this process is referenced
by the use of the passive with the inverse voice and active in the direct. Indeed, the
promotion is reminiscent of the active/passive alternation, with the direct alignments
(and therefore direct voice) being associated with promotion of the proximate agent,
as schematized in (25a), and inverse alignments (and therefore inverse voice) being
associated with promotion of the proximate patient, as shown in (25b).
(25) Proximate arguments are promoted to subject in both direct and inverse
a. [IP DPPROX/AG ... [VoiceP <DPPROX/AG> ... [vP <DPPROX/AG> ... DPOBV/PAT ] ] ]
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b. [IP DPPROX/PAT ... [VoiceP <DPPROX/PAT> ... [vP DPOBV/AG ... <DPPROX/PAT> ] ] ]
While full details on the motivations for this analysis can be found in Chapter 5, the ba-
sic motivation is related to patterns of agreement. In these cases, the slot corresponding
with Infl always shows agreement with the proximate argument, regardless of whether
it is the external or internal argument. This agreement is highlighted below with em-
bedded clauses in both the direct (26a) and inverse (26b) voice, where the “central














‘...if they (PROX) are seen by h/ (OBV)’
This can be compared to the active/passive distinction in languages such as English,
where agreement with Infl (T) occurs with the noun that occupies the subject position
rather than the agent per se, as shown in (27).
(27) a. They were looking at her
b. They were being looked at by her
The force of this analysis is that proximate nouns always occupy the syntactic subject
position in Ojibwe. This has consequences for interpreting the role of the subject-gap
advantage in Ojibwe relative clauses: proximate nouns are grammatically tied to the
subject position, while obviative nouns never occupy this position. As a result, filler-
gap dependencies formed by proximate nouns will always be resolved with a chain that
includes the syntactic subject gap, and obviative nouns a non-subject gap.
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6.3.2 Processing obviation and direct/inverse
The goal of this section is to review the literature on the processing of obviation and di-
rect/inverse voice. The existing literature provides preliminary evidence for processing
preferences that are consistent with the agent-first preference and the proximate-agent
preference (the analogue to the animate-agent preference).
The first experimental study of an Algonquian language comes from Christianson
and Ferreira (2005). In a production study of Odawa, an eastern dialect of Ojibwe
that is largely mutually intelligible with the Border Lakes dialect and other Southwest-
ern varieties, Christianson and Ferreira used a picture description task to probe struc-
tural choice and word order preferences. They prompted Ojibwe speakers to describe
a transitive event by asking either an “agent question”, “patient question”, or “general







‘What is happening here?
In this case, Christianson and Ferreira found that when transitive verbs were produced,
agent arguments were nearly always produced before patients, despite no absolute
word order generalizations requiring this to be the case. This means in clauses with
direct voice the proximate argument was produced linearly to the left of the obviative
argument, and with inverse voice the obviative was produced prior to the proximate.
Given the general possibility of dissociation between the subject position and the agent
role, this is consistent with an Agent-First Preference.
However, there was also a strong preference for the direct voice over the inverse
voice, which resulted in the agent role nearly always being associated with the proxi-
mate role. Given that proximate nouns occupy the syntactic subject position, it there-
fore difficult to claim an independent Agent-First Preference from these data alone. It
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is possible that this is simply a preference to produce the subject first, rather than the
agent first. That said, these findings are broadly consistent with a preference to align
the agentive thematic role with higher prominence status such as proximate and the
more prominent syntactic subject position.
In subsequently published work by Christianson and Cho (2009) more direct evi-
dence for an agent-first preference can be observed. In this study, speakers of Odawa
listened to a sentence with word-by-word self-paced listening, then completed a picture-
verification task where they were asked to decide whether a single picture was or was
not congruent with the meaning of a sentence. Sentences consisted of a single noun,
alternating factorially between being proximate/obviative crossed with human/animal,
followed by a main verb, which alternated between direct and inverse voice. An exam-




























‘S/he (PROX) was dragged by the bear (OBV)’
Setting aside the animacy manipulation, in both the obviative and proximate condi-
tions, accuracy in the picture selection task was higher when this initial, overt noun
was associated with the agent role compared to the patient role (29a,d). With initial
obviative nouns, accuracy was 89% when this argument was ultimately associated with
an agent role (29d), and 66% when it was associated with the patient role (29b). With
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proximate nouns the association between thematic role and voice is reversed, but the
basic pattern is the same. Accuracy was 65% when the proximate argument was ulti-
mately associated with the agent role (29a), and 22% when it was associated with the
patient role (29c).
Christianson and Cho frame the result in terms of the relative ease or difficulty
in identifying null arguments, but the decrease in accuracy associated with the initial
noun ultimately ending up in the patient role is also consistent with a theory where the
predictive encoding of this initial argument as an agent makes reanalysis less successful.
This initial agent preference is difficult to overcome, and accuracy suffers as a result.
Because the effect occurred with both direct and inverse voice, the study allows for
the isolation of the agent-first preference—the explanation of this finding cannot be
reduced to a subject-proximate-agent alignment, which would only predict an effect in
the direct voice conditions. While the agent role is confounded with the subject position
with the direct voice, this alignment is broken in the inverse, where the patient is instead
promoted to subject position.
As part of the current line of work, an initial pilot study was conducted in Summer
2018 to further test whether the preference for direct versus inverse voice is affected
by obviation. The data were collected from a single first speaker who participated in
two separate sessions, about one month apart. In each session, the experimenter read
a series of 24 preambles of the form in (30), and asked the speaker to repeat back the
preambles and complete the sentence.


















Direct 12 16 28
Inverse 2 8 10
Other 10 0 10
Table 6.1: Results of Summer 2018 production pilot
The head noun in these items alternated between proximate (30a) and obviative (30b).
Instead of complete sentences, the preamble ends where the direct/inverse morphology
would appear. Therefore the speaker was free to choose the morphology of the verb
inside the RC, essentially choosing whether to complete the dependency with a direct
or inverse alignment.
The results are given in Table 6.1. In general, the sentence was continued with
either direct or inverse, but it was also possible with some items to continue with an in-
transitive or indefinite actor construction (combined into the “other” category). These
non-transitive continuations occurred exclusively in the proximate head condition. Con-
sidering the transitive continuations alone, the results show an interactive shape: 86%
of the proximate head items resulted in the head noun being aligned with the more
agentive role (14% non-agentive), while only 33% of the obviative head items resulted
in the head being aligned with the more agentive role (67% patient).
While care should be taken in interpreting these data given the sample size of one,
the difference in the adoption of non-transitive structures with the proximate head
nouns, and the increase in the use of the inverse voice with obviative compared to
proximate nouns, provide a tantalizing insight into the relation between obviation and
voice in Ojibwe. While proximate nouns are nearly universally tied to the agentive role
(by use of the direct voice or an intransitive structure), obviative nouns show a mixture
of association with the patient role (via direct voice) and the agent role (via inverse).
This asymmetry is consistent with a the proximate-agent preference.
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6.3.3 Processing voice beyond direct/inverse
Beyond the relatively small literature on direct/inverse voice, much work has looked
at other related voice alternations such as the active/passive in English. To review, it
is assumed that active voice in transitive clauses results in the promotion of the ex-
ternal argument (agent) to the subject position, while the passive voice results in the
promotion of the internal argument (patient). Like direct versus inverse, active ver-
sus passive structures differ in their processing profile and interact with prominence in
ways that can add additional motivation for our processing pressures — particularly
the Agent-First Preference and the Minimal Dependency Preference.
A simple but striking example of how processing differs as a function of active/passive
voice alternations can be seen in the work of Ferreira (2003). Ferreira presented simple
sentences auditorily and prompted participants to respond with who was either the “do-
er” (agent question) or the the “undergo-er” (patient question) in the sentence. There
were three basic item types, as exemplified in (31). The main contrast of interest here
is that items varied in whether they appeared in active voice (shown below) or passive
voice (e.g. The man was bitten by the dog). The experiment had an additional manip-
ulation of noun reversal which has a different effect depending on the item type. For
both the biased and nonreversible sentences this resulted in an implausible meaning
(e.g. The man bit the dog), while the symmetrical sentences simply reversed the actor
and undergoer roles with the meaning retaining plausibility.
(31) Sample item from Ferreira (2003)
a. Biased reversible: The dog bit the man
b. Nonreversible: The mouse ate the cheese
c. Symmetrical: The woman visited the man
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The major finding reveals a baseline difficulty for passive compared to active sentences:
in all three item types, and with both the agent and patient questions, there were more
errors and longer response latencies in the passive conditions compared to the active.
Ferreira argues that this finding supports the view that language comprehension is at
least in part guided by associative heuristics such as assigning the first noun into the
prototypical agent role. Rather than engaging in deep processing that derives a meaning
from the syntactic parse, in certain instances, comprehenders take shortcuts that result
in something that is not perfect, but “good-enough”. For the present purposes, the
particular shortcut of assigning the first noun to the agent role can be seen as a surface-
level formulation of the pressure that derives the agent-first preference.
Further relevant evidence on the comprehension of passives again comes from Gen-
nari and MacDonald (2008) (see Section 6.2.3 for additional discussion of their study).
In their second experiment, Gennari and MacDonald examined the comprehension pro-
file of animate versus inanimate heads with active voice ORCs and passive voice SRCs
using a word-by-word self-paced reading design with end-of-sentence comprehension
questions. An example item for each of the four conditions is shown in (32).
(32) Sample item from Gennari and MacDonald (2008)
a. The director that the movie pleased had received a prize
b. The movie that the director watched had received a prize
c. The director that was pleased by the movie had received a prize
d. The movie that was watched by the director had received a prize
Gennari and MacDonald found the animate headed active ORCs exemplified in (32a)
was lower in comprehension accuracy than all other conditions at 69%, indicating that
these sentences are associated with more difficulty in comprehension. The SPR but-
ton press RTs dovetail and add to this result: The passive SRC sentences were read
faster than the active ORC sentences within both the animate and inanimate head noun
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conditions; the active animate ORCs were associated with the biggest slow-down. In
general, both animate head conditions were slower than their inanimate head noun
counterparts.
In their analysis of these results, Gennari and MacDonald show a significant correla-
tion between SPR button press latency and frequency-based co-occurence distributions
from an initial production study. They use this finding to advance the hypothesis that
the major determinant of difficulty in ORCs is the degree of semantic indeterminacy, as
measured by the distribution of alternative interpretations at each incremental point in
the sentence, which in turn is deduced from the sentence completions in their initial
production study.
However, I argue that there is another equally plausible interpretation of their results
in terms of our three processing pressures. The particular difficulty with the animate-
active ORC, where the animate head noun is non-agentive and forms a non-subject gap,
can be attributed to compounding difficulty borne of “violating” the Minimal Depen-
dency Preference and the Animate-Agent Preference. This contrasts with the animate-
passive SRC, which still results in a non-agentive animate noun, violating the Animate-
Agent Preference, while the formulation of the more minimal subject-gap dependency
results in a relative ease of processing compared to the animate-active ORC. Within the
inanimate nouns, the relative ease of processing observed in the passive SRC compared
to the active ORC suggests that the Minimal Dependency Preferences is indeed present
with inanimate heads — with the non-agentive thematic role being assigned in both
cases, the difference boils down to the structural position of the gap within the RC.
The overall takeaway is that these data can be seen as consistent the view that there
are complex interactions between animacy (i.e. person-based prominence), thematic
role, and structural position, and thus a variety of factors must be appealed to in order
to account for the complex patterns of argument structure processing. The Minimal De-
pendency Preference can be observed with both animate and inanimate nouns when the
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thematic role is kept constant. However, because inanimate nouns are most optimally
aligned with non-agentive thematic roles, this results in a pressure for the passive voice
to be used. That said, the passive is still generally marked compared to active structures
— it comes with its own complexities including an additional step of movement (assum-
ing the smuggling analysis of Collins (2005) from Section 6.3.1.1), and it results in the
argument with a noun with a less prominent thematic role occupying a more prominent
syntactic position.
Particularly direct evidence for the cost associated with promotion of non-agentive
arguments to the subject position comes from the work of Sauppe (2017), who exam-
ined the effort associated with producing voice marking in Tagalog (Austronesian) and
German (Germanic). Unlike both English and German, which have asymmetrical voice
systems that shows decreases to the valency of the verb, Tagalog has a symmetrical voice
system, where voice alternations are not associated with detransitivization. This makes
it more similar to the direct/inverse system of Ojibwe. The relevant consequence is that
there is no strongly observable markedness distinction between the agent and patient
voices of Tagalog, where either the agent or patient argument is highlighted as the syn-
tactically prominent “pivot” argument. This contrasts with the Germanic voice system,
where active voice, the closest analogue to the agent voice of Tagalog, is unmarked
compared to the passive, the closest analogue to the patient voice.
Sauppe (2017) finds a number of processing differences between symmetrical and
asymmetrical voice systems in terms of when difficulty arises, but also finds a core
similarity in that promotion of the patient to the highest syntactic function (as in the
patient voice in Tagalog and the passive in German) is associated with more effortful
processing in general, as measured by pupil diameter response and speech onset latency.
Sauppe ties this effort to a general preference for mapping the agent to the highest
syntactic position (or, a dispreference for mapping the patient to this position).
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The results reviewed in this section highlight some of the general difficulties with
comprehending dependencies with inanimate as compared to animate head nouns (or
less prominent compared to more prominent nouns). Consider again the case of rel-
ative clauses with head nouns alternating in animacy. With animate heads, an active
voice SRC allows for a full alignment between animacy, syntactic position, and thematic
role (i.e. an animate-agent forming a subject gap with the active voice). With inanimate
heads, one of these alignments must always be broken. An inanimate patient with the
passive voice violates an alignment between thematic role and structural position, while
the active voice in the same case creates an object gap, and therefore goes against the
subject gap preferences flowing from the Minimal Dependency Preference. Similarly,
an inanimate agent in either the active or passive voice results in a violation of the
Animate-Agent Preference, where a more prominent thematic role is associated with
a less animate argument. The question that emerges is how these different pressures
are related to the computation of thematic roles: At what point is different information
used, how does it impact prediction, integration, and reanalysis, and how is a “com-
promise” found when there is no single optimal parse. The next section presents the
background for the current study, which seeks to shed light on these questions.
6.4 The current study
The review conducted over the past sections was intentionally broad in scope: there is a
wide range of proposals for the role of prominence information in sentence processing,
with many complex interactions between prominence information such as animacy or
obviation and the different alignments of syntactic structure and thematic roles pro-
duced by various voice systems. The most immediate goal of this study is to examine
what role, if any, the obviation status of nouns has in immediately restricting processing
choices. Does obviation have an immediate impact on parsing, interpretation, or both?
The secondary question is then how filler-gap dependencies are resolved via integration
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and reanalysis, and the final links to argument structure determined, once bottom-up
information related to the alignment of thematic role with obviation is encountered.
In the present study, this comes in the form of direct/inverse voice morphology. In
this section, I provide the immediate background for the study, and outline the core
predictions.
6.4.1 Relative clauses in Ojibwe
Relative clauses in Ojibwe can be headed by either proximate or obviative nouns, with
the embedded clause being grammatical with either direct or inverse marking. The four




























































‘I know the elder (OBV) who the man is being laughed at by’
According to judgements collected in Summers of 2018 and 2019 with two speakers of
the Border Lakes dialect, the same basic word order of head noun, embedded verb, and
other argument, which all the examples in (33) conform to, is the only grammatical
option for transitive RCs. This means that there are no word order cues to determining
the association between the head noun and argument structure. This broadly conforms
to the fact that Ojibwe is a verb-initial language. While the relativized argument is
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promoted to a high position, the other argument remains in the (relatively) low position
with verbal spine, therefore appearing to the right of the embedded verb.
Another property of relative clauses, which is relatively unique to the Border Lakes
dialect, is the existence of an explicit relativizer gaa-. Like relative pronouns in English,
this morpheme serves as a cue that a relative clause is being formed. For the purposes
of sentence processing, this serves as the cue that renders the head noun as a filler,
triggering the expectation that a gap should be upcoming.
The final question relevant to the current study is how these various relative clauses
link the SRC/ORC distinction. More particularly, in the examples in (33), when is the
head noun parsed into the subject gap position? Ojibwe shows a marked difference
from languages such as English, in that there is a strict relationship between promi-
nence distinctions and derived syntactic positions. As outlined in Section 6.3.1.2, prox-
imate nouns are always promoted to the subject position of the clause. As a result,
proximate head nouns are grammatically bound to ultimately fill the subject-gap posi-
tion, and therefore form an SRC. On the other hand, obviative nouns are extracted from
their base-generated position within the VP. The basic derivations in (34) are therefore
respectively assumed to underly the derivation of each of the RCs exemplified in (33).
(34) Proximate links to a subject gap, obviative to a non-subject gap
a. DPPROX/AG [CP REL-VERB-DIR [IP ... [VoiceP ... [vP ... DPOBV/PAT ] ] ] ]
b. DPPROX/PAT [CP REL-VERB-INV [IP ... [VoiceP ... [vP DPOBV/AG ... ] ] ] ]
c. DPOBV/PAT [CP REL-VERB-DIR [IP DPPROX/AG ... [VoiceP ... [vP ... ] ] ] ]
d. DPOBV/AG [CP REL-VERB-INV [IP DPPROX/PAT ... [VoiceP ... [vP ... ] ] ] ]
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The representations in (34) advance the claim that RCs headed by a proximate noun are
formed by a three-link chain, with the filler occupying (i) its “deep-structure” or base-
generated position, which is the location of thematic composition; (ii) the specifier of
VoiceP, an intermediate landing site linked to direct/inverse voice marking; (iii) the
specifier of IP, the derived subject position; and (iv) the relative clause head noun posi-
tion. On the other hand, RCs headed by obviative nouns are derived by a single, long
movement chain, which brings the argument from its base-generated position directly
the head noun position of the RC. In these cases, the proximate noun also undergoes a
separate movement sequence to the derived subject position.
6.4.2 Summary of questions and predictions
To recapitulate the through line of this chapter, the major goal is to understand what role
prominence information, and obviation more particularly, has in forming a predictive
link between a filler and the argument structure of the verbal predicate. A secondary
goal is to understand how, when bottom-up evidence of a verb’s argument structure is
reached, the link between arguments and argument structure is formed — that is, un-
derstanding how new information is integrated with previous material and the predic-
tions engendered at early points in the sentence, and if necessary how initial processing
decisions are revised and reanalyzed based on this new information.
For Ojibwe, the first question can be narrowed to what parsing and/or interpreta-
tion commitments are made at the head noun of the relative clause, and whether these
commitments differ as a function of the obviation of the head noun. If prominence
information is used to guide predictions in the early stages of sentence comprehen-
sion, and if the relative prominence of proximate over obviative is akin to that seen
with animacy, then there should be evidence that comprehenders commit to an inter-
pretation of the proximate noun as an agent before there is direct bottom-up evidence
from direct/inverse voice marking. On a direct analogy to previous findings with inani-
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mate nouns, evidence of an early commitment to a particular argument-theta alignment
should be absent with obviative nouns.
At the point where voice marking is reached, in the inverse voice with proximate
head nouns, there should be evidence of reanalysis (or general difficulty with resolving
the dependency) due to a disruption of the predicted alignment between proximate and
the agent theta role. On the other hand, processing should proceed smoothly in the case
of direct marking, where voice matches expectations. Assuming no predictive effects
with the obviative noun, resolution of the dependency should show similar profiles
regardless of voice marking in this case.
The additional complicating factor is the fact that proximate head nouns are medi-
ated in their connection to the embedded clause by an initial promotion to the subject
position, while obviative nouns must be directly associated with their base-generated
position in the clause. Assuming a general subject gap advantage, we might expect evi-
dence of an overall ease of processing with proximate head nouns compared to obviative
head nouns, as the connection between the displaced filler and the argument position





Participants were recruited with the help of community liaisons at Nigigoonsiminikaan-
ing (also known as Red Gut) and Seine River. Both communities are Treaty 3 nations,
with indistinguishable dialects, and are located within a short drive of Fort Frances in
Northwestern Ontario. In total, 19 individuals participated, with 16 being included in
the final analysis. Two participants were excluded for declining to have video recordings
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taken, thus no preferential looking data was collected. One participant was excluded for
low performance on filler items. All participants, including those ultimately excluded,
were paid $40 USD for their participation.
Six participants were from Nigigoonsiminikaaning, with the remainder being from
Seine River. Seven reported their gender as female, and nine as male. The mean age was
61.3 years, with the youngest being 42 and the oldest 80. All participants were deemed
by the relevant community liaison to be a fluent speaker of Ojibwe, and all participants
self-reported their first language as Ojibwe. All participants reported using Ojibwe at
least multiple times per week, with most using the language on a daily basis in the
context of familial and community gatherings. All participants were fluent in English
as a second language, albeit to varying degrees. The average age of first exposure
to English was 6.3 years, with the range varying from 4 to 10 years old. Exposure
to English was invariantly tied to residential school. For more information about this
history see Chapter 1.
6.5.1.2 Auditory stimuli
The core of the experiment comprised of a fully crossed 2x2 within subjects design with
factors HEAD (OBVIATIVE versus PROXIMATE) and VOICE (DIRECT versus INVERSE). Each
participant saw 32 experimental trials, which were randomly interspersed with 16 filler
trials. An example transcription of an experimental auditory stimulus, with each of the
four conditions represented, is shown in (35).





















































‘...the elder (OBV) who the man is being laughed at by’
The form of the auditory stimuli was initially devised by the experimenter following
extensive fieldwork with a first speaker community consultant (who was paid $40 USD
per hour for their work). This confirmed the felicity of the basic relative clause con-
struction, ensured the naturalness of word order, and controlled for other grammatical
factors. As shown in (35), all sentences began with an instructive preamble onaaban-
dan mazinaakizon. . . , translating to choose the picture with. . . in English. This was then
followed by the head noun of the relative clause, which alternated between being either
proximate or obviative. In all cases, the head noun was immediately followed by the
relativizer gaa-, then the relative clause verb, to which the direct or inverse morphology
(along with an invariant proximate agreement marker -d) is appended. The final word
of each sentence is the non-head argument of the relative clause verb, which takes the
opposite obviation status to that of the head noun. Both experimental and filler items
used this same basic form (as explained below, fillers differed from experimental items
in which class of visual stimulus was associated with the correct response).
Fieldwork was further conducted to generate a list of familiar nouns and verbs that
could comprise the items. This provided a basic guard against extremely low frequency
words. The end result was a set of 6 nouns and 24 transitive verbs from which the
final sentences were constructed. The full set of stimuli is given in Appendix C. The
sentences were constructed by the experimenter to balance which of the two nouns
appeared together, which noun occupied the head noun position, and, given that each
verb appeared twice, whether a verb was used in two experimental items or one experi-
mental item and one filler. This was done to ensure that counterbalancing was achieved
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such that no combination of two nouns, head noun, or verb appeared in the same ex-
perimental condition, or the same type of filler condition, more than once. The goal
was to ensure that no strategies could be used to predict the outcome of how a sentence
would be interpreted given the particular action denoted by the verb or thematic role
that a given noun previously played, or about what sort of voice marking would appear
on a verb given what marking it showed when it appeared the first time.
All items were then deemed by the community consultant to be culturally appropri-
ate, readily comprehensible, and were translated and explained in detail so they could
be accurately depicted with simple images. Voice recordings of the 128 experimental
sentences and the 16 filler sentences were created with the community consultant using
a Zoom H5 Handy Recorder with a Shure SM93 lavalier microphone. The raw .WAV
files were cut into individual files for each item and condition, edited for volume bal-
ancing, and in some cases digitally slowed (keeping frequency controlled) to ensure the
critical analysis regions were as lengthy as possible (the analysis regions are explained
in Section 6.5.2.2).
6.5.1.3 Visual stimuli
Once all sentences were recorded, an artist with connections to the Ojibwe community
was contracted to create the visual stimuli, which comprised 150 drawings, 3 for each
of the 48 trials, plus 6 that were used in the practice session. All images were black and
white line drawings depicting the transitive action in the sentence. An example set is
shown in Figure 6.1, which corresponds to the example auditory stimulus in (35). With
respect to the experimental items, one image was associated with the head noun being
the agent (the agent image), one with the head noun ultimately being the patient (the
patient image), and finally one that entirely lacked a character corresponding to the
head noun, but included the non-head noun character (the distractor image). For the
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Figure 6.1: Example visual stimuli set. The upper left image is the agent image, upper
right the patient image, and at the bottom the distractor, all with respect to the example
sentence in (35).
distractor, whether the non-head noun character was depicted as an agent or patient
was counterbalanced across items.
One of the two role-reversed images, either the agent or patient image, ultimately
corresponded to the correct response in the experimental trials, while the distractor
image was always the correct response for the filler trials. Therefore each of the three
types of images was the correct response on one-third of trials. For the filler items,
the head noun of the auditory stimulus was always found in the distractor image, but
never in either of the role-reversed images; again, for the experimental trials, the head
noun was in both of the role-reversed images, but not in the distractor image. While
participants could not know at the start of a trial which image would be correct, follow-
ing the head noun they could confidently rule in (as in the filler trials) or rule out (as
in the experimental trials) the distractor image. The hope was that this aspect of the
experimental design, besides counterbalancing the response options, would encourage
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incremental interpretation and eye gaze behavior among the participants, given that
certain images could be ruled-in/out in the middle of the sentence.
6.5.1.4 Equipment and software
The visual stimuli were presented on a 27” Acer T272HL Touch Screen Monitor, and the
auditory stimuli over USB-Powered Creative Pebble Desktop Speakers. Both visual and
auditory presentation were controlled by a 2015 Macbook Pro running the PsychoPy2
experimental software. Preferential looking data was collected with a Logitech C920S
HD Pro Webcam mounted at the top of the screen. The OBS Studio application was used
to record the participant’s head and face as well as the experimental display within a
video, written into a .MOV file. The sample rate of the video was 30 frames per second,
the maximum the camera would allow. Other behavioral data from the picture selection
task was collected through the experimental software and was output to a .CSV file.
Interaction with the touch screen was coded as mouse clicks, with both the region and
timing of every touch over the course of each trial being recorded. Touches were time-
locked to the onset of the auditory stimulus.
6.5.1.5 Procedure
The experiment was conducted at three different sites over a three week period in Febru-
ary 2020. Six participants were run at the cultural center at Nigigoonsiminikaaning and
one at the round house. All Seine River participants were run in the home of the commu-
nity liaison. Participants were run one at a time in a single session lasting approximately
one hour.
Participants were first given an overview of the goal of the experiment: to learn
how speakers of Ojibwe understand complex sentences by looking at how eyes move
around to pictures associated with different possible meanings of the sentence. A brief
outline of the mechanics of the task was given. This was followed by a consent process
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Figure 6.2: Schematization of experimental trials.
approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Massachusetts Amherst,
as well as a brief demographic survey. The session began with a practice session that
introduced the six characters within the images, as well as the nouns associated with
each character, to ensure that there was no confusion about who was who. This also
served as an opportunity to further detail the mechanics and goals of the task, ensure
the auditory stimuli were being presented at the appropriate volume, and to familiarize
participants with the touch screen computer before the main experimental block. Dur-
ing the practice, participants were shown three images, each corresponding to one of
the six characters, and heard a sentence of Ojibwe that asked them to select the image
corresponding to one of the characters. There were 12 practice trials in total, with each
of the six characters appearing as the correct answer twice. The experimenter moni-
tored the selection and corrected the participant if they selected the wrong character to
ensure appropriate mappings were being made.
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Participants were given a chance to ask questions about the task before moving onto
the experimental block. A visual schematization of the trial structure is shown in Figure
6.2. Each of the 48 trials in this block could be started at the leisure of the participant,
with a wait screen between each trial allowing breaks to be taken at any point (the
screen read touch the screen when ready to start in Ojibwe). All text appeared in black
font, and the background of the screen was white across the whole experiment to max-
imize contrast with the line-drawn images. Both the order of trials and dispersement
of fillers were randomized over the block. The trial commenced when the participant
touched the screen. Immediately following the registration of the touch, a fixation cross
appeared at the center of the screen for 1500ms. Participants were instructed to train
their gaze on this point. This allowed preferential looking data to be coded more easily.
Following a 100ms blank screen buffer, the three visual stimuli appeared. One appeared
in the bottom center of the screen, one in the upper left corner, and one in the upper
right corner. The images were arranged to ensure easy coding of looks, with maximal
distance between each image. The association between image type (agent, patient, and
distractor) and location (left, right, bottom) was randomized on each trial, but recorded
for use during data analysis using the experimental software. Participants were told to
examine each of the images to familiarize themselves with the scenes and the charac-
ters. The familiarization period lasted 4000ms, after which the sentence began to play
over the speakers.
Participants were instructed to select the image corresponding to the meaning of
the sentence as soon as they could to encourage active parsing. Once selected, a green
border would appear around the image, as well as a check mark either below the image
(as in the case of the two upper images) or above the image (as in the lower image). At
this point, participants could change their response by touching a different image, con-
firm their response by pressing the checkmark, or hear the sentence again by pressing
a repeat button in the lower left corner of the screen. Participants were encouraged to
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go with their gut response and limit use of the repeat button. The images remained on
the screen until the check mark was pressed, at which point the screen would go blank
for 750ms and the wait screen would appear for the next trial. Following the final trial,
the experimenter conducted a debriefing session to gather the participant’s impressions
of the study. Participants were then paid and the session was concluded.
6.5.2 Analysis
6.5.2.1 Picture selection
For the main analysis of the picture selection task, I retain focus on the accuracy results.
While latency data was collected and is reported in the results, there are a number of
issues in interpreting this measure. First, there is not a single principled point when
a response might be initiated. Participants could make a selection at any point from
when the sentence began. This leaves a long time span during which a response could
be initiated. Second, participants were able to change their answer, and also had to
confirm their answer with a second button press, complicating the choice of how to
define the end point of a response. Finally, significant variability in how motor responses
were prepared when moving hands from their resting position to the screen strongly
affects latency, making it difficult to interpret timing as measuring the main cognitive
variables of interest. As a result, the latency measures are presented without a statistical
analysis and with an abundance of caution.
Accuracy was measured using the final response on each trial. That is, the last image
that was touched prior to the check mark being pressed. In order to fit a logistic mixed
effects model for the analysis of the experimental trials, each trial was also coded in a
binary fashion as either correct or incorrect, despite the fact that three response options
were available. For proximate-direct and obviative-inverse, the agent image was coded
as a correct response. For proximate-inverse and obviative-direct, the patient image was
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coded as the correct response. All other responses (i.e. the role-reversed counterpart
and the Distractor) were coded as incorrect.
6.5.2.2 Preferential looking: Calculating ROIs
The raw .MOV files for each participant were first separated into individual files for
each of the 48 trials. Each of the 32 experimental trials were then hand-coded frame-
by-frame to establish the gaze direction at each sampled time point. Coding was done
by the experimenter using the VCode software, and was done with full blindness to
experimental condition and item number. Coding began at the onset of the fixation
cross and continued until the first response touch was made, be it the pressing of the
repeat button or selection of one of the images. Each frame could be coded as (i)
right, where the look was towards the image in the upper right corner; (ii) left, where
the look was towards the image in the upper left corner; (iii) bottom, where the look
was towards the image on the bottom; or (iv) other, which included looks towards
the fixation cross at the start of the trial, blinks, saccades, off-screen looks (of which
there were very few), looks towards the repeat button, or otherwise uncategorizable
frames due to issues such as rapid head movements or the loss of camera focus. This
direction-based coding was then transformed using the record of the experimental block
so that looks were recategorized as towards the agent, patient, distractor, or other. This
process also associated the pattern of looks with critical time points within the auditory
stimulus.
The main region of interest (ROI) is the ambiguous region, which is defined as the
span of time between when the obviation status of the head noun becomes apparent, up
to when the direct/inverse marking occurs. In the proximate conditions, this started at
the relativizer gaa-, where it becomes apparent that the head noun is unmarked. In the
obviative conditions, this started at the onset of the obviative suffix on the noun. During
this time, the thematic role of head noun is unknown, but the obviation information can
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in principle be used to predictively parse the sentence. There are two additional ROIs
that are not integral to the core analysis, but are present in the results. The first is
the resolution region, which begins with the direct-inverse marking and ends whenever
the first touch of the screen is made by the participant. This is where disambiguation
occurs and the thematic roles can be established. The second is the familiarization
region, which begins with the onset of the visual stimuli and ends with the preamble of
the sentence.
For each of the auditory stimuli, these critical time points were established by the
experimenter by examining spectrograms in Praat, along with careful auditory confir-
mation, to find the onset of the relevant words and morphemes that define the bound-
aries of each ROI. For the calculation of each region for each item, an additional 200ms
was added to the end points of the regions on the assumption that there is a delay
in saccade planning and execution such that looks during this additional time reflect
earlier processing.
An important consideration for the analysis is that the length of each of the ROIs
differs as a function of both item and condition, with no single combination being ex-
actly identical to another. This is due to a number of factors including the experimental
manipulation (e.g. the obviative suffix on the head noun makes the ambiguous region
systematically longer in these conditions), lexical variation (e.g. the embedded verb
differs in length depending on the item), and the latency of response (e.g. the resolu-
tion region ends once a response is made, which varies from trial to trial). While these
issues strongly affect the end point of a region—that is, how long the region lasts—it is
still possible to define a relative starting point that is shared across all trials for a given
region. The relative starting point is treated as time zero for the analysis of that region.
Again, for the ambiguous region, this is the point at which information about obviation
comes online; for the resolution region, it is the point at which direct/inverse marking
begins. A semi-arbitrary cutoff was selected as the maximal end point for each region.
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This was deemed necessary as the further from the zero point one gets, the smaller the
data set to calculate the proportion of looks becomes, causing the reliability of the mea-
sure to suffer. For the analysis of the ambiguous region, a cut was made at 1200ms (at
which point 81% of trials are contributing). For the resolution region, a cut was made
at 5000ms (at which point 97% of trials are contributing). Finally, the data input to the
statistical models included only those trials where the repeat button was not pressed,
resulting in a loss of 11.3% of trials.
6.5.2.3 Preferential looking: Cluster-based permutation
Times series data, such as the preferential looking data collected here, have a number
of properties that makes statistical analysis tricky (see Stone, Lago, and Schad, 2020;
Huang and Snedeker, 2020, for recent discussions). The first is the multiple compar-
isons problem. For example, if we ask the question of when a particular effect is or
becomes statistically reliable, and a test is run at each of the sampled time points to
examine this effect to determine this, then the Type I error rate (i.e. the rate of false
positives) will be inflated. The second is that parametric tests of this sort rely on the as-
sumption that each sampled point is an independent observation. However, the points
are highly autocorrelated—that is, data points that are adjacent in time are likely to stem
from the same cognitive source (again, see Stone et al., 2020, for a relevant discussion
and quantification of autocorrelation). Individual saccades (and by extension, the cog-
nitive processes that control eye movements) extend across multiple sample points. As
a result, all sampled points within a saccade are interdependent, violating a key as-
sumption of the test. While Type I error can be controlled by computing significance
based on corrected p-values, auto-correlation must be solved by other means.
A solution to both of these issues (Type I error inflation and autocorrelation) can be
found in non-parametric statistical tests. Following most closely the visual world analy-
sis presented in Barr, Jackson, and Phillips (2014), I utilize a cluster-based permutation
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test. The starting point of the test is to identify sequences of the sampled time points
that satisfy a chosen statistical criterion within the original data set. Each sequence
forms a cluster. These clusters are usually restricted such that they extend for at least
a certain length of time, deemed by the researcher to be relevant to the question at
hand, and with effects that occur in the same direction. For each of these clusters, a
cluster mass statistic (CMS) can be calculated by taking the sum of the individual test
statistics (e.g. the t- or z-value) within the cluster. For a given ROI, it is possible to
identify multiple separate clusters.
Significance for each cluster found in the original data set can be determined by
a permutation test, where the relevant condition labels are randomized to create a
large number (> 1000) of alternative data sets formed from the original data. Each
of these alternative data sets represent a sample under the null hypothesis, where it is
assumed that there is no difference between the levels of a given conditions (i.e. that the
condition labels do not matter, and are therefore interchangeable). With each of these
randomized data sets, the maximal CMS is calculated and stored. Collectively, these
maximal CMS’s form a null hypothesis distribution, which can be used to determine a
p-value for the CMS of the original data set. Under the conventional alpha threshold
of .05, if fewer than 5% of the CMS values in the null hypothesis distribution are more
extreme than the observed CMS, then the effect is deemed significant. It is important to
emphasize that the result of this procedure does not provide direct information about
when an effect arose—for example, it is incorrect to interpret the edges of the cluster
as the “beginning” or “end” of when the effect was significant. The procure identifies
a window of significance, but significance does not necessarily extend to the individual
points within that window.
To return to the original impetus of the test, cluster-based permutation provides a
solution to the multiple comparisons problem as significance is assessed with respect
to clusters, rather than the individual time points. Therefore there are only as many
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“tests”, in the sense of evaluating a test statistic against a null hypothesis distribution,
as there are clusters. Furthermore, by respecting the original temporal structure of
the data (by only permuting the condition labels), the null hypothesis distribution is
constructed in a way that holds autocorrelation constant across each permuted sample,
essentially factoring out the effects.
For the current experiment, which used a within-subjects factorial design, we fol-
lowed the synchronized permutation logic outlined by Barr et al. (2014) to create ran-
domized data sets (see also Pesarin, 2001; Salmaso, 2003). To this end, we randomized
the labels of the relevant experimental factor by subject, rather than trial-by-trial. That
is, for a given subject, either all labels of the relevant factor were completely reversed,
or the original labels were retained. The idea behind the method is that a given sub-
ject may differ in how sensitive they are to the experimental manipulation, therefore
individual trials may not be exchangeable under the null hypothesis. Furthermore, the
adopted permutation logic respects the original structure of the data, ensuring the va-
lidity of the null hypothesis distribution.
Given the categorical nature of the gaze-baed data, we choose a generalized logistic
mixed effects model to generate the test statistic z at each time point. Since a sample
was taken every 33ms, we choose to only consider clusters (in the original data set)
that span at least three frames, or 100ms. To construct the clusters, we choose a liberal
cutoff of p < .2. The validity of the test against the null hypothesis distribution is not
affected by this choice, as long as the same cutoff is used to form clusters in both the
original and alternative data sets. This does, however, affect the size of the clusters,
with a larger value corresponding to wider clusters (and therefore decreased resolution
related to the timing of the effect). In some cases, no significant cluster of any size
could be found within the randomized data set. In these cases, the most extreme z-
value (either in the positive or negative direction) was stored to contribute to the null
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hypothesis distribution. For each model described below, we fit 2,000 randomized data
sets using this procedure.
The analysis focuses on the ambiguous region. Given that there is no information
about how the thematic dependencies resolve at this point (i.e. direct-inverse marking
has not yet been encountered), the main analysis collapses across the contrast in Voice
and proceeds with respect to the contrast in head noun obviation alone. The goal of
the analysis in the ambiguous region is to establish (i) within obviative and proximate
conditions separately, whether there is a difference in the proportion of looks to the
agent versus patient image (i.e. whether obviation is being used to predict the thematic
role of the head noun); (ii) again within the proximate and obviative conditions sepa-
rately, whether there is a difference in the proportion of looks between the agent versus
distractor images and the patient versus distractor images (i.e. whether the distractor
is being ruled out); and (iii) whether each of the above contrasts differer between the
two head noun conditions (e.g. does the proportion of looks to the agent versus patient
images differ between the proximate and obviative conditions).
To isolate each relevant difference (agent versus patient, distractor versus agent, and
distractor versus patient), the looking data were coded three different ways. For the
difference between agent and patient looks, each time point was coded such that a look
towards the agent image was 1, a look towards patient as 0, and distractor and other
looks as NA. For the difference between distractor and agent, the distractor image was
coded as 1, the agent 0, and the patient and other looks as NA. Finally, for the difference
between distractor and patient looks, the distractor was coded as 1, the patient 0, and
agent and other looks as NA.
To test the first two sets of questions, that is whether the proportion of looks between
each of the three pairings of images differed within each head noun condition in the am-
biguous region, six logistic regression models were specified, one for each of the three
differences for the two levels of head noun obviation with subject and item random
350
slopes and intercepts. The basic model syntax is shown in (36), where Pr(Look) is
filled by one of the three look codings described in the previous paragraph, again with
models run separately for the two levels of head noun.
(36) Pr(Look) ∼ 1 + (1|Subj) + (1|Item)
These six models were run at each time point in the original data set as well as the 2,000
alternative data sets under the cluster-based permutation procedure described above.
This created six null hypothesis distributions for each of the six contrasts/models. In all
cases, permutation proceeded with respect to the relevant image labels, with agent/patient,
distractor/agent, or distractor/patient labels being randomly swapped, depending on
the contrast at hand.
To test the third question outlined above, that is whether these three contrasts dif-
fered between levels of head noun obviation (i.e. to establish whether there is a main
effect of head noun obviation), for each contrast in looks, a mixed effects logistic re-
gression with a single fixed effect of head noun (Proximate= 1, Obviative= −1), along
with maximal subject and item random effects, was used to generate a test statistic for
the cluster-based permutation test. The basic model syntax is given in (37).
(37) Pr(Look) ∼ Head
+ (1|Subj) + (0 + Head|Subj)
+ (1|Item) + (0 + Head|Item)
In this case, there were three models in total. The permutation procedure swapped the
head noun condition labels to generate the relevant alternative data sets.
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Figure 6.3: Average look proportions over time in the familiarization region with 95%
CIs. Time zero marks the onset of the audio stimulus.
6.5.3 Results
6.5.3.1 Preferential Looking
While not subject to statistical analysis, the looking preferences in the familiarization
region, the period prior to the onset of the auditory stimulus, but after the onset of the
visual stimuli, is shown in Figure 6.3. The patterns reveal equal preferences to each of
the three images over the course of this period. If anything, the distractor (the odd one
out, in that it includes a character not in the other two) is receiving decreased looks
over the course of this region. The looks towards the agent versus patient images are on
par throughout the region. Overall, this supports the presence of roughly equal visual
attention to each image, which can then facilitate informed eye movements towards
different images as the sentence unfolds.
The looking proportions towards each image in the critical ambiguous region, the
period starting from where obviation information comes online and ending 200ms after
voice marking begins, is given in Figure 6.4. The figure includes all data submitted to
the statistical analysis. As detailed previously, this means regions longer than 1200ms
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Figure 6.4: Average look proportions over time in the ambiguous region regardless of
accuracy and collapsed across levels of voice. Time zero marks the end of the head
noun (the start of obviative morphology or the relativizer). The area in grey marks the
significant cluster for the analysis of agent versus patient looks in the proximate condi-
tions. No cluster of significance was found in the obviative conditions for this contrast.
Significant clusters for contrasts between agent/distractor and patient/distractor and
the the test of main effect of head noun for each comparison is given in Table 6.2.
were cut short, and regions shorter than 1200ms stopped contributing at the point
where voice marking begins. The gray box in Figure 6.4 corresponds to the cluster
of significance found for the comparison of agent versus patient looks with proximate
heads (no significant cluster was found for this comparison in the obviative head con-
dition). The results of the cluster-based permutation tests for each of the six contrasts,
as well as the test of the main effect for each comparison, is given in Table 6.2.
In both the proximate and obviative head noun conditions, looks towards the dis-
tractor decreased over the course of the region as measured by the comparison between
the distractor versus agent looks and distractor versus patient looks. As detailed in
Table 6.2, for the distractor versus agent contrast, a significant cluster (p = 0.001)
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Contrast Head Cluster (ms) CMS (z) p-value
Agent v. Patient
Proximate 533–1200 48.54 *0.013
Obviative — — —
Distractor v. Agent
Proximate 0–1200 −112.39 *0.001







267–1200 −96.87 *< 0.001
Main Effect of Head Cluster (ms) CMS (z) p-value
Agent v. Patient 433–1200 55.55 *0.005
Distractor v. Agent — — —
Distractor v. Patient 0–1200 29.02 0.078
Table 6.2: Results of cluster permutation test. All located clusters are shown, along with the
CMS with significance values determined from the constructed null hypothesis distribution.
spanned the entire analysis region, while in the obviative conditions the cluster of
significance (p = 0.009) ranged from 367ms after the onset of the obviative marker
till the end of the region. For the distractor versus patent looks, a significant cluster
(p = 0.010) was found spanning 267–933ms for proximate heads, with the significant
cluster (p < 0.001) spanned the time slice starting at 267ms to the end of the region.
The test of a difference between the proximate and obviative head noun conditions did
not reveal any significant clusters. Overall, the results provide basic evidence that gaze
data can provide a window into incremental interpretation. At this point, the head
noun will have been heard (and encoded). Given that the distractor lacks the character
associated with the head noun, this image can be ruled out at this point.
The contrast between agent and patient image looks in the ambiguous region, again
as indicated by the gray box in Figure 6.4, revealed a significant cluster in the proximate
head condition (p = 0.013) spanning the period of 533ms to the end of the region. No
cluster, let alone a significant cluster, was found in the obviative head noun conditions.
The test of the main effect of agent versus patient looks was also significant, supporting
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Figure 6.5: Average look proportions over time in the resolution region with 95% CIs
for correct responses only, split by head noun and voice. Time zero marks the onset of
direct/inverse marking.
the conclusion that there is a reliable difference in the looking behavior between the
two conditions.
The gaze proportions in the resolution region, the region beginning at the onset
of voice morphology and ending with the participant’s response, split by both head
noun and voice marking for correct answers only is given in Figure 6.5. At present, the
statistical analysis of this region is ongoing; to understand the profile of dependency
resolution, I focus on the picture selection accuracy results, presented in the next sec-
tion. That said, a bried description of the difference between looks towards the agent
versus patient images is warranted.
The proportion of looks in the proximate head condition both start with greater
looks towards the agent image. This pattern is sustained in the direct condition, where
that image is associated with a correct response, but reverses in the inverse condition,
where the patient image is ultimately associated with the correct response. The patterns
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Figure 6.6: Box plots of by-participant response accuracy in the picture selection task,
split by the four experimental conditions. Correct responses vary as a function of con-
dition, with agent image being correct in the proximate/direct and obviative/inverse,
and patient being correct with proximate/inverse and obviative/direct.
in the obviative head conditions are not as neat, partially due to the greater loss of data
in these conditions (as discussed in the next section, there was a lower proportion of
accurate responses in these cases. At the start of the region, and consistent with the
results in the ambiguous region, neither the agent nor patient image are receiving a
particularly large share of the overall looks. As the region wears on, a looking preference
appears to emerge towards the image associated with the correct response: the agent
image in the inverse condition, and the patient image in the direct condition.
6.5.3.2 Picture Selection Accuracy
Box plots with by-participant accuracy in the picture selection task, broken down by the
four experimental conditions, is given in Figure 6.6. The mean response proportions
for each of the three image types, also split by condition, are shown in Table 6.3. Over-
all, relatively few of the responses were associated with the distractor image, therefore
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Head Voice Agent Patient Distractor
Proximate
Direct .891 (.025) .039 (.019) .070 (.022)
Inverse .273 (.052) .664 (.052) .063 (.016)
Obviative
Direct .539 (.088) .406 (.078) .055 (.020)
Inverse .672 (.076) .242 (.079) .086 (.039)
Table 6.3: Mean response proportions and by-subjects SEM by condition for agent,
patient, and distractor images.
Effect z p-value
HEAD 3.39 *< 0.001
VOICE 0.60 0.548
HEAD:VOICE 3.67 *< 0.001
Table 6.4: Results of logistic regression on picture accuracy selection data.
participants had little trouble connecting the characters in the sentence to the images.
Consistent with this, accuracy on the fillers, where the distractor image was the cor-
rect response, was 92%. Descriptively, obviative head noun conditions were associated
with lower accuracy and much greater variance, with higher accuracy in the inverse
compared to the direct conditions. Proximate head nouns had less variance overall,
with direct conditions being associated with higher accuracy than inverse.
The results of the the logistic regression on response accuracy are given in Table
6.4. Consistent with the description above, the model revealed a main effect of head
noun (p < 0.001) such that proximate conditions were more accurate than obviative
conditions overall, and a significant interaction of head noun and voice (p < 0.001).
Contrasts to resolve the interaction on the difference between accuracy between levels
of voice were significant for both obviative heads (t(15) = 3.01, p = 0.009) and proxi-
mate heads (t(15) = −4.42, p < 0.001) such that the accuracy in the inverse conditions
was higher compared to the direct conditions with an obviative head, and lower with
inverse compared to direct with a proximate head.
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Figure 6.7: Empirical Cumulative Density Function of response initiation time for cor-
rect responses, time-locked to the end of the auditory stimulus. Includes trials where
the first engagement with the touchscreen was ultimately the final response (i.e. does
not include trials where the repeat button was pressed or the response was changed).
6.5.3.3 Picture Selection Response Initiation Time
While not part of the analysis, in the interest of transparency Figure 6.7 provides cu-
mulative density functions for response initiation time in the experimental conditions.
Response initiation time is time-locked to the end of the auditory stimulus, and repre-
sents the latency between this time point and the first time the participant touches the
screen, given that the touch was a response to the picture verification task (i.e. cases
where the repeat button was the initial response is not included). Only trials where
the initial response was the final response are included — cases where the participant
changed answers are excluded from the curves. These exclusions result in a loss of 14%
of experimental trials.
The initiation times for accurate responses mirror the response accuracy patterns.
The median initiation time for accurate responses was 4.94s for proximate direct, 5.53s
for proximate inverse, 6.72s for obviative direct, and 5.42s for obviative inverse. That
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is, correct responses in proximate direct conditions were on average faster than those in
the proximate inverse counterparts, while the obviative conditions showed the opposite
pattern, with correct responses in the inverse condition being faster on average than
with direct. Finally, independent of voice, the proximate conditions were generally
associated with faster initiations than the obviative conditions.
6.6 Discussion
6.6.1 Key empirical generalizations
There are a number of important findings to highlight from the study. First, preferential
looking patterns in the ambiguous region revealed a significant effect of head noun
obviation. Following a proximate noun, but before the disambiguating influence of
direct/inverse voice was encountered, participants showed a significant preference for
looking towards the image consistent with the interpretation of that noun as the agent
of the depicted action. Following an obviative noun, no such preferences were found.
This finding provides evidence for an immediate impact of prominence information.
The accuracy results revealed two major effects. First, that relative clauses headed
by proximate nouns were interpreted with greater accuracy than those headed by ob-
viative nouns. Second, that the impact of direct/inverse marking on interpretation ac-
curacy had distinct effects in the proximate and obviative head noun conditions. With
proximate head nouns, direct marking was associated with higher accuracy of interpre-
tation compared to inverse marking. With obviative head nouns the reverse was true,
with inverse voice being associated with more accurate interpretation when compared
to the direct voice conditions. Recalling that direct voice indicates that the proximate
noun fills the more agentive role, and inverse voice indicates that the obviative noun fills
the agentive role, this interaction provides evidence that interpretation is more accurate
when the head noun is ultimately associated with the agent role.
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Consistent with the accuracy findings were the patterns of response initiation time.
Though caution should be taken, as they were not subject to a statistical analysis, the
patterns dovetailed with the shape of the accuracy results. First, proximate head nouns
were associated with faster response initiation compared to obviative head nouns. Sec-
ond, response initiations were faster when the head noun was ultimately associated
with the agentive role. That is, for the proximate conditions the direct was faster than
the inverse, and for the obviative conditions inverse was faster than direct.
Overall, the accuracy findings provides an insight into the process of integration
between the the filler and the argument structure of the verb, and ultimately the diffi-
culty of reanalysis given the finding of predictive processing in the ambiguous region.
The results provide clear evidence for (i) the general difficulty of accurately resolving
filler-gap dependencies with obviative fillers (or the relative ease of proximate fillers),
and (ii) the relative ease of associating the filler with the agentive role (or the difficulty
of associating it with a non-agentive role).
Taking everything together, the major findings can be summarized as follows:
(38) a. Under Ambiguity: Anticipatory looks towards the agent image with proxi-
mate head nouns, but not obviative head nouns.
b. Following Disambiguation: More accurate (and faster) responses:
(i) With proximate head nouns.
(ii) When the head noun was ultimately the agent.
There are thus three aspects of the results that demand explanation:
1. Why do proximate fillers result in the appearance of predictive encodings, while
obviative fillers fail to show evidence of such an effect?
2. Why are proximate fillers associated with greater accuracy in forming a link be-
tween displaced arguments and argument structure?
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3. Why are alignments where the head noun is interpreted as the agent more accu-
rate in both the proximate and obviative head noun conditions?
I argue that each of these results can find an explanation via the interaction of the
three pressures discussed in Section 6.2.6, repeated in (39) for reference.
(39) Three processing pressures
a. Animate/Proximate-Agent Preference: Animate nouns are more prototypi-
cally agentive than inanimate ones; proximate nouns are more prototypi-
cally agentive than obviative ones.
b. Agent-First Preference: The prototypical agent role is assigned first.
c. Minimal Dependency Preference: Shorter dependencies are preferred over
longer dependencies.
While I ultimately provide an explanation for the source of each pressure in terms of
the maximize incremental well-formedness framework proposed by Wagers and Pendle-
ton (2016) and Wagers et al. (2018), they are intended to be general pressures. Any
comprehensive model of language processing must provide an explanation for why each
one arises across a variety of measures, languages, and constructions, ideally in terms
of general principles. The main goal of the discussion is therefore to provide a unified
explanation of these pressures, and in turn account for the experimental results. I begin
with broader discussion of the prospects for each model described in the introduction to
explain the results, which motivates the specific adoption of the maximize incremental
well-formedness framework.
6.6.2 An evaluation of existing models
The finding that informs the central question of if and how prominence information is
used predictively is the fact that proximate head nouns were associated with increased
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looks towards the image where the referent of that noun is the agent, prior to direct ev-
idence from voice marking about the argument structure of the clause. Unlike previous
evidence put forward for a predictive role of prominence information (e.g. Wagers and
Pendleton, 2016), it is not possible to interpret this effect as part of an integration or
reanalysis process. Voice marking, which provides the critical disambiguating evidence
of the relationship between obviation and argument structure, has not been reached,
therefore any preferences that are encoded are necessarily predictive. In short, the find-
ing makes it clear that whatever model of processing is adopted, there must be a role
for immediate use of prominence-based information.
This finding rules out the classical version of the modular theory, where prominence
information such as animacy, and by analogy, obviation, is not considered part of the
syntactic information used to construct an initial parse. Instead, prominence informa-
tion forms a part of the world-knowledge used in interpretation and reanalysis. That
said, one can imagine a reformulation of the modular account that allows prominence
information to inform initial parsing decisions. The basis for this move would be iden-
tical to that which drove the inclusion of this information in the early stages of process-
ing in the eADM: Given that prominence information can provide hard grammatical
constraints on the possible syntactic representations of a language, and parsing is a
procedure to build these representations in real time, prominence information should
factor into the initial parsing decisions. In many respects, the version of the maximize
incremental well-formedness model that is put forward in the coming sections brings
this extension to life.
It is currently difficult to evaluate the classic constraint-based model based on these
findings alone, given the lack of corpus data on Ojibwe. That said, this model would
predict that co-occurance patterns should reveal a strong correlation between proxi-
mate nouns and agentive roles, leading to an early preference for associating the proxi-
mate argument with this role, which is then reflected in the gaze patterns. Some initial
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production studies do seem to support this generalization. For example, the results of
Christianson and Ferreira (2005) show a strong pattern of association between proxi-
mate and agent through the general preference for direct voice over inverse in regular
transitive clauses. Matching this finding, Sullivan (2016a) found a strong preference
for direct voice in regular transitive sentences using a picture elicitation task with a
single speaker of Ojibwe. Finally, in the production pilot presented in the introduction,
proximate was nearly always associated with direct voice in the formation of relative
clauses in particular. That said, further work is needed to determine if these correlations
are borne out in larger and more naturalistic samples.
However, even if these correlations are supported upon further investigation, the
classic constraint-based model on its own leaves a deeper question unexplained: What
is the source of the patterns of frequency that are ultimately used to build these asso-
ciations? This question bites on a number of levels. Within a language, one must find
an explanation for how a particular pattern of association might have arose diachroni-
cally. Across languages, one must explain the consistency, if not universality, with which
certain patterns arise, and, perhaps even more importantly, provide an explanation for
why certain patterns are never observed.
Indeed, various iterations of these questions have motivated the past 60 years of
work within generative linguistics. These questions were also at the heart of under-
standing the wide, yet still limited, variation in prominence effects across agreement
systems explored in Chapter 4, as well as the range of possible distinctions in person
and obviation explored in Chapters 2 and 3. What unified all patterns reviewed in those
chapters was obedience to the PAH. In this very basic sense, the PAH is universal: the
possible person-based prominence patterns that can arise in natural language are ex-
hausted by the possibilities defined by the PAH. While the previous chapters advocated
for the view that the scale itself is derivative of something more basic — in particular,
different sets of person, animacy, and obviation features, which are in turn made up of
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sets of ontological person primitives — we do not need to take on those assumptions
here. The PAH itself is descriptively adequate, in the sense of Chomsky (1965), in that
it can be used to specify all and only the known degrees of variation of prominence
effects in human language.
The PAH is thus well-suited to allow us make progress on understanding the uni-
versal constraints that underly language processing, and in turn to understand why the
same patterns of argument structure processing crop up across a variety of languages,
and with different types of prominence information. The eADM and the incremental
well-formedness model, both of which make direct use of the PAH, are thus one step
closer to arriving at an explanatory theory. Returning to the results of the current study,
both make clear predictions that proximate nouns should be predictively associated
with the agent role. From the perspective of the eADM, this occurs because proxi-
mate nouns are “prototypically” agentive, where the attributes that define prototypical
agents are derived from the various prominence hierarchies, including the PAH. For
the well-formedness model, an alignment of the obviation sub-hierarchy and thematic
role hierarchy results in a prediction of proximate = agent being the most harmonic
possibility given the input at that point.
In the next section, I detail the maximize incremental well-formedness model, show-
ing how it can account for the full range of effects seen in the present experiment.
6.6.3 A maximize incremental well-formedness account
The framework for the maximize incremental well-formedness model comes from Wa-
gers and Pendleton (2016) and Wagers et al. (2018). The formulation adopted here
provides an account how the incremental optimization of movement dependencies cap-
tures filler-gap dependency processing in Ojibwe. The procedure is couched within a
serial parsing model, where at each point the single most optimal parse is anticipated.
However, given that data at hand one could equally couch the account within a parallel
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parsing architecture, where the probability of the various possible parses is proportional
to a well-formedness score.
6.6.3.1 A revised active filler strategy
The starting point of the incremental well-formedness model when applied to filler-gap
dependencies amounts to the Active Filler Strategy. I propose the following formulation
of the AFS:
(40) The Revised Active Filler Strategy
A filler predictively and incrementally extends a comprehender’s syntactic rep-
resentation to include a movement chain such that:
a. The chain terminates in a theta-assigning position (an A-position)
b. Each link minimizes distance
c. Each link maximizes well-formedness
The main clause of (40) is the extension of the structure — the predictive component
that is triggered by the recognition of a filler. I propose that this prediction builds a
movement chain, as well as the phrase structure marker implied by that chain. The
chain predictively links the filler to its anticipated base-generated A-position (40a),
which is the position of thematic role assignment. For our current purposes, this is
either the External Argument (EA) position, where the AGENT role is assigned, or or In-
ternal Argument (IA) position, where the PATIENT role is assigned. When such a chain
is formed, the consequence is that the filler is assigned a thematic role. As a result,
the initial thematic role assignment follows directly from parsing decisions, providing
a direct linking theory between parsing and interpretation, which is fully consistent
with the current representations of argument structure in formal theories (e.g. Harley,
2011).
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That said, intermediate movement steps, or chain links, may be formulated along
the way. Each chain and its links are subject to two optimization constraints. The first
(40b) dictates that each link is as short as possible. The second (40c) dictates that each
link must maximize well-formedness. One can imagine a number of possible theories
of distance and well-formedness. The length of a dependency could, in principle, be
defined or estimated by linear/temporal distance in a string (Lewis and Vasishth, 2005;
Futrell, Levy, and Gibson, 2020), the number of open dependencies (Gibson, 1998,
2000; Warren and Gibson, 2002), or the number of intervening phrase structure nodes
(O’Grady, 1997). The current proposal focuses on a version of the final possibility, but
does not exclude the possibility that other factors may be broadly relevant to human
language processing. Similarly, “well-formedness” could be replaced by optimizing on
any number of dimensions, for example by minimizing surprisal (Hale, 2001; Levy,
2008), maximizing informativity (Hale, 2006), or maximizing harmony based on the
weighted sum of constraint violations (Smolensky and Legendre, 2006). Again, it is
the final possibility that is adopted here, as it allows for the inclusion of structural well-
formedness constraints derived directly from the PAH.
6.6.3.2 Minimize Syntactic Distance
The first chain optimization principle is to minimize the length of the dependency, where
length is determined by phrase structure distance. I posit that Syntactic Distance can be
defined as follows, which is closely related to previous formulations including O’Grady
(1997) and Hornstein (2009):
(41) Definition of Syntactic Distance
Given two linked syntactic positions X and Y, Syntactic Distance is the number
of maximal projections (XPs) that dominate X but do not dominate Y.
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For example, the syntactic distance between X and Y in the structure in (42a) is 2, as
both ZP and YP dominate Y, but not X, while the distance between X any Y in (42b) is
3. Therefore all else being equal, (42a) will be preferred over (42b).
(42) Shorter chains are preferred over longer chains
a. [XP X . . . [ZP . . . [YP . . . Y ] ] ]
b. [XP X . . . [ZP . . . [WP . . . [YP . . . Y ] ] ] ]
Minimization of this sort can be seen as following from general economy principles
that seek to limit the use of memory resources whenever possible. This guides both the
AFS and principles like Minimal Attachment (Frazier and Fodor, 1978; Frazier, 1987).
For the current formulation of the AFS, the goal is to minimize the number of XPs
intervening between two linked syntactic objects; for Minimal Attachment, the goal is
to minimize the number of XPs posited overall.
A further aspect is that not all chains from X to Y are made equal. For example,
the chain in (43a) includes an intermediate link at position W, while the chain in (43b)
lacks this link in the chain.
(43) Multiple short links are preferred over one long chain
a. [XP X . . . [ZP . . . [WP W . . . [YP . . . Y ] ] ] ]
b. [XP X . . . [ZP . . . [WP W . . . [YP . . . Y ] ] ] ]
The hypothesis, which follows from the current formulation of distance as minimizing
the distance of links rather than entire chains, is that (43a) is more minimal than (43b),
as each link of (43a) is shorter than that on (43b). Assuming that both of these chains
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are equally well-formed, and given that both terminate their chains in the same position
and therefore assign the same thematic role, the chain that will be preferred is the one
with multiple intermediate links rather than a single long link.
This derives a preference for chains with intermediate movement steps between the
displaced position of the argument and the final argument position. More immediately,
this derives a general Subject Gap Advantage. As schematized in (44a), having an inter-
mediate landing side in the subject position of Spec,IP breaks up a chain compared to
the equivalent counterpart that lacks such a step (44b). Given the principles sketched
above, and all else being equal, the chain in (44a), which contains a subject gap, will
always be preferred over one that lacks a subject gap such as (44b).
(44) The Subject Gap Preference
a. FILLER ... [IP SUBJ ... [vP EA [pP IA ] ] ]
b. FILLER ... [IP SUBJ ... [vP EA [pP IA ] ] ]
Furthermore, the minimization of syntactic distance can derive the preference to
assign the AGENT thematic role first. This follows from the fact that the EA position,
where this role is assigned, is less deeply embedded in the phrase structure compared to
the IA position. Therefore from any particular syntactic position, a chain that terminates
in the EA position (45a) will always be more minimal than one that terminates in the
IA position (45b) by a syntactic distance unit of 1, as
p
P dominates the IA position but
not the EA position.
(45) The Agent-First Preference
a. FILLER ... [vP EA [pP IA ] ]
b. FILLER ... [vP EA [pP IA ] ]
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6.6.3.3 Maximize Well-Formedness
The second aspect of chain optimization is to maximize structural well-formedness. I
posit that well-formedness is determined by comparing the Harmony scores of the pos-
sible structures consistent with the input at the point the filler is initially encountered.
Harmony is defined by the linear equation in (46), where each constraint C k (k =
1 . . . K) is associated with a weight wk, and each candidate (i.e. possible parse) has a vi-
olation score sk on that constraint. Harmony (H) is the sum of the the weight multiplied
by the violation score for each constraint.





There are two critical questions: (i) what the set of constraints is that are used to de-
termine Harmony? And (ii) what are the weights for each constraint? These questions
are discussed in the next two sections.
6.6.3.4 Scales and constraints
This section describes the scales and constraints that are needed to account for the role
of person, animacy, and obviation in the processing of filler-gap dependencies. The first,
which has already been presented at length, is the PAH, repeated in (47) along with the
implied Animacy and Obviation Sub-Hierarchies.
(47) Person-Animacy Hierarchy (repeated)
1/2 (LOCAL) > 3 (PROXIMATE) > 3′ (OBVIATIVE) > 0 (INANIMATE)
a. Animacy Sub-Hierarchy: 3/3′ (ANIMATE) > 0 (INANIMATE)
b. Obviation Sub-Hierarchy: 3 (PROXIMATE) > 3′ (OBVIATIVE)
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Given the hypothesis that there is a one-to-one relationship between thematic roles
and syntactic position, either the Thematic Role Hierarchy in (48a) or the Argument
Position Hierarchy in (48b) could in principle be used to capture the rankings related to
argument structure. Given that the current theory has been framed in terms of parsing,
and (48b) provides a ranking in terms of the phrase structure representation, I adopt
the Argument Position Hierarchy moving forward.
(48) Two equivalent Argument Structure Hierarchies
a. Thematic Role Hierarchy: AGENT > PATIENT
b. Argument Position Hierarchy: EA > IA
Finally, there is a constraint which ranks the derived subject position, in this case Spec,IP,
above any position which it dominates — these are the non-subject positions.
(49) Derived Position Hierarchy
SUBJ > NON-SUBJ
Both the Argument Position and the Derived Position Hierarchies are specific cases of
a General Syntactic Position Hierarchy that ranks higher syntactic positions over lower
syntactic positions, given in (50).
(50) General Syntactic Position Hierarchy
HIGHER > LOWER
That is, a given position X is ranked higher on the scale than all positions that are
dominated by the maximal projection that contains X.
For the present discussion, I restrict consideration to the constraints that are imme-
diately relevant to account for the patterns of Ojibwe. These constraints can be derived
by the Harmonic Alignment (see Section 6.2.5) of the Obviation Sub-Hierarchy with
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the Argument and Derived Position Hierarchies. The derived constraints are given in
(51):
(51) a. Alignment of Argument Position and Obviation Hierarchies
*EA/OBV  *EA/PROX
*IA/PROX  *IA/OBV
b. Alignment of Derived Position and Obviation Hierarchies
*SUBJ/OBV  *SUBJ/PROX
*NON-SUBJ/PROX  *NON-SUBJ/OBV
The constraints in (51a) prefer a movement chain that places a proximate filler in the EA
position, assigning it the AGENT role, and an obviative filler in the IA position, assigning
it the PATIENT role. This derives the Proximate/Agent Preference as a soft constraint. The
constraints in (51b) prefer a movement chain that places a proximate filler in the sub-
ject position and an obviative filler in a non-subject position, where again non-subject
position is defined as any position lower in the phrase structure hierarchy than Spec,IP.
This ultimately enforces the hard grammatical constraint in Ojibwe where proximate
arguments always occupy the derived subject position.
6.6.3.5 Setting weights: A role for experience
The earlier discussion of the classic constraint-based model did not reject a role for
learning and experience. Rather, it demanded a linking theory between linguistic expe-
rience, learning, and the online processing behavior observed in adults; in particular,
a linking theory that recognizes the universal nature of PAH effects across all human
languages. To reiterate a critical point that is too often misunderstood, universality in
this case refers to the fact that the PAH is sufficient to describe all and only the possible
person-based prominence effects in human language. It is therefore not necessarily a
claim about what, if anything, is endowed by Universal Grammar. The previous section
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showed that the relevant well-formedness constraints can be derived from the Har-
monic Alignment of the PAH with two Syntactic Position Hierarchies — the Argument
and Derived Position Hierarchies. In this section I spell out a linking theory between
linguistic experience and language processing based in the weighting of these universal
constraints.
Harmonic Alignment provides a relative ranking between the constraints, as indi-
cated by “”, but the particular influence of a given constraint on the Harmony or
well-formedness of a structure is fine-tuned by their weights. A hypothesis that follows
from Harmonic Alignment, for example, is that all languages with a proximate-obviative
distinction will at least prefer the proximate argument to occupy the derived subject po-
sition, even if it does not go as far as Ojibwe in requiring this to be the case. To briefly
bring in English as a point of reference, this type of soft constraint is reflected in the
fact that animate nouns are preferred as subjects compared to inanimate nouns, but
are not grammatically required to occupy that position. For the current purposes, the
difference between hard and soft constraints can fall on a continuum defined by the
relative weights of the constraints.
The constraint weights, and perhaps even the constraints themselves, are posited to
be learned over the course of acquisition based on the primary input. There is a great
deal of work of learning in the wider literature on Harmonic Grammar and Optimality
Theory (for a review and discussion, see Pater, 2009). The basic contour assumed here
is that the weight of a constraint is at least partially a function of frequency and other
distributional information, for example via a Maximum Entropy model (e.g. Goldwa-
ter and Johnson, 2003). This has the potential to provide a deep link to the broadly
connectionist framework that the classic constraint-based model is based in.
Again given the lack of suitable corpus data for Ojibwe, I simply stipulate the rela-
tive weights of the various constraints based on the observed processing patterns. For
now, it is sufficient to say that hard constraints such as those derived from the Derived
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Position hierarchy are weighted relatively high, while soft constraints such as those de-
rived from the Argument Position hierarchy are weighted relatively low. Within each
class of constraints, it is then sufficient to maintain the relative weights derived by the
ranking under Harmonic Alignment in (51). In the next section, I walk through the
four conditions in the present experiment and show how this model accounts for the
looking and picture selection patterns in each.
6.6.3.6 A step-by-step account of Ojibwe
To review, there are three patterns from the experiment that require explanation: (i)
the anticipatory looks towards the agent picture in the proximate conditions, and the
lack of anticipatory looks in the obviative conditions; (ii) the higher accuracy in the
proximate compared to the obviative conditions; and (iii) the increased accuracy in
both the proximate and obviative conditions when the dependency was resolved such
that the filler is associated with the agent role.
I begin with the consideration of the proximate head noun conditions with the
schematizations repeated in (52).
(52) a. DPPROX/AG [CP REL-VERB-DIR [IP ... [VoiceP ... [vP ... DPOBV/PAT ] ] ] ]
b. DPPROX/PAT [CP REL-VERB-INV [IP ... [VoiceP ... [vP DPOBV/AG ... ] ] ] ]
At the point at which the head noun is encoded, the hard Derived Position constraints
strongly favor a parse with a chain that includes an intermediate gap in the derived
subject position. In turn, both the minimal dependency preference and the soft Argu-
ment Position constraints favor a parse where the chain terminates in the EA position.
Therefore both of these constraints conspire to prefer a chain that terminates in an EA
position, accounting for the predictive encoding of the agent role as evidenced by the
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preferential looking patterns in the ambiguous region, and a parse consistent with (52a)
is adopted. The second point of interest is when voice marking is reached. In direct
voice conditions, where the prediction aligns with the actual structure, integration pro-
ceeds smoothly resulting in high accuracy. In the inverse voice conditions, this triggers
a reanalysis process such that the parse in (52b) must be adopted. In some proportion
of cases, this process is not successful, leading to lower accuracy in the form of more
erroneous agent image responses.
Moving along, the schematization of the obviative head noun conditions are re-
peated in (53).
(53) a. DPOBV/PAT [CP REL-VERB-DIR [IP DPPROX/AG ... [VoiceP ... [vP ... ] ] ] ]
b. DPOBV/AG [CP REL-VERB-INV [IP DPPROX/PAT ... [VoiceP ... [vP ... ] ] ] ]
The first point of consideration is immediately after the head noun and obviation has
been encoded. In this case, the high weighting of the Derived Position constraints en-
sures that obviative fillers will never be predicted to form a gap in the subject position.
This comes at the cost of making a longer and more costly chain, which ultimately has
the general effect of making accuracy lower in these conditions compared to their prox-
imate counterparts.4 Obviative fillers are associated with an inherent tension between
(i) minimizing dependency length by terminating the chain in the EA position and as-
signing the AGENT role, a preference that is independent of prominence information;
and (ii) avoiding a violation of the Argument Position constraints that prefers obviative
arguments to terminate in the IA position and be assigned PATIENT. These conflicting
4In addition, the proximate argument is also posited to undergo movement to the subject position in
these conditions. The hypothesized presence of two movement chains in these conditions makes these
costs even higher.
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preferences account for the lack of predictive encoding of thematic roles in the obvia-
tive conditions as measured by looking patterns. When voice marking is reached, the
patterns of accuracy ultimately revealed a bias towards assigning the agent role to the
obviative filler. This can be accounted for by appealing to the fact that, of the two possi-
ble chains formed with an obviative filler, resolving the dependency into the EA position
is less costly than the IA position. In other words, it is a reflection of the preference to
form the most minimal dependency and adopt the parse in (53b). This comes at the
cost of violating the Argument Position constraint, which would be satisfied by the parse
in (53a), and results in lower accuracy in the direct compared to the inverse conditions.
That said, there is an apparent paradox with obviative head nouns given the lack
of agent preference in the looking patterns, but the strong agent preference in the re-
sponse patterns. At present, only a tentative analysis of this tension can be provided.
I hypothesize that the finding can be attributed the increased load on memory when
forming this long dependency, leading to the prominence information of the filler to
be degraded. Given that the chain length advantage of an EA gap is independent of
prominence information, the parse that would be most likely to be well-formed under
uncertainty about prominence information would be the one with the shortest chain.
This results in the takeover of the preference to minimize dependency length, such that
an open filler-gap dependency terminates in the EA position, resulting in the assignment
of the agent role to the filler. I further hypothesize that this preference takes over once
the parser is triggered by voice marking to integrate the open filler into an argument
structure position, accounting for the lack of effect in the predictive measures, but the
strong effect in end-of-sentence interpretations.
6.6.4 The consequences of incremental prediction
Zooming out, the major difference between proximate and obviative conditions is that
with the proximate conditions, all constraints can be obeyed by a parse where the chain
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terminates in the EA position. This contrasts with the obviative conditions where there
is no single parse that allows all constraints to be satisfied. The parse with a shorter
chain (53b) terminates the dependency in the EA position, resulting in a violation of
the Argument Position constraints, while the parse that satisfies the Argument Position
constraints results in a longer chain (53a). This conditions provides a particularly rich
ground for understanding the nature of incremental prediction and its downstream
consequences.
The account proposed in the previous section hypothesized that these conflicting
constraints can explain the lack of prediction in the obviative conditions. This could be
due from a number of sources. One possibility is that the conflict leads the parser to
abandon the active filler strategy entirely, adopting a wait-and-see approach, leading to
a lack of predictive encoding of the thematic role, with looks varying randomly between
the two possible images. Another possibility is that both of the parses in (53) are acti-
vated over the course of the ambiguous region, and within a given trial participants are
entertaining both to an equal degree, with looks reflecting this competition by being
split with each trial. This would be a parallel parsing approach. Finally, it is possible
that on each given trial, stochastic noise or item-by-item variation allows one or the
other parses to “win out”. On average, this leads to the appearance of a wash-out, even
though a specific predictive encoding is adopted on each trial. This would be a serial
parsing approach.
In principle, it should be possible to decide between the wait-and-see and parallel
approaches on one hand, which predict that within a given trial looks should be split
evenly between the two role-reversed images, and the serial parsing approach, where
looks on each trial should coalesce towards a single image depending on which parse
wins out. Given the relatively small sample size both in terms of number of subjects
(N = 16) and the number of items (n = 8 per condition), any answer to this ques-
tion based on the current results must remain preliminary. That said, one test of this
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Figure 6.8: Average look proportions towards agent image in the ambiguous region
split by condition and the ultimate response.
hypothesis is to examine whether there is a relationship between the looking behav-
ior in the ambiguous region and the ultimate response. On the serial parsing account,
there should be a relationship such that predictive looks towards a particular image
should lead to more responses consistent with that initial encoding, whether correct
or incorrect. On the other hand, the wait-and-see and parallel accounts do not predict
any relationship between looking behavior in the ambiguous region and the ultimate
response.
The graph in Figure 6.8 shows the breakdown of how the proportion of looks to-
wards the agent image differs as a function of head noun and the ultimate response.
Recall that there are three images total, making chance looks approximately 33%. In
the proximate conditions, and consistent with all findings so far, the proportion of looks
towards the agent image hovers around 50%, regardless of the ultimate response. In
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contrast, in the obviative conditions the proportions appear to vary as a function of ul-
timate response, with higher proportions of agent looks when the response was agent,
and a lower proportion when the response was the patient image.
The question is therefore whether image choice can be predicted from looking be-
havior. To provide a test of the hypothesis, the overall look proportion towards the
agent image on each trial for each participant was used as a continuous predictor in
a logistic regression on image choice. Image choice was coded as a binary variable
such that selection of the agent image was 1 and all other selections were zero. Given
that the relationship is only predicted in the obviative head noun conditions, separate
models were run on the proximate and obviative conditions. As expected the effect of
look proportions did not reach significance in the proximate conditions (z = −0.55,
p = 0.799), but did in the obviative conditions (z = 2.346, p = 0.019). An analogous
test that instead tested the effect of proportion of patient looks with image choice coded
such that the patient choice was 1 and all others zero did not reach significance in either
the proximate conditions (z = −1.154, p = 0.249) or obviative conditions (z = 1.412,
p = 0.158).
The significant effect reported above provides preliminary evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that there are indeed competing constraints with obviative fillers. Moreover,
in these conditions, the initial prediction engendered at the filler, prior to bottom-up
evidence of the thematic structure, is difficult to overcome, leading to a relationship
between predictive looks and final response. One goal of future work should be to
provide a more direct test of the hypothesis that this effect is indeed the result of com-
peting constraints, rather than a failure to predict with lower prominence fillers such
as obviatives and inanimates.
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6.6.5 The return of the modular parser
The maximize incremental well-formedness model put forward in the previous section
is a syntax-first model. In particular, the formulation of a parse is hypothesized to pre-
cede the formulation of an interpretation. Put another way, the model recognizes that
syntactic structures provide the road map for interpretation, and furthermore that the
possible representations at each incremental point not only obeys, but optimizes based
on, the constraints imposed by the grammar. While there is a role for experience-based
knowledge, and world-knowledge more generally, these types of knowledge do not form
the core of the human language processing faculty on the proposed theory. In this way,
the account can be seen as a direct descendent of the classic modular model, which
made a cut between information used to inform the formulation of a parse and that
used to interpret, evaluate, and potentially revise the adopted syntactic representation.
One of the major differences between the current theory and the eADM is in the
representation of argument structure. The eADM posits that thematic role assignment
occurs prior to the linking of arguments to their structural positions. By adopting a
theory where thematic roles are associated one-to-one with syntactic positions, the as-
signment of thematic roles on the current theory follows from general parsing princi-
ples. In particular, this allows the preference for shorter dependencies to give rise to
the Agent-First Preference, given that the position where the agent role is assigned is
higher than all other theta-assigning positions. There is no need to posit an indepen-
dent mechanism for thematic role assignment above and beyond those necessary for
interpreting structures more generally.
The major innovation from the classic modular model is the inclusion of prominence-
based information in the formulation of an initial parse. Like the eADM, this is moti-
vated by the fact that such information is used to restrict the possible syntactic represen-
tations seen across languages of the world. Given that the PAH describes all and only
the possible range of person-based prominence effects, this scale provides a valid basis
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for the formulation of general constraints for the processing of prominence informa-
tion across all languages. The differences between languages falls to the weighting of
constraints, and the weighting of constraints is determined by the input to the learner.
At one extreme, the constraints can effectively block particular parses from ever aris-
ing, hemming in the possibilities. In the middle, constraints can be weighted to lead
to preferences that can be readily overridden. At the other extreme, a language may
show no evidence or extremely limited evidence for a particular constraint. In all cases,
the question that underlies each parsing decision is which structure is most likely to be
well-formed given the currently available information?
In this way, the account recognizes a central role for distributional and experience-
based information in learning, as posited by the classic constraint-based model. How-
ever, rather than appealing to a representation of co-occurance frequencies as the source
of language processing behaviors, this information serves to set the parameters that de-
termine the well-formedness within a given language. I leave open the question of
whether the PAH and the derived constraints can be deduced from the primary input,
or whether it is necessary to specify this as part of the initial state of a learner. In either
case, the universality of prominence effects demands an explanation. By employing the
PAH directly, the present account meets these demands.
6.6.6 The nature of obviation (in processing)
The current study is the third experimental investigation of an Algonquian language.
The goal of this section is to explore connections to previous work by Christianson
and Ferreira (2005) and Christianson and Cho (2009), who studied the closely related
Eastern dialect of Ojibwe Odawa.
Obviation is multifaceted. The category of proximate is associated with a constel-
lation of closely related semantic and syntactic properties: (i) it occupies the subject
position, (ii) it undergoes agreement with Infl, (iii) it is most harmonically aligned with
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the external argument position and agent thematic role, (iv) it is the most “discourse
prominent” third person if there are multiple third persons, and (v) it is the default role
if there is only a single third person. All of these properties can be tied to the rela-
tive prominence ranking between the proximate and obviative categories, as described
by the PAH, where aligning the proximate argument with the more important role or
position is preferred or required.
Throughout this dissertation, the focus has been on understanding the syntactic ef-
fects of obviation once the roles have been assigned. Very little focus has been given to
understanding why particular referents are elevated the role of proximate or relegated
to obviative. The referent for the proximate role itself is generally determined by the
discourse context. When there is a choice (i.e. multiple animate third persons in the
discourse) the more “topical” referent or the referent whose “point-of-view” is being
taken takes the proximate role. That said, in the literature on obviation, the notions
of “centrality”, “topicality”, “point-of-view”, and “givenness” often end up being inter-
changeable catchalls for whatever discourse propert(y/ies) obviation can be associated
with, rather than precise properties that correspond to independent primitives of the
discourse representation. It is clear that these properties are crucial in some way, but
the particular nature of how they relate to obviation is yet to be fully elucidated.
The major finding of Christianson and Cho (2009) was that sentences with pro-
dropped proximate arguments were easier to interpret than those with dropped obvia-
tive arguments. The authors interpret this finding as evidence that the more topical
arguments are easier to recover than non-topical arguments, where relative topicality
can be ascertained by ranking on the PAH, with higher ranked arguments being op-
timally aligned with the topic role. This finding is also congruent with Christianson
and Ferreira (2005), who show that production preferences that placed proximate ar-
gument before obviative ones, and put the more “topical” argument in the proximate
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role. This too can be readily described by appealing to the interaction of the PAH with
other grammatical and discourse properties.
The PAH therefore broadly provides the means to connect the current account with
previous work: the formation of chains (as explored in the present work), the pro-
duction of the interpretation of pro (Christianson and Cho, 2009), and the production
of word order and voice marking (Christianson and Ferreira, 2005) are all guided by
prominence relations in some sense. A goal of future work is to more clearly spell-out
the discourse representations that underly obviation, and draw out the connections be-
tween the syntactic and discourse representation. This line of work is sure to reveal
even deeper relationships between the three studies, and in the real-time processing of
syntax and discourse representations, than can be seen at this point in time.
6.6.7 Further extensions
In this section, I consider some additional applications of the maximize incremental
well-formedness model and the Revised Active Filler Strategy. There are two basic types
of extensions that I consider. The first is how well-formedness constraints are expected
to affect syntactic processing more generally, outside of the formation of movement
dependencies. The second is understanding the predictions of the account for other
instances of filler-gap dependencies and different types of prominence relationships.
To briefly step back and take stock, the focus of the proposed Revised Active Filler
Strategy is on the formation of the representation that underlies syntactic displacement.
The fundamental push and pull proposed within the account is between the pressure to
make the shortest dependencies possible and the pressure to construct well-formed de-
pendencies. In the case of more prominent proximate or animate fillers, these pressures
always align. As a result, the patterns observed in these conditions alone do not pro-
vide direct evidence that both types of pressures are needed — either one alone could
be sufficient. The conflict occurs, and the evidence emerges, with the less prominent
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obviative or inanimate fillers. If only the minimal dependency preference were active
in determining initial parsing decisions, we would expect there to be a strong agent
(and subject gap) preference. If only the well-formedness conditions were active, we
would expect a strong patient preference. These are not the observed patterns with
either animacy (e.g. Wagers and Pendleton, 2016) or obviation (the present study).
Despite this focus, the principles are not intended to be specific to understanding
the comprehension of movement chains. First, the chain/link minimization preference,
which prefers a parse with the smallest number of XPs between two linked positions,
can be tied together with other parsing principles such as Minimal Attachment, which
prefers a parse with the smallest number of XPs in general. These in turn can be based in
the preference to conserve limited memory resources when possible (e.g. Frazier, 1979).
From this point of view, the minimization preference permeates parsing well beyond the
creation of chains and into the formation of the base-generated phrase structure.
Second, the well-formedness conditions are general constraints on the formation of
the syntactic representation. We should therefore expect them to shape parsing pref-
erences in a wide variety of constructions. To this end, one important prediction of
the account is that there should be a general relationship between syntactic height and
ranking on the PAH such that higher ranked categories are preferred in higher struc-
tural positions. Somewhat simplified versions of these constraints, which are adopted
for the discussion in this section, are given in (54).
(54) Alignment of the PAH and General Syntactic Position Hierarchy
*LOCAL/LOWER  *ANIMATE/LOWER  *INANIMATE/LOWER
*HIGHER/INANIMATE  *HIGHER/ANIMATE  *HIGHER/LOCAL
These constraints are derived by the harmonic alignment of the scales in (55) and (56).
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(55) Person-Animacy Hierarchy (simplified)
LOCAL > ANIMATE > INANIMATE
(56) General Syntactic Position Hierarchy
HIGHER > LOWER
As detailed above, in filler-gap dependencies, the emergence of these types of well-
formedness effects can be attenuated by the preference to minimize the length of syn-
tactic dependencies. However, outside of movement dependencies, where the pressure
to create minimal links is irrelevant, this preference should be observed whenever there
are multiple argument positions within a clause that differ in height. This is one of the
predictions explored over the course of this section.
Finally, the focus of the present work has been on how PAH-based well-formedness
conditions impact incremental parsing decisions; and even more particularly, on how
obviation and animacy impact parsing. However, the relatively narrow focus should not
be taken to indicate that these are the only constraints on well-formedness. Borrowing
from the eADM, conditions based in case and definiteness should also be expected.
Another goal of this section is to consider a few critical extended predictions of the
model, including how well-formedness constraints from case marking and the local
persons can impact incremental processing.
6.6.7.1 Ditransitives and animacy in English
One the earliest studies of prominence effect by Bock and Warren (1985) speaks to a
possible extension of the account beyond the immediate data at hand. Bock and Warren
examined accuracy in recall of declarative sentences alternating between active (57a)
and passive (57b), dative constructions alternating between prepositional dative (57c)
and double object dative (57d) forms, and phrasal conjuncts alternating between ‘nat-
ural’ (57e) and ‘unnatural’ (57f) orders. The items were constructed such that each
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pair differed in whether the more prominent argument, as measured by ‘imageability’,
was ‘early’ or ‘late’. In the declarative and dative constructions, the early position cor-
responded to a structurally higher position, while the phrasal conjunction construction
alternated early and late based on linear order within the conjunct.
(57) Example stimuli from Bock and Warren (1985)
a. The doctor administered the shock. Active/Early
b. The shock was administered by the doctor. Passive/Late
c. The old hermit left the property to the university. PD/Early
d. The old hermit left the university the property. DO/Late
e. The lost hiker fought winter and time. Conjunct/Early
f. The lost hiker fought time and winter. Conjunct/Late
Participants listened to sentences of the form above, performed a short digit-recall task,
then were asked to recall the original sentence by writing in a booklet. Bock and Warren
measured the number of ‘inversions’ in each sentence structure depending on whether
the more prominent argument was early or late. For example, an inversion would
be counted if participants recalled a passive sentence as active, or vice versa. They
found that participants were significantly more likely to invert declarative and dative
constructions when the more prominent argument was late in the target sentence. In
the declarative conditions, when the more imageable argument was late, inversions
occurred around 30% of the time compared to 15% when it was early. In dative con-
ditions, inversions in the late conditions were around 30% and the early conditions
around 20%. In contrast, in both late and early conditions in the conjunct construction
there was a low numbers of inversions (less than 10% of trials).
The results were argued to show that there is a tight linking between the prominence
of a given noun in memory and the hierarchy of grammatical relations in (58), which
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was originally proposed by Keenan and Comrie (1977) to account for cross-linguistic
extraction asymmetries in relative clauses.
(58) Accessibility Hierarchy (Keenan and Comrie, 1977)
Subject > Direct Object > Indirect Object > Genitive > Comparative Object
In short, subjects mis-recalled sentences in a way that increased the congruence (i.e.
harmony) between prominence and structural position — a more prominent argument
that was in a structural position lower on the hierarchy in the target sentence was
frequently placed in a position higher on the hierarchy upon recall. The results cannot
be reduced to linear order preferences, as no effect of early versus late was found in
the phrasal conjunction constructions, where both alternating positions are on equal
footing with respect to the accessibility hierarchy.
These results can be reinterpreted in terms of the current well-formedness con-
straints. The dative alternation is particularly interesting, as the alternation between the
prepositional dative (PD) and double object dative (DO) does not turn on a movement-
based transformation, as is the case for the passive. While there is significant debate
about the particular structures that underly these constructions (e.g. Harley, 1997,
2002; Bruening, 2001, 2010), there is a general consensus that the GOAL/RECIPIENT
position is structurally higher than the THEME position in the DO, and the THEME po-
sition is higher than the GOAL position in the PD. A severely abstract structure for the
alternation, which only assumes these height relationships without claiming the identity
of the projections, is given in (59).
(59) a. The woman (AGENT) sent [ the man (GOAL) [ the letter (THEME) ] ]
b. The woman (AGENT) sent [ the letter (THEME) [ to the man (GOAL) ] ]
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Given that there is a mismatch in the prominence such that, for example, the GOAL is
higher ranked on the PAH than the THEME, then the well-formedness conditions dictate
that a preference for the DO structure over the PD structure should emerge. This is
exactly what was found by Bock and Warren. This provides some preliminary evidence
that the proposed well-formedness constraints provide general conditions on parsing
commitments rather than being restricted to filler-gap dependencies alone.
One important avenue for future work is to provide a more direct test of the hypoth-
esized interaction between well-formedness conditions and chain minimization prefer-
ences. In particular, when there is no chain formation in play, minimization should
not play a role, and incremental well-formedness preferences should dominate. When
a chain is added to the structure, the potential for conflict between pressures should
arise. My intention here is to outline what a test of this hypothesis might look like.
The example sentences in (60) cross two factors: whether the THEME argument
of the ditransitive verb is animate (messenger) or inanimate (message), and whether
the THEME is in situ or moved. The proposed method is the forced-choice pseudo-
production task introduced by Staub (2009), where participants are presented the be-
ginning of a sentence word-by-word, and are then asked to choose between two possible
completions by pressing a button. In the examples below, the portion of the sentences
outside of the curly braces would be presented word-by-word, with participants choos-
ing between the two possible completions within the curly braces (minus the visible
“gap”), which correspond to either a PD or DO structure.
(60) Extension 1: In situ versus moved arguments and the PD/DO contrast
a. The woman sent {the messenger to the man | the man the messenger}
b. The woman sent {the message to the man | the man the message }
c. . . . the messenger who the woman sent { to the man | the man }
d. . . . the message that the woman sent { to the man | the man }
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The hypothesis is that completions in the in situ conditions should be influenced by
well-formedness conditions alone, while completions in the moved conditions should
be additionally influenced by minimization pressures. This will play out specifically
in the inanimate theme conditions. In the in situ inanimate theme conditions, there
should be a preference for the DO completion, as this places the animate goal in a higher
structural position. In the moved inanimate theme conditions, the preference for the DO
completion should be reduced due to the competing pressure to make a more minimal
dependency by selecting the PD frame. In the in situ animate condition there should be
no preference between the two frames, as both arguments are equal in animacy. (Or, if
there is a bias for one structure or another based on some third factor, this condition will
reveal the direction of that potentially confounding preference). Finally, in the moved
animate condition, minimization should take over, favoring the PD frame.
6.6.7.2 Voice and animacy in English
Building from the discussion of Bock and Warren (1985), as well as the method and
design of the current study on Ojibwe, it is pertinent to consider whether the effect of
obviation and direct/inverse voice can be (conceptually) replicated in English with an-
imacy and active/passive voice. The example sentences in (61) fully cross three factors
with two levels each: head noun ANIMACY (animate versus inanimate), the THEMATIC
ROLE of the head noun (agent versus patient), and the VOICE of the clause (active versus
passive). Given the word order cues in English that are not present in Ojibwe, all exam-
ples include a parenthetical phrase between the head noun and the embedded clause to
create an extended period of ambiguity. All sentences would begin with the instructive
carrier phrase choose the picture with...
(61) Extension 2: Animacy, Voice, and Thematic Role
a. . . . the man who, from what you can tell, is hitting the ball.
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b. . . . the man who, from what you can tell, the ball is being hit by .
c. . . . the man who, from what you can tell, the ball is hitting .
d. . . . the man who, from what you can tell, is being hit by the ball.
e. . . . the ball that, from what you can tell, is hitting the man.
f. . . . the ball that, from what you can tell, the man is being hit by .
g. . . . the ball that, from what you can tell, the man is hitting .
h. . . . the ball that, from what you can tell, is being hit by the man.
Again following the method presented in the main experiment, the sentences would
be presented auditorily, with the task being to select among a series of images the one
that is congruent with the meaning of the sentence. The critical measures would be the
patterns of anticipatory looks towards the “head = agent” or “head = patient” images,
and accuracy on the picture selection task.
The main hypothesis for the anticipatory looks is that the animate head conditions
(like the proximate head conditions) should be associated with more looks towards
the agent images, while inanimate head conditions (like the obviative head conditions)
should on average show no preference. One benefit of this study is that a much higher
number of items and participants should be available, with tighter controls over factors
such as frequency and plausibility than was possible in the study of Ojibwe. The higher
number of items and subjects in particular could help tease apart questions such as
whether a serial or parallel account of the competition in the inanimate head conditions
is more appropriate.
The hypotheses for picture selection accuracy are more complex. There are at least
four pressures that will be in competition. Two are based purely on chain minimization:
(i) a general preference for subject gaps (i.e. to form an intermediate chain link), and
(ii) a general preference of the head noun to be the agent (i.e. for the chain to terminate
at the EA position). Two are based on well-formedness constraints: (iii) a preference
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for the animate argument to be the agent (i.e. an alignment of the EA position and
the animate argument), and (iv) a preference for the animate argument to occupy the
subject position (i.e. an alignment of the subject position and the animate argument).
The design allows for these factors to be isolated and interact. Only the condition
in (61a) allows every pressure to be satisfied by aligning the animate head noun with
the subject and EA positions. All others provide one violation or another. Focusing
on the animate conditions, (61b) associates the animate filler with a non-subject posi-
tion, (61c) associates the animate filler a patient in a non-subject position, and (61d)
results in the animate filler being a patient (61d). Of these four, (61c) should be the
most difficult as both proposed alignments are violated; whether the violation of the
animate/subject alignment in (61b) or the animate/agent alignment in (61d) is more
disruptive, or whether they are equally dispreferred, is an open question.
As with the obviative head nouns in Ojibwe, all of the inanimate conditions vio-
late one preference or another. This is the result of the fundamental clash between the
general preference for minimal chains by creating an intermediate link in the subject
position, and the preference for animate arguments to fill the subject position (or inan-
imate arguments to be in a non-subject position). In (61e), both the animate/subject
and animate/EA alignments are violated; in (61f) the animate/agent alignment and
subject gap preference is violated; in (61g) the subject gap and agent-first preferences
are violated; in (61h) the agent-first preference and the animate/subject preference
is violated. Given that nearly everything in these conditions relies on the interaction
of constraints, the results will inform how much weight should be given to each con-
straint. This should be done by implementing a formal model that can derive these
constraint weights from the experimental results and evaluate the fit of various models
that include/lack various pressures.
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6.6.7.3 Ergativity and the Subject Gap Advantage
In this section I consider evidence from filler-gap processing in (split)-ergative lan-
guages. A wide range of languages with ergative case and/or agreement patterns have
been studied including Basque (Carreiras, Duñabeitia, Vergara, De La Cruz-Pavía, and
Laka, 2010), Avar (Polinsky, Gallo, Graff, and Kravtchenko, 2012), Q’anjob’al (Clemens,
Coon, Pedro, Morgan, Polinsky, Tandet, and Wagers, 2015), Chamorro (Wagers et al.,
2018), Niuean (Tollan, Massam, and Heller, 2019), and Tongan (Ono, Otaki, Sato, Vea,
Otsuka, Koizumi, et al., 2020). These results provide a challenge for the claim that
dependency minimization universally underlies the predictive formation of movement
chains by generally questioning the universality of the Subject Gap Advantage.
Indeed, the existence of the Subject Gap Advantage is more vexed than I have let
on so far. In particular, there is much debate centering around whether or not it is
universally attested in all languages. This debate is broadly relevant here as the Minimal
Dependency Preference, and by extension the SGA, are posited to be borne of a universal
processing pressure that prefers shorter movement chains. Therefore from one angle, it
appears that the account makes the rather strong (and misguided) claim that the SGA
should be universal.
That said, the very question of whether the SGA is universal is ill-formed in at least
two ways. First, as stated previously, there is no single property that defines a “subject”
in all languages (McCloskey, 1997). If there is no universal and independent notion of
subjecthood within our linguistic representation, then the idea of a universal Subject
Gap Advantage in processing is at worst nonsensical, and at best non-homogenous.
Second, the SGA, as it is formulated in this chapter, is an often observed pattern of
behavior rather than a mental constraint on parsing. The parsing constraint that leads
to the SGA is chain minimization. If we take on a definition of subject as the syntacti-
cally highest argument position in the clause, as has been done here, then the question
we should be asking is whether there is a universal preference for syntactic dependency
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minimization. Similarly, if we define the subject as the most agentive argument in the
clause (e.g. Tollan, 2020), the empirical question becomes about the universal emer-
gence of the Agent-First Preference. This too is a surface pattern that is hypothesized
to be derived by the pressure to minimize chain length, given that the agent role is
assigned in a higher structural position than the patient role.
That said, as noted now a number of times, the emergence of minimization pres-
sures in observed behavioral preferences can be obscured by other factors such as well-
formedness conditions. When these other factors end up advantaging a non-minimal
dependency, it is possible for minimization effects to disappear. In the most extreme
case, if these competing constraints are strong enough, the advantage could even be
imagined to reverse. Such a reversal would not falsify the theory that there is a general
preference for minimal dependencies. It simply shows that there are other, sometimes
stronger, pressures that guide our incremental parsing commitments.
Briefly before moving forward, a posited example of this in Ojibwe can be found
in the proposal that obviative arguments are grammatically blocked from forming syn-
tactic subject gaps. Therefore, while forming a chain with an intermediate link in this
position would be the more minimal option, it is blocked by the well-formedness con-
ditions imposed by the grammar.
With all of this in mind, I consider the results and claims of Tollan et al. (2019),
who examine the processing of wh-movement dependencies in Niuean, a Polynesian
language of the South Pacific with a split-ergative case system. Their study is among
the most recent to examine the effects of ergativity, and was in part the methodological
inspiration for the current study on Ojibwe.
There are three different case alignments in Niuean, which vary as a function of
the particular verb — for convenience and consistency with the terminology of Tollan
et al., I refer to the more agentive argument as the subject and the non-agentive argu-
ment the object. With Transitive-ERG verbs, the subjects is ERG(ATIVE) and the object
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is ABS(OLUTIVE). With Transitive-ABS and Intransitive-ABS verbs, the subject is ABS and
the object OBL(IQUE). These two differ in that the object is obligatory in the transitive
counterpart, and optional with the intransitive. In their study, these three verb types
were crossed either a subject or object wh-question, exemplified in (62).









































































‘Which cat {always ran to the rabbit | did the dog always run to}’?
Because the wh-phrase is not marked with overt case morphology, all three sentences are
temporarily ambiguous between subject and object extractions. The critical window of
ambiguity occurs in the time between the encoding of the verb and the case morphology
of the non-extracted argument. During this time period, the case frame can be deduced,
but the case marking of the extracted argument, and therefore its thematic role, is not
yet evident. The question, which should be familiar, is whether Niuean speakers make
assumptions about the thematic role of the extracted argument during this period of
ambiguity, and whether this differs as a function of case frame and transitivity.
There are two major results. First, there was a lower proportion of looks towards
subject-images in Transitive-ERG conditions (.41) compared to the Transitive-ABS and
Intransitive-ABS conditions (.48). The Transitive-ABS (.47) and Intransitive-ABS (.49)
conditions did not show a reliable difference in subject-image looks. Second, there
was a higher proportion of looks towards the object-image in Transitive-ERG (.50) com-
pared to Transitive-ABS and Intransitive-ABS conditions (.41). However, in this case,
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Transitive-ABS and Intransitive-ABS did show a reliable difference such that there were
more looks towards the object-image in Transitive-ABS condition (.44) than Intransitive-
ABS condition (.38). In other words, Tollan et al. found two main effects: (i) a prefer-
ence for the filler argument to be predictively encoded with absolutive case, resulting
in an “object” preference in the Transitive-ERG condition and “subject” preferences in
the Transitive-ABS and Intransitive-ABS conditions, and (ii) an attenuated expectation
for the “object” argument in the Intransitive-ABS conditions. It is the first finding — a
preference for the “object” parse — that calls into question the universality of the SGA.
Tollan et al. account for these results by positing that the parser prefers depen-
dencies that are more likely to materialize. Likelihood, in turn, is couched in terms
of presumed frequency — absolutive arguments have a wider syntactic distribution,
and are almost certainly the most common; similarly, objects are not obligatory with
intransitives, and therefore are less likely to included in the sentences.
I note that this is a rather different use of frequency than has been employed else-
where, for example by Gennari and MacDonald (2008, 2009) and Reali and Chris-
tiansen (2007). A parallel argument would be based on the distribution of subject
versus object extractions given a particular case-frame. While it may well be that ob-
ject extractions are more frequent than subject extractions with Transitive-ERG verbs in
Niuean, this is neither shown nor presumed in their account. Instead, Tollan et al. rea-
son that non-case marked arguments are predictively assigned the most common case
(absolutive). In turn, given a Transitive-ERG verb, this argument is linked to the object
position and assigned the patient role.
From this vantage point, the lack of SGA under ergative alignments boils down to
incremental commitments related to case assignment, which then directly feed expecta-
tions about where a gap should arise. This allows the pattern to be immediately folded
into the maximize well-formedness framework. Because Transitive-ERG verbs are only
consistent with a parse where the ergative argument occupies the agent-assigning po-
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sition, well-formedness conditions block the more minimal parse that would otherwise
blindly prefer the (presumed) absolutive argument to occupy this position.
To take this even further, the commitments about case assignment can be tied to a
general hierarchy of case, given in (63). Note that, like the PAH, the hierarchy belies
the underlying grammatical source, but proves handy for online implementation.
(63) Morphological case accessibility hierarchy (Bobaljik, 2008; Tollan, 2020)
UNMARKED (NOM, ABS) > DEPENDENT (ERG, ACC) > LEXICAL/OBLIQUE (DAT)
Given a case-ambiguous noun, I contend that the parser assigns the least marked case
consistent with the input at that point. This obviates the need for a direct appeal to
frequency in explaining incremental parsing commitments related to case assignment.
Frequency is treated as a pattern of behavior to be explained by grammatical or pro-
cessing principles rather than the source of the effect.
6.6.7.4 Person, pronouns, and the Subject Gap Advantage
The final extension I consider is to go beyond animacy and obviation to the expected
effects of the core person categories. This literature has revealed configurations where
object relative clauses are preferred over subject relative clauses, which has been argued
to support experience-based accounts such as the classic constraint-based model.
Given what has been discussed so far, the well-formedness account makes the clear
prediction that local persons (first and second) should be preferred as agents and syntac-
tic subjects above all other person categories, as they are the highest ranked categories
on the PAH. However, the local persons also introduce a number of additional factors
that must be taken into consideration — most saliently, they are encoded as pronouns
(i.e. I, me, we, us, you) and their reference is computed indexically. While animate and
inanimate persons may also appear as indexical pronouns (i.e. they, them, he, him, she,
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her, it), in the studies reviewed so far they have appeared as full, definite nominals (e.g.
the message/messenger).
These types of factors have long been known to factor into prominence-based ef-
fects. For example, the Empathy Hierarchy proposed by DeLancey (1981), among other
distinctions, introduces a ranking of third person pronouns above the other full nominal
categories. I give a simplified form that ignores additional distinction made between
humans and animals and natural forces versus inanimate objects.
(64) The (simplified) Empathy Hierarchy (cf. DeLancey, 1981)
LOCAL > 3RD PRONOUNS > ANIMATE > INANIMATE
DeLancey uses the scale to account for patterns of split-ergativity, noting that the splits
between local persons versus everything else and local/third pronominals versus every-
thing else are the most consistently evidenced across languages. If we take the hierarchy
in (64) on board, we still make the prediction that local versus third persons should dif-
fer in prominence, but that this should be additionally cut by a distinction between
nouns and pronouns.
With all of this in mind, I first consider the results of a series of experiments by Re-
ali and Christiansen (2007) and a later follow-up by Heider, Dery, and Roland (2014),
who examine the processing of SRCs versus ORCs with “pronominal” relative clauses
(see also Gordon, Hendrick, and Johnson, 2001). In four separate self-paced reading
experiments, Reali and Christiansen (2007) compare the processing profile of ORCs
versus SRCs with an embedded (i) second person pronoun (65a), (ii) first person pro-
noun (65b), (iii) third person (plural) animate pronoun (65c), and (iv) a third person
inanimate (or impersonal) pronoun (65d).
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(65) Sample stimuli from Reali and Christiansen (2007)
a. The consultant that { you called | called you } emphasized the need for
additional funding.
b. The lady that { I visited | visited me } enjoyed the meal.
c. According to the Taylors, the landlord that { they telephoned | telephoned
them } offered a nice apartment.
d. The research was very illuminating. The studies that { it motivated | mo-
tivated it } converged to similar results
With second, first, and animate pronouns, they found that ORCs were associated with
faster button presses than SRCs in two-word embedded clause region. In contrast,
inanimate pronouns showed the opposite patterns, with SRCs showing faster button
presses than ORCs. Reali and Christiansen link these results to the corpus-based statis-
tical distribution of SRCs versus ORCs given each type of pronominal argument, on the
hypothesis that less frequent constructions should be associated with more processing
difficulty, and therefore longer button press latency in SPR. Congruent with this rea-
soning, they show that first, second, and animate RCs more commonly appear as ORCs,
while inanimate RCs are more commonly SRCs.
In a later follow-up, Heider et al. (2014) argue that there are issues with both the
corpus-based counts and the experimental items in the inanimate RC conditions of Reali
and Christiansen (2007). For the corpus counts, Heider et al. show that if both full
and reduced relative clauses are included in the counts, the inanimate ORCs show the
same asymmetry as the other pronominal RCs (i.e. ORCs being more frequent than
SRCs). Therefore, at first blush, there appears to in fact be a mismatch between the
distributional patterns and the processing measures, upending the experience-based
account.
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However, Heider et al. also argue in a series of studies that Reali and Christiansen’s
finding of longer RTs in SRCs versus ORCs with inanimate pronouns is cofounded by a
garden-path effect. In many of their items, including the one in (66d), the first noun
in the critical second sentence can be initially interpreted as co-referential with the
subject of the carrier sentence — e.g. the string The research was very illuminating.
The studies. . . can be interpreted such that the studies is referring back to the research.
In the SRC conditions, this parse is disrupted at the pronoun, where the misanalysis
first becomes apparent, leading to longer reading times in the critical region. Heider
et al. show that with stimuli that control for this confound, the inanimate pronoun
conditions show the same asymmetry as the other pronominal conditions, such that
ORCs are associated with faster button presses than SRCs. They argue these results
are therefore still consistent with an experience-based account, but not a so-called fine-
grained experience-based account where the different associations for reduced versus
unreduced RCs is maintained.
As with the processing of absolutive arguments in ergative languages, the finding of
an ORC advantage with pronominal RCs calls into question the Subject Gap Advantage,
and therefore the universality of the proposed chain-minimization principles. Once
again, the model can handle such cases in a principled manner by appealing to inde-
pendent well-formedness conditions. In this case, the relevant factor is that pronominal
forms are ranked above non-pronominal forms; therefore alignments where pronouns
are in the syntactic subject position and assigned the agent role will be preferred over
parses with the opposite alignment. For the cases examined by Reali and Christiansen
and Heider et al., all of the ORC constructions have this preferred alignment, while the
SRCs are in violation. Therefore the finding of the ORC preference in these cases is
broadly consistent with the incremental well-formedness account.
Further evidence in support of the proposal that the nominal-pronominal distinction
obscures the impact of minimization can be found in Clothier-Goldschmidt and Wagers
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(2017), who compare full DPs, third person pronouns, and second person pronouns
inside of SRCs and ORCs using self-paced reading. Sample items for each condition are
given in (66).
(66) Sample stimuli from Clothier-Goldschmidt and Wagers (2017)
a. . . . the nurse that { welcomed the mailman | the mailman welcomed } . . .
b. . . . the nurse that { welcomed him | he welcomed } . . .
c. . . . the nurse that { welcomed you | you welcomed } . . .
Clothier-Goldschmidt and Wagers found a subject gap advantage for the full DP condi-
tions. The penalty for ORCs compared to SRCs in the full DP conditions in both SPR
button presses at the embedded verb (RTORC − RTSRC ≈ 44ms) and in end-of-sentence
comprehension questions (SRC = 80%, ORC = 68%). No differences were found be-
tween SRCs and ORCs for either of the pronominal conditions in either button press
latency or comprehension question accuracy (cf. Reali and Christiansen (2007) who
claim an object gap advantage in SPR RT in these cases).
Clothier-Goldschmidt and Wagers argue that this goes against the predictions of the
PAH, on the logic that the third persons should pattern together by both showing the
SGA, with only the second person leading to neutralization of the effect. However,
when the additional factor of pronominalization is taken into account (i.e. as in the
Empathy Hierarchy of DeLancey (1981)), it is possible to reconcile the pattern with
the PAH. In short, it appears that the pressure to put pronominal forms in the subject
position overrides minimization pressures, which would otherwise prefer a subject gap
across the board.
While I have argued that the findings of Reali and Christiansen (2007), Heider et al.
(2014), and Clothier-Goldschmidt and Wagers (2017) are generally consistent with an
account where PAH-based well-formedness pressures can attenuate or eliminate the
SGA, an issue arises if care is taken to consider the incremental availability of different
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pieces of information. All of these studies had a third person animate full DP as the
filler and modulated the identity of the non-displaced argument. But at the point at
which this filler is encoded, and therefore when a chain is predictively formed, it is not
yet known what the identity of the non-displaced argument will be, or even if there
will be another argument at all (i.e. the verb could be intransitive). This information
matters a great deal to what incremental predictions will be entertained given the PAH.
For example, if the other argument is an animate full DP, then the filler and the non-
displaced argument are on equal footing; if it is an inanimate full DP, then the filler
is ranked above the non-displaced argument; if it is a second person, then the filler is
ranked below the non-displaced argument.
Given that information about the non-displaced filler is not available until further
down the line, initial parsing decisions cannot be informed by relational factors. With an
animate filler, the non-relational effects of the PAH in conjunction with chain-minimization
should results in the predictive formation of a chain terminating in the EA position with
an intermediate subject gap. Herein lies the rub: This predicts that there should be a
filled-gap effect with ORCs and a processing disruption regardless of the identity of the
argument ultimately found to be filling this position.
This issue has echos of another long-running challenge for the prediction-based ac-
counts of filler-gap processing, and in particular the Active Filler Strategy. In the classic
sentences from Stowe (1986), exemplified in (67), the filled-gap effect appears not at
the filled subject position (Ruth), but the filled direct object position (us).
(67) My brother wanted to know who Ruth will bring us home to at Christmas.
However, as discussed in the introduction, a later study by Lee (2004), which was then
replicated and extended in Wagers and Pendleton (2016), showed that filled-gap effects
could be observed in this position if an adjunct is inserted between the filler and the filled
subject position. The relevant example is given in (68).
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(68) That is the cult which, in the early eighties, Elaine inspired many friends to
make a deep commitment to .
Following Wagers and Pendleton (2016), it is reasonable to assume that the process of
predictive chain formation takes time, and that, without the extra time afforded by the
presence of the adjunct phrase, the parser does formulate a prediction before reaching
the subject position, which occurs in the very next word.
Returning to the sentences in Reali and Christiansen (2007), Heider et al. (2014),
and Clothier-Goldschmidt and Wagers (2017), none of these studies included a buffer
region between the filler and the embedded clause, with the filled subject position in the
ORC conditions immediately following the region where the filler could be identified.
It is therefore possible that the parser simply did not have enough time to generate the
subject gap prediction, leading to a lack of subject gap effect. One priority for future
work should be to provide a test of this hypothesis by conducting a version of these
studies where the items include an intervening adjunct phrase.
A further avenue of interest is to examine whether local person fillers lead to the
expected effects. One challenge to overcome is the oddity of relativization with pro-
nouns in English. To my ears, both you who saw the woman and you who the woman
saw are both rather marked, if not ungrammatical. One initial idea that could be used
to get around this is to embed the pronoun within a quantificational phrase, as in (69),
where either a first person, second person, third person animate pronoun, animate DP,
or inanimate DP is within the quantificational phrase.
(69) Extension 3: Modifying the PAH ranking of the filler
a. All of us who { inspired the woman | the woman inspired }
b. All of you who { inspired the woman | the woman inspired }
c. All of them who { inspired the woman | the woman inspired }
d. All of the painters who { inspired the woman | the woman inspired }
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e. All of the paintings that { inspired the woman | the woman inspired }
Assuming that these quantificational phrases, in some sense, have the features of the
embedded person, we should expect to see differences between SRCs and ORCs as a
function of person and ranking on the PAH — the local persons should be most strongly
preferred in the SRC parse, followed by the third person pronouns, then the animate
DPs, and finally the inanimate DPs.
6.7 Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to explore the processing of obviation and voice mark-
ing in Border Lakes Ojibwe, and explore the wider role of person-based prominence
information in theories of sentence processing. The major finding was that Ojibwe
speakers predictively encode proximate arguments as agents, with obviative arguments
showing no clear preference to be placed in one role or another prior to the bottom-up
evidence from voice marking. This provides some of the most direct support to date
for theories where prominence information such as obviation has an immediate impact
on processing decisions. Further, it provides evidence that the proximate-obviative dis-
tinction mirrors the impact of animacy on filer-gap processing in languages like English
(Wagers and Pendleton, 2016).
These results were argued to be best captured by the Revised Active Filler Strategy,
where fillers trigger a process of predictive chain formation that terminates in a theta-
assigning position. These chains were argued to be subject to two basic pressures: (i)
the pressure to make the smallest links possible, and (ii) the pressure to maximize in-
cremental well-formedness. The particular well-formedness conditions considered here
were derived from the harmonic alignment of the Person-Animacy Hierarchy and a num-
ber of specific instantiations of the General Syntactic Position Hierarchy. These basic
pressures on chain formation were shown to align with higher ranked arguments such
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as proximate and animate, and conflict with lower ranked arguments such as obviative
and inanimate, providing an explanation for the immediate experimental results and
the cross-linguistic profile of prominence effects on filler-gap dependency processing.
The model linked both the Agent-First Preference and the Subject Gap Advantage to the
chain minimization pressure, providing a syntax-first model where initial parsing deci-





This dissertation set out to understand person-based prominence effects: the observation
that certain person categories such as first, second, or proximate are often privileged
by the grammar. In leading theories of the past fifty years such as the feature geom-
etry and prominence hierarchy, these effects have been argued to arise from extrinsic
entailment relationships between features or categories. I argued for a lower layer
of representation for person, obviation, and animacy — ontologically-based primitives
that correspond to the author, addressee, animate beings, and inanimate objects. These
primitives were argued to be combined into sets to form features related to person,
obviation, and noun classification, providing a first-order representation of the entail-
ment relationships between features and categories described by feature geometries and
prominence hierarchies. With this representation, the full range of known prominence-
based agreement effects related to person and obviation were captured, as well as the
possible category distinctions within natural language. Finally, prominence relations
were shown to be active in sentence processing by forming restrictions on predictive
chain formation in filler-gap dependency processing, and by guiding the computation
of argument structure relationships more generally.
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The remainder of this conclusory chapter is devoted to briefly outlining two ma-
jor areas for future consideration, including wider speculations on the impact of the
findings and arguments in this thesis.
7.2 Categories, features, and primitives
There are three major levels of representation that underly person: categories, features,
and primitives. Primitives connect the linguistic representation to the basic concepts
within the ontology of person. Features consist of particular sets of these primitives.
Finally, categories are different combinations of features. The lowest level of mental
representation is the ontology. The concepts within the ontology constrain the pos-
sible features that can be created. In turn, the possible categories (and probes) are
constrained by the available set of features. An overarching goal of this thesis was to
understand each level of representation and provide a further elucidation of the rela-
tionships between the levels.
With any representation, one must be careful not to confuse the formal attributes
(the “structure” of the representation) from the actual values that are assigned within
the structure (the “type” of the representation). For example, the structure of features
argued for in this thesis consists of a set and a value. The type of the feature is defined
by the particular primitives that fill the set. Over the course of the dissertation, claims
were made both about what types can exist (i.e. claims about what concepts should
be included in the ontology) as well as about the structure of the representation (i.e.
how features are structured and how they interact semantically and syntactically). I
consider outstanding issues in both of these domains.
While the idea of the ontology of person comes from Harbour (2016), the novel
proposal was to create analogues of the ontology in the syntactic representation, and
to further elaborate the ontology by adding the inanimate objects, represented by r,
r ′, r ′′, and so on. So far, the ontology gives us the means to conceptualize basic so-
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cial interaction with the author and addressee, and creates a fundamental cut between
living and non-living things. Other strong contenders for being ontologically specified
are cuts between humans and non-humans within the living things, and natural forces
versus inanimate objects in the domain of the non-living.
That said, care should be taken when claiming that a concept is ontologically spec-
ified versus emergent from the particulars of the linguistic representation itself. For
example, on the present account the concept of “proximate” is not a fundamental part
of the ontology. It is a function of a feature that groups together the i, u, and a single
o. The question of whether a given distinction is ontological versus emergent from the
structure of features arises most sharply in noun classification and classifier systems.
The question of how exactly the types defined by distinction in sex, gender, honorific
or social status, and more should be treated within the theory remains open. However,
the data structures provided within the theory have the potential to accommodate such
cuts in a number of ways.
A second critical question that is largely open is why particular subsets of the on-
tology become features. The proposed data structure could in principle give rise to a
huge variety of different features, but in fact there is only a limited set that are observed
across the world’s languages. The features discussed here were [Animate], [Proximate],
[Participant], [Author], and [Addressee]. These syntactic sets for each of these features
is repeated in (1).
(1) Attested “person” features
a. [Animate] = {I , U , O, O′, . . . , On}
b. [Proximate] = {I , U , O}
c. [Participant] = {I , U}
d. [Author] = {I}
e. [Addressee] = {U}
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There are therefore many unattested features. A sample of some of the most salient
missing features is given in (2).
(2) Sample of unattested “person” features
a. [Other] = {O, O′, . . . , On}
b. [Obviative] = {O′, O′′ . . . , On}
c. [Y’all] = {U , O, O′, . . . , On}
d. [Exclusive] = {I , O, O′, . . . , On}
There is, at present, no evidence for a feature that uniquely picks out the non-local
others (2a), nor the non-proximate others (2b). In agreement, these features would
be respectively expected to give rise to patterns where the third person is ranked above
the local persons or the obviative person above the proximate person. Furthermore, the
known patterns are inconsistent with a feature that picks out the addressee and others
to the exclusion of the author (2c), as well as one that picks out the author and others
to the exclusion of the addressee (2d). These would give rise to a probe that prefers
agreement with a second/third person over the first person, or a first/third person over
the second person, respectively.
The account does not provide a principled explanation for why we have the features
we have, but two one-way implicational relations, which are reminiscent of the feature
geometry, emerge. These are summarized below, with (3a) showing that the presence
of a “non-proximate” O implies the presence of I , U , and O, and (3b) showing that the
presence of the “proximate” O implies the presence of I and U .
(3) Implicational relationships between primitives
a. O′, . . . , On→ I , U , O
b. O→ I , U
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Like feature geometries and prominence hierarchies, the relationships in (3) should
be considered purely descriptive. They do not constitute an explanation of why these
properties should hold. I suspect that the implicational relationships between primitives
could find an explanation in the nature of acquisition. For example, it is possible that
the learning algorithm is constrained in such a manner that leads these relationships to
emerge, though spelling-out this suspicion is left to future work.
A subsidiary outstanding puzzle within this family is the Addressee Asymmetry. To
review, this is the observation that an independent [Addressee] feature is necessary to
define the possible person probes, in order to capture the You-First and Ultra Strong
Addressee patterns, but cannot be independently specified in the derivation of person
categories, to account for the asymmetry encompassed by Zwicky’s Problem. To gen-
eralize the issue, we have a case where there is clear motivation to include a feature
within the representation, but it is not free to be used in every domain of the grammar.
Again, I imagine this problem could be solved by an appeal to the acquisition path. It
is plausible to assume that the set of categories within a language are established by the
learner prior to the acquisition of the system of agreement with those categories. The
learning of categories could be constrained such that there can be no independent [ad-
dressee] feature, accounting for the asymmetry observed by Zwicky (1977). However,
if a contrast emerges within the language to support the winnowing of [participant] to
[participant*], as proposed here under the theory of contrastive interpretations (Cow-
per and Hall, 2019), this “unlocks” an independent [addressee] feature that can be
specified on agreement probes in this later stage of acquisition. Seeing if this proposed
path, or something similar, could be responsible for this asymmetry is another avenue
to explore to refine the claims of the thesis.
The above problems were issues in the domain of representational types. However,
there are also a number of issues to grapple with in how the representation is structured
and how it is manipulated. First, while a theory of the semantics of number was devel-
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oped, a syntactic theory of number agreement was almost entirely taken for granted.
The major question left is how the set-based formulation of AGREE applies within this
domain. Second, very little was said about the insertion of morphology. However, the
phenomena of gluttony, and the different types of repairs and reactions that lead to the
PCC, portmanteau forms, omnivority, and so on are intimately tied to the workings of
spell-out. A detailed account in this vein is again left to future work.
7.3 The role of the grammar in processing
A grammar within the Chomskyan tradition is a finite system of rules or operations that
can generate all and only well-formed linguistic representations. Classically, a major
constraint on theories of the grammar is that they should be learnable from the primary
input — a child must be able to arrive at a generative system under the conditions
presented by the poverty of the stimulus (Chomsky, 1965).
However, being acquirable (given limited input) is not the only demand that our the-
ory of the grammar must meet. The act of language processing involves understanding
and producing well-formed representations under the pressures and uncertainty pre-
sented by incrementality. The grammar must be deployable over time — we do not
wait till the end of a sentence to generate a phrase-marker, but rather generate struc-
tures in what appears to be a continuous manner, revising and integrating based on the
new information that we encounter. One underlying goal in this thesis was to ensure
that the model of the grammar met this condition of incremental validity.
All of this reveals an apparent tension within the dissertation: While the “static”
theory of the grammar presented here rejected direct use of prominence hierarchies,
treating them as descriptive rather than explanatory, the model of incremental well-
formedness was centered around using prominence hierarchies to generate constraints.
This leads to questions about the relationship between the current theory of the gram-
mar and the theory of how that grammar is deployed in real-time.
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I believe the main issue here is one of granularity. The proposed theory of filler-gap
processing is operating at the level of the person categories: a filler is displaced from
its base-position, and that filler must be associated with that gap site. In contrast, the
formal theory of agreement, which was the focus of the earlier chapters, was operat-
ing at the level of features/primitives. Given that the particular PAH was shown to
be descriptively adequate in capturing prominence relationships at the category level,
the PAH minimally provides a sufficient approximation of the actual well-formedness
conditions that are employed by the parser at that level of representation. Whether
these are the actual constraints in the minds of language users should be questioned,
though treating them as such is sure to provide fruitful grounds for refining our under-
standing of how prominence relations affect real-time processing behavior in filler-gap
dependencies.
Broadening out, the processing theory developed in this thesis is a marked shift from
the theories of filler-gap dependencies that have lead the field over the past 25 years.
These theories have largely followed the lead of the classical constraint-based approach
by treating patterns of behavior as both the explanation and the explicandum. If the new
lines of inquiry opened in the 1950’s and 60’s marked the cognitive revolution, freeing
the psychological sciences from the confines of behaviorism, perhaps what is needed
now is something of a cognitive revival. This does not mean abandoning or dismissing
lines of inquiry related to experience and association. These studies uncover the critical
patterns of linguistic behavior and inform the nature of the primary input to the learner.
However, these patterns do not at the same time constitute an explanation for why
certain strings of language are well-formed or ill-formed, or why some strings are more
difficult to process than others — this begs the question of why these particular patterns
should arise in the first place. Moreover, it leaves entirely unanswered the question of
why some patterns arise (or arise with a greater degree of frequency), while others do
not (or do to a lesser degree).
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By accepting the argument in the previous paragraph, one does not necessarily need
to commit to the existence of an innate Universal Grammar or a built-in roadmap spe-
cific to language development, which are commonly associated with the paradigm shift
of the cognitive revolution. The main claims of the thesis did not hinge on positing
domain-specific and innate universals, though many of the claims could be framed in
that way. However, one does need to commit to the idea that the initial state and/or
mechanisms that govern language acquisition are biased in such a way that leads to
certain readily imaginable linguistic patterns to be ruled out. Specifically, these biases
must result in only a limited set of possible person features, which in turn give rise to a
restricted set of possible person-based categories and prominence effects. We can and
should (and do) debate whether these biases are language-specific or domain-general,
but the fact that such biases exists is a matter of fact. This thesis gave a formal account
of the “end state” that these biases give rise to — the representations that they produce
synchronically in mature language users, and how these representations influence in-
cremental processing. However, the question of how and why these biases arise is one





DERIVATIONS WITH PROXIMATE IN HARBOUR’S
SYSTEM
This appendix provides the derivations in Harbour’s (2016) system to examine whether
the quintipartition of Ojibwe can be derived from any of the possible feature orders.
Only orders within the three feature specification are considered. As explored in de-
tail in the main text of Chapter 2, these are the only combinations that allow for the
possibility of deriving a five-way split. One feature systems max out at two partitions,
and two feature systems max out at four partitions. This leaves the following feature
combinations in contention:
(1) Feature combinations in contention for deriving the quintipartition









I consider each in turn.
A.1 ±proximate(±author(±participant(π))
The first combination is where the proximate feature composes last, with participant
composing before author. The derivation can be truncated, as it builds from the output
of the original quadripartition of Harbour. These outputs are shown in (2).
(2) Output of quardipartition combination, before Lexical Complementarity
a. −author(+participant(π)) = {∅, ux , x x}
b. −author(−participant(π)) = {∅, x x}
c. +author(+participant(π)) = {i x , iux}
d. +author(−participant(π)) = {i x}
The derivations are given in the following four examples:
(3) ±proximate +author −participant
a. J−proximate(+author(−participant(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L pt))⊕L au)	max(L px))
= {i x} 	 {iuo}
= {i x\iuo}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
b. J+proximate(+author(−participant(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L pt))⊕L au)⊕L px)
= {i x} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o}
= {i x t iuo, i x t iu, i x t io, i x t uo, i x t i, i x t u, i x t o}
= {iuox , iux , iox , iuox , i x , iux , iox}
= {iux , i x , }
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(4) ±proximate +author +participant
a. J−proximate(+author(+participant(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L pt))⊕L au)	max(L px))
= {i x , iux} 	 {iuo}
= {i x\iuo, iux\iuo}
= {∅, x ′x ′ , x ′x ′}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
b. J+proximate(+author(+participant(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L pt))⊕L au)⊕L px)
= {i x , iux} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o}
= {i x t iuo, i x t iu, i x t io, i x t uo, i x t i, i x t u, i x t o,
iux t iuo, iux t iu, iux t io, iux t uo, iux t i, iux t u, iux t o}
= {iuox , iux , iox , iuox , i x , iux , iox ,
iuox , iux , iuox , iuox , iux , iux , iuox}
= {iux , i x}
(5) ±proximate −author −participant
a. J−proximate(−author(−participant(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L pt))	max(L au))	max(L px))
= {∅, x x} 	 {iuo}
= {∅\iuo, x x\iuo}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
b. J+proximate(−author(−participant(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L pt))	max(L au))⊕L px)
= {∅, x x} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o}
= {∅t iuo,∅t iu,∅t io,∅t uo,∅t i,∅t u,∅t o
x x t iuo, x x t iu, x x t io, x x t uo, x x t i, x x t u, x x t o}
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= {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o,
iuox x , iux x , iox x , uox x , i x x , ux x , ox x}
= {iux , i x , ux , ox}
(6) ±proximate −author +participant
a. J−proximate(−author(+participant(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L pt)	max(L au))	max(L px))
= {∅, ux , x x} 	 {iuo}
= {∅\iuo, ux\iuo, x x\iuo}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
b. J+proximate(−author(+participant(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L pt)	max(L au))⊕L px)
= {∅, ux , x x} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o}
= {∅t iuo,∅t iu,∅t io,∅t uo,∅t i,∅t u,∅t o
ux t iuo, ux t iu, ux t io, ux t uo, ux t i, ux t u, ux t o
x x t iuo, x x t iu, x x t io, x x t uo, x x t i, x x t u, x x t o}
= {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o,
iuox , iux , iuox , uox , iux , ux , uox ,
iuox x , iux x , iox x , uox x , i x x , ux x , ox x}
= {iux , i x , ux , ox}
A.2 ±author(±proximate(±participant(π)))
The second derivation is with the proximate feature in a medial position, with partic-
ipant composing prior to author. These derivations are truncated slightly, taking for
granted the initial operation of the participant feature in each case.
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(7) −author ±proximate −participant
a. J−author(−proximate(−participant(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L pt))	max(L px))	max(L au))
= ({∅, x x} 	 {iuo})	 {i}
= {∅\iuo, x x\iuo} 	 {i}
= {∅, x ′x ′} 	 {i}
= {∅\i, x ′x ′\i}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
b. J−author(+proximate(−participant(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L pt))⊕L px)	max(L au))
= ({∅, x x} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o})	 {i}
= {iux , i x , ux , ox} 	 {i}
= {iux\i, i x\i, ux\i, ox\i}
= {ux , x x}
(8) +author ±proximate −participant
a. J+author(−proximate(−participant(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L pt))	max(L px))⊕L au)
= ({∅, x x} 	 {iuo})⊕ {i}
= {∅\iuo, x x\iuo} ⊕ {i}
= {∅, x ′x ′} ⊕ {i}
= {∅t i, x ′x ′ t i}
= {i x ′}
b. J+author(+proximate(−participant(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L pt))⊕L px)⊕L au)
= ({∅, x x} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o})⊕ {i}
= {iux , i x , ux , ox} ⊕ {i}
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= {iux t i, i x t i, ux t i, ox t i}
= {iux , i x}
(9) −author ±proximate +participant
a. J−author(−proximate(+participant(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L pt)	max(L px))	max(L au))
= ({i x , iux , ux} 	 {iuo})	 {i}
= {i x\iuo, iux\iuo, ux\iuo} 	 {i}
= {∅, x ′x ′} 	 {i}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
b. J−author(+proximate(+participant(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L pt)⊕L px)	max(L au))
= ({i x , iux , ux} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o})	 {i}
= {i x , iux , ux} 	 {i}
= {∅, ux , x x}
(10) +author ±proximate +participant
a. J+author(−proximate(+participant(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L pt)	max(L px))⊕L au)
= ({i x , iux , ux} 	 {iuo})⊕ {i}
= {i x\iuo, iux\iuo, ux\iuo} ⊕ {i}
= {∅, x ′x ′} ⊕ {i}
= {i x ′}
b. J+author(+proximate(+participant(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L pt)⊕L px)⊕L au)
= ({i x , iux , ux} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o})⊕ {i}
= {i x , iux , ux} ⊕ {i}
= {iux , i x}
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A.3 ±author(±participant(±proximate(π)))
The third set is proximate composing first, with participant again composing before
author. All of these derivations begin with the result of either positive action of the
proximate feature on π, shown in (11a), or negative action, shown in (11b).
(11) Positive/negative action of proximate on π
a. J+proximate(π)K
= L π ⊕L px
= {i x , iux , ux , x x} ⊕ {i, u, o, iu, io, uo, iuo}
= {i x t i, iux t i, ux t i, x x t i,
i x t u, iux t u, ux t u, x x t u,
i x t o, iux t o, ux t o, x x t o,
i x t iu, iux t iu, ux t iu, x x t iu,
i x t io, iux t io, ux t io, x x t io,
i x t uo, iux t uo, ux t uo, x x t uo,
i x t iuo, iux t iuo, ux t iuo, x x t iuo}
= {i x , iux , iux , i x x ,
iux , iux , ux , ux x ,
iox , iuox , uox , ox x ,
iux , iux , iux , iux x ,
iox , iuox , iuox , iox x ,
iuox , iuox , uox , uox x ,
iuox , iuox , iuox , iuox x}
= {i x , iux , ux , ox}
b. J−proximate(π)K
=L π	 max(L px)
= {i x , iux , ux , x x} 	 {iuo}
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= {i x\iuo, iux\iuo, ux\iuo, x x\iuo}
= {∅, x ′x ′ ,∅, x ′x ′ ,∅, x ′x ′ ,∅, x ′x ′}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
Given this, the derivations are as follows:
(12) −author(−participant(±proximate(π)))
a. J−author(−participant(−proximate(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L px))	max(L pt))	max(L au))
= (({∅, x ′x ′} 	max(L pt))	max(L au))
= (({∅, x ′x ′} 	 {iu})	 {i})
= {∅\iu, x ′x ′\iu} 	 {i})
= {∅, x ′x ′} 	 {i}
= {∅\i, x ′x ′\i}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
b. J−author(−participant(+proximate(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L px)	max(L pt))	max(L au))
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} 	max(L pt))	max(L au))
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} 	 {iu})	 {i})
= {i x\iu, iux\iu, ux\iu, ox\iu} 	 {i}
= {∅, x x ,∅, x x ,∅, x x ,∅, ox} 	 {i}
= {∅, x x , ox} 	 {i}
= {∅, x x} 	 {i}
= {∅\i, x x\i}




= ((L π ⊕L px)⊕L pt)	max(L au)
= ({i x , iux , ux , ox} ⊕L pt)	max(L au)
= ({i x , iux , ux , ox} ⊕ {i, u, iu})	 {i}
= {i x t i, i x t u, i x t iu,
iux t i, iux t u, iux t iu,
ux t i, ux t u, ux t iu,
ox t i, ox t u, ox t iu} 	 {i}
= {i x , iux , ux} 	 {i}
= {i x\i, iux\i, ux\i}
= {∅, x x , ux}
b. J−author(+participant(−proximate(π)))K
= ((L π 	max(L px))⊕L pt)	max(L au)
= ({∅, x ′x ′} ⊕ {i, u, iu})	 {i}
= {∅t i,∅t u,∅t iu,
x ′x ′ t i, x ′x ′ t u, x ′x ′ t iu} 	 {i}
= {i x ′ , ux ′ , iux ′} 	 {i}
= {i x ′\i, ux ′\i, iux ′\i}
= {∅, x ′x ′ , ux ′}
(14) +author(−participant(±proximate(π)))
a. J+author(−participant(+proximate(π)))K
= ((L π ⊕L px)	max(L pt))⊕L au
= ({i x , iux , ux , ox} 	max(L pt))⊕L au
= ({i x , iux , ux , ox} 	 {iu})⊕ {i}
= {i x\iu, iux\iu, ux\iu, ox\iu} ⊕ {i}
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= {∅, x x} ⊕ {i}
= {∅t i, x x t i}
= {i x}
b. J+author(−participant(−proximate(π)))K
= ((L π 	max(L px))	max(L pt))⊕L au
= ({∅, x ′x ′} 	max(L pt))⊕L au
= ({∅, x ′x ′} 	 {iu})⊕ {i}
= {∅\iu, x ′x ′\iu} ⊕ {i}
= {∅, x ′x ′} ⊕ {i}
= {∅t i, x ′x ′ t i}
= {i x ′}
(15) +author(+participant(±proximate(π)))
a. J+author(+participant(+proximate(π)))K
= {i x , iux , ux} ⊕ {i}
= {i x t i, iux t i, ux t i}
= {i x , iux}
b. J+author(+participant(−proximate(π)))K
= {i x ′ , ux ′ , iux ′} ⊕ {i}
= {i x ′ t i, ux ′ t i, iux ′ t i}
= {i x ′ , iux ′}
A.4 ±proximate(±participant(±author(π)))
The fourth case, where proximate composes last, assumes the basic output of the tri-
partition, derived in detail in Harbour (2016), and summarized in (16).
(16) Output of tripartition, before Lexical Complementarity
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a. −participant(±author(π)) = {∅, x x}
b. +participant(+author(π)) = {i x , iux}
c. +participant(−author(π)) = {i x , iux , ux}
Given this, the derivations are as follows:
(17) ±proximate−participant±author
a. J+proximate(−participant(±author(π)))K
= {∅, x x} ⊕ {i, u, o, iu, io, uo, iuo}
= {∅t i,∅t u,∅t o,∅t iu,∅t io,∅t uo,∅t iuo,
x x t i, x x t u, x x t o, x x t iu, x x t io, x x t uo, x x t iuo}
= {i, u, o, iu, io, uo, iuo,
i x x , ux x , ox x , iux x , iox x , uox x , iuox x , }
= {i x , iux , ux , ox}
b. J−proximate(−participant(±author(π)))K
= {∅, x x} 	max({i, u, o, iu, io, uo, iuo})
= {∅\iuo, x x\iuo}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
(18) ±proximate+participant+author
a. J+proximate(+participant(+author(π)))K
= {i x , iux} ⊕ {i, u, o, iu, io, uo, iuo}
= {i x t i, i x t u, i x t o, i x t iu, i x t io, i x t uo, i x t iuo,
iux t i, iux t u, iux t o, iux t iu, iux t io, iux t uo, iux t iuo}
= {i x , iux , iox , iux , iox , iuox , iuox ,
iux , iux , iuox , iux , iuox , iuox , iuox}
= {i x , iux}
423
b. J−proximate(+participant(+author(π)))K
= {i x , iux} 	max({i, u, o, iu, io, uo, iuo})
= {i x\iuo, iux\iuo}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
(19) ±proximate+participant−author
a. J+proximate(+participant(−author(π)))K
= {i x , iux , ux} ⊕ {i, u, o, iu, io, uo, iuo}
= {i x t i, i x t u, i x t o, i x t iu, i x t io, i x t uo, i x t iuo,
iux t i, iux t u, iux t o, iux t iu, iux t io, iux t uo, iux t iuo,
ux t i, ux t u, ux t o, ux t iu, ux t io, ux t uo, ux t iuo}
= {i x , iux , iox , iux , iox , iuox , iuox ,
iux , iux , iuox , iux , iuox , iuox , iuox ,
iux , ux , uox , iux , iuox , uox , iuox}
= {i x , iux , ux}
b. J−proximate(+participant(−author(π)))K
= {i x , iux , ux} 	max({i, u, o, iu, io, uo, iuo})
= {i x\iuo, iux\iuo, ux\iuo}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
A.5 ±participant(±proximate(±author(π)))
The fifth derivation is with the proximate feature in a medial position, with author com-
posing prior to participant. These derivations are truncated slightly, taking for granted
the initial operation of the author feature in each case.
(20) −participant ±proximate −author
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a. J−participant(−proximate(−author(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L au))	max(L px))	max(L pt))
= ({∅, ux , x x} 	 {iuo})	 {iu}
= {∅\iuo, ux\iuo, x x\iuo} 	 {iu}
= {∅, x ′x ′} 	 {iu}
= {∅, x ′x ′\iu}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
b. J−participant(+proximate(−author(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L au))⊕L px)	max(L pt))
= ({∅, ux , x x} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o})	 {iu}
= {∅t i,∅t u,∅t o,∅t iu,∅t io,∅t uo,∅t iuo,
ux t i, ux t u, ux t o, ux t iu, ux t io, ux t uo, ux t iuo,
x x t i, x x t u, x x t o, x x t iu, x x t io, x x t uo, x x t iuo} 	 {iu}
= {i, u, o, iu, io, uo, iuo,
iux , ux , uox , iux , iuox , uox , iuox ,
i x x , ux x , ox x , iux x , iox x , uox x , iuox x} 	 {iu}
= {i x , iux , ux , ox} 	 {iu}
= {i x\iu, iux\iu, ux\iu, ox\iu}
= {∅, ox , x ′x ′}
(21) +participant ±proximate −author
a. J+participant(−proximate(−author(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L au))	max(L px))⊕L pt)
= ({∅, ux , x x} 	 {iuo})⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {∅\iuo, ux\iuo, x x\iuo} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {∅, x ′x ′} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {∅t i,∅t u,∅t iu,
x ′x ′ t i, x ′x ′ t u, x ′x ′ t iu}
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= {i, u, iu,
i x ′x ′ , ux
′
x ′ , iux
′
x ′}
= {i x ′ , iux ′ , ux ′}
b. J+participant(+proximate(−author(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L au))⊕L px)⊕L pt)
= ({∅, ux , x x} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o})⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {∅t i,∅t u,∅t o,∅t iu,∅t io,∅t uo,∅t iuo,
ux t i, ux t u, ux t o, ux t iu, ux t io, ux t uo, ux t iuo,
x x t i, x x t u, x x t o, x x t iu, x x t io, x x t uo, x x t iuo} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {i, u, o, iu, io, uo, iuo,
iux , ux , uox , iux , iuox , uox , iuox ,
i x x , ux x , ox x , iux x , iox x , uox x , iuox x} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {i x , iux , ux , ox} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {i x , iux , ux}
(22) −participant ±proximate +author
a. J−participant(−proximate(+author(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L au)	max(L px))	max(L pt))
= ({i x , iux} 	 {iuo})	 {iu}
= {i x\iuo, iux\iuo} 	 {iu}
= {∅, x ′x ′} 	 {iu}
= {∅, x ′x ′\iu}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
b. J−participant(+proximate(+author(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L au)⊕L px)	max(L pt))
= ({i x , iux} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o})	 {iu}
= {i x t i, i x t u, i x t o, i x t iu, i x t io, i x t uo, i x t iuo,
iux t i, iux t u, iux t o, iux t iu, iux t io, iux t uo, iux t iuo} 	 {iu}
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= {i x , iux , iox , iux , iox , iuox , iuox ,
iux , iux , iuox , iux , iuox , iuox , iuox} 	 {iu}
= {i x , iux} 	 {iu}
= {i x\iu, iux\iu}
= {∅, ox , x ′x ′}
(23) +participant ±proximate +author
a. J+participant(−proximate(+author(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L au)	max(L px))⊕L pt)
= ({i x , iux} 	 {iuo})⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {i x\iuo, iux\iuo} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {∅, x ′x ′} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {∅t i,∅t u,∅t iu,
x ′x ′ t i, x ′x ′ t u, x ′x ′ t iu}
= {i, u, iu,
i x ′x ′ , ux
′
x ′ , iux
′
x ′}
= {i x ′ , iux ′ , ux ′}
b. J+participant(+proximate(+author(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L au)⊕L px)⊕L pt)
= ({i x , iux} ⊕ {iuo, iu, io, uo, i, u, o})⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {i x t i, i x t u, i x t o, i x t iu, i x t io, i x t uo, i x t iuo,
iux t i, iux t u, iux t o, iux t iu, iux t io, iux t uo, iux t iuo}⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {i x , iux , iox , iux , iox , iuox , iuox ,
iux , iux , iuox , iux , iuox , iuox , iuox} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {i x , iux} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {i x t i, i x t u, i x t iu,
iux t i, iux t u, iux t iu}
= {i x , iux , iux ,
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iux , iux , iux}
= {i x , iux}
A.6 ±participant(±author(±proximate(π)))
The sixth set is again simplified slightly by taking for granted the action of the proximate
lattice on the π lattice.
(24) ±participant+author+proximate
a. J+participant(+author(+proximate(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L px)⊕L au)⊕L pt)
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} ⊕L au)⊕L pt)
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} ⊕ {i})⊕ {i, u, iu})
= {i x t i, iux t i, ux t i, ox t i} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {i x , iux , iux , iox} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {i x , iux} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {i x t i, i x t u, i x t iu,
iux t i, iux t u, iux t iu}
= {i x , iux , iux ,
iux , iux , iux}
= {i x , iux}
b. J−participant(+author(+proximate(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L px)⊕L au)	max(L pt))
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} ⊕L au)	max(L pt))
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} ⊕ {i})	 {iu})
= {i x t i, iux t i, ux t i, ox t i} 	 {iu}
= {i x , iux , iux , iox} 	 {iu}
= {i x , iux} 	 {iu}
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= {i x\iu, iux\iu}
= {∅, x x}
(25) ±participant−author+proximate
a. J+participant(−author(+proximate(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L px)	max(L au))⊕L pt)
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} 	max(L au))⊕L pt)
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} 	 {i})⊕ {i, u, iu})
= {i x\i, iux\i, ux\i, ox\i} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {ux , x x} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {ux t i, ux t u, ux t iu,
x x t i, x x t u, x x t iu}
= {iux , ux , iux ,
i x x , ux x , iux x}
= {i x , iux , ux}
b. J−participant(−author(+proximate(π)))K
= (((L π ⊕L px)	max(L au))	max(L pt))
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} 	max(L au))	max(L pt))
= (({i x , iux , ux , ox} 	 {i})	 {iu})
= {i x\i, iux\i, ux\i, ox\i} 	 {iu}
= {∅, ux , x x} 	 {iu}
= {∅\iu, ux\iu, x x\iu}
= {∅, x x}
(26) ±participant+author−proximate
a. J+participant(+author(−proximate(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L px))⊕L au)⊕L pt)
= (({∅, x ′x ′} ⊕L au)⊕L pt)
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= (({∅, x ′x ′} ⊕ {i})⊕ {i, u, iu})
= {∅t i, x ′x ′ t i} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {i, i x ′x ′} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {i t u, i t i, i t iu,
i x ′x ′ t i, i x ′x ′ t u, i x ′x ′ t iu}
= {iu, i, iu,
i x ′x ′ , iux
′
x ′ , iux
′
x ′}
= {i x ′ , iux ′ , ux ′}
b. J−participant(+author(−proximate(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L px))⊕L au)	max(L pt))
= (({∅, x ′x ′} ⊕L au)	max(L pt))
= (({∅, x ′x ′} ⊕ {i})	 {iu})
= {∅t i, x ′x ′ t i} 	 {iu}
= {i, i x ′x ′} 	 {iu}
= {i\iu, i x ′x ′\iu}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
(27) ±participant−author−proximate
a. J+participant(−author(−proximate(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L px))	max(L au))⊕L pt)
= (({∅, x ′x ′} 	max(L au)⊕L pt)
= (({∅, x ′x ′} 	 {i})⊕ {i, u, iu})
= {∅\i, x ′x ′\i} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {∅, x ′x ′} ⊕ {i, u, iu}
= {∅t u,∅t i,∅t iu,
x ′x ′ t i, x ′x ′ t u, x ′x ′ t iu}
= {u, i, iu,
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i x ′x ′ , ux
′
x ′ , iux
′
x ′}
= {i x ′ , iux ′ , ux ′}
b. J−participant(−author(−proximate(π)))K
= (((L π 	max(L px))	max(L au))	max(L pt))
= (({∅, x ′x ′} 	max(L au)	max(L pt))
= (({∅, x ′x ′} 	 {i})	 {iu})
= {∅\i, x ′x ′\i} 	 {iu}
= {∅, x ′x ′} 	 {iu}
= {∅\iu, x ′x ′\iu}
= {∅, x ′x ′}
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APPENDIX B
MIXED AND LOCAL ONLY ALIGNMENTS
The main text of Chapter 5 provided a deep-dive into the agreement, movement, and
spell-out of the non-local only alignments in Border Lakes Ojibwe. In this appendix,
I expand the empirical scope beyond the non-local only configurations to the “mixed”
configurations, which include both local and non-local persons, as well as the local only
configurations. I focus mainly on sketching the proposed agreement and movement
relations, leaving a detailed analysis of copying and spell-out to future work.
The widening of empirical scope precipitates two major additions to the theory pro-
posed in the previous section. The first is an added object-licensing probe µ on Voice.
I argue that µ has the morphological reflex of object agreement in the theme sign po-
sition. Extending the basic proposal of Coon and Preminger (2017), who argue that
a special person licensing probe µ is added when there is an unlicensed local object,
I argue that the presence of an unlicensed local or proximate argument conditions the
presence of an added probe on Voice in Ojibwe.1 The need for an added probe in these
cases follows from the proposed extension to the Person Licensing Condition of Béjar
1Béjar and Rezac (2009), the originators of the added probe, also argue that the probe is added to
meet the demands of the PLC. That said, the added probe in their proposal licenses otherwise unlicensed
local subjects rather than objects. This difference is due to a number of factors, which I name here but
do not explore further, including differences in the interpretation of the theme sign and the geometry
between the probe and the potential goals.
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and Rezac (2003, 2009), given in (1), to include the proximate third person along with
the local persons (and to fit with the proposed representation of person features).2
(2) Extended Person Licensing Condition (ePLC)
A DP with set G, where G includes I , U , or O as a member, must be targeted by
AGREE with a ρ-probe.
The second addition to the theory is to allow for genuine Multiple Agree, in the sense
that a single feature of the probe Matches with more than one argument at once. This
differs from the case where a probe agrees with multiple arguments, but with different
features, as was seen with agreement in the inverse alignments of the previous section.
Following Oxford (2019b), Multiple Agree is triggered when two equally matched goals
are equidistant from the probe. Equidistance occurs when two arguments are in a multi-
ple specifier configuration. I differ from Oxford in the distribution of this configuration,
arguing that all mixed and local only configurations result in a multiple specifiers of
VoiceP. This is argued to underly the rampant portmanteau agreement on Infl in the
mixed and local-only constructions.
B.1 Agreement on Voice and the added probe
For reference, the full set of theme signs is given in Table B.1. There are forms for each of
basic person categories (first, second, proximate, and obviative), plus the inverse form,
which is analyzed as an elsewhere form and does not index any particular features.
2This is meant to superseded the original PLC in languages with a proximate-obviative distinction.
That said, the “Standard” PLC, which can be formulated as in (1), is still assumed to be relevant and
active in languages that lack obviation.
(1) Standard Person Licensing Condition (sPLC)








Table B.1: Theme sign forms
The distribution of the theme sign for all possible animate argument combinations,
including the non-local, local, and mixed alignments, is shown in Table B.2 for the
independent and conjunct orders. Focusing on the not-yet-discussed local and mixed
cases, the theme sign distribution appears as object agreement with direct alignments
and the inverse marker with inverse alignments, as described by the independent and
conjunct order hierarchies repeated in (3).
(3) The PAH for the independent and conjunct orders (repeated)
a. The Independent Hierarchy: 1/2 > 3 > 3′
b. The Conjunct Hierarchy: 1/2/3 > 3′
An important addendum to this description is that theme sign for the LOCAL → 3′
cases includes both the obviative theme sign -im and proximate theme sign -aa. As
discussed in detail below, this occurs because the object in this case is in fact a complex
possessive DP, which includes both an obviative and proximate noun. Thus it still falls
under the broader umbrella of “object” agreement, with the theme sign indexing both
the obviative and proximate arguments in this case.
There is one exception with the EXCL → 2SG/PL cases, where the theme sign arises
in a form otherwise associated with the impersonal passive -igoo, also known as the
indefinite actor construction. Note that the regular inverse theme sign also often ap-
pears as -igoo, but this is due to a phonological alternation conditioned by the presence
of peripheral agreement. The difference here is that -igoo appears in the absence of
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EA/IA 1SG EXCL INCL 2SG 2PL 3SG 3PL 3′SG 3′PL
1SG in in aa aa im-aa im-aa
EXCL igoo igoo aa aa im-aa im-aa
INCL aa aa im-aa im-aa
2SG i i aa aa im-aa im-aa
2PL i i aa aa im-aa im-aa
3SG igo igo igo igo igo aa aa
3PL igo igo igo igo igo aa aa
3′SG igo igo
3′PL igo igo
EA/IA 1SG EXCL INCL 2SG 2PL 3SG 3PL 3′SG 3′PL
1SG in in aa aa im-aa im-aa
EXCL igoo igoo aa aa im-aa im-aa
INCL aa aa im-aa im-aa
2SG i i aa aa im-aa im-aa
2PL i i aa aa im-aa im-aa
3SG i i in in in aa aa
3PL i i in in in aa aa
3′SG igo igo
3′PL igo igo
Table B.2: Independent (top) and conjunct order (bottom) theme sign distribution
the phonologically conditioned environment. Indeed, the verb form as a whole is am-
biguous between an impersonal passive reading and a EXCL → 2SG/PL interpretation,
as shown in (4) with the second singular (this also holds with the second plural, but is
not shown).











‘You were seen (by someone)’ or ‘We (EXCL) saw you’
For the present analysis, this argument alignment will be treated as an accidental paradigm
gap that is filled by the use of the impersonal passive, and will not receive a principled
explanation within the current analysis (c.f. Hammerly, 2018).
I consider the derivation of inverse marking in the independent 3 → LOCAL first,
as it follows the same form as seen with the inverse in the 3′ → 3 alignments. I then
turn to the 3→ LOCAL alignments in the conjunct order, which show object agreement
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via the added probe µ instead of inverse. This analysis also covers without adaptation
the LOCAL → 3 alignments. This leaves the case of LOCAL → 3′, where the object is a
possessive DP and the theme sign shows a complex of both obviative and proximate
marking. I argue this also follows from agreement with the added probe µ.
B.1.1 The inverse with independent 3→ LOCAL
The appearance of inverse marking with the 3→ LOCAL combinations in the indepen-
dent order receives a similar treatment as seen with the 3′ → 3 configurations. This is
exemplified with a 3→ 1 combination in (5), where the initial agreement cycle with the
proximate EA satisfies uΠ and uProximate, and the second cycle with the first person
singular IA satisfies uParticipant. This leads both the set of the EA and IA to be copied
to the probe. As before, this binary set is spelled-out as the inverse/elsewhere form.
The major difference is that the relativized EPP feature of Voice first triggers move-
ment of both of the agreed with arguments to its specifier, as each one sequentially sat-
isfies a different EPP feature of Voice. This mirrors the satisfaction that occurs within
the ϕ-domain, where the initial agreement relationship between Voice and the prox-
imate EA triggers movement via [EPP: Proximate], while the second agreement rela-
tionship triggers movement via [EPP: Participant]. This results in a double specifier
configuration, where both the EA and IA are in Spec,VoiceP following this stage of the
derivation. This is critical for capturing the patterns of Infl agreement and is a marked
distinction from the 3′→ 3 inverse alignments, where only the proximate IA was moved
to Spec,VoiceP.
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This same basic situation applies throughout the rest of the 3 → LOCAL alignments
in the independent order, regardless of what type of local argument occupies the IA
position—all will provide a Match for the uParticipant feature that is left unsatisfied by
the probing of the proximate EA. In all cases, agreement on Voice agreement therefore
renders a gluttonous set, leading to the spell-out of the inverse form.
B.1.2 The lack of inverse with conjunct 3→ LOCAL
This basic situation of gluttony in the 3 → LOCAL does not occur in the conjunct or-
der, as the probe on Voice is not specified for a uParticipant feature. This accounts for
the difference in the distribution of the inverse marker in the two orders. As a result,
the initial probing by Voice targets the proximate EA, satisfies both the uAnimate and
uProximate features, and moves the proximate EA to Spec,VoiceP, as shown in (6), again
with the example of the 3→ 1 alignment.
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(6) Step 1 of mixed 3 → 1 Voice agreement in the conjunct order: EA licensing













If the probe stopped here, as it did in the 3 → 3′ alignments, we would predict
the theme sign to take a form consistent with subject agreement. The emergence of
a subject agreement pattern is disrupted by the insertion of the added probe µ, which
is part of the projection of Voice. In the schematizations that follow, to highlight the
presence of µ, I put it as an additional head within the VoiceP projection, but it is
formally an added probe in the sense of Béjar and Rezac (2009). The probe enters into
the derivation because the first person IA has not entered into an agreement relationship
with a proximate-licensing head, and therefore must undergo agreement to prevent a
violation of the ePLC, which requires all proximate arguments (those with I , U , or O
in their set) to enter into an agreement relationship with the obviation-based ρ-probe.
As shown in the lower tree of (7), µ reflects the same articulation as the core probe,
agrees with and licenses the first person IA, copies the set {I}, and moves the IA to the
second specifier of VoiceP to satisfy its own separate [EPP: Proximate] feature.
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Given this analysis, a first question is why the theme sign is only spelled-out as object
agreement with the added probe µ, rather than subject agreement with the initial set
produced by agreement with the core probe, or with an inverse form due to the fact
that agreement has occurred with both the EA and IA. The latter scenario of spell-out
of the inverse can be blocked by the fact that agreement with the EA versus IA occurs
with separate probes, rather than two segments of the same probe as in the canonical
inverse cases. This difference is laid out in (8).
(8) a. Independent order: Core ρ-probe (Voice) = ({O}, {I})
b. Conjunct order: Core ρ-probe (Voice) = {O}; Added ρ-probe (µ) = {I}
This then leaves the question as why only object agreement of the added probe is spelled
out, if the core probe, which has agreed with the subject, is also present. Here it is
possible to take advantage of a generalization from Béjar and Rezac (2009), who argue
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that the features of the projection that fully deactivates the probe is the locus of spell-
out. Here, final deactivation of the probes within the Voice projection occur in the
“second cycle”, following the satisfaction of the added probe via agreement with the IA.
Therefore only IA agreement (the added probe) is spelled-out.
While the derivation has used the 3→ 1 alignments as the example, this same logic
extends to all 3→ LOCAL alignments in the independent order, and all LOCAL→ LOCAL
alignments regardless of clause type. The reason is that in all of these cases, the EA
provides a full match for the core probe on Voce, while at the same time the IA requires
licensing to satisfy the ePLC, motivating the insertion of the added probe and giving
rise to object agreement. The only part of the paradigm that does not fit neatly into this
logic are the LOCAL → 3′ alignments, which I turn to now.
B.1.3 The LOCAL → 3′ alignments
There is one final piece to deal with that deserves special consideration: Why does
object agreement, and by extension the proximate-licensing added probe µ, appear in
the LOCAL → 3′ configurations? The analysis so far has conditioned the insertion of
the added probe on the presence of an unlicensed local or proximate argument. This
restricted distribution is particularly motivated by the given analysis of the theme sign as
subject agreement in 3→ 3′ alignments. In these cases, the added probe is not inserted,
and object agreement does not arise, because there is no unlicensed proximate or local
argument to condition the presence of the probe. The only argument that is not agreed
with by a person probe on Voice is the obviative third person, which is not subject to
the PLC and therefore is exempt from the need for licensing. At first blush, it seems
that the same logic should apply with the LOCAL → 3′ alignments, and therefore there
should be no object agreement under the present analysis.
The issue turns out to be more complex than the above logic would suggest, due to
the nature of the obviative argument that appears within the LOCAL → 3′ alignments.
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Unlike the 3 → 3′ constructions, having a simple obviative DP in this position is un-













intended: ‘I know the man (OBV)’ ’ [NJ 06.20.18]
The negative judgment in (9) could be from a number of sources. A priori, the most
likely source is the general markedness of having an obviative argument out of context
with no contrasting proximate argument. This issue can be alleviated by having the

















‘I saw Ziibiin’s (PROX) mother (OBV)’ [NJ 11.06.19]
The entire possessive DP Ziibiins ogiin is obviative, but it contains within it a proximate
possessor DP Ziibiins. The precise structure is introduced below. I argue that this prox-
imate nominal must be licensed by an agreement relation, and therefore triggers the
insertion of the added probe µ. Given that we have the added probe, we then have to
then explain why it shows agreement with the obviative DP instead of the proximate
argument, given that µ is ostensibly inserted to license the proximate object via agree-
ment. Relevant to this question is the fact that it is possible for the added probe in
these cases to show agreement with either the proximate or obviative argument in this
construction, as shown with the grammaticality of the two examples in (11), with (11a)
repeated from above and (11b) showing the grammaticality of proximate agreement.































‘I saw Ziibiin’s (PROX) mother (OBV)’ [NJ 11.06.19]
At present, there are no clear interpretative differences that correspond to the alter-
nation in (11), but further work should be able to tease apart a syntax of possessive
phrases in Ojibwe that allows the alternation to have a principled source. For example,
it is possible that the alternation corresponds to which noun heads the phrase, similar to
the alternation between the child’s mother versus the mother of the child in English. For
now, I focus on the analysis of (11a), where the theme sign of interest -imaa is present.
I assume a canonical structure for the possessive DP, where the possessor DP is in the
specifier of a possessive D, which is spelled-out with the person prefix o-. This makes
the entire DP obviative, with the possessor DP sitting in the specifier of that larger
possessive DP being proximate.







Recall that in the point in the derivation we are focusing on, the core probe on Voice will
have been fully checked by agreement with the first person EA, and the added probe
µ has entered the derivation to license the proximate argument within the possessive
DP. The derivation from here on is schematized in (13). Given the structure in (12), µ
will first AGREE with the entire obviative possessive DP. This will only satisfy the uAnim
feature on the added probe, and thus it will probe again, finding the proximate possessor
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DP which satisfies the uProx feature and licenses the proximate argument, satisfying the
ePLC.
(13) [ nin-gii-waabam -im -aa -n [ DP (OBV) [ DP (PROX) ziibiins ] omaamaayan ] ]
The given analysis in (13) asserts that the theme sign -imaa is in fact two separate
morphemes, an obviative marker -im and the already seen proximate marker -aa. This
is consistent with work in the Algonquianst literature, which has assumed this theme
sign to be internally complex, with -im (or its cognate across Algonquian languages) to
mark and “unpredictively obviative” object—i.e. an obviative argument that occurs in
the absence of a proximate subject (Pentland, 1999). It has also been referred to as a
supplementary obviative theme sign, that specifically co-occurs with the direct theme
sign, as the present analysis also assumes (Nichols, 1980).3
The final piece of the analysis is sorting out why the added probe does not spell out
the inverse marker in this case, despite entering into a gluttonous configuration that
appears identical to that seen with the 3′ → 3 alignments. To review the full picture,
the core and added probes are given in (14).
(14) Core ρ-probe (Voice) = {I}; Added ρ-probe (µ) = ({O′}, {O})
Given that the added probe is the locus of final satisfaction, as explained in detail above,
only the added probe will be spelled-out. To account for the lack of inverse in this case,
I leverage the fact that gluttony with the 3′ → 3 arises on the core probe, while in
the LOCAL → 3′ cases, gluttony occurs on the added probe. The proposal, which again
follows the possible range of spell-out distinctions leveraged by Béjar and Rezac (2009),
is that spell-out need not occur identically on the core and added probes. I propose that
unlike the core probe, the added probe in Ojibwe can undergo fission, which allows the
3Thanks to Will Oxford for making me aware of these connections.
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two sets of features to be spelled out separately, preventing the insertion of the default
inverse marker in these cases and resulting in the sequence of theme signs -im followed
by -aa.
B.2 Agreement on Infl
As in the non-local only alignments, the most important factor for determining agree-
ment on Infl is the configuration produced by Voice. As discussed earlier, the two non-
local only configurations had a single argument within its specifier: The direct pro-
moted the proximate EA to this position (15a), and the inverse the proximate IA (15b).
In contrast, the mixed and local only alignments, regardless of clause order and argu-
ment identity, all converge on a double-specifier configuration, with the EA and IA both
sitting in Spec,VoiceP, as shown in (15c).
(15) a. [IP Infl [VoiceP EA [vP <EA> . . . IA ] ] ] 3→ 3′
b. [IP Infl [VoiceP IA [vP EA . . .<IA> ] ] ] 3′ → 3
c. [IP Infl [VoiceP IA EA [vP <EA> . . .<IA> ] ] ] MIXED/LOCAL ONLY
I argue that the situation in (15c) gives rise to genuine Multiple Agree (Hiraiwa, 2001),
in the sense that a single segment on a probe ends up agreeing with more than one
argument at once. This can be contrasted with the case where a probe agrees with
multiple arguments, with each agreement relation serving to satisfy a distinct feature, as
has been seen repeatedly in gluttonous configurations. I assume that genuine Multiple
Agree of this type is strictly limited to cases where there are two equidistant goals. I
adopt the path-based definition of equidistance put forward by Hornstein (2009), which
has been previously applied to the Algonquin dialect of Ojibwe in Oxford (2019b):
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(16) Equidistance (Hornstein, 2009, p. 40)
A path is the set of maximal projections (XPs) that dominate the target or the
launch site
Given that two DPs within a multiple specifier configuration are dominated by the same
number of XPs, it follows from (16) that both are equidistant from any given probe. This
has the consequence of making Infl agreement in the mixed and non-local configura-
tions invariably a function of Multiple Agree. This is schematized abstractly in (17),
where any of the current alignments of interest could fill the EA and IA positions.












This proposal marks yet another departure from the account of Oxford (2019b), who
argues that Multiple Agree occurs with the local-only configurations, but not the mixed
configurations, in the independent order. I show that Multiple Agree is motivated in
both types of alignments by the difference between Set A and Set B morphology in the
independent order, which varies depending on whether Infl has agreed with two local
445
arguments (Set A) or one local and one non-local argument (Set B) (cf. Despić et al.,
2019, for Cheyenne (Plains Algonquian)).
B.2.1 Multiple Agree in the independent order
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two basic forms of local person morphology
on Infl, shown on the lefthand side of Table B.3. Following the labels used by Despić
et al. (2019) for the cognate sets of morphology in Cheyenne, I adopt the terms Set A
and Set B. An addendum to the basic forms of Set A morphology, which only overtly
index a single argument, are the true portmanteau forms of Set A morphology, shown
on the righthand side of Table B.3.







2SG → EXCL gi–naam
2PL → EXCL gi–naam
1SG → 2PL gi–inim
Table B.3: Independent order Infl: Set A versus Set B for local persons
Table B.4 shows where each of these forms appears in the mixed and local only
alignments (the non-local alignments are also included for completeness). The general
distribution of these two sets can be readily described. Set A appears in the local only
alignments, while Set B appears in the mixed alignments.
I adopt the view that the sets copied from each argument are maintained in an
ordered set, and furthermore that the multiple specifier configuration has the same
order of the EA and IA in all cases being examined here. This requires the assumption
that, while equidistant from the point of view of the Search algorithm, the two positions
within the multiple specifier configuration are not fully interchangeable. I adopt the
convention of representing each set as the ordered set ({π: EA}, {π: IA}). Equivalent
spell-out rules could be readily formulated for the reverse ordering, as long as it is
consistent across all alignments, so the choice is purely aesthetic.
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EA/IA 1SG EXCL INCL 2SG 2PL 3SG 3PL 3′SG 3′PL
1SG gi–∅ gi–inim ni–∅ ni–∅ ni–∅ ni–∅
EXCL gi–∅ gi–im ni–aanaa ni–aanaa ni–aanaa ni–aanaa
INCL gi–aanaa gi–aanaa gi–aanaa gi–aanaa
2SG gi–∅ gi–naam gi–∅ gi–∅ gi–∅ gi–∅
2PL gi–im gi–naam gi–waa gi–waa gi–waa gi–waa
3SG ni–∅ ni–aanaa gi–aanaa gi–∅ gi–waa o–∅ o–∅
3PL ni–∅ ni–aanaa gi–aanaa gi–∅ gi–waa o–waa o–waa
3′SG o–∅ o–waa
3′PL o–∅ o–waa
EA/IA 1SG EXCL INCL 2SG 2PL 3SG 3PL 3′SG 3′PL
1SG Set A Set A Set B Set B Set B Set B
EXCL Set A Set A Set B Set B Set B Set B
INCL Set B Set B Set B Set B
2SG Set A Set A Set B Set B Set B Set B
2PL Set A Set A Set B Set B Set B Set B
3SG Set B Set B Set B Set B Set B Subj Subj
3PL Set B Set B Set B Set B Set B Subj Subj
3′SG Obj Obj
3′PL Obj Obj
Table B.4: Independent order VTA Infl (person prefix + central agreement). The port-
manteau Set A morphology is indicated in bold
For the time being, I keep the description for rules of Vocabulary Item insertion at
a relatively high level. As was the case in the non-local only configurations, both the
person and number morphology associated with Infl must be inserted in a single step
of the derivation, leading to the same split between the person prefix appearing to the
left of the stem, and the number-marking central agreement marker to the right.
The basic contrast between Set A and Set B can then be captured by a rule of the form
in (18), which is based closely on the proposal of Despić et al. (2019) for Cheyenne.
(18) Generalizations for Set A versus Set B VI insertion
a. {π: LOCAL} / { , ϕ: NON-LOCAL}⇔ SET B
b. {π: LOCAL}⇔ SET A
The rule states that if a set contains a local person and a non-local person, regardless of
the order of the set, the Set B morphology is associated with the local person is spelled-
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out. If there is no non-local person within the set, then the Set A rule (an elsewhere
rule) applies.
That said, the rules that govern the insertion of Set A morphology can in turn be
specified with more granularity in order to account for cases with and without a port-
manteau form. These are given in (19). The first two rules in (19a,b) condition the
insertion of the two possible portmanteau forms, and the rules in (19c,d) the non-
portmanteau Set A forms.
(19) Specific Set A VI insertion rules
a. {π: 2SG/PL} / ( , π: EXCL)⇔ gi- -naam
b. {π: 2PL} / (π: 1SG, )⇔ gi- -inim
c. {π: 2PL} / ( , π: 1SG )⇔ gi- -m
d. {π: 2SG}⇔ gi- -∅
The difference between the rules in (19b) and (19c) is particularly important, as it pro-
vides explicit motivation for the notion that the order of the sets matters and therefore
must be preserved when the sets of multiple arguments are copied (see the Preservation
of History principle proposed in Chapter 4 for further discussion). When the EA is 1SG
and the IA is 2PL, then the portmanteau form appears; the reverse order results in the
realization of the regular 2PL form.
A final point about the Set A versus Set B morphology, and the independent order
Infl morphology more generally, is that the Set A forms always show full agreement. In
other words, the exponed form ensures that the number marking of a plural argument
is expressed, even if it is within the context of a special portmanteau form. This is not
the case in the Set B forms, where a singular/plural distinction in the third persons is
systematically absent from the forms, but the number of the local person is expressed
if relevant. The consequence is that full agreement applies to all local arguments, but
not third person arguments—as a result, the Activity Condition does not apply to the
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third persons. As such, they are open to be targeted by further agreement operations,
most notably C. In contrast, the local arguments are rendered inactive, as their full set
of ϕ-features have been expressed.
B.2.2 Conjunct Order
The conjunct order does not divide as neatly along mixed and local only lines, with no
similar distinction between Set A and Set B forms of morphology. The set of forms that
governs this slot is shown in Table B.5, and the distribution of these forms across the










1SG → 2PL -agog
1SG → 3 -ag
EXCL↔ 3 -angid
2SG → 3 -ad
Table B.5: Conjunct order Infl: regular (left) and portmanteau (right)
EA/IA 1SG EXCL INCL 2SG 2PL 3SG 3PL 3′
1SG aan agog ag ag-waa ag
EXCL an eg angid angid-waa angid
INCL ang ang-waa ang
2SG an aang ad ad-waa ad
2PL eg aang eg eg-waa eg
3SG g angid ang d eg d
3PL g-waa angid-waa ang-waa g-waa eg-waa g-waa
3′ d g-waa
EA/IA 1SG EXCL INCL 2SG 2PL 3SG 3PL 3′
1SG EA Port Port Port + # Port
EXCL IA IA Port Port + # Port
INCL EA EA + # EA
2SG EA IA Port Port + # Port
2PL EA IA EA EA + # EA
3SG EA Port IA EA IA EA
3PL EA + # Port + # IA + # EA + # IA + # EA + #
3′ IA IA + #
Table B.6: Conjunct order VTA Infl (person prefix + central agreement)
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I remain at a relatively high level for the current discussion of spell-out rules, leaving
the precise specifications to future work. I hope to provide a few of the broader gener-
alizations here. To review, the proposal is that the fused probe on Infl ties together the
satisfaction condition of the π-probe and the #-probe, but the copying algorithm only
copies back those sets that match the relevant π or # segments. This is shown abstractly
in (20). The consequence is that π always collects copies of both arguments (both al-
ways Match the flat probe), while # only copies back the sets of plural arguments.
(20) a. EASG + IASG: Infl = {π: {EA, IA}, #: {∅}}
b. EAPL + IASG: Infl = {π: {EA, IA}, #: {EA}}
c. EASG + IAPL: Infl = {π: {EA, IA}, #: {IA}}
d. EAPL + IAPL: Infl = {π: {EA, IA}, #: {EA, IA}}
One generalization that must be accounted for is the number marker -waa within the
central agreement slot is only realized in the presence of a proximate plural argument.
With local arguments, number is always realized within a single combined person-
number form. Furthermore, within the person slot, there appears to be a general pref-
erence for spelling out the EA over the IA, even when the EA is ranked lower on the
prominence hierarchy than the IA. The exception is when the IA is plural, where spell-
out of the IA takes precedence.
B.3 Agreement on C
In this section, I present the final piece of the transitive animate agreement in Ojibwe:
C agreement in the mixed and local only alignments. To review the basics, this slot
only appears in the independent order, and always indexes the lowest ranked argument
within the clause. As discussed with the non-local only alignments, this was always the
obviative argument. In the mixed alignments, this is always the non-local argument.
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In the local only alignments, the marker does not appear. This distribution is shown in
Table B.7.
EA/IA 1SG EXCL INCL 2SG 2PL 3SG 3PL 3′SG 3′PL
1SG — — -∅ -g -n -’
EXCL — — -∅ -g -n -’
INCL -∅ -g -n -’
2SG — — -∅ -g -n -’
2PL — — -∅ -g -n -’
3SG -∅ -∅ -∅ -∅ -∅ -n -’
3PL -g -g -g -g -g -n -’
3′SG -n -n
3′PL -’ -’
EA/IA 1SG EXCL INCL 2SG 2PL 3SG 3PL 3′SG 3′PL
1SG — — IA IA IA IA
EXCL — — IA IA IA IA
INCL IA IA IA IA
2SG — — IA IA IA IA
2PL — — IA IA IA IA
3SG EA EA EA EA EA IA IA
3PL EA EA EA EA EA IA IA
3′SG EA EA
3′PL EA EA
Table B.7: Independent order VTA C (peripheral agreement)
The analysis is identical to that given for the non-local only alignments in the main
text: C agrees with whatever Infl has not already deactivated. As noted previously,
all local arguments are deactivated by Infl, while non-local arguments (in the mixed
conditions) are not. This accounts for the fact that C does not appear with the local





This appendix presents the transcription and translation into English for the auditory
stimuli used in the study presented in Chapter 6.
Transcription Translation
ikwe gaa-binaakwe’waad abinoojiinyan ‘The woman who is combing the child’
ikwewan gaa-binaakwe’ogod abinoojiinh ‘The woman who is combing the child’
ikwe gaa-binaakwe’ogod abinoojiinyan ‘The woman who the child is combing’
ikwewan gaa-binaakwe’waad abinoojiinh ‘The woman who the child is combing’
abinoojiinh gaa-ginagijiibinaad ininiwan ‘The child who is tickling the man’
abinoojiinyan gaa-ginagijiibinigod inini ‘The child who is tickling the man’
abinoojiinh gaa-ginagijiibinigod ininiwan ‘The child who the man is tickling’
abinoojiinyan gaa-ginagijiibinaad inini ‘The child who the man is tickling’
inini gaa-goshko’aad ikwewan ‘The man who is surprising the woman’
ininiwan gaa-goshko’ogod ikwe ‘The man who is surprising the woman’
inini gaa-goshko’ogod ikwewan ‘The man who the woman is surprising’
ininiwan gaa-goshko’aad ikwe ‘The man who the woman is surprising’
oshki-inini gaa-nimikawaad oshkiniigikwewan ‘The teen boy who is dancing for the teen girl’
oshki-ininiwan gaa-nimikawigod oshkiniigikwe ‘The teen boy who is dancing for the teen girl’
oshki-inini gaa-nimikawigod oshkiniigikwewan ‘The teen boy who the teen girl is dancing for’
oshki-ininiwan gaa-nimikawaad oshkiniigikwe ‘The teen boy who the teen girl is dancing for’
gichi-aya’aa gaa-ojiimaad abinoojiinyan ‘The elder who is kissing the child’
gichi-aya’aan gaa-ojiimigod abinoojiinh ‘The elder who is kissing the child’
gichi-aya’aa gaa-ojiimigod abinoojiinyan ‘The elder who the child is kissing’
gichi-aya’aan gaa-ojiimaad abinoojiinh ‘The elder who the child is kissing’
oshkiniigikwe gaa-anamikawaad gichi-aya’aan ‘The teen girl who is waving to the elder’
oshkiniigikwewan gaa-anamikawigod gichi-aya’aa ‘The teen girl who is waving to the elder’
oshkiniigikwe gaa-anamikawigod gichi-aya’aan ‘The teen girl who the elder is waving to’
oshkiniigikwewan gaa-anamikawaad gichi-aya’aa ‘The teen girl who the elder is waving to’
ikwe gaa-jiisibinaad oshkiniigikwewan ‘The woman who is pinching the teen girl’
ikwewan gaa-jiisibinigod oshkiniigikwe ‘The woman who is pinching the teen girl’
ikwe gaa-jiisibinigod oshkiniigikwewan ‘The woman who the teen girl is pinching’
ikwewan gaa-jiisibinaad oshkiniigikwe ‘The woman who the teen girl is pinching’
abinoojiinh gaa-migwechiwi’aad oshkiniigikwewan ‘The child who is thanking the teen girl’
abinoojiinyan gaa-miigwechiwi’igod oshkiniigikwe ‘The child who is thanking the teen girl’
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abinoojiinh gaa-miigwechiwi’igod oshkiniigikwewan ‘The child who the teen girl is thanking’
abinoojiinyan gaa-migwechiwi’aad oshkiniigikwe ‘The child who the teen girl is thanking’
inini gaa-binaakwe’waad oshkiniigikwewan ‘The man who is combing the teen girl’
ininiwan gaa-binaakwe’wigod oshkiniigikwe ‘The man who is combing the teen girl’
inini gaa-binaakwe’wigod oshkiniigikwewan ‘The man who the teen girl is combing’
ininiwan gaa-binaakwe’waad oshkiniigikwe ‘The man who the teen girl is combing’
oshki-inini gaa-ginagijiibinaad ikwewan ‘The teen boy who is tickling the woman’
oshki-ininiwan gaa-ginagijiibinigod ikwe ‘The teen boy who is tickling the woman’
oshki-inini gaa-ginagijiibinigod ikwewan ‘The teen boy who the woman is tickling’
oshki-ininiwan gaa-ginagijiibinaad ikwe ‘The teen boy who the woman is tickling’
gichi-aya’aa gaa-goshko’aad ininiwan ‘The elder who is surprising the man’
gichi-aya’aan gaa-goshko’wigod inini ‘The elder who is surprising the man’
gichi-aya’aa gaa-goshko’wigod ininiwan ‘The elder who the man is surprising’
gichi-aya’aan gaa-goshko’aad inini ‘The elder who the man is surprising’
oshkiniigikwe gaa-nimikawaad ikwewan ‘The teen girl who is dancing for the woman’
oshkiniigikwewan gaa-nimikawigod ikwe ‘The teen girl who is dancing for the woman’
oshkiniigikwe gaa-nimikawigod ikwewan ‘The teen girl who the woman is dancing for’
oshkiniigikwewan gaa-nimikawaad ikwe ‘The teen girl who the woman is dancing for’
ikwe gaa-ojiimaad gichi-aya’aan ‘The woman who is kissing the elder’
ikwewan gaa-ojiimigod gichi-aya’aa ‘The woman who is kissing the elder’
ikwe gaa-ojiimigod gichi-aya’aan ‘The woman who the elder is kissing’
ikwewan gaa-ojiimaad gichi-aya’aa ‘The woman who the elder is kissing’
abinoojiinh gaa-anamikawaad oshki-ininiwan ‘The child who is waving to the teen boy’
abinoojiinyan gaa-anamikawigod oshki-inini ‘The child who is waving to the teen boy’
abinoojiinh gaa-anamikawigod oshki-ininiwan ‘The child who the teen boy is waving to’
abinoojiinyan gaa-anamikawaad oshki-inini ‘The child who the teen boy is waving to’
inini gaa-jiisibinaad oshki-ininiwan ‘The man who is pinching the teen boy’
ininiwan gaa-jiisibinigod oshki-inini ‘The man who is pinching the teen boy’
inini gaa-jiisibinigod oshki-ininiwan ‘The man who the teen boy is pinching’
ininiwan gaa-jiisibinaad oshki-inini ‘The man who the teen boy is pinching’
oshki-inini gaa-migwechiwi’aad gichi-aya’aan ‘The teen boy who is thanking the elder’
oshki-ininiwan gaa-migwechiwi’igod gichi-aya’aa ‘The teen boy who is thanking the elder’
oshki-inini gaa-migwechiwi’igod gichi-aya’aan ‘The teen boy who the elder is thanking’
oshki-ininiwan gaa-migwechiwi’aad gichi-aya’aa ‘The teen boy who the elder is thanking’
gichi-aya’aa gaa-amaji’aad abinoojiinyan ‘The elder who is waking up the child’
gichi-aya’aan gaa-amaji’igod abinoojiinh ‘The elder who is waking up the child’
gichi-aya’aa gaa-amaji’igod abinoojiinyan ‘The elder who the child is waking up’
gichi-aya’aan gaa-amaji’aad abinoojiinh ‘The elder who the child is waking up’
oshkiniigikwe gaa-baapi’aad oshki-ininiwan ‘The teen girl who is laughing at the teen boy’
oshkiniigikwewan gaa-baapi’igod oshki-inini ‘The teen girl who is laughing at the teen boy’
oshkiniigikwe gaa-baapi’igod oshki-ininiwan ‘The teen girl who the teen boy is laughing at’
oshkiniigikwewan gaa-baapi’aad oshki-inini ‘The teen girl who the teen boy is laughing at’
ikwe gaa-mazinaakizwaad ininiwan ‘The woman who is photographing the man’
ikwewan gaa-mazinaakizigod inini ‘The woman who is photographing the man’
ikwe gaa-mazinaakizigod ininiwan ‘The woman who the man is photographing’
ikwewan gaa-mazinaakizwaad inini ‘The woman who the man is photographing’
abinoojiinh gaa-biminizha’waad ikwewan ‘The child who is following the woman’
abinoojiinyan gaa-biminizha’ogod ikwe ‘The child who is following the woman’
abinoojiinh gaa-biminizha’ogod ikwewan ‘The child who the woman is following’
abinoojiinyan gaa-biminizha’waad ikwe ‘The child who the woman is following’
inini gaa-babaaminizhikawaad abinoojiinyan ‘The man who is chasing the child’
ininiwan gaa-babaaminizhikawigod abinoojiinh ‘The man who is chasing the child’
inini gaa-babaaminizhikawigod abinoojiinyan ‘The man who the child is chasing’
ininiwan gaa-babaaminizhikawaad abinoojiinh ‘The man who the child is chasing’
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oshki-inini gaa-izhinoo’waad ininiwan ‘The teen boy who is pointing at the man’
oshki-ininiwan gaa-izhinoo’igod inini ‘The teen boy who is pointing at the man’
oshki-inini gaa-izhinoo’igod ininiwan ‘The teen boy who the man is pointing at’
oshki-ininiwan gaa-izhinoo’waad inini ‘The teen boy who the man is pointing at’
oshkiniigikwe gaa-ashamaad abinoojiinyan ‘The teen girl who is feeding the child’
oshkiniigikwewan gaa-ashamigod abinoojiinh ‘The teen girl who is feeding the child’
oshkiniigikwe gaa-ashamigod abinoojiinyan ‘The teen girl who the child is feeding’
oshkiniigikwewan gaa-ashamaad abinoojiinh ‘The teen girl who the child is feeding’
gichi-aya’aa gaa-gikinoo’amawaad ikwewan ‘The elder who is teaching the woman’
gichi-aya’aan gaa-gikinoo’amawigod ikwe ‘The elder who is teaching the woman’
gichi-aya’aa gaa-gikinoo’amawigod ikwewan ‘The elder who the woman is teaching’
gichi-aya’aan gaa-gikinoo’amawaad ikwe ‘The elder who the woman is teaching’
ikwe gaa-migoshkaaji’aad oshki-ininiwan ‘The woman who is pestering the teen boy’
ikwewan gaa-migoshkaaji’igod oshki-inini ‘The woman who is pestering the teen boy’
ikwe gaa-migoshkaaji’igod oshki-ininiwan ‘The woman who the teen boy is pestering’
ikwewan gaa-migoshkaaji’aad oshki-inini ‘The woman who the teen boy is pestering’
inini gaa-biindaakoonaad gichi-aya’aan ‘The man who is offering tobacco to the elder’
ininiwan gaa-biindaakoonigod gichi-aya’aa ‘The man who is offering tobacco to the elder’
inini gaa-biindaakoonigod gichi-aya’aan ‘The man who the elder is offering tobacco to’
ininiwan gaa-biindaakoonaad gichi-aya’aa ‘The man who the elder is offering tobacco to’
abinoojiinh gaa-gagaanjinawe’aad oshki-ininiwan ‘The child who is irritating the teen boy’
abinoojiinyan gaa-gagaanjinawe’igod oshki-inini ‘The child who is irritating the teen boy’
abinoojiinh gaa-gagaanjinawe’igod oshki-ininiwan ‘The child who the teen boy is irritating’
abinoojiinyan gaa-gagaanjinawe’aad oshki-inini ‘The child who the teen boy is irritating’
oshki-inini gaa-daanginaad gichi-aya’aan ‘The teen boy who is touching the elder’
oshki-ininiwan gaa-daanginigod gichi-aya’aa ‘The teen boy who is touching the elder’
oshki-inini gaa-daanginigod gichi-aya’aan ‘The teen boy who the elder is touching’
oshki-ininiwan gaa-daanginaad gichi-aya’aa ‘The teen boy who the elder is touching’
oshkiniigikwe gaa-zinigwaawiganebinaad ikwewan ‘The teen girl who is massaging the woman’
oshkiniigikwewan gaa-zinigwaawiganebinogod ikwe ‘The teen girl who is massaging the woman’
oshkiniigikwe gaa-zinigwaawiganebinogod ikwewan ‘The teen girl the woman is massaging’
oshkiniigikwewan gaa-zinigwaawiganebinaad ikwe ‘The teen girl the woman is massaging’
gichi-aya’aa gaa-gikinjijiinaad oshkiniigikwewan ‘The elder who is hugging the teen girl’
gichi-aya’aan gaa-gikinjijiinigod oshkiniigikwe ‘The elder who is hugging the teen girl’
gichi-aya’aa gaa-gikinjijiinigod oshkiniigikwewan ‘The elder who the teen girl is hugging’
gichi-aya’aan gaa-gikinjijiinaad oshkiniigikwe ‘The elder who the teen girl is hugging’
ikwe gaa-gaandinaad ininiwan ‘The woman who is pushing the man’
ikwewan gaa-gaandinigod inini ‘The woman who is pushing the man’
ikwe gaa-gaandinigod ininiwan ‘The woman who the man is pushing’
ikwewan gaa-gaandinaad inini ‘The woman who the man is pushing’
abinoojiinh gaa-bakite’waad oshki-ininiwan ‘The child who is hitting the teen boy’
abinoojiinyan gaa-bakite’ogod oshki-inini ‘The child who is hitting the teen boy’
abinoojiinh gaa-bakite’ogod oshki-ininiwan ‘The child who the teen boy is hitting’
abinoojiinyan gaa-bakite’waad oshki-inini ‘The child who the teen boy is hitting’
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